1. IT might seem
to have more convenience, though it come often
otherwise to pass, excellent King, that those, which are fruitful in
their generations, and have in themselves the foresight of
immortality in their descendants, should likewise be more careful of
the good estate of future times, unto which they know they must
transmit and commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was
a sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was a
blessing to her own times; and yet so as the impression of her good
government, besides her happy memory, is not without some effect which
doth survive her. But to your Majesty, whom God hath already blessed
with so much royal issue, worthy to continue and represent you for
ever, and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet promise many of
the like renovations; it is proper and agreeable to be conversant not
only in the transitory parts of good government, but in those acts
also which are in their nature permanent and perpetual: amongst the
which, if affection do not transport me, there is not any more worthy
than the further endowment of the world with sound and fruitful
knowledge. For why should a few received authors stand up like
Hercules' columns, beyond which there should be no sailing or
discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your
Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore where we left,
it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are which have been
undertaken and performed by kings and others for the increase and
advancement of learning: wherein I purpose to speak actively without
digressing or dilating.
2. Let this ground
therefore be laid, that all works are overcome
by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the
conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second
preventeth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man: but the
principal of these is direction: for CLAUDUS IN VIA ANTEVERTIT
CURSOREM EXTRA VIAM; and Salomon excellently setteth it down, IF THE
IRON BE NOT SHARP, IT REQUIRETH MORE STRENGTH; BUT WISDOM IS THAT WHICH
PREVAILETH; signifying that the invention or election of the mean is
more effectual than any inforcement or accumulation of endeavours.
This I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating from the noble
intention of any that have been deservers towards the state of
learning) I do observe, nevertheless, that their works and acts are
rather matters of magnificence and memory, than of progression and
proficience; and tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the
multitude of learned men, than to rectify or raise the sciences
themselves.
3. The works or acts of
merit towards learning are conversant about
three objects: the places of learning, the books of learning, and the
persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of
heaven, or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in
the ground, except it be collected into some receptacle, where it may
by union comfort and sustain itself, (and for that cause the industry
of [23] man hath made and framed spring-heads, conduits, cisterns,
and pools, which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn
with accomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and
necessity) so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend
from divine inspiration, or spring from human sense, would soon
perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not preserved in books,
traditions, conferences, and places appointed, as universities,
colleges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of the same.
4. The works which
concern the seats and places of learning are four;
foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with
franchises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for
government; all tending to quietness and privateness of life, and
discharge of cares and troubles; much like the stations which Virgil
prescribeth for the hiving of bees:
Principio sedes apibus
statioque petenda,
Quo neque fit ventis aditus, etc.
5. The works touching
books are two: first, libraries, which are as
the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true
virtue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved and
reposed: secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct
impressions, more faithful translations, more profitable glosses,
more diligent annotations, and the like.
6. The works pertaining
to the persons of learned men, besides the
advancement and countenancing of them in general, are two: the reward
and designation of readers in sciences already extant and invented;
and the reward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning
any parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.
7. These are summarily
the works and acts, wherein the merits of
many excellent princes and other worthy personages have been
conversant. As for any particular commemorations, I call to mind what
Cicero said, when he gave general thanks; DIFFICILE NON ALIQUEM,
INGRATUM QUENQUAM PRAETERIRE. Let us rather, according to the
Scriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before us than
look back to that which is already attained.
8. First, therefore,
amongst so many great foundations of colleges
in Europe, I find it strange that they are all dedicated to
professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For if
men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge
well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient
fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach
had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as
the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet,
notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to
all the rest: so if any man think philosophy and universality to be
idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from
thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that
hath hindered the progression of learning, because these fundamental
knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you will have a
tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything you
can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth and putting
new mould about the roots that must work it. Neither is it to be
forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to
professory learning hath not only had a malign aspect and influence
upon the growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states
and governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude
in regard of able men to serve them in causes of state, because there
is no education collegiate which is free; where such as were so
disposed might give themselves to histories, modern languages, books
of policy and civil discourse, and other the like enablements unto
service of estate.
9. And because Founders
of Colleges do plant, and Founders of
Lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect
which is in public lectures; namely, in the smallness and meanness of
the salary or reward which in most places is assigned unto them;
whether they be lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is
necessary to the progression of sciences that Readers be of the most
able and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating
and propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot
be, except their condition and endowment be such as may content the
ablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole age
in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a proportion
answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement, which may
be expected from a profession or the practice of a profession. So as,
if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe David's military
law, which was, THAT THOSE WHICH STAID WITH THE CARRIAGE SHOULD HAVE
EQUAL PART WITH THOSE WHICH WERE IN THE ACTION, else will the
carriages be ill attended. So Readers in sciences are indeed the
guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences, whence men in
active courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have equal
entertainment with them: otherwise if the fathers in sciences be of the
weakest sort, or be ill-maintained,
Et patrum invalidi
referent jejunia nati.
10. Another defect I
note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to
help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and to build
furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren
virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto the
deep, fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, especially
Natural Philosophy and Physic, books be not the only instrumentals;
wherein also the beneficence of men hath not been altogether wanting:
for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been
provided as appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as well as
books: we see likewise that some places instituted for physic have
annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all sorts, and do
likewise command the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these do
respect but a few things. In general, there will hardly be any main
proficience in the disclosing of [24] nature, except there be some
allowance for expenses about experiments; whether they be experiments
appertaining to Vulcanus or Daedalus, furnace or engine, or any other
kind: and therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and states
bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the spials and
intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or else you shall
be ill advertised.
11. And if Alexander made
such a liberal assignation to Aristotle
of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the
like, that he might compile a History of Nature, much better do they
deserve it that travail in Arts of Nature.
12. Another defect which
I note, is an intermission or neglect in
those which are governors in universities, of consultation, and in
princes or superior persons, of visitation: to enter into account and
consideration, whether the readings, exercises, and other customs
appertaining unto learning, anciently begun, and since continued, be
well instituted or no; and thereupon to ground an amendment or
reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient. For it is one
of your majesty's own most wise and princely maxims, THAT IN ALL
USAGES AND PRECEDENTS, THE TIMES BE CONSIDERED THEREIN THEY FIRST
BEGAN; WHICH, IF THEY WERE WEAK OR IGNORANT, IT DEROGATETH FROM THE
AUTHORITY OF THE USAGE, AND LEAVETH IT FOR SUSPECT. And therefore
inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the universities were
derived from more obscure times, it is the more requisite they be
re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two, for example
sake, of things that are the most obvious and familiar. The one is a
matter, which though it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an
error; which is, that scholars in universities come too soon and too
unripe to logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children
and novices: for these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of
sciences, being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other for
ornament: and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and
dispose matter; and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with
matter, and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth SYLVA
and SUPELLEX, stuff and variety, to begin with those arts (as if one
should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind), doth
work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great
and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into
childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further, the
untimely learning of them hath drawn on, by consequence, the
superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth
indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a lack I find in the
exercises used in the Universities, which do make too great a divorce
between invention and memory; for their speeches are either
premeditate, IN VERBIS CONCEPTIS, where nothing is left to invention,
or merely extemporal, where little is left to memory: whereas in life
and action there is least use of either of these, but rather of
intermixtures of premeditation and invention, notes and memory; so as
the exercise fitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it
is ever a true rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may
be to the life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions
and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is
not obscure, when scholars come to the practices of professions, or
other actions of civil life; which when they set into, this want is
soon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this part, touching
the amendment of the institutions and orders of Universities, I will
conclude with the clause of Caesar's letter to Oppius and Balbus, HOC
QMEMADMODUM FIERI POSSIT, NONNULLA MIHI IN MENTEM VENIUNT, ET MULTA
REPERIRI POSSUNT; DE IIS REBUS ROGO VOS UT COGITATIONEM SUSCIPIATIS.
13. Another defect which
I note, ascendeth a little higher than the
precedent: for as the proficience of learning consisteth much in the
orders and institutions of Universities in the same states and
kingdoms, so it would be yet more advanced, if there were more
intelligence mutual between the Universities of Europe than now there
is. We see there may be many orders and foundations, which though
they be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet they
take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and
correspondence one with the other; insomuch as they have provincials
and generals. And surely, as nature createth brotherhood in families,
and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in commonalties, and the
anointment of God superinduceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops;
so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and
illumination, relating to that paternity which is attributed to God,
who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.
14. The last defect which
I will note is, that there hath not been,
or very rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers
concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been
already sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an
inducement to enter into a view and examination what parts of
learning have been prosecuted, and what omitted: for the opinion of
plenty is among the causes of want, and the great quantity of books
maketh a show rather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge,
nevertheless, is not to be remedied by making no more books, but by
making more good books, which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour
the serpents of the enchanters.
15. The removing of all
the defects formerly enumerated, except the
last, and of the active part also of the last (which is the
designation of writers), are OPERA BASILICA; towards which the
endeavours of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway,
that may point at the way, but cannot go it: but the inducing part of
the latter, which is the survey of learning, may be set forward by
private travail. Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and
faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts
thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the
industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to
memory, may both minister light to any public designation, and also
serve to excite voluntary endeavours: wherein, nevertheless, my
purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiencies, and
not to make [25] any redargution of errors or incomplete
prosecutions; for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth
unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which
is manured.
In the handling and
undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what
it is that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own
weakness to sustain my purpose; but my hope is, that if my extreme
love to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of
affection; for that IT IS NOT GRANTED TO MAN TO LOVE AND TO BE WISE.
But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must
leave to others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either
to perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of humanity; NAM
QUI ERRANTI COMITER MONSTRAT VIAM, ETC. I do foresee likewise that of
those things which I shall enter and register as deficiencies and
omissions, many will conceive and censure that some of them are
already done and extant; others to be but curiosities, and things of
no great use; and others to be of too great difficulty, and almost
impossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the two first, I
refer myself to the particulars; for the last, touching
impossibility, I take it those things are to be held possible which
may be done by some person, though not by every one; and which may be
done by many, though not by any one; and which may be done in the
succession of ages, though not within the hour-glass of one man's
life; and which may be done by public designation, though not by
private endeavour. [--] But, notwithstanding, if any man will take to
himself rather that of Salomon, DICIT PIGER, LEO EST IN VIA, than
that of Virgil, POSSUNT QUIA POSSE VIDENTUR, I shall be content that my
labours be esteemed but as the better sort of wishes: for as it
asketh some knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it
required some sense to make a wish not absurd.
I. 1. THE parts of human
learning have reference to the three parts
of man's understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to his
memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason.
Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for the spirit of
man is the same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be
diverse: so as theology consisteth also of the history of the church;
of parables, which is divine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept:
for as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy,
it is but Divine History; which hath that prerogative over human, as
the narration may be before the fact as well as after.
[Pp. 25-27:Tables: THE
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
MEMORY. IMAGINATION. REASON.]
[28] History is natural,
civil, ecclesiastical, and literary;
whereof the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as
deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of
learning to be described and represented from age to age, as many
have done the works of nature, and the state civil and
ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth to me
to be as the statua of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being
wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person: and
yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the
jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the
philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools,
authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching
the invention of arts or usages.
2. But a just story of
learning, containing the antiquities and
originals of knowledges and their sects, their inventions, their
traditions, their diverse administrations and managings, their
flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions,
removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events
concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly
affirm to be wanting. [--] The use and end of which work I do not so
much design for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the
lovers of learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose;
which is this in few words, that it will make learned men wise in the
use and administration of learning. For it is not St. Augustine's nor
St. Ambrose's works that will make so wise a divine, as
ecclesiastical history, thoroughly read and observed; and the same
reason is of learning.
3. History of nature is
of three sorts; of nature in course, of
nature erring or varying, and of nature altered or wrought; that is,
history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of arts. [--]
The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and that in good perfection;
the two latter are handled so weakly and unprofitably, as I am moved
to note them as deficient. [--] For I find no sufficient or competent
collection of the works of nature which have a digression and
deflection from the ordinary course of generations, productions, and
motions; whether they be singularities of place and region, or the
strange events of time and chance, or the effects of yet unknown
properties, or the instances of exception to general kinds. It is
true, I find a number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets,
and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a
substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or irregulars
of nature, well examined and described, I find not: especially not
with due rejection of fables and popular errors: for as things now
are, if an untruth in nature be once on foot, what by reason of the
neglect of examination and countenance of antiquity, and what by
reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of
speech, it is never called down.
4. The use of this work,
honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, is
nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and
vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two
reasons, both of great weight; the one to correct the partiality of
axioms and opinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and
familiar examples; the other because from the wonders of nature is
the nearest intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art: for
it is no more but by following, and as it were hounding nature in her
wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place
again. [--] Neither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels, that
superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams,
divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear
evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet known
in what cases and how far effects attributed to superstition do
participate of natural causes: and therefore howsoever the practice
of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation and
consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the discerning
of the offences, but for the further disclosing of nature. Neither
ought a man to make scruple of entering into these things for
inquisition of truth, as your majesty hath showed in your own
example; who with the two clear eyes of religion and natural
philosophy have looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet
proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, which passeth through
pollutions and itself remains as pure as before. [--] But this I hold
fit, that these narrations, which have mixture with superstition, be
sorted by themselves, and not be mingled with the narrations which
are merely and sincerely natural. [--] But as for the narrations
touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are either not
true, or not natural; and therefore impertinent for the story of
nature.
5. For history of nature
wrought or mechanical, I find some
collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but
commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar. [--]
For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to
inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be such as
may be thought secrets, rarities, and special subtilities; which
humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in Plato;
where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with
Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where the subject
being touching beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of
inductions, put first an example of a fair virgin, and then of a fair
horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was
offended, and said, MORE THAN FOR COURTESY'S SAKE, HE DID THINK MUCH
TO DISPUTE WITH ANY THAT DID ALLEGE SUCH BASE AND SORDID SUBSTANCES:
whereunto Socrates answered, YOU HAVE REASON, AND IT BECOMES YOU
WELL, BEING A MAN SO TRIM IN YOUR VESTMENTS, ETC., and so goeth on in
an irony. [--] But the truth is, they be not the highest instances
that give the securest information; as may be well expressed in the
tale so common of the philosopher, [29] that while he gazed upwards
to the stars fell into the water; for if he had looked down he might
have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see
the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and
small things discover great, better than great can discover the
small: and therefore Aristotle noteth well, THAT THE NATURE OF
EVERYTHING IS BEST SEEN IN ITS SMALLEST PORTIONS. And for that cause
he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a family, and the
simple conjugations of man and wife, parent and child, master and
servant, which are in every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of
this great city of the world, and the policy thereof, must be first
sought in mean concordances and small portions. So we see how that
secret of nature, of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone
towards the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars of
iron.
6. But if my judgment be
of any weight, the use of history
mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards
natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in
the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as
shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of man's life: for it
will not only minister and suggest for the present many ingenious
practices in all trades, by a connection and transferring of the
observations of one art to the use of another, when the experiences
of several mysteries shall fall under the consideration of one man's
mind; but further, it will give a more true and real illumination
concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. [--] For like
as a man's disposition is never well known till he be crossed, nor
Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast; so
the passages and variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the
liberty of nature, as in the trials and vexations of art.
II. 1. For civil history,
it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be
compared with the three kinds of pictures or images: for of pictures
or images, we see some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are
defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds, memorials, perfect
histories, and antiquities; for memorials are history unfinished, or
the first or rough draughts of history; and antiquities are history
defaced, or some remnants of history which have casually escaped the
shipwreck of time.
2. Memorials, or
preparatory history, are of two sorts; whereof the
one may be termed commentaries, and the other registers. Commentaries
are they which set down a continuance of the naked events and
actions, without the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches,
the pretexts, the occasions and other passages of action: for this is
the true nature of a commentary; though Caesar, in modesty mixed with
greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the
best history of the world. Registers are collections of public acts,
as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declarations and letters
of state, orations and the like, without a perfect continuance or
contexture of the thread of the narration.
3. Antiquities, or
remnants of history, are, as was said, TANQUAM
TABULA NAUFRAGII, when industrious persons by an exact and scrupulous
diligence and observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs,
traditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories,
passages of books that concern not story, and the like, do save and
recover somewhat from the deluge of time.
4. In these kinds of
unperfect histories I do assign no deficience,
for they are TANQUAM IMPERFECTE MISTA; and therefore any deficience
in them is but their nature. [--] As for the corruptions and moths of
history, which are EPITOMES, the use of them deserveth to be
banished, as all men of sound judgment have confessed; as those that
have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent
histories, and wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs.
5. History, which may be
called just and perfect history, is of
three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth or
pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a time, or a
person, or an actions. The first we call chronicles, the second
lives, and the third narrations or relations. [--] Of these, although
the first be the most complete and absolute kind of history, and hath
most estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in profit and
use, and the third in verity and sincerity. For history of times
representeth the magnitude of actions, and the public faces and
deportments of persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller
passages and motions of men and matters. [--] But such being the
workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight upon the
smallest wires, MAXIMA È MINIMIS SUSPENDENS, it comes therefore
to
pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business
than the true and inward resorts thereof. But lives, if they be well
written, propounding to themselves a person to represent in whom
actions both greater and smaller, public and private, have a
commixture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively
representation. So again narrations and relations of actions, as the
war of Peloponnesus, the expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of
Catiline, cannot but be more purely and exactly true than histories
of times, because they may choose an argument comprehensible within
the notice and instructions of the writer: whereas he that
undertaketh the story of a time, especially of any length, cannot but
meet with many blanks and spaces which he must be forced to fill up
out of his own wit and conjecture.
6. For the History of
Times, I mean of Civil History, the
providence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath pleased God
to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms,
learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the state of Graecia, and
the state of Rome; the histories whereof occupying the middle part of
time, have more ancient to them, histories which may by one common
name be termed the antiquities of the world: and after them histories
which may be likewise called by the name of modern history.
7. Now to speak of the
deficiencies. As to the [30] heathen
antiquities of the world, it is in vain to note them for deficient:
deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments;
but the deficience cannot be holpen; for antiquity is like fame,
CAPUT INTER NUBILA CONDIT, her head is muffled from our sight. For
the history of the exemplar states, it is extant in good perfection.
Not but I could wish there were a perfect course of history for Graecia
from Theseus to Philopoemen (what time the affairs of Graecia were
drowned and extinguished in the affairs of Rome); and for Rome from
Romulus to Justinianus, who may be truly said to be ULTIMUS
ROMANORUM. In which sequences of story the text of Thucydides and
Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius,
Caesar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire
without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and continued.
But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to be commended than
required: and we speak now of parts of learning supplemental and not
of supererogation.
8. But for modern
histories, whereof there are some few very
worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, (leaving the care of
foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be CURIOSUS IN
ALIENA REPUBLICA,) I cannot fail to represent to your majesty the
unworthiness of the history of England in the main continuance
thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in the
latest and largest author that I have seen: supposing that it would
be honour for your Majesty, and a work very memorable, if this island
of Great Britain, as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to
come, so were joined in one history for the times passed; after the
manner of the Sacred History, which draweth down the story of the ten
tribes, and of the two tribes, as twins, together. And if it shall
seem that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly
performed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of
time, as to the story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of
the Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time, wherein,
to my understanding, there hath been the rarest varieties that in
like number of successions of any hereditary monarchy hath been
known. For it beginneth with the mixed adoption of a crown by arms
and title: an entry by battle, an establishment by marriage, and
therefore times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of
working and swelling, though without extremity of storm; but well
passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being one of the most
sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the reign of a
king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much intermixture with
the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them variably; in
whose time also began that great alteration in the state
ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage. Then
the reign of a minor: then an offer of a usurpation, though it was
but as FEBRIS EPHEMERA. Then the reign of a queen matched with a
foreigner: then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet
her government so masculine, that it had greater impression and
operation upon the states abroad than it any ways received from
thence. And now last, this most happy and glorious event, that this
island of Britain, divided from all the world, should be united in
itself: and that oracle of rest, given to Aeneas, ANTIQUAM EXQUIRITE
MATREM, should now be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of
England and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient mother name
of Britain, as a full period of all instability and peregrinations.
So that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have
certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle; so it
seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it was to
settle in your majesty and your generations, (in which I hope it is
now established for ever,) had these prelusive changes and varieties.
9. For lives, I do find
it strange that these times have so little
esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writing of lives
should be no more frequent. For although there be not many sovereign
princes or absolute commanders, and that states are most collected
into monarchies, yet are there many worthy personages that deserve
better than dispersed report or barren elogies. For herein the
invention of one of the late poets is proper, and doth well enrich
the ancient fiction: for he feigneth that at the end of the thread or
web of every man's life there was a little medal containing the
person's name, and that Time waited upon the shears; and as soon as
the thread was cut, caught the medals, and carried them to the river
of Lethe; and about the bank there were many birds flying up and
down, that would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little
while, and then let them fall into the river: only there were a few
swans, which if they got a name, would carry it to a temple where it
was consecrate. And although many men, more mortal in their affections
than in their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a
vanity and ventosity,
Animi nil magnae laudis
egentes;
which opinion cometh from
that root, NON PRIUS LAUDES CONTEMPSIMUS,
QUAM LAUDANDA FACERE DESIVIMUS: yet that will not alter Salomon's
judgment, MEMORIA JUSTI CUM LAUDIBUS, AT IMPIORUM NOMEN PUTRESCET: the
one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion,
or turneth to an ill odour. [--] And therefore in that style or
addition, which is and hath been long well received and brought in
use, FELICIS MEMORIAE, PIAE MEMORIAE, BONAE MEMORIAE, we do
acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes,
that BONA FAMA PROPRIA POSSESSIO DEFUNCTORUM; which possession I
cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and that
therein there is a deficience.
10. For narrations and
relations of particular actions, there were
also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great
action but hath some good pen which attends it. [--] And because it
is an ability not common to write a good history, as may well appear
by the small number of them; yet if particularity of actions
memorable were but tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of
a complete history of times might [31] be the better expected, when a
writer should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such
relations mought be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and
stately garden, when time should serve.
11. There is yet another
portion of history which Cornelius Tacitus
maketh, which is not to be forgotten, especially with that
application which he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals:
appropriating to the former matters of estate, and to the latter acts
and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a touch of certain
magnificent buildings, he addeth CUM EX DIGNITATE POPULI ROMANI
REPERTUM SIT, RES ILLUSTRES ANNALIBUS TALIA DIURNIS URBIS ACTIS
MANDARE. So as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as
civil. And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more
than confusion of degrees; so it doth not a little embase the
authority of a history, to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters
of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with matters of state. But the
use of a journal hath not only been in the history of time, but
likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of actions; for
princes in ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy both,
journals kept of what passed day by day: for we see the chronicle
which was read before Ahasuerus, when he could not take rest,
contained matter of affairs indeed, but such as had passed in his own
time, and very lately before: but the journal of Alexander's house
expressed every small particularity, even concerning his person and
court; and it is yet a use well received in enterprises memorable, as
expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to keep diaries of
that which passeth continually.
12. I cannot likewise be
ignorant of a form of writing which some
wise and grave men have used, containing a scattered history of those
actions which they have thought worthy of memory, with politic
discourse and observation thereupon: not incorporate into the
history, but separately, and as the more principal in their
intention; which kind of ruminated history I think more fit to place
amongst books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak; than
amongst books of history: for it is the true office of history to
represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to
leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and
faculty of every man's judgment. But mixtures are things irregular,
whereof no man can define.
13. So also is there
another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and
that is history of cosmography: being compounded of natural history,
in respect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in respect of
the habitations, regiments, and manners of the people; and the
mathematics, in respect of the climates and configurations towards
the heavens: which part of learning of all others in this latter time
hath obtained most proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the
honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity,
that this great building of the world had never through-lights made
in it, till the age of us and our fathers: for although they had
knowledge of the Antipodes,
Nosque ubi primus equis
Oriens afflavit anhelis,
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper:
yet that mought be by
demonstration, and not in fact; and if by
travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to circle
the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done or enterprised
till these latter times: and therefore these times may justly bear in
their word, not only PLUS ULTRA, in precedence of the ancient NON
ULTRA, and IMITABILE FULMEN, in precedence of the ancient NON
IMITABILE FULMEN,
Demens qui nimbos et non
imitabile fulmen; etc.
but likewise IMITABILE
COELUM; in respect of the many memorable
voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth.
14. And this proficience
in navigation and discoveries may plant
also an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of
all sciences; because it may seem they are ordained by God to be
coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel,
speaking of the latter times, foretelleth PLURIMI PERTRANSIBUNT, ET
MULTIPLEX ERIT SCIENTIA: as if the openness and thorough passage of
the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the
same ages; as we see it is already performed in great part; the
learning of these latter times not much giving place to the former
two periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians, the
other of the Romans.
III. 1. History
ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with
history civil: but further, in the propriety thereof, may be divided
into the history of the church, by a general name; history of
prophecy; and history of providence. The first describeth the times of
the militant church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah; or
moveable, as the ark in the wilderness; or at rest, as the ark in the
temple: that is, the state of the church in persecution, in remove,
and in peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient; only
I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the
mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with censures, but with
omissions.
2. The second, which is
history of prophecy, consisteth of two
relatives, the prophecy, and the accomplishment; and therefore the
nature of such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the
Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same, throughout
the ages of the world; both for better confirmation of faith, and for
the better illumination of the Church touching those parts of
prophecies which are yet unfulfilled: allowing nevertheless that
latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies;
being of the nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are
but as one day; and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once,
but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages;
though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age. [--]
This is a work which I find deficient; but is to be done with wisdom,
sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.
3. The third, which is
history of providence, [32] containeth that
excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and His
secret will: which though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is
not legible to the natural man; no, nor many times to those that
behold it from the Tabernacle; yet at some times it pleaseth God, for
our better establishment and the confuting of those which are as
without God in the world, to write it in such text and capital
letters, that as the prophet saith, HE THAT RUNNETH BY MAY READ IT,
that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's judgments, and
never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in
their passage and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable
events and examples of God's Judgments, chastisements, deliverances,
and blessings: and this is a work which hath passed through the
labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.
4. There are also other
parts of learning which are appendices to
history: for all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and
deeds: whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the
deeds: and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds: so
are there other books and writings, which are appropriate to the
custody and receipt of words only; which likewise are of three sorts:
orations, letters, and brief speeches or sayings. [--] Orations are
pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, inventives, apologies,
reprehensions, orations of formality or ceremony, and the like. [--]
Letters are according to all the variety of occasions,
advertisements, advices, directions, propositions, petitions,
commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, of pleasure,
of discourse, and all other passages of action. And such as are
written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment,
the best; for they are more natural than orations and public
speeches, and more advised than conferences or present speeches. So
again letters of affairs from such as manage them, or are privy to
them, are of all others the best instructions for history, and to a
diligent reader the best histories in themselves. [--] For
Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Caesar's; for as his
history, and those few letters of his which we have, and those
apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men's else, so I suppose
would his collection of Apophthegms have done; for as for those which
are collected by others, either I have no taste in such matters, or
else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these three kinds of
writings I do not insist, because I have no deficiencies to propound
concerning them.
5. Thus much therefore
concerning history; which is that part of
learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices
of the mind of man: which is that of memory.
IV. 1. Poesy is a part of
learning in measure of words for the most
part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth
truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of
matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and
sever that which nature hath joined; and so make unlawful matches and
divorces of things; PICTORIBUS ATQUE POETIS, ETC. It is taken in two
senses in respect of words or matter; in the first sense it is but a
character of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not
pertinent for the present: in the latter it is, as hath been said,
one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but
feigned history, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.
2. The use of this
feigned history hath been to give some shadow of
satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of
things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the
soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a
more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute
variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore,
because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude
which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events
greater and more heroical: because true history propoundeth the
successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of
virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in
retribution, and more according to revealed providence: because true
history representeth actions and events more ordinary, and less
interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and
more unexpected and alternative variations: so as it appeareth that
poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to
delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to have some
participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind,
by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind; whereas
reason doth buckle and bow the mind into the nature of things. [--]
And we see, that by these insinuations and congruities with man's
nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and comfort it
hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in rude times and
barbarous regions, where other learning stood excluded.
3. The division of Poesy
which is aptest in the propriety thereof
(besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as
feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as
feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is into poesy
narrative, representative, and allusive. [--] The Narrative is a mere
imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered; choosing
for subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes
pleasure or mirth. [--] Representative is as a visible history; and
is an image of actions as if they were present, as history is of
actions in nature as they are (that is) past. [--] Allusive or
Parabolical is a Narrative applied only to express some special
purpose or conceit. Which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much
more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of Aesop, and the
brief sentences of the Seven, and the use of hieroglyphics may
appear. And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to
express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtile than the
vulgar in that manner, because men in those [33] times wanted both
variety of examples and subtility of conceit: and as hieroglyphics
were before letters, so parables were before arguments: and
nevertheless now, and at all times, they do retain much life and
vigour; because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit.
4. But there remaineth
yet another use of Poesy Parabolical,
opposite to that which we last mentioned: for that tendeth to
demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and
this other to retire and obscure it: that is, when the secrets and
mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables
or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorized. In
heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes
with great felicity; as in the fable that the giants being overthrown
in their war against the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge
thereof brought forth Fame:
Illam terra parens,
irâ irritata Deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent,
Coelo Enceladoque sororem Progenuit:
Expounded, that when
princes and monarchs have suppressed actual
and open rebels, then the malignity of the people, which is the
mother of rebellion, doth bring forth libels and slanders, and
taxations of the states, which is of the same kind with rebellion,
but more feminine. So in the fable, that the rest of the gods having
conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his hundred
hands to his aid: expounded, that monarchies need not fear any
curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as by wisdom
they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come in on
their side. So in the fable, that Achilles was brought up under
Chiron the Centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, expounded
ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the
education and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the
part of the lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in
virtue and justice. [--] Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I
do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised,
than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. For I
find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself
with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the
fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and
fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose
no opinion. [--] Surely of those poets which are now extant, even
Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the
latter schools of the Grecians), yet I should without any difficulty
pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning;
but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy
to alarm; for he was not the inventor of many of them.
5. In this third part of
learning, which is poesy, I can report no
deficience, For being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the
earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad
more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for
the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we
are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers' works; and for
wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators' harangue. But it is
not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the
judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to approach and
view with more reverence and attention.
V. 1. The knowledge of
man is as the waters, some descending from
above, and some springing from beneath; the one informed by the light
of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. [--] The light of
nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of the
senses: for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is
cumulative and not original; as in a water that besides his own
spring-head is fed with other springs and streams. So then, according
to these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first
of all divided into divinity and philosophy.
2. In Philosophy, the
contemplations of man do either penetrate
unto God, -- or are circumferred to nature,-- or are reflected or
reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise
three knowledges, divine philosophy, natural philosophy, and human
philosophy or humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with
this triple character of the power of God, the difference of nature
and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of
knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so
touch but in a point; but are like branches of a tree, that meet in a
stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and
continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms
and boughs: therefore it is good, before we enter into the former
distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the
name of PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, primitive or summary philosophy, as the
main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide
themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or no,
I stand doubtful. [--] For I find a certain rhapsody of natural
theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural
philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that other part of
natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit; all these
strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me
rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto
some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself.
[--] Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is
current, that the same things are handled but in several respects. As
for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in
notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature; the one in
appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference better
made than pursued. For if they had considered quantity, similitude,
diversity, and the rest of those extern characters of things, as
philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force have been of
a far other kind than they are. [34] [--] For doth any of them, in
handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it
multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in
nature are so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, and
in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity,
assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more
like, but move to the lode-stone, which is less like? Why in all
diversities of things there should be certain participles in nature,
which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But
there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of
those common adjuncts of things, as in nature: and only a resuming
and repeating of the force and use of them in speech or argument.
[--] Therefore, because in a writing of this nature, I avoid all
subtility, my meaning touching this original or universal philosophy
is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative: THAT IT BE A
RECEPTACLE FOR ALL SUCH PROFITABLE OBSERVATIONS AND AXIOMS AS FALL
NOT WITHIN THE COMPASS OF ANY OF THE SPECIAL PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY OR
SCIENCES, BUT ARE MORE COMMON AND OF A HIGHER STAGE.
3. Now that there are
many of that kind need not to be doubted. For
example: is not the rule, SI INAEQUALIBUS AEQUALIA ADDAS, OMNIA ERUNT
INAEQUALIA, an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? and
is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive
justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other
rule, QUAE IN EODEM TERTIO CONVENIUNT, ET INTER SE CONVENIUNT, a rule
taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms
are built upon it? Is not the observation, OMNIA MUTANTUR, NIL
INTERIT, a contemplation in philosophy thus, that the quantum of
nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth the
same Omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made
nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, DIDICI QUOD OMNIA
OPERA, QUAE FECIT DEUS, PERSERVERENT IN PERPETUA; NON POSSOMUS EIS
QUICQUAM ADDERE NEC AUFERRE. Is not the ground, which Machiavel
wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way
to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them AD PRINCIPIA, a
rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil administration? Was
not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles
and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of governments?
Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh
accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection. Is
not the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence,
common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not
the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the
playing of light upon the water?
--------------Splendet
tremulo sub lumine pontus.
Are not the organs of the
senses of one kind with the organs of
reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait
determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of
narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of
nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. [--]
This science, therefore, as I understand it, I may justly report as
deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits in
handling some particular argument will now and then draw a bucket of
water out of this well for their present use; but the spring-head
thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited; being of so excellent
use, both for the disclosing of nature, and the abridgment of art.
VI.1. This science being
therefore first placed as a common parent,
like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue,
Omnes Coelicolas, omnes
supera alta tenentes,
we may return to the
former distribution of the three philosophies,
divine, natural, and human. [--] And as concerning divine philosophy
or natural theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge
concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of His
creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed drwe in respect of the
object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this
knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to
inform religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God
to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him
to confess a God: but miracles have been wrought to convert idolators
and the superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to
declare the will and true worship of God. [--] For as all works do show
forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image; so it is
of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the
Maker, but not His image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion
differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be
the image of God, and man to be an exact or compendious image of the
world, but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world
that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the work of His
hands neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man:
wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and perforce the
acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, and
goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled
by divers.
But on the other side,
out of the contemplation of nature, or
ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion
concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe: DA FIDEI
QUAE FIDEI SUNT. For the heathens themselves conclude as much in that
excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: THAT MEN AND GODS
WERE NOT ABLE TO DRAW JUPITER DOWN TO THE EARTH; BUT CONTRARIWISE,
JUPITER WAS ABLE TO DRAW THEM UP TO HEAVEN. [--] So as we ought not
to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason;
but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth.
So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so
far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess: whereunto I
have digressed because of the extreme [35] prejudice which both
religion and philosophy have received and may receive, by being
commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical
religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.
2. Otherwise it is of the
nature of angels and spirits, which is an
appendix of theology both divine and natural, and is neither
inscrutable nor interdicted; for although the Scripture saith, LET NO
MAN DECEIVE YOU IN SUBLIME DISCOURSE TOUCHING THE WORSHIP OF ANGELS,
PRESSING INTO THAT HE KNOWETH NOT, ETC., yet notwithstanding, if you
observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two
things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of
them, either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of
a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them further than he
hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out
of the passages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of
nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, the
conversing with them or the employment of them is prohibited, much
more any veneration towards them; but the contemplation or science of
their nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or
reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, WE
ARE NOT IGNORANT OF HIS STRATAGEMS. And it is no more unlawful to
inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of
poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. But this
part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many
have occupied themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many
of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.
VII. 1. Leaving therefore
divine philosophy or natural theology
(not Divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of
all, as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations), we will
now proceed to natural philosophy.
If then it be true that
Democritus said, THAT THE TRUTH OF NATURE
LIETH HID IN CERTAIN DEEP MINES AND CAVES, and if it be true likewise
that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second
nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which
nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide
natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace: and to make two
professions or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be
pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer:
and surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more
familiar and scholastical terms; namely, that these be the two parts
of natural philosophy, -- the inquisition of causes, and the
production of sects; speculative, and operable; natural science and
natural prudence. [--] For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of
discourse and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. And here I
will make a request, that for the latter, or at least for a part
thereof, I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of
natural magic, which, in the true sense, is but natural wisdom, or
natural prudence; taken according to the ancient acception, purged
from vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I know it
well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as
both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great
connection between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful
natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and
descendent; ascending from experiments to the invention of causes,
and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments;
therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally
considered and handled.
2. Natural science or
theory is divided into physique and
metaphysiqme: wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the
word metaphysique in a differing sense from that that is received:
and in like manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of
judgment, that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my
conception and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious
to keep the ancient terms. [--] For hoping well to deliver myself
from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do
propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little
from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth
and the proficience of knowledge. [--] And herein I cannot a little
marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a
spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity:
undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but
to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom: insomuch as he never
nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and
reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he
took the right course. [--] For certainly there cometh to pass and
hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the
highest truth: VENI IN NOMINE PATRIS, NEC RECIPITIS ME; SI QUIS
VENERIT IN NOMINE SUO EUM RECIPIETIS. But in this divine aphorism,
(considering to whom it was applied, namely to Antichrist, the
highest deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming in a man's own
name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of
truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an EUM
RECIPIETIS. [--] But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will
think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom,
it seemeth, he did emulate, the one to conquer all opinions, as the
other to conquer all nations; wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may
at some men's hands that are of a bitter disposition get a like title
as his scholar did:
Felix terrarum praedo,
non utile mundo
Editus exemplum, etc.
So
Felix doctrinae praedo.
But to me, on the other
side, that do desire as much as lieth in my
pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and
proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity USQUE AD
ARAS; and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes
alter the uses and definitions; according to [36] the moderate
proceeding in civil government; where although there be some
alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, EADEM
MAGISTRATUUM VOCABULA.
3. To return therefore to
the use and acceptation of the term
Metaphysique, as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that
which hath been already said, that I intend PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA,
Summary Philosophy, and Metaphysique, which heretofore have been
confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For the one I have made
as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I have
now brought in as a branch or descendent of natural science. It
appeareth likewise that I have assigned to Summary Philosophy the
common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to
several sciences: I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry
touching the operation of the relative and adventive characters of
essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the
rest: with this distinction and provision; that they be handled as
they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth
likewise that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been handled
confusedly with Metaphysique, I have inclosed and bounded by itself.
[--] It is therefore now a question which is left remaining for
Metaphysique; wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of
the conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate that which
is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and Metaphysique that
which is abstracted and fixed. [--] And again, that Physique should
handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and
Metaphysique should handle that which supposeth further in nature a
reason, understanding, and platform. But the difference,
perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. [--] For as
we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes,
and productions of sects: so that part which concerneth the inquiry
of causes we do subdivide according to the received and found
division of causes; the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and
handleth the material and scient causes; and the other, which is
Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final causes.
4. Physique, taking it
according to the derivation, and not
according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle term or
distance between Natural History and Metaphysique. For natural
history describeth the variety of things; physique, the causes, but
variable or respective causes; and metaphysique, the fixed and
constant causes.
Limus ut hic durescit, et
haec ut cera liquescit,
Uno eodemque igni:
Fire is the cause of
induration, but respective to clay; fire is
the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but fire is no
constant cause either of induration or colliquation: so then the
physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. [--] Physique
hath three parts; whereof two respect nature united or collected, the
third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. [--] Nature is
collected either into one entire total, or else into the same
principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the
contexture or configuration of things, as DE MUNDO, DE UNIVERSITATE
RERUM. [--] The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or
originals of times. [--] The third is the doctrine concerning all
variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing
substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there
needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss, or
paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of natural history. [--] Of
these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or
perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment; but they
are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.
5. For Metaphysique, we
have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal
and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may
seem to be nugatory and void; because of the received and inveterate
opinion that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out
essential Forms or true differences: of which opinion we will take
this hold, that the invention of Forms is of all other parts of
knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found.
[--] As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think
there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. [--] But it is
manifest that Plato, in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a wit
of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry, THAT FORMS WERE THE
TRUE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by
considering of Forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not
confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon
theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. [--] But
if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon
action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take
notice what are the Forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and
important to the state of man. For as to the forms of substances, man
only except, of whom it is said, FORMAVIT HOMINEM DE LIMO TERRE, ET
SPIRAVIT IN FACIEM EJUS SPIRACULUM VITAE, and not as of all other
creatures, PRODUCANT AQUAE, PRODUCAT TERRA; the Forms of substances,
I say, as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied,
are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more than it
were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the Forms of
those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition
of letters are infinite. [--] But, on the other side, to inquire the
Form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily
comprehensible; and being known, induceth and manifesteth the Forms
of all words, which consist and are compounded of them. In the same
manner to inquire the Form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of
water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the forms of sense,
of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and
levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures
and [37] qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of
which the essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to
inquire, I say, the true Forms of these, is that part of metaphysique
which we now define of. [--] Not but that Physic doth make inquiry,
and take consideration of the same natures: but how? Only as to the
material and scient causes of them, and not as to the Forms. For
example; if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and
it be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and water
is:he cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the form
of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but
VEHICULUM FORMAE. [--] This part of Metaphysique I do not find
laboured and performed: whereat I marvel not; because I hold it not
possible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been
used; in regard that men, which is the root of all error, have made
too untimely a departure and too remote a recess from particulars.
6. But the use of this
part of Metaphysique, which I report as
deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the
one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge
the infinity of individual experience, as much as the conception of
truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of VITA BREVIS, ARS
LONGA; which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of
sciences: for knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the
basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the
stage next the basis is physique; the stage next the vertical point
is metaphysique. As for the vertical point, OPUS QUOD OPERATUR DEUS A
PRINCIPIO USQUE AD FINEM, the summary law of nature, we know not
whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true
stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than
the giant's hills:
Ter sunt conati imponere
Pelio Ossam,
Scilicet atque Ossae frondosum involvere Olympum.
But to those who refer
all things to the glory of God, they are as
the three acclamations, SANCTE, SANCTE, SANCTE! holy in the
description or dilatation of His works; holy in the connection or
concatenation of them: and holy in the union of them in a perpetual
and uniform law. [--] And therefore the speculation was excellent in
Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all
things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge is
worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity; which appeareth
to be metaphysique; as that which considereth the simple Forms or
differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and
co-ordinations whereof make all this variety.
The second respect, which
valueth and commendeth this part of
metaphysique, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the
greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physique
carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents
of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature; but
LATAE UNDIQUE SUNT SAPIENTIBOS VIAE: to sapience, which was anciently
defined to be RERUM DIVINARUM ET HUMANARUM SCIENTIA, there is ever
choice of means. For physical causes give light to new invention in
SIMILI MATERIA; but whosoever knoweth any Form, knoweth the utmost
possibility of super-inducing that nature upon any variety of matter;
and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of the
matter, or the condition of the efficient; which kind of knowledge
Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sort, elegantly describeth:
NON ARCTABUNTUR GRESSUS TUI, ET CURRENS NON HABEBIS OFFENDICULUM. The
ways of sapience are not much liable either to particularity or
chance.
7.The second part of
metaphysique is the inquiry of final causes,
which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet
if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it: for order
is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of
sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a
great improficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of
final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath
intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical
causes, and given men the ccasion to stay upon these satisfactory and
specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further
discovery. [--] For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever
anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others which
do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. FOR TO
SAY THAT THE HAIRS OF THE EYELIDS ARE FOR A QUICKSET AND FENCE ABOUT
THE SIGHT; or that THE FIRMNESS OF THE SKINS AND HIDES OF LIVING
CREATURES IS TO DEFEND THEM FROM THE EXTREMITIES OF HEAT OR COLD; or
that THE BONES ARE FOR THE COLUMNS OR BEAMS, WHEREUPON THE FRAMES OF
THE BODIES OF LIVING CREATURES ARE BUILT: or that THE LEAVES OF TREES
ARE FOR PROTECTING OF THE FRUIT; or that THE CLOUDS ARE FOR WATERING
OF THE EARTH; or that THE SOLIDNESS OF THE EARTH IS FOR THE STATION
AND MANSION OF LIVING CREATURES and the like, is well inquired and
collected in metaphysique, but in physique they are impertinent. Nay,
they are indeed but REMORAE, and hindrances to stay and slug the ship
from further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search
of the physical causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence.
[--] And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and some
others (who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things,
but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite
essays or proofs of nature, which they term FORTUNE) seemeth to me,
as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto
us, in particularities of physical causes, more real and better
inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled
final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part
of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those
persons. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be
inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their
excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness
and [38] solitude in that track. For otherwise, keeping their
precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there
is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause
rendered, that THE HAIRS ABOUT THE EYE-LIDS ARE FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF
THE SIGHT, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that PILOSITY IS
INCIDENT TO ORIFICES OF MOISTURE; MUSCOSI FONTES, etc. Nor the cause
rendered, THAT THE FIRMNESS OF HIDES IS FOR THE ARMOUR OF THE BODY
AGAINST EXTREMITIES OF HEAT OR COLD, doth not impugn the cause
rendered, THAT CONTRACTION OF PORES IS INCIDENT TO THE OUTWARDEST
PARTS, IN REGARD OF THEIR ADJACENCE TO FOREIGN OR UNLIKE BODIES: and
so of the rest: both causes being true and compatible, the one
declaring an intention, the other a consequence only. [--] Neither
doth this call in question, or derogate from Divine Providence, but
highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the
greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the instruments
of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose,
so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that
imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God
more admirable, when nature intendeth one thing, and Providence
draweth forth another, than if He communicated to particular
creatures and motions the characters and impressions of His Providence.
And thus much for metaphysique: the latter part whereof I allow as
extant, but with it confined to his proper place.
VIII. 1. Nevertheless
there remaineth yet another part of Natural
Philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part and holdeth rank
with Physique special and Metaphysique, which is Mathematique; but I
think it more agreeable to the nature of things and to the light of
order to place it as a branch of Metaphysique: for the subject of it
being quantity (not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and
belongeth to PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, as hath been said, but quantity
determined or proportionable) it appeareth to be one of the essential
Forms of things; as that that is causative in nature of a number of
effects; insomuch as we see, in the schools both of Democritus and of
Pythagoras, that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of
things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the principles and
originals of things: and it is true also that of all other Forms, as
we understand Forms, it is the most abstracted and separable from
matter, and therefore most proper to Metaphysique; which hath
likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured and inquired
than any of the other Forms, which are more immersed in matter. [--]
For it being the nature of the mind of man, to the extreme prejudice
of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as
in a champain region, and not in the inclosures of particularity; the
Mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy
that appetite. [--] But for the placing of this science, it is not
much material: only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to
observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon
another.
2. The Mathematics are
either pure or mixed. To the Pure
Mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle quantity
determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural philosophy;
and these are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling quantity
continued, and the other dissevered. [--] Mixed hath for subject some
axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth quantity
determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. [--] For many
parts of nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtilty, nor
demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated unto use
with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of the
mathematics; of which sort are perspective, music, astronomy,
cosmography, architecture, enginery, and divers others.
In the Mathematics I can
report no deficience, except it be that
men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of the Pure
Mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit
and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen
it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they
abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of
great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put
itself into all postures; so in the Mathematics, that use which is
collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is
principal and intended. [--] And as for the Mixed Mathematics, I may
only make this prediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of
them, as nature grows further disclosed. Thus much of Natural
Science, or the part of nature speculative.
3. For Natural Prudence,
or the part operative of Natural
Philosophy, we will divide it into three parts, experimental,
philosophical, and magical; which three parts active have a
correspondence and analogy with the three parts speculative, natural
history, physique, and metaphysique: for many operations have been
invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and occurrence, sometimes
by a purposed experiment: and of those which have been found by an
intentional experiment, some have been found out by varying or
extending the same experiments, some by transferring and compounding
divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of invention an
empiric may manage.
Again, by the knowledge
of physical causes there cannot fail to
follow many indications and designations of new particulars, if men
in their speculation will keep one eye upon use and practice. But
these are but coastings along the shore, PREMENDO LITTUS INIQUUM: for
it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any radical or
fundamental alterations and innovations in nature, either by the
fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of
physical causes. [--] If therefore we have reported Metaphysique
deficient, it must follow that we do the like of natural Magic, which
hath relation thereunto. For as for the Natural Magic whereof now
there is mention in books, containing certain credulous and
superstitious conceits [39] and observations of sympathies and
antipathies, and hidden properties, and some frivolous experiments,
strange rather by disguisement than in themselves; it is as far
differing in truth of nature from such a knowledge as we require, as
the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bordeaux, divers from
Caesar's Commentaries in truth of story. For it is manifest that
Caesar did greater things DE VERO than those imaginary heroes were
feigned to do; but he did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this
kind of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to
enjoy Juno, the goddess of power; and instead of her had copulation
with a cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras.
[--] So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations,
instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes
and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes.
And therefore we may note
in these sciences which hold so much of
imagination and belief, as this degenerate Natural Magic, Alchemy,
Astrology, and the like, that in their propositions the description
of the mean is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. [--] For
it is a thing more probable, that he that knoweth well the natures of
weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile, in respect of the hammer, of
volatile and fixed in respect of the fire and the rest, may
superinduce upon some metal the nature and Form of gold by such
mechanique as belongeth to the production of the natures afore
rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine projected should in
a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material
into gold: so it is more probable that he that knoweth the nature of
arefaction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing
nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, the manner
of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and solid
parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines,
motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore some degree of youth
or vivacity, than that it can be done with the use of a few drops or
scruples of a liquor or receipt. To conclude, therefore, the true
Natural Magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation
which dependeth upon the knowledge of Forms, I may report deficient,
as the relative thereof is.
To which part, if we be
serious, and incline not to vanities and
plausible discourse, besides the deriving and deducing the operations
themselves from Metaphysique, there are pertinent two points of much
purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other by way of caution:
the first is, that there be made a kalendar, resembling an inventory
of the estate of man, containing all the inventions, being the works
or fruits of nature or art, which are now extant, and whereof man is
already possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note, what
things are yet held impossible, or not invented: which kalendar will
be the more artificial and serviceable, if to every reputed
impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest
in degree to that impossibility; to the end that by these optatives
and potentials man's inquiry may be more awake in deducing direction
of works from the speculation of causes: and secondly, that those
experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present
use, but those principally which are of most universal consequence
for invention of other experiments, and those which give most light
to the invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner's
needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for
navigation than the invention of the sails which give the motion.
4. Thus have I passed
through Natural Philosophy, and the
deficiencies thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and
received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction; for my
part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it
be truth,
Non canimus surdis,
respondent omnia sylvae.
The voice of nature will
consent, whether the voice of man do or
no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the
French for Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark
up their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better
that entry of truth which cometh peaceably, with chalk to mark up
those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which
cometh with pugnacity and contention.'
5. But there remaineth a
division of natural philosophy according
to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or
subject; and that is positive and considerative; when the inquiry
reporteth either an assertion or a doubt. These doubts or NON LIQUETS
are of two sorts, particular and total. For the first, we see a good
example thereof in Aristotle's Problems, which deserved to have had a
better continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof
warning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts hath two
excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and
falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not collected
into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but reserved in
doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or
sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that which, if doubts
had not preceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it over
without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts, is made
to be attended and applied. But both these commodities do scarcely
countervail an inconvenience which will intrude itself, if it be not
debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour
rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it; and
accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar example in
lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once admitted a doubt,
it goeth ever after authorised for a doubt. But that use of wit and
knowledge is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things
certain, and not those which labour to make certain things doubtful.
[--] Therefore these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent
things; so that [40] there be this caution used, that when they be
thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth
omitted, decarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men in
doubting. To which kalendar of doubts or problems, I advise be
annexed another kalendar, as much or more material, which is a
calendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly in natural history, such
as pass in speech and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently
detected and convicted of untruth: that man's knowledge be not
weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity.
As for the doubts or NON
LIQUETS general, or in total, I understand
those differences of opinions touching the principles of nature, and
the fundamental points of the same, which have caused the diversity
of sects, schools, and philosophies, as that of Empedocles,
Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. For although
Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought
he could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all his
brethren; yet to those that seek Truth and not magistrality, it
cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see before them the
several opinions touching the foundations of nature: not for any
exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the same
phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by the received astronomy of the
diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the planets, with their
eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus,
who supposed the earth to move (and the calculations are
indifferently agreeable to both), so the ordinary face and view of
experience is many times satisfied by several theories and
philosophies; whereas to find the real truth requireth another manner
of severity and attention. For as Aristotle saith, that children at
the first will call every woman mother, but afterward they come to
distinguish according to truth, so experience, if it be in childhood,
will call every philosophy mother, but when it cometh to ripeness, it
will discern the true mother. So as in the meantime it is good to see
the several glasses and opinions upon nature, whereof, it may be,
every one in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows:
therefore I with some collection to be made, painfully and
understandingly, DE ANTIQUIS PHILOSOPHIIS, out of all the possible
light which remaineth to us of them: which kind of work I find
deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be done distinctly
and severally; the philosophies of every one throughout by
themselves; and not by titles packed and fagotted up together, as
hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philosophy in
itself which giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be singled
and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as when I read
in Tacitus the actions of Nero, or Claudius, with circumstances of
times, inducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but
when I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and
bundles, and not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and
incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and
dismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of latter
times to be likewise represented in this kalendar of sects of
philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced
into a harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane: and that of Telesius
and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of
sense, but of no great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who, though
he pretended not to make any new philosophy, yet did use the
absoluteness of his own sense upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our
countryman, who revived, with some alterations and demonstrations,
the opinions of Xenophanes: and any other worthy to be admitted.
6. Thus have we now dealt
with two of the three beams of man's
knowledge; that is, RADIUS DIRECTUS, which is referred to nature;
RADIUS REFRACTUS, which is referred to God, and cannot report truly
because of the inequality of the MEDIUM. There resteth RADIUS
REFLEXUS, whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth himself.
IX. 1. We come therefore
now to that knowledge whereunto the
ancient oracle directeth us, which is the KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES; which
deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth
us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural
philosophy in the intention of man, so nothwithstanding it is but a
portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature: and
generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges be
accepted; rather for lines and veins than for sections and
separations; and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be
preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to
become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they have not been
nourished and maintained from the common fountain. So we see Cicero
the orator complained of Socrates and his school that he was the
first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric
became an empty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of
Copernicus touching the rotation of the earh, which astronomy itself
cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the phenomena,
yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see also that the science
of medicine, if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy,
it is not much better than an empirical practice. [--] With this
reservation therefore we proceed to human philosophy or humanity,
which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate or
distributively; the other congregate or in society. So as human
philosophy is either simple and particular, or conjugate and civil.
Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man
consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the body, and of
knowledges which respect the mind. But before we distribute so far, it
is good to constitute. For I do take the consideration in general and
at large of human nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a
knowledge by itself: not so much in regard of those delightful and
elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of man, of his
miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his [41]
common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge
concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body,
which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of
either.
2. This knowledge hath
two branches: for as all leagues and amities
consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so this league of
mind and body hath these two parts; how the one discloseth the other,
and how the one worketh upon the other; discovery and impression.
[--] The former of these hath begotten two arts, both of prediction
or prenotion; whereof the one is honoured with the inquiry of
Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. And although they have of
later time been used to be coupled with superstitious and fantastical
arts, yet being purged and restored to their true state, they have
both of them a solid ground in nature, and a profitable use in life.
The first is physiognomy, which discovereth the disposition of the
mind by the lineaments of the body: the second is the exposition of
natural dreams, which discovereth the state of the body by the
imaginations of the mind. In the former of these I note a deficience.
For Aristotle hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the factures
of the body, but not the gestures of the body, which are no less
comprehensible by art, and of greater use and advantage. For the
lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition and indination of
the mind in general; but the motions of the countenance and parts do
not only so, but do further disclose the present humour and state of
the mind and will. For as your majesty saith most aptly and
elegantly, AS THE TONGUE SPEAKETH TO THE EAR SO THE GESTURE SPEAKETH
TO THE EYE. And therefore a number of subtle persons, whose eyes do
dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well know the advantage
of this observation, as being most part of their ability; neither can
it be denied, but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and
a great direction in business.
3. The latter branch,
touching impression, hath not been collected
into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same
relation or antistrophe that the former hath. For the consideration
is double: either how, and how far the humours and sects of the body
do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far the
passions or apprehensioos of the mind do alter or work upon the body.
The former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part and
appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or
superstition: for the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in
phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibit
medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify
the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like: but the scruples
and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the body in the sect
of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law
of Mohomet, do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial
law, interdicting the eating of the blood and the fat, distinguishing
between beasts clean and unclean for meat, are many and strict. Nay
the faith itself being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony,
yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences, and other macerations
and humiliations of the body, as things real, and not figurative. The
root and life of all of which prescripts is, besides the ceremony,
the consideration of that dependency which the affections of the mind
are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the body. And if
any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of the mind
from the body doth either question the immortality, or derogate from
the sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught in easy instances that
the infant in the mother's womb is compatible with the mother and yet
separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his
servants and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge,
which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon
the body, we see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their
regiments to their patients, do ever consider ACCIDENTIA ANIMI as of
great force to further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and more
especially it is an inquiry of great depth and worth concerning
imagination, how and how far it altereth the body proper of the
imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it
followeth not it hath the same degree of power to help; no more than
a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent airs able
suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign
airs able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition of
this part is of great use, though it needeth, as Socrates said, A
DELIAN DIVER, being difficult and profound. But unto all this
knowledge DE COMMUNI VINCULO, of the concordances between the mind
and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary, which
considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of
the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; which
knowledge hath been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to
be much better inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the
understanding in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call
anger, having a greater mixture with pride) w the heart, and
concupiscence or sensuality in the later, deserveth not to de
despised; but much less to be allowed. So then we have constituted,
as in our own wish and advice, the inquiry touching human nature
entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be handled apart.
X.1. The knowledge that
concerneth man's body is divided as the
good of man's body is divided, unto which it referreth. The good of
man's body is of four kinds, Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleasure: so
the knowledges are Medicine, or art of Cure; art of Decoration, which
is called Cosmetic; art of Activity, which is called Athletic; and
art Voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth ERUDITUS LUXUS. This
subject of man's body is of all other things in nature most
susceptible of remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of
error. For the same subtility of the subject doth cause large
possibility and easy failing; and therefore the inquiry ought to be
the more exact.
[42] 2. To speak
therefore of Medicine, and to resume that we have
said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was
MICROCOSMUS, an abstract or model of the world, hath been
fantastically strained by Paracelsus' and the alchemists, as if there
were to be found in man's body certain correspondences and parallels,
which should have respect to all varieties of things, as stars,
planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus much
is evidently true, that of all substances which nature hath produced,
man's body is the most extremely compounded. For we see herbs and
plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for the most part by
herbs and fruits; man by the mesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs,
grains, fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, dressings, and
preparations of the several bodies, before they come to be his food
and aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a more simple order of
life, and less change of affections to work upon their bodies: whereas
man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite
variations: and it cannot be denied but that the Body of man of all
other things is of the most compounded mass. The Soul on the other
side is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed:
Purumque reliquit
Aethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem.
So that it is no marvel
though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if
that principle be true, that MOTUS RERUM EST RAPIDUS EXTRA LOCUM,
PLACIDUS IN LOCO. But to the purpose: this variable composition of
man's body hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and
therefore the poets did well to conjoin Music and Medicine in Apollo,
because the office of Medicine is but to tune this curious harp of
man's body and to reduce it to harmony. So then the subject being so
variable, hath made the art by consequence more conjectural; and the
art being conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left for
imposture. For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts,
or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and
events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not
by the issue of the cause; the master of the ship is judged by the
directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage;
but the physician, and perhaps the politique, hath no particular acts
demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event; which
is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell if a patient die or
recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or
accident? And therefore many times the impostor is prized, and the
man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see the weakness and credulity of men is
such, as they will often prefer a mountebank or witch before a
learned physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in
discerning this extreme folly, when they made Aesculapius and Circe
brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses,
Ipse repertorem medicine
talis et artis
Fulmine PHOEBIGENAM Stygias detrusit ad undas:
And again,
Dives inaccessos ubi
SOLIS FILIA lucos, etc.
For in all times, in the
opinion of the multitude, witches and old
women and impostors have had a competition with physicians. And what
followeth? Even this, that physicians say to themselves as Salomon
expresseth it upon a higher occasion; IF IT BEFALL TO ME AS BEFALLETH
TO THE FOOLS, WHY SHOULD I LABOUR TO BE MORE WISE? And therefore I
cannot much blame physicians, that they use commonly to intend some
other art or practice, which they fancy more than their profession.
For you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen,
merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than in their
profession; and no doubt upon this ground, that they find that
mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit
or reputation towards their fortune; for the weakness of patients,
and sweetness of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend upon
physicians with all their defects. But nevertheless, these things
which we have spoken of, are courses begotten between a little
occasion, and a great deal of sloth and default; for if we will
excite and awake our observation, we shall see in familiar instances
what a predominant faculty the subtilty of spirit hath over the
variety of matter or form: nothing more variable than faces and
countenances: yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of
them; nay, a painter with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of
his eye and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever
have been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him: nothing
more variable than voices; yet men can likewise discern them
personally: nay, you shall have a buffoon or PANTOMIMUS, who will
express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the
differing sounds of words; yet men have found the way to reduce them
to a few simple letters. So that it is not the insufficiency or
incapacity of man's mind, but it is the remote standing or placing
thereof, that breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions: for as the
sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it
of the understanding; the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or
strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and therefore
there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the true
approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet
saith:
Et quoniam variant morbi,
variabimus artes;
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.
Which that they should
do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve;
well shadowed by the poets, in that they made Aesculapius to be the
son of the sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as the
second stream: but infinitely more honoured by the example of our
Saviour, who made the body of man the object of His miracles, as the
soul was the object of His doctrine. For we read not that ever He
vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money, except that one
for giving tribute to Caesar; but only about the preserving,
sustaining, and healing the body of man.
3. Medicine is a science
which hath been, as we [43], more
professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the
labour having been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in
progression. For I find much iteration, but small addition. It
considereth causes of diseases, with the occasions or compulsions;
the diseases themselves, with the accidents; and the cares, with the
preservations. The deficiencies which I think good to note, being a
few of many, and those such as are of a more open and manifest
nature, I will enumerate, and not place.
4. The first is the
discontinuance of the ancient and serious
diligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the
special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they
were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having an example proper
in the father of the art, I shall not need to allege an example
foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are careful to report new
cases and decisions for the direction of future judgments. This
continuance of medicinal history I find deficient; which I understand
neither to be so infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so
reserved as to admit none but wonders: for many things are new in the
manner, which are not new in the kind; and if men will intend to
observe, they shall find much worthy to observe.
5. In the inquiry which
is made by Anatomy, I find much deficience:
for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and
collocations; but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts,
the secrecies of the passages, and the seats or nestlings of the
humoors, nor much of the footsteps and impressions of diseases: the
reason of which omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry
may be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies: but the
latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the view of
many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the
facture or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as
the outward, and in that is the CAUSE CONTINENT of many diseases;
which not being observed, they quarrel many times with humours, which
are not in fault; the fault beings in the very frame and mechanic of
the part, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must be
accommodate and palliate by diets and medicines familiar. As for the
passages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, that the
more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, because they are shut
and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in live:
which being supposed, though the inhumanity of ANATOMIA VIVORUM was
by Celsus justly reproved; yet in regard of the great use of this
observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been
relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of
surgery; but mought have been well diverted upon the dissection of
beasts alive, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts,
may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are
commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; whereas it is most
necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and recptacles the
humours do find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour
so lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases and
their devastations of the inward parts, imposthumations,
exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions,
contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, obstructions,
repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as stones,
carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have
been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the contribution
of men's several experiences, and carefully set down, both
historically, according to the appearances, and artificially, with a
reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, in
case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now, upon
opening of bodies, they are passed over slightly and in silence,
6. In the inquiry of
diseases, they do abandon the cures of many,
some as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of
cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men to
die, as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape
with less difficulty than they did in the Roman proscriptions.
Therefore I will not doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire
not the perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases;
but pronouncing them incurable, do enact a law of neglect, and exempt
ignorance from discredit.
7. Nay, further, I esteem
it the office of a physician not only to
restore health, but to mitigate pain and dours; and not only when
such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when. it may serve to
make a fair and easy passage: for it is no small felicity which
Augustus Cesar was wont to wish to himself, that same Euthanasia; and
which was especially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose
death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant
sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was
judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large
draught and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made,
HINC STYGIAS EBRIUS HAUSIT AQUAS, he was not sober enough to taste
any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians contrariwise
do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after
the disease is deplored; whereas, in my judgment, they ought both to
inquire the skill and to give the attendances for the facilitating
and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death.
8. In the consideration
of the cures of diseases, I find a
deficience in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular
cures and diseases: for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of
tradition and experience by their magistralities, in adding, and
taking out, and changing QUID PRO QUO, in their receipts at their
pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as the medicine cannot
command over the diseases: for except it be treacle and MITHRIDATUM,
and of late DIASCORDIUM, and a few more, they tie themselves to no
receipts severely and religiously: for [44] as to the confections of
sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness and not for
propriety; for they are upon general intention of purging, opening,
comforting, altering, and not much appropriate to particular
diseases: and this is the cause why empirics and old women are more
happy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because they
are more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the
deficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of
their own practice, partly out of the constant probations reported in
books, and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and
delivered over certain experimental medicines for the cure of
particular diseases, besides their own conjectural and magistral
descriptions. For as they were the men of the best composition in the
state of Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the people, or
being tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the matter we now handle,
they be the best physicians, which being learned incline to the
traditions of experience, or being empirics incline to the methods of
learning.
9. In preparation of
medicines, I do find strange, especially
considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they
are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought
to make an imitation by art of natural baths and medicinable
fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to receive their virtues
from minerals: and not so only, but discerned and distinguished from
what particular mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol,
steel, or the like; which nature, if it may be reduced to
compositions of art, both the variety of them will be increased, and
the temper of them will be more commanded.
10. But lest I grow to be
more particular than is agreeable either
to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the
note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest
consequence; which is, that the prescripts in use are too compendious
to attain their end: for, to my understanding, it is a vain and
flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign or so
happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any great effect
upon the body of man. It were a strange speech, which spoken, or
spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by
nature subject: it is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of
application, which is mighty in nature; which although it require more
exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience in
observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects. And
although a man would think, by the daily visitations of the
physicians, that there were a pursuance in the cure: yet let a man
look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them
but inconstancies and every day's devices, without any settled
providence or project. Not that every scrupulous or superstitious
prescript is effectual, no more than every straight way is the way to
heaven; but the truth of the direction must precede severity of
observance.
11. For Cosmetic, it hath
parts civil, and parts effeminate: for
cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence
to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration,
it is well worthy of the deficiencies which it hath; being neither
fine enough to deceive, nor to use, nor wholesome to please.
12. For Athletic, I take
the subject of it largely, that is to say,
for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought,
whether it be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two
parts, strength and softness; and patience likewise hath two parts,
hardness against wants and extremities, and endurance of paw or
torment; whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, and in
those that suffer punishment: nay, if there be any other faculty
which falls not within any of the former divisions, as in those that
dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the
like, I refer to it this part. Of these things the practices are
known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired;
the rather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained, either
by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by continual
custom, which is soon prescribed: which though it be not true, yet I
forbear to note any deficiencies: for the Olympian games are down
long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; as for the
excellency of them it serveth for the most part but for mercenary
ostentation.
13. For arts of pleasure
sensual, the chief deficience in them is
of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that the
arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military;
and while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in
declination, are voluptuary; so I doubt that this age of the world is
somewhat upon the decent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple
practices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the
pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to
belong to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular
human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle
of the mind.
XI. 1. For Human
Knowledge which concerns the Mind, it hath two
parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul
or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions
