Documents on Roman Political History

1. A Roman Treaty: Alliance with the Aequians, 467BC, Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

"The Aequians sent ambassadors to the Roman General, Fabius, to negotiate a reconciliation and friendship before they were compelled to either by defeat of their army or by the loss of their towns...The Senate gave to Fabius full power to make peace...After that the two peoples entered into an alliance on these conditions: that the Aequians should be subject to the Romans without being disposssessed either from their cities or from their territories; and that they should not be obliged to send anything to the Romans except troops, when ordered, to be maintained at their own expense.:

2. Absorption of Latium, 338 BC, Livy.

[After revolting from Rome, the Senate decided how to deal with the Latin cities]

"The leading senators [accepted the motion of the consul] that ...as the circumstances differed in different cases, they thought that each case ought to be decided on its merits...The people of Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum received full citizenship...The rest of the Latin cities were deprived intermarriage, trade, and common councils with each other...Capua (and other cities) was granted citizenship without the suffrage (right to vote or stand for office)/

3. The Social War, 91-88 BC, Velleius Paterculus, II, 15

The fortune of the Italians was as cruel as their cause was just, for they were seeking citizenship in the state whose power they were defending by their arms: every year and in everty war they were furnishing a double number of men, and yet were not admitted to the rights of citizens in a state which through their efforts had reached so high a position."

4. . How to get elected...

Quintus Cicero, Letter to His Brother Marcus Cicero, 64 B.C.

Almost every day as you go down to the Forum you must say to yourself, "I am a novus homo [i.e. without noble ancestry]. "I am a candidate for the consulship." "This is Rome." For the "newness" of your name you will best compensate by the brilliance of your oratory. This has ever carried with it great political distinction. A man who is held worthy of defending ex-consuls, cannot be deemed unworthy of the constitution itself. Therefore approach each individual case with the persuasion that on it depends as a whole your entire reputation. For you have, as few novi homines have had---all the tax-syndicate promoters, nearly the whole equestrian ordo, and many municipal towns, especially devoted to you, many people who have been defended by you, many trade guilds, and besides these a large number of the rising generation, who have become attached to you in their enthusiasm for public speaking, and who visit you daily in swarms, and with such constant regularity!

See that you retain these advantages by reminding these persons, by appealing to them, and by using every means to make them understand that this, and this only, is the time for those who are in your debt now, to show their gratitude, and for those who wish for your services in the future, to place you under an obligation. It also seems possible that a novus homo may be much aided by the fact that he has the good wishes of men of high rank, and especially of ex-consuls. It is a point in your favor that you should be thought worthy of this position and rank by the very men to whose position you are wishing to attain.

All these men must be canvassed with care, agents must be sent to them, and they must be convinced that we have always been at one with the Optimates, that we have never been dangerous demagogues in the very least. Also take pains to get on your side the young men of high rank, and keep the friendship of those whom you already have. They will contribute much to your political position. Whosoever gives any sign of inclination to you, or regularly visits your house, you must put down in the category of friends. But yet the most advantageous thing is to be beloved and pleasant in the eyes of those who are friends on the more regular grounds of relationship by blood or marriage, the membership in the same club, or some close tie or other. You must take great pains that these men should love you and desire your highest honor.

In a word, you must secure friends of every class, magistrates, consuls and their tribunes to win you the vote of the centuries: men of wide popular influence. Those who either have gained or hope to gain the vote of a tribe or a century, or any other advantage, through your influence, take all pains to collect and to secure. So you see that you will have the votes of all the centuries secured for you by the number and variety of your friends. The first and obvious thing is that you embrace the Roman senators and equites, and the active and popular men of all the other orders. There are many city men of good business habits, there are many freedmen engaged in the Forum who are popular and energetic: these men try with all your might, both personally and by common friends, to make eager in your behalf. Seek them out, send agents to them, show them that they are putting you under the greatest possible obligation. After that, review the entire city, all guilds, districts, neighborhoods. If you can attach to yourself the leading men in these, you will by their means easily keep a hold upon the multitude. When you have done that, take care to have in your mind a chart of all Italy laid out according to the tribes in each town, and learn it by heart, so that you may not allow any chartered town, colony, prefecture---in a word, any spot in Italy to exist, in which you have not a firm foothold.

