Moisei Yakovlevich Ostrogorskii
["Ostrogorski" on title pages],
Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties
(1897:Original French edition | 1902:English edition | 1964:Later edition)
These excerpts are selections from the two-volume 1902:English edition,
adhering closely to an extensive table of contents
and wherever possible adhering to the language of that edition.
SAC editor put certain passages in boldface, and
provided some hypertext linkage to SAC
© Alan Kimball
A SAC Narrative Extension
This book addresses the problem of Government caused by the advent of democracy.
Ostrogorskii began his research on this theme in 1883 and published his findings in 1897.
At that time he defined “advent of democracy” as the collapse of medieval political forms and
the feudal social system, followed by the advent of mass participation in the business of governance.
In other words, he meant something very much like what SAC calls "The First Phase of the European
Revolution" [ID]. And he heartily
approved of it, in fact he was an active participant in Russian political action
aimed to realize this "First Phase" in his homeland.
He defined the advent of Democracy this way = “severance of the old social ties and
the [introduction of] supremacy accorded to numbers in the State”.
Extra-constitutional organization of the electoral masses [political parties]
evolved in the effort to solve problems some perceived in democratic Government,
problems caused by spontaneous and free popular political activism.
Typically the democratic political party throughout the 19th century came under the
control of the Caucus. The caucus was the direct opposite of what we could call the
democratic institutional and political equivalent of Adam Smith's economic notion of
"the invisible hand" [ID]. Here is
a précis of Ostrogorskii’s description of the Caucus.
In other words, Ostrogorskii's study described the historical evolution of political institutions
in leading "democratic" countries, England and USA, institutions that
contributed significantly to the rise of what SAC calls "The Third Phase of the European Revolution"
[ID]. England and USA provided
Ostrogorskii two somewhat surprising case studies in this universal or, at
first, general European or "Western" development. There was
little of Adam Smith reflected in political and economic trends of the late 19th- and early
20th-centuries. Laissez-faire described none of the emerging features of politics and
economics in the third phase of the European (and soon world) Revolution.
Table of Contents =
SUMMARY OF VOLUME ONE (about English political parties in the late 19th-century)
SUMMARY OF VOLUME TWO (about political parties in late 19th-century USA)
Volume one, part 3, chapter 1, The Machinery of the Political Caucus
SUMMARY OF VOLUME ONE (England)
Studying the late 19th-century role of the English Caucus [the central
managerial authority within the modern political party], Ostrogorskii discovered that
the design of the
Caucus, at first intended to make party government more democratic, in fact
failed to do that, most notably in British liberal political parties. It made
little difference, however, whether parties are leftist or rightist, liberal or conservative,
they all worked to the detriment of the democratic ideal which created them. This failure was
more in form than in essence. The Caucus tried to apply the
democratic principle in all its strictness, even to extra-constitutional political relations,
as in public volunteer societies and political parties. Instead, the Caucus accentuated the
divergence between “institutions and manners” [i.e., between political
institutions and social norms] made inevitable by the English electoral reform of 1867
[ID]. The Caucus offered
only a mechanical organizational contrivance for reconciling
institutions and manners. Deposed in theory, the middle class recovered power by
surreptitious devices, in spite of the democratized organization of the party.
But the story is not completely bleak. The Caucus did in fact enhance the
importance of small folk in party counsels, and contributed especially to their
advancement up the social scale.
Yet the Caucus did nothing to raise the public spirit of the masses. It has demonstrated a radical inability
to serve as an instrument of political education. Far from stimulating the
exercise of political judgment, it tended to stereotype opinion. In this,
however, it moved in harmony with general trends of that epoch, the effect of
which was to obliterate individuality = “we now think in battalions”.
The Caucus made party unity an object of pious devotion, dispensing with the
necessity of professing reasoned principles. It encouraged impatience of
discussion, fanaticism, and intolerance, while inclining men's minds towards
moral and intellectual opportunism, towards a policy of “quarterly dividends”.
