This course focuses on applied aspects of the survey of formal political theory with emphasis on Game Theory and on utilizing mathematical models to understand political and economic phenomena. Specific topics include applications of spatial models, collective action and structure-induced equilibrium. Applications concern political participation, public goods, legislatures, industrial regulations, interest groups and party competition. Designed to help students become informed users of game theoretical methods in political science.

GRADING: Each student will be required to make an in-class paper presentation on a selected topic (see below for the list of suggested papers and topics). There will be two exams in this course. Each exam is worth 40 points, and the presentation is worth 20 points. No makeups will be scheduled for any of the exams without a documented medical excuse. There will be a number of homeworks in this course. They will be graded as pass/fail. Generally a passing grade will be given to all turned in homeworks which show that some reasonable amount of work has been contributed, and at least an attempt was made to find correct answers. Each missing homework will result in a 5 point deduction from final score. Grades: A:85-100, B:70-84, C:50-69. Curve might be used only to increase points.

BOOKS: Peter C. Ordeshook "A Political Theory Primer"

Ken Binmore "Fun and Games"

Peter Ordeshook and Thomas Schvartz, "Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes", American Political Science Review, 81 (1987): 180-99.

James Enelow, "Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and the Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting", Journal of Politics, 43 (1981): 1062-89.

David Austen-Smith, "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous Agendas," American Political Science Review, 81 (1987): 1323-9.

Richard D. McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976): 472-82.

Robert Rosenthal, "Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain Store Paradox", Journal of Economic Theory, 25 (1982): 92-100.

Jeffrey Banks, "A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 50 (1990): 309-25.

Gary Cox, "Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions," American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987): 82-108.

Gary Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990): 903-35.

Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1979 563-587.

R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, 77 (1983): 330-46.

William T. Bianco and Robert H. Bates, "Cooperation By Design: Leadership Structure and Collective Dilemmas," American Political Science Review, 84 (1990): 133-47.

James E. Alt, Randall L. Calvert, and Brian D. Humes, "Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, "American Political Science Review", 82 (1988): 445-66.

Emerson Niou and P.C. Ordeshook, "Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation," American Journal of Political Science, May 1991.