Trace out also individuals in every region, inform yourself about them, seek them out, secure that in their own districts they shall canvas for you, and be, as it were, candidates in your interest.

5. Checks and Balances

Polybius 6.11-18:
The Constitution of the Roman Republic [Polybius here sets forth a general analysis of the Roman constitution at the time of the Second Punic War.]

I have already mentioned the three divisions of government in control of state affairs. All three were so equally and fittingly set out and organized in all respects as regards their respective roles that no one, not even any of the Romans themselves, could say for certain whether their system of government was aristocratic in its general nature, or democratic, or monarchical. And this uncertainty was only reasonable, for if we were to focus on the powers of the consuls it would appear to be altogether monarchical and kingly in nature. If, however, we were to focus on the powers of the Senate, it would appear to be a government under the control of an aristocracy. And yet if one were to look at the powers enjoyed by the people, it would seem plain that it was democratic in nature. As for the parts of government controlled by each element, they were at that time and (with a few exceptions) still are as follows:

The consuls, when in Rome prior to leading out their armies, are in charge of all public affairs. In addition to the powers just mentioned, the consuls introduce to the Senate urgent matters for its consideration and bring about the detailed implementation of its decrees. Moreover, it is the consuls' duty to consider all matters of public concern which are to be decided by the people: they summon the assemblies, introduce measures requiring a vote, and have authority over the execution of the decisions of the majority. Furthermore, they enjoy nearly autocratic powers as regards preparations for war and the general conduct of military affairs in the field. It is within their power ... to levy soldiers, and to choose those fit for military service. When in the field they also have authority to punish any of those under their command whom they might wish. And they have the power to dispense any public funds that they propose. As a result, one might reasonably say, if one were to look at this section of the government, that the Roman constitution was a pure monarchy or kingship. ...

The Senate, first of all, has control of the treasury, for it has complete authority over all revenues and expenditures. For the quaestors are unable to disburse funds for any particular purpose without a decree from the Senate, the only exception being in the case of the consuls [see above]. The Senate is in charge of by far the most important and the greatest expenditure of public funds — that which the censors make every every five years for the repair and construction of public works. Similarly, whatever crimes committed in Italy require a public investigation — for example, treason, conspiracy, poisoning, assassination — these all fall under the jurisdiction of the Senate. ...when foreign embassies arrive in Rome, the Senate votes as to how to deal with them and what reply is to be given them. None of the above matters is presented to the people for consideration. As a result, if one were in Rome when the consuls were not present, the constitution would appear altogether aristocratic in nature. .

Given this, who would not reasonably inquire as to just what sort of role is left in the Roman state for the people, and just what that role is, seeing that the authority of the Senate extends over the various jurisdictions that I have detailed — and over the greatest of all, that being revenues and expenditures — while the consuls in turn have absolute authority concerning preparations for war and operations in the field? But in fact there is a role left for the people as well, and a most weighty one. For the people alone amid the organs of state have jurisdiction over the conferring of rewards and punishments ... The people pass judgment, then, whenever the punishment for a crime involves a substantial penalty, and especially when the accused have held high office. And the people alone pass judgment in capital cases. ... It is the people who grant offices to the deserving, the most noble prize for virtue in a state. They also have authority over the ratifying of laws and — the greatest of their powers — they deliberate and pass judgment concerning war and peace. They also confirm decisions concerning the various military alliances, truces, and other treaties, rendering them valid or rejecting them. The result is that one might reasonably say that the people have the greatest role in the state, and that the constitution is democratic in nature.