After 1868, these properties made
the Caucus an admirable vehicle for new political tendencies, for a Radicalism
that brought with it formal and sentimental democracy. The modus operandi of the Caucus encouraged
this sort of democracy. The Caucus appealed by preference to the emotions and
employed wholesale, rigid processes, regulated beforehand by cut-and-dried
methods. These methods worked on behalf of an external orthodoxy and had the
effect of shaping all political relations attempted by the Caucus in a mechanical way, whether these were
manifestations of reason or demonstrations of political feeling.
Dwindling individuality and the
development of formalism in political relations culminated in the behavior of
party leadership. Too rigid an application of the principle of autonomy in the
organization of the party has siphoned off central leadership and parceled it
out, benefiting only the maintenance of local mediocrity. Unqualified adhesion
to the party creed gave special importance to conventional and external
qualities in public men. Party loyalty was converted into a supreme political
virtue, and the machinery of the Organization defined that party loyalty. Far
from having eliminated the plutocratic element [element conducive to the rule of
the rich] and the influence of social rank
[evident in the old feudal political world], the Caucus itself made use of them.
The monopoly of leadership changed only its aspect. It now was more manufactured.
It was more divided and less responsible. The party “worker”
grew in influence. “Electioneering is now quite a business.” The Caucus favored
the rise of the professional politician. The original design of the Caucus was
to accelerate the democratic process in political society and organize public
life into a moral whole. In this the Caucus failed. The Caucus design tended
rather to set up a government by machine instead of a responsible government by
human beings. It offered society a new but purely mechanical political
synthesis.
[And that is the modern "synthesis" Ostrogorskii claimed was created without proper prior
"analysis". He here proposes to analyze this hasty synthesis.]
To be sure, the Caucus has a
proper role in the life of political parties. To some extent its organization
has ensured a real representation to various elements of the party and proved
itself able to serve as a faithful and independent mouthpiece of opinion. The
Caucus sometimes hurried the party and at others prevented it from advancing
freely. It maintained cohesion in the ranks of the party, not so much by its
intrinsic force as by its assuming the role of party standard-bearer. Yet it
swelled the contingents of the party by attracting “blanks” into its Organization.
The Caucus popularized the style,
the title and the abstract notion of the party. But this abstract notion was
slow to lay hold of the popular mind. Eventually the Caucus proved powerless
to stop party divisions. Party divisions are an inevitable effect of the growing
complexity of social relations. Complex social relations have long since smitten
and doomed the classic dualism of parties with their old cohesion. The Caucus is
intent on the idea of restoring this cohesion, and it has none but mechanical
means and methods at its disposal for reuniting incongruous elements. The
Caucus of necessity paved the way for government by machine. The Caucus was
unable to set the old party system on its legs again. The Caucus has in fact
aggravated the evils of the old system by investing party tyranny with legal
claims, by doing away with freedom of candidatures, by usurping the monopoly of
party orthodoxy, and by drawing from this a power of moral coercion over its
followers. There is no escape from inexorable party orthodoxy save in schism.
There is no place for free or independent organizations.
The Caucus has not improved the
working of parliamentary government either. On the contrary, it has helped to
warp its representative principle, to disturb the equilibrium in the relations
between parliamentary leaders and Members, and in the equilibrium between
Parliament and public opinion. It has diminished personal confidence in the
relations of electors with candidates, and especially with the Members. It has
appropriated for its own the obligations ordinarily assumed by the MP [Member
of Parliament, elected legislator] in relationship to his constituents. The
Member has been transformed by the Caucus into a delegate with diminished
responsibility and independence. Great parliamentary leaders have in the past
operated within the electoral body, now they have to be mindful of the Caucus.
