<>2004mr29:Moscow|
Crisis of Russia's Liberalism
An open letter published in the business daily Vedomosti 
by 
Michael Khodorkovsky [Mikhail Khodorkovskii] 
after the 2003 Russian elections [ID] and after his own arrest
[boldface in text is added by SAC editor, as are several hypertext links]
Here is Khodorkovsky's text [F/Beautiful Lie/ for comments on 1995 privatization =
Russian liberalism is facing a crisis: today, there is almost no doubt about 
that. If someone had told me a year ago that SPS (the Union of Right Forces) and Yabloko
[ID] would not clear 
the 5-per cent voting threshold at the Duma elections, I 
would have seriously doubted the analytical and forecasting skills of the 
speaker. Today the defeat of SPS and Yabloko has become a reality. 
Two candidates officially represented Russia's liberal forces at the 
presidential elections. One of them, the former communist-agrarian Ivan Rybkin 
[W-ID], instead of 
conducting a clear-cut election campaign staged a cheap farce, which even the LDPR
[ID] representative, 
Zhirinovsky's personal security expert Oleg Malyshkin, would have felt ashamed of. 
The other candidate, Irina Khakamada, did her best to distance herself from her 
own liberal past, criticized Boris Yeltsin and campaigned for the building of a 
social state. And then, without a hint of embarrassment (and, perhaps, not without 
grounds) she called the 3.84 per cent of votes cast in her favor a big success.
Politicians and experts who shortly after the arrest of my friend and partner 
Platon Lebedev [W-ID] 
last summer spoke of the threat of authoritarianism, of the violation of laws and 
civic freedoms, now compete in their ability to spout honey-sweet compliments to 
Kremlin officials. Not a trace is left of their rebellious liberal ardor. Of 
course, there are exceptions, but they only confirm the rule.
Today we are witnessing the virtual capitulation of the liberals. And that 
capitulation, indeed, is not only the liberals' fault, but also their problem. 
It is their fear in the face of a thousand-year history, mixed with the strong 
liking for household comforts they developed in the 1990s. 
It is their servility ingrained on the genetic level, their readiness to ignore 
the Constitution for the sake of another helping of sturgeon. Russian liberals 
have always been like that. 
"Freedom of speech", "freedom of thought", "freedom of consciousness" - those 
word combinations are rapidly losing their meaning and turning into mere verbal 
fillers. Not only the common people but also most of the so-called elite wearily 
snub them, as if willing to say: everything is clear; it is just another 
conflict between the oligarchs and the president, plague on both your houses, 
where we have been so successfully turned into fodder for worms. 
Nobody knows, and, in fact, nobody cares what is happening to the Union of Right 
Forces and Yabloko following their December defeat. 
The [Free Choice] 2008-Committee [World-champion chess player and Committee chair, Gary 
Kasparov], while claiming the role of the conscience of Russia's 
liberals, itself readily admits its impotence and says, nearly excusing itself, 
yes, there are only a few of us and the timing is wrong, so there is little hope 
of anything, but still… 
Irina Khakamada's idea to form the Free Russia party from the remnants of 
Yabloko and SPS has not evoked any substantial public interest except for the 
excitement of several professional "party-builders" who once again smell easy 
money. 
Meanwhile, the Russian political soil generously nurtures the bearers of the new 
discourse, the ideology of the so-called "party of national revenge", or PNR. PNR 
bears the traits of the featureless United Russia [Edinaia Rossiia, the party of President Putin]
[ID (Russian-language)], of the self-complacent 
Motherland [ID (Russian-language)], reveling 
in its superiority over its less successful rivals, as well 
as of LDPR, whose leader has once again confirmed his exceptional political 
vitality. 
All those people -- sometimes sincerely, though in most cases falsely and to 
order, yet no less convincingly -- hold forth on the demise of liberal ideas, 
asserting that our country, Russia, simply needs no freedom at all. 
