|   This case,
                 which involved divided religious loyalties within one troubled
                family,  illustrates what a socially and legally sensitive identity
                marker  religion was in the 1930s, and how significant it was
                for questions  related to the custody, care, and placement of
                children whose parents  did not offer adequate care and support.
                Written by Judge Justine 
              Wise Polier shortly after her appointment to the Domestic Relations
               Court of New York, this case solidified her reputation as a critic
               of matching and earned her
                the enmity of the Catholic church, which considered the opinion
                an attack on the sectarian tradition of Catholic charity. Polier
                argued that matching amounted to government-sponsored discrimination,
                violated the constitutional separation of church and state, and
                rejected the idea that children were the permanent possessions
               of  either parents or faith communities. It is also clear from
               this  excerpt that she took children’s own autonomy seriously,
               considered  their views (when they were old enough to express
               them confidently),  and did not believe that families had to be
               places where a single  faith prevailed. The opinion drew support
               from Purinton 
              v. Jamrock, among other legal precedents. 
            Under the circumstances, on an application of two institutions 
              [one Catholic and the other Protestant] to be relieved of the care 
              of four neglected children because of conflict over their religious 
              education, the oldest son of the children of a Mohammedan father 
              and Roman Catholic mother will be paroled to the home of his parental 
              uncle, a Mohammedan, with the understanding that his placement will 
              be carefully watched and that arrangements will be made for weekly 
              visitations to the mother, where it appears that this son, of the 
              age of fifteen years, has indicated that he is eager to go into 
              his uncle’s home, that it is his father’s desire that 
              he should, and that the mother has agreed to this placement. 
            The three younger neglected children, who cannot be placed in any 
              relative’s home, will be placed in a Protestant foster home, 
              a neutral meeting ground for the separated and hostile parents, 
              under the supervision of the court, with the understanding that 
              there will be no religious instruction given to them by the foster 
              parents. The mother is to be permitted to take the oldest daughter 
              of the three, who is thirteen years of age and who has indicated 
              clearly her preference for her mother and her mother’s religion, 
              with her to the Catholic church. The father is to be permitted to 
              take the two younger children with him to the Mohammedan church. . . . 
            Happily for us the American tradition of religious freedom and 
              freedom of conscience demands that all religious groups shall be 
              treated with respect and as equal in standing before the law. . . . 
              This court is, therefore, happily relieved of having children made 
              the subject of a religious controversy in any cases except rare 
              ones such as the one now before the court, where in the process 
              of saving the children from parental neglect, the court must also 
              decide rival claims as to religious education between separated 
              and hostile parents. There are no interests entitled to consideration 
              except those of the parents and the children. 
            In the case now before the court, the mother, a member of the Catholic 
              faith, was married to the father, a member of the Mohammedan faith, 
              by a Protestant minister in 1920. There is no evidence of any antenuptial 
              agreement as to the religious education of the children. After the 
              birth of the oldest boy, the mother had him baptized within the 
              Catholic church without the knowledge of the father and against 
              his expressed wishes, during a period of the father’s desertion 
              of the home. Subsequently, after the birth of the next two children, 
              the father had them inducted into the Mohammedan faith in the presence 
              of the mother but also against her wishes. . . . 
            The rights of the parents in regard to their minor children has 
              long been recognized, but there is no right in any church to compel 
              continued adherence. . . . 
            The children in this case were first brought before the court when 
              the home was finally broken up through the serious illness of the 
              mother. At that time the mother brought the children to the court 
              alleging that the father was unfit to care for the children in her 
              absence. The court made a finding that the children were neglected 
              and in need of the care and supervision by the State, and temporarily 
              placed them in a Catholic institution so that they might remain 
              together. The court, however, directed that no religious instruction 
              should be given to the three younger children who were not Catholics. 
              When this placement by the court met with the violent opposition 
              of the father, the court agreed to transfer the four children to 
              a Protestant institution as the most neutral place available. . . . 
            The extent of the injury to the children which must inevitably 
              follow from such a situation can hardly be estimated and outweighs 
              in importance the legal rights of either parent in regard to the 
              determination of the future placement of these children. . . . 
             In an effort to determine what is most likely to make for the 
              welfare of these children, the court examined the children in the 
              absence of both parents. The oldest boy, who is now fifteen years 
              of age, is clearly determined to follow his father in the Mohammedan 
              faith. The oldest girl, who is now almost thirteen, is equally sure 
              that she wishes to attend the Catholic church with her mother. The 
              two younger children, who are nine and five respectively, are too 
              young to be seriously concerned with the problem. 
            Some courts have held that when a child reaches “years of 
              discretion” the leaning of the child should be considered. 
              Other courts have been reluctant to consider the preference of children 
              on the ground that they are unable to evaluate the comparative merits 
              or meaning of religious faiths. It is clear that there can be no 
              arbitrary rule by which any court can determine when a child reaches 
              “years of discretion.” It is also clear that the capacity 
              for an intellectually correct evaluation of differing religions 
              is not the touchstone to religious faith in either children or adults. . . . 
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