And the Caucus has thus become more powerful and more autocratic. This has been
to the detriment of the equilibrium which Cabinet government presupposes between
Members and party leaders. More than this, party leaders can shield themselves
behind the Caucus. From there they can force the hand of Members in the House
without compromising themselves personally. When the Caucus renders assistance
to parliamentary leaders, it imposes obligations on them, sometimes of an
onerous kind. Arbitration between various opinions in Parliament has become
more difficult, owing to the interposition of the Caucus. General concerns about
the deterioration of parliamentary government, as well as the other political
effects, are attributable to the action of the Caucus. But the “Caucus”, after
all, represents but part of a large, complex reservoir formed when many currents
of the “democratic movement” flow together. The Caucus both reflects and shapes
the phenomena which it represents.
Corruptive Caucus influences have not gone unchecked. They have been attenuated in practice. They face opposition
of a sentimental kind — such as the traditional authority of landlords and
Church, the fascination which social rank still exercises, even over Radical
masses, and the exceptional prestige of illustrious leaders, the personal
ascendancy of character and knowledge. They also face opposition of a more
substantial kind — such as local considerations and prosaic anxieties about
material interests. The Caucus has made insufficient allowance for the living
forces of society. And achievement of Caucus goals has been hampered by the
slenderness of its material resources and by the shortcomings, as well as
merits, of its own personnel. After all, the Caucus is still far from
being “enthroned on the ruins of the British Constitution”.
Still, the living forces which
hold the Caucus in check are in decline. The personal influences of rank, as
well as of character and knowledge, have more difficulty coming to the fore.
This is in part owing to the excessive growth of towns and growing urban
absenteeism [in public affairs]. The city estranges men from each other,
especially the rich and the poor. Then there are the obstacles raised by the
Caucus itself. The Caucus invariably insists on the shibboleth of the party over
all else. And the Caucus organization rather favors the rise of local
mediocrity. “Deference” is declining and will continue to decline. The Caucus
contributes to this decline, even on the Tory side. Liberty itself contributes
to the weakening of solidarity within the great religious bodies. Thus another
old living force is passing away. At the same time political apathy infects
society. Apathy drives cultivated classes away from public life without bringing
new strata into it. The Caucus represents the dawn of separation between
society at large and the minority engaged in politics. The Caucus also
obliterates the distinctive principles which identified different parties.
Parties will be reduced to the condition of simple aggregates, with nothing but
mechanical organization, without vital system. The Caucus has created a
political vacuum, and that vacuum will be filled by the Caucus itself. Party
Organizations henceforth represent nothing but convention. Instead of being a
means, party Organization will become an end unto itself. Everything will be
subordinated to it, in defiance of real interests and to the detriment of
purely public manners. Hints as to the future of these trends can be seen,
for instance, in municipal life and in the apprehensions excited in this
connection by the proposal to pay salary to Members of Parliament. In the other
direction certain symptoms promise slightly to hamper the upward movement of the
Organizations, for example, growing skepticism with regard to political parties
and the Socialist secession from standard political parties.
The more ample experience of the
American sector of the Anglo-Saxon world throws more light on all these data and
all these forecasts and in general on the whole problem of the organization of
electoral masses.
SUMMARY OF VOLUME TWO (USA)
Party Organization set out to
perform a double function in American democracy = (1) upholding the power of
the individual whom the Revolution elevated as a member of a sovereign people,
and (2) ensuring the working of an increasingly more complex governmental
machinery. Relative success was achieved in the second undertaking and complete
failure in the first. Citizen-hold on government weakened. Party Organization
brought under its own control those great public powers enfeebled in the course
of events. The manner in which the President was elected damaged the authority
of the executive. The exercise of executive power was subordinated to
considerations of patronage. This lowered the head of the executive to the
position of an attorney of a party. It curtailed the President’s constitutional
authority with Congress. It degraded the Senate. The Caucus brought inferior men
into the Senate. The Senate encroached on the powers of the House of
Representatives as well as on those of the executive. The Caucus ensured Senate
irresponsibility. The House became a stronghold of private interests. It made
regular raids on the national budget. Congress was no longer a deliberative
assembly. It was stuck in a legislative sterility which amounted to general
failure. Two things combined to devalue or nullify separation of powers = (1)
the Caucus installed in Congress men of low character, and (2) the Caucus
encouraged current legislative methods that have helped bring about all these
results.