Freedom, in their opinion, is the fifth wheel in the wagon of national 
development. And those who talk of freedoms are either oligarchs or scum (which 
is, on the whole, the same). 
Against such a background President Vladimir Putin is perceived as the most 
devout liberal, because from an ideological standpoint he is far better than 
Rogozin and Zhirinovsky. 
And let us think this through: indeed, Putin is probably neither a liberal nor a 
democrat, but he is still more liberal and democratic than 70 per cent of our 
country's population. 
After all, none other than Putin has reined in our national demons and prevented 
Zhirinovsky and Rogozin (or rather not them, because in truth they are just 
talented political players, but to the numerous supporters of their public 
statements) to seize state power in Russia. 
Chubais and Yavlinsky, 
for their part, were unable to resist "the national 
revenge" - all they could do was sit and wait till the apologists of nationalist 
values such as "Russia for the Russians"
threw them out of the country (as, 
alas, has happened before in our history) [possibly a reference to Communist 
Party/KGB policy of the 1970's which gave several dissenters the option = "Go 
west or we send you east"]. 
That's how it is. Nonetheless, liberalism in Russia must not die. For the 
craving for freedom has always been and will remain one of the main instincts of 
man, be he Russian, Chinese, or Laplander. Yes, that sweet word "freedom" has 
many meanings. But its spirit cannot be eradicated nor extirpated. 
It is the spirit of the titan Prometheus who presented man with fire. It is the 
spirit of Jesus Christ who spoke as the one who was right and not like the 
scribes and Pharisees. 
Hence, the reason for the crisis of Russian liberalism lies not in the ideals of 
freedom, albeit perceived differently by everyone. This is not about the system, 
but people, as the last Soviet prime-minister Valentin Pavlov
[W-ID] used to say. 
Those who were entrusted by fate and history to guard the liberal values in our 
country have failed in their task. Today we must sincerely admit that, because 
the times of slyness are over, and to me, here in a dungeon of Remand Center 
No.4 this is, perhaps, a bit more obvious than to those in more comfortable 
conditions. 
SPS and Yabloko did not lose the elections because the Kremlin discriminated 
against them. But rather because the presidential administration, for the first 
time, denied them support, putting them on a par with the other opposition 
forces. 
And Irina Khakamada, too, secured her notable 3.84 per cent not in spite of the 
state machine, which simply did not notice her, but in many ways, because of the 
Kremlin's frantic drive to secure a higher voter turnout. 
Big business (often referred to as 'the oligarchs' in the vernacular) have left 
the arena, driven out not by the flourishing corruption but solely because of 
the malfunction of standard lobbying mechanisms, which were designed to work 
under a weak president and the former Kremlin administration. And that's it.  
Socially active proponents of liberal views, to which I believe my sinful self 
also belongs, were responsible for preventing Russia from deviating from the 
path of freedom. And, paraphrasing Stalin's well-known statement made in June 
1941, we have screwed up our cause. Now we will have to analyze our tragic 
mistakes and acknowledge our guilt, both moral and historic. And only thus we 
will be able to find a solution. 
It's a Beautiful Lie
Russian liberalism was defeated because it had 
tried to ignore, firstly, some important aspects of Russia's national and 
historic development, and secondly, the vital interests of an overwhelming 
majority of Russian people. Moreover, it was terrified of telling the truth.
I don't want to say that Chubais, Gaidar
[ID], and their kindred spirits set before 
them the goal of deceiving Russia. Many liberals of the first crop, the Yeltsin 
crop, were people who sincerely believed that liberalism is historically right, 
that a tired country practically deprived of freedom's delights needed a 
"liberal revolution". But their approach to this revolution, once liberals 
suddenly came to power, was too superficial, if not frivolous. They concerned 
themselves with life and labor conditions for the ten percent of Russians who 
were ready for radical life changes once they rejected state paternalism. They 
wound up forgetting the other ninety percent. The politicians covered up their 
tragic failures with lies, as a rule.
They lied to 90% of the people when they generously promised that a 
privatization voucher would buy two cars. Sure, an enterprising player on the 
financial market with access to private information and with the ability to 
analyze this information could turn a privatization voucher into as many as ten 
cars. But the promise was that everyone would be able to do it.
They kept their eyes shut to Russia's social conditions, while conducting 
privatization and ignoring its negative social consequences, coyly calling it 
painless, honest, and fair. It's well known what people think of that "great" 
privatization now.
They didn't force themselves to think of the catastrophic consequences of the 
devaluation of Sberbank deposits [Russia's largest, state-owned savings bank]. 
Then, it would have been possible to come up with a very simple solution -- by 
securing deposits through government bonds that could be paid back by taxes on 
capital gains (or for example stocks in Russia's best companies transferred to 
private ownership). But the powerful liberals didn't want to waste their 
precious time; they didn't want to exercise their grey matter.
In the 90s, no one took up education, healthcare, and housing reforms, or 
targeted support of the poor and the indigent, all issues upon which an enormous 
majority of our compatriots depended and still depends on now.
Social stability, social peace -- the only possible foundation for any long-term 
reformation that involves the very basics of a country's existence -- were 
ignored by Russian liberals. They set themselves apart from the people with a 
chasm. Into this chasm, through media and bureaucratic channels, they pumped 
pretty liberal ideas about reality, manipulating information. By the way, it was 
in the 90s when the concept of the all-powerful Political Technologist first 
arose [ID] -- a person 
who is supposed to be able to make up for the absence of real 
politics in one or another area with clever "virtual" throwaway products.
The election campaign of 1995-1996 showed that the Russian people had already 
rejected liberal government. As one of the 1996 presidential campaign's major 
sponsors, I, of all people, should remember quite well what a monstrous effort 
it took to make the Russian people "choose with their hearts".
What were the country's liberal top managers thinking when they said that there 
was no alternative to the default of 1998? There was an alternative -- the 
devaluation of the ruble. All the way back in February and even June 1998 it 
could have been avoided by a devaluation of 5 to 10, 12 rubles per USD. I and 
many of my colleagues had defended this option for deflecting the looming 
financial crisis. But, although we had considerable political leverage at that 
time, we weren't able to defend our point of view and thus must share the moral 
responsibility for the default with the authorities, which had been 
irresponsible and incompetent.
Liberal leaders called themselves victims and their governments -- "kamikaze 
cabinets". It seems to have been the case at first. But by the mid-90s, they had 
garnered too many Mercedes-Benzes, country houses, villas, nightclubs, gold 
credit cards. The image of a stoical liberalist fighter prepared to die for the 
triumph of the idea was replaced by relaxed bohemians who didn't even attempt to 
mask their indifference toward the Russian people, the voiceless "population". 
This bohemian image, spiced up with demonstrative cynicism, to a large degree, 
served to discredit liberalism in Russia.
Liberals weren't telling the truth when they said that Russian people are living 
better and better, because they themselves didn't know and didn't understand -- 
and, I should note, often didn't want to understand -- how the majority of people 
really lives. And now they have to listen to it and learn about it -- I hope 
they're ashamed of themselves.
Even as far as declared liberalist values went, liberals were often far from 
honest and logical. For instance, liberals talked of freedom of speech, while at 
the same time doing everything possible to create financial and administrative 
control over the media in order to use this magical resource to their own 
advantage. Most commonly such actions were justified by the existence of the 
"communist threat," for the neutralization of which everything was permitted. 
And the fact that the "red-brown plague" is strong only in as far as the liberal 
government has forgotten its people and their problems was never mentioned.
The media was choked with praise for the "diversified economy of the future". In 
reality, however, Russia got strongly addicted to oil. Naturally, the profound 
crisis of the technological complex was a direct consequence of the falling 
apart of the USSR and an abrupt shrinkage of investments because of high 
inflation. Liberals were obliged to solve this problem -- by inviting powerful, 
knowledgeable left-wingers into the government. But they preferred to ignore 
this problem. Is it any surprise, then, that millions of people in the 
scientific and technical intelligentsia, which was the main impulse behind the 
Soviet liberation movement of the late 80s, now vote for "Motherland" and the 
Communist Party?
They had always said -- disregarding objections -- that they could do anything 
they liked with the Russian people, that "in this country" the elite decides 
everything, and the regular folks don't deserve as much as a thought. Any 
nonsense, any insolence, any lie is going to be accepted by the people like 
manna from heaven, if it came from the boss. As a result, such theses as 
"social politics are necessary", "everyone must share", etc, were tossed out, 
denied, denounced with a grin.
Well, it's time for retribution. At the 2003 election, the Russian people said 
to liberal officials their resolute and dry-eyed "goodbye". Even Russia's young 
people, whom everyone believed to be definitely impressed with the ideas of the 
Union of Right Forces and wholly supportive of Chubais, voted for the Liberal 
Democratic Party [LDPR] and Motherland.
That was people spitting into the chasm between the liberals in power and the 
country.
Where was big business at this time? Right next to the liberal government. We 
helped them make mistakes and lie.
Of course we never admired the authorities. But we never contradicted them, so 
as to not risk our daily bread. It's funny when zealous propaganda-mongers call 
us "oligarchs". An oligarchy is a group of people who actually hold power, 
whereas we always depended on the powerful bureaucrat in his ultra-liberal 
thousand-dollar suit. Our collective pilgrimages to Yeltsin were but a 
theatrical prop -- we were publicly made out to be the chief culprits of the 
country's woes, while we didn't even realize at first what was going on. We were 
simply being conned.
We had the resources to challenge a game with such rules. That is, a game 
without any rules. But, compliant and obedient as we were, with our obsequious 
ability to give when we were asked to give and even when we weren't, we created 
both the bureaucratic arbitrariness and orchestrated justice.
We did revive industry, squashed in the final years of Soviet rule; we created 
over two million highly paid vacancies. But we couldn't convince the country of 
this. Why not? Because the country hadn't forgiven business its alliance with 
"the party of irresponsibility", "the party of lies".
Business at Large
Equating the liberal part of society with business 
circles is a traditional misconception.
The philosophy behind business is making money. But a liberal environment is not 
necessary for big money at all. Large American corporations which invested 
billions of dollars into the USSR loved the Soviet government, since it 
guaranteed complete stability and the freedom of business from social control. 
Only recently, in the late 90s, did transnational corporations begin to reject 
partnerships with the most abominable of African dictatorships. And at that, not 
all of them and not always.
Civil society [ID] more frequently gets in the way of business than aids it -- it 
stands up for the rights of hired laborers, protects the environment from 
careless intrusion, and limits corruption. All of this cuts down on profits. I 
speak as a former head of one of Russia's largest oil companies when I say that 
it's much easier for entrepreneurs to work things out with a handful of 
acceptably greedy officials than to coordinate their actions with a branched and 
competent network of social institutions.
Business does not seek liberal reforms in the political sphere, it isn't 
obsessed with freedom -- it always coexists with the current government regime. 
More than anything, it wants the regime to protect it from civil society and 
hired laborers. As a result, business, especially big business, is doomed to 
fight the real, not sham, civil society.
Moreover, business is always cosmopolitan -- money has no fatherland. It winds up 
wherever it's profitable, it hires whoever is profitable, it invests its 
resources only where the profit is optimal. For many (although, doubtlessly, not 
for all) of our businessmen who amassed their wealth in the 90s, Russia is not a 
place where they belong but just a free hunting ground. Their main interests and 
life strategies are tied to the West.
For me, Russia is my Motherland. I want to live, work, and die here. I want my 
descendants to be proud of Russia, and of myself, as a part of this country, 
this unique civilization. Perhaps, I realized this too late -- I only got 
involved in charities and investing in the infrastructure of civil society in 
2000. But better late than never.
For this reason, I have quit business. I'm not speaking for the business 
community, but for myself, and for the liberal part of society, the group of 
people I see as teammates, sharing a common idea. Naturally, there are 
businessmen among us, since no one is refused entry into the world of true 
freedom and real democracy.
Choosing the Way
What can and must we do today?
I'll name seven of our top priorities. 
The first: establish a new strategy of cooperation with the government. The 
government and the bureaucracy are not synonymous. It's time to ask yourself: 
"What have I done for Russia?" It's already clear what Russia has done for us 
after 1991.
[2] Learn to look for truth in Russia, and not in the West. Russia's image in the 
United States and Europe is all very well, but it will never match the 
importance of respect from one's fellow citizens. We have to show, to ourselves 
first of all, that we are not favorites, but permanent citizens on our Russian 
land. We must stop disregarding -- especially in such a pointed manner -- the 
interests of our nation and people. These interests are our interests. 
[3]
We must give up the useless attempts to call the president's legitimacy into 
question. Regardless of whether we like Vladimir Putin or not, it's time to 
realize that the head of state is not just a private person. The president is an 
institution guaranteeing a nation's stability and integrity. And God forbid that 
we live to see a day when this institution collapses -- Russia will not survive 
another February 1917. The nation's history tells us that a bad government is 
better than no government at all. Moreover, it's time to realize that in order 
for a civil society to develop, it needs an impulse from the government. The 
infrastructure of a civil society forms over centuries, not in a week with the 
help of a magic wand.
[4]
It's time to stop lying -- to oneself and to society. To grasp that we are adults 
that are strong enough to tell the truth. I respect and value Irina Khakamada, 
but unlike my partner, Leonid Nevzlin [ID#1 
| ID#2 |
ID#3], I 
decided not to finance her presidential 
campaign, because I saw something false in it. For example, we cannot accuse 
Putin of the Nord-Ost tragedy [W-ID], 
because it is unfair. 
[5] Leave behind our cosmopolitan perception of the world; to grasp that 
we live on earth, and not in the air; to accept that a liberal project in Russia 
can 
be successful only when the nation's interests are taken into account. That 
liberalism will take root in Russia only when it gains a strong, firm footing on 
the earth beneath its feet. 
[6] Legitimize privatization. We need to accept that 90 percent of the people in 
Russia do not consider privatization fair, and feel that those who got rich from 
it accumulated their wealth illegally. And while this is the case, there will 
always be forces -- political, bureaucratic, or even terrorist -- that will 
encroach upon private property. In order to justify privatization before a nation 
where the notions of Roman property law have never been strong, we must force 
big business to share with the people -- possibly by accepting reforms in mineral tax 
and other sectors that will not be very advantageous to the companies.
It's better if we start these processes ourselves, to influence them and direct 
them, than to stubbornly resist the inevitable. What is meant to be cannot be 
avoided. Legitimizing privatization is not something the government needs, for 
it will always prefer to have a means of pressuring us. It is something 
necessary for us and for our children, who will live in Russia and who would 
like to walk the streets of Russian cities without bodyguards. 
[7] Invest in the minds of citizens and in the creation of fundamentally new social 
institutions not brainwashed by the lies of the past. To create real structures 
of civil society, instead of treating them like entertainment centers. To open 
doors for new generations. To attract conscientious and talented people that can 
form the basis of Russia's new elite. The worst thing for Russia is the 
continuing brain drain, because talent and intellect is the basis of Russia's 
most competitive asset, not the ever-diminishing fossil fuels. And talent will 
only accumulate in a thriving environment -- that same civil society. 
In order to change this country, we must ourselves change. In order to convince 
Russia of the need and the inevitability of liberal development, we must 
overcome fears from the previous decade, and from the dreary history of 
Russian liberalism. 
For freedom to return to Russia, we must start believing in it ourselves.
[Signed] Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a private person and a citizen of the Russian Federation. 
\\
*--SQF
*--Khodorkovskii's personal webpage = http://www.khodorkovsky.com/