I have now indicated how the various functions of the state are divided among the different parts of the government. Now I will indicate how each can counteract the others, should it so wish, or work in harmony with them. Whenever the consul should set out on a military expedition invested with the aforementioned powers and with imperium, he appears to have absolute authority as regards the mission at hand, yet he requires the cooperation of both the people and the Senate, and without them he lacks sufficient power to bring his operation to a successful conclusion. For it is clear that supplies must always be sent to accompany his armies, but neither food nor clothing nor pay for the soldiers can be allocated without a decree of the Senate, with the result that the commander's plans are rendered ineffectual if the Senate chooses to be negligent or obstructionist. Furthermore, it lies with the Senate whether the commander's plans and designs ultimately come to fulfillment or not, since the Senate has the authority to send the new consuls out to supersede the old at the end of a year's time or to extend the command of the consuls in the field. It also has the power to celebrate and thus increase the fame of the consuls' achievements, or to belittle them and render them obscure. For the celebrations that they call triumphs, in which the spectacle of the general's achievements is brought strikingly before the eyes of the citizens, cannot be organized as is fitting — and at times cannot be held at all — unless the Senate should concur and should provide the requisite expenditures. As for the people, it is altogether necessary for the consuls to court their favor, even if they should happen to be quite far from Rome. For it is the people who ratify or reject truces and other treaties, as I have noted above. Of greatest weight is the fact that, upon laying aside their office, it is before the people that they must submit an account of their actions. The result is that it is in no way safe for the commanders to slight the Senate or the good will of the people.

The Senate, in turn, which enjoys so much authority, first of all must pay attention to the masses and court the favor of the people in matters of public concern. The most important and greatest inquiries into crimes against the state, and the penalties thereby adjudicated — those that involve the death sentence — cannot be carried out by it unless the people ratify its decisions. The same is true of those things that concern the Senate itself: for if ever anyone introduces a measure that would strip the Senate of some part of the powers accorded it by the mos maiorum, or would abolish the right of precedence and other honors accorded senators, or, indeed, would effect a reduction in their livelihoods — the people have authority over all such matters, whether to pass them or not. Most important of all, if a single one of the tribunes should interpose his veto, the Senate is unable to put into effect any of its resolutions; indeed, it cannot even convene or come together at all. And the tribunes are bound always to effect the will of the people and to be guided by their wishes. As a result of all of these factors, the Senate fears the people and is ever mindful of them.

Similarly, in turn, the people are subordinate to the Senate and must have regard for its wishes, both in public matters and private. Many contracts are let out by the censors for the repair and construction of public works throughout all of Italy — so many that one could scarcely number them all — and also the rights to the revenues from many rivers, harbors, gardens, mines, lands — everything that falls under Roman control. All of the aforementioned are administered by the people, and nearly everyone, so to speak, has an interest in the contracts and the works derived therefrom. For some purchase the grants for these contracts from the censors, others act as partners in such ventures, others provide sureties for the purchasers, and others still pledge their property to the public treasury for this purpose. But the Senate has authority over all of these matters: it is able to grant extensions and, in the case of an unforeseen catastrophe, can lessen the contractor's liability, or can release him from his contract altogether should he prove unable to complete it. And there are in fact many ways in which the Senate either greatly harms or greatly benefits those who have charge of public works, for all of the aforementioned matters are referred to it. Most important, it is from the Senate that judges are appointed in most public and private suits that concern charges of any weight. As a result, everyone, being bound to the good will of the Senate and fearing the possibility of needing its assistance, takes care with regard to obstructing or opposing its decisions. Similarly, as regards the desires of the consuls, the people are loathe to oppose them since all citizens, both privately and collectively, fall under their authority when in the field.

Such then are the powers of each of the parts of government both to oppose one another and to work in conjunction. In unison they are a match for any and all emergencies, the result being that it is impossible to find a constitution that is better constructed. For whenever some common external danger should come upon them and should compel them to band together in counsel and in action, the power of their state becomes so great that nothing that is required is neglected, inasmuch as all compete to devise some means of meeting the disaster, nor do they dally in reaching a decision until too late, but each, both communally and individually, work together to complete the task that lies before them. The result is that their unique form of constitution comes to be unconquerable and successfully achieves every goal upon which it resolves.