The decline of deliberative assemblies is especially clear in State Legislatures
and city councils. The judiciary itself has suffered at the hands of the Caucus. The
well-spring of government has been depleted or poisoned at every point. Private
initiative tried to make up by its own efforts for the inadequacy or irregularity of
governmental action. Attempts were made to strengthen private initiative by
aggrandizing the executive power at the expense of legislative power, and by
development of “police power”. With greater frequency efforts are being made to
restrict the sphere of representative government by the direct exercise of the
power of the people. Local self-government has relaxed. The Caucus has
contributed to these developments by subordinating all elections to national
elections with a view to the distribution of federal patronage. Centralization
of political life and enfeeblement of local public life, brought about by the
Caucus, has not been palliated by the fact that the Caucus as contributed to
the beneficent growth of the influence of the Union.
The havoc wrought in public life by the Caucus or with its help has not even been
counterbalanced by the success of “party government”, which it claimed to set going.
It has not promoted co-ordination between executive and legislative branches of
government, nor has it ensured cohesion of Congressional parties. The party
discipline which it enforced was of use only for electioneering, with a view to
spoils, and this could not be maintained in Congress. The parties which it
formed constituted nothing but agglomerates brought together mechanically, the
ill-assorted elements of which, left to themselves in the House, sought only to
promote the private interests which they represented. In the absence of common
principles r divergent ideas, understanding between these interests can be
achieved only by means of “deals”. Congress lives in an atmosphere of
unprincipled compromise. There is no regular opposition to counterbalance the
predominant party. As the traditional see-saw of parties does not work, a remedy
for the misgovernment of rulers is sought in Lynch methods = “tidal waves” and
“landslides”. The separation of powers is not the main cause of the failure of
“party government”. The main cause is this = The Caucus has reduced political
parties to an electoral contrivance. The Caucus cannot serve as an instrument of
government.
The decline of the political
party is confirmed by the decline of a political leadership who is motivated
solely by power. Men capable of leading are disqualified for public life under
the Caucus regime and are little countenanced by American social conditions.
Those who enter public life shirk responsibility. Public men lack civic courage.
They have ceased to be leaders of men. Leadership is wielded by outsiders in an
irregular and spasmodic manner. The responsibility of public men is all the
less evident because there is no control to enforce it. The public is
indifferent. Merit is unnoticed just as much as demerit. The action of public
men also lacks the advantage of continuity. They lose their ascendancy when they
lose political position. Political statesmen have been replaced by political
machinists.
The modern political party
does not give expression to public opinion, it distorts public opinion. External
conformity crafted by the Caucus weakens the citizen's private judgment and
individual responsibility. It makes him shifty and timorous. It develops in him
acquiescence in political abuses, and led him into connivance with abuse. If at
the same time party discipline has discharged the function of a regulator in a
young and exuberant democracy, it has still proved above all to be a reactionary
force. It tends to shackle free play of the public mind, to crystallize opinion.
The American community was already only too inclined to an ultra Conservatism by
its mercantile character, as well as by a constitution which impeded the spirit
of innovation in political and social life. The “regularity” enforced by Caucus
works both sides of the street. It curbs public opinion, keeps it imprisoned in
old formulas and old titles. At the same time it also thrusts on the political
party, against its will, new programs, however extravagant, when the
Organization thinks it might benefit them. In the upshot, the Organization
creates a sham opinion in the form of parties, and leaves actual opinion no
other means of asserting itself except open revolt against the parties. Yet even when
victorious, opinion is able to assert itself only by means of repression.
Opinion has been shorn of its most essential power, the power of prevention.
The political party failed
in its legitimate functions. It served as a lever for private interests and an
instrument of their designs on the public weal. It promoted the advent of
plutocracy. The power of plutocracy has proved pernicious especially in the
political sphere. It has taken up its abode there with the aid of the party
Organization. Public opinion does not understand the political source of money
power. So it fastens only on the economic effects of money power. A movement
against “trusts” has arisen. But the power of money in the State gets too little
attention. It appears to be an irresistible force which contributes to the
weakening of civic sentiment. The alliance of plutocracy with the Machine has
strengthened Machine power and contributed to the degradation of popular
government.
How account for the fact
that the American people have let government slip from their hands?
They were
wholly absorbed in material preoccupations. The working of political
institutions was subordinated to money-making. Abuses in public life were
tolerated so long as they did not entail too serious a threat to pecuniary
interests.
"Live and let live" describes the generosity of the
American. He is insensible to the effects, even of a material kind, which the
political disorders threaten to produce in the future. He looks only at
immediate results and present-day advantage. He is kept in these views by the
boundless optimism which is the national faith, and he is constantly stimulated
by it in his materialistic aspirations.
The materialistic spirit
deadened the civic conscience with the aid of idealism itself. Idealism is by no
means missing in America.
All of American idealism is given over to patriotic
feeling.
The idea of the Union, of the national territory, cast a spell over
the American mind.
The grandeur of continental natural features, plus the human
effort that has made it even better, have fostered American patriotic
sensibility.
Liberty is the third factor in the creation of the New World.
Liberty revealed itself as “mystic and indefinite”, but it became also a facet
of the patriotic cult of material success and confirmation of a national pride
inspired by that cult. The country is worshiped (“our country, right or
wrong”). A patriotism of the second degree, no less a fetish, must also be
recognized among Americans, that of political party. This second-degree
patriotism of party served as substitute for the citizen's civic conscience, and
enabled him to serve an ideal and pay off civic obligations in every-day life
with little personal sacrifice.
The cult of party suited the civic
piety of the busy American. It corresponded also to the innermost tendencies of
his mind, on the one hand, moulded by the Puritan spirit in a jealous
sectarianism, and, on the other hand, harassed by the need which the American
feels to gather in a herd with his fellows. There is much need to counteract
moral isolation in this New World society, leveled, scattered, and destitute of
fixed grooves that might offer direction and support to the individual.
The Republic has, nonetheless,
been able to withstand the corruptive or disintegrating action of the Caucus
[ID].
Government has slipped away from the people, but [seven] exceptional conditions have
cushioned the blow = [1] Government plays only an insignificant role in the economy
of American life. [Doesn't this assertion contradict what Ostrogorskii said above about the relationship
between wealth and political power?] [2] The simplicity of administrative
responsibilities mitigated the deterioration of public service. [3] Unbounded
national resources made up for the harm done to the public purse. [4] The usurpation
of power by bosses and the machines proved limited in effect, owing to the
particular character of the usurpers’ objectives. They aimed not so much at the
liberty of the citizens as at the resources available through manipulation of
the election business. [5]Additionally, the Constitution surrounds individual
rights with solid protection, and the Republic is organized as a federation.
[6] Federations are but little favorable to the rise of an autocracy or of a
political oligarchy. [7] Finally, a vast and thinly peopled continent offers a lot
a space and material facilities for escaping oppression. The invasion of the
State by plutocracy has not aimed at popular liberties. And, at least until
quite recently, it has also not impeded the free pursuit of wealth by the
individual. The citizen's faith in his potential strength and in the general
strength of public opinion mitigated the decline of active public spirit.
However, the moral and material
resources which neutralized or abated the bad effects of the Caucus regime are
dwindling [as represented by the following five trends=] [1] Free lands are exhausted.
[2] Social life grows more complex, as do the
functions of government. [3] The need for stricter regulation and the decrease of
the vis medicatrix [ability of a body to heal itself] that liberty
earlier represented is
obvious. [4] Personal character declines
under the influence of new economic factors which sap the economic independence
of the citizen. [5] Religious and political skepticism spreads and contributes to
this process. Spontaneous play of natural forces can no longer check the
destructive action of the Caucus. Now and all along the line, an active
resistance must be raised against it.
The task of building levies against the surge of the Caucus regime is gigantic but
not hopeless. Progress made already in the last twenty years gives
grounds for hope [EG]. The public conscience
is awakening and showing a growing
interest in public welfare. Party ties are relaxing. Voting becomes more
enlightened. Two factors have had a major influence on the progress achieved and
to be achieved = (1) the development of general culture, in particular that
fostered by Universities, and (2) the improvement of political methods. Most
previous attempts at reform were based on defective mechanical conceptions.
Experiments which accepted stereotyped parties as a basis have failed. Those
that paid no attention whatever to parties have had relative success. New
methods of political action must be found in order to assure a future for
democracy.
The following chapter defines Ostrogorskii’s meaning of the term “Caucus” =
THE MACHINERY OF THE CAUCUS
We need to understand the working
of the Caucus, the conditions and the methods of its action on the bulk of the
electorate. We can distinguish the constituent parts of the machinery of the
Caucus and the men who set it in motion. Organization centers on the ward.
Members are recruited there. Ward meetings are held there periodically. The
public-house [the “pub”, tavern] is a rallying center. Members are not
numerous, and regular attendance at ward meetings is still less so. The workings
of the Caucus therefore fall into the hands of an inner managerial elite. A ward
secretary prompts an inner coterie in the management of all Caucus business. The
powers of the ward secretary and the part played by him determines everything in
the Caucus.
At the next level of the
Organization -- the Council -- we find co-opted members and large subscribers
more dominant than elected members. Authority is increasingly concentrating in
fewer hands.
The great majority of members do not contribute at all to the pecuniary
resources of the Association. The local "Divisions" of the party [most often
called "Hundreds"] thus become marginalized.
The executive committee of the
“Hundreds” has a preponderant influence on Caucus life. An “inner circle” arises
within it. The concentration of power in the hands of this “inner circle”
reaches the highest levels in large towns [cities] with several electoral
Divisions.
The secretary of the Association
is the factotum of the Organization, and works closely with the President to control the organization.
The President is sometimes described as “the man who can tell the biggest lies”,
yet his “respectability” must be secured.
The social composition of the Associations is mixed. Aristocracy is hardly represented, and
the upper middle class takes very slight part in the daily life of Associations.
Leading representatives have great influence on the choice of candidates, yet
the working classes are indifferent. The lower middle class alone is left to
take an interest in the Caucus, and it does so with alacrity. The victim of
social exclusiveness, the lower middle class finds social and political
distinction in opportunities provided by the Caucus. The lower middle class in
the Tory Caucus [a conservative Caucus] plays a less prominent part.
The intellectual standard of
Caucus-men is not high. Their political horizon is low and their ideal of a
politician lacks vision. By temperament some Caucus-men are restless and some
staid. In either case, Caucus temperament shows itself ready to submit to the
impulse given by leaders, to cultivate an unbending political orthodoxy, and,
finally, to exclude spontaneity, independence of action and the spirit of
criticism. Large Caucus meetings have altogether lost their deliberative
character. This encourages a special style of eloquence. A hierarchy of
wire-pullers present everything “cut and dried” to the “hundreds” who act simply
as registering [yea-saying or “rubber stamp”] assemblies.
The vital force of the Caucus can
be analyzed. A sense of duty and an amour-propre [a decorous impulse, an
affection for the appearance of propriety] are the motive power which gathers
together and sets in motion the varied components of the Caucus. The
Organization of the party cultivates and develops the varied components and
makes them subservient to organizational ends. The Organization promotes an
ideal worship of the party. It prescribes rites for the rank and file. It
schedules systematic meetings and presents “resolutions”. The Caucus provides
its followers a gradation of satisfactions and a degree of self-esteem adapted
to various tastes and requirements. The need to flatter vanities and smooth
susceptibilities is, however, counterbalanced by the devotion of the caucus-men
to the Organization, their discipline. Party discipline is thus subject to
certain limitations, but the general result is to make the Caucus a body little
calculated to attract the best elements of society. The quality of Caucus
officials has in fact declined.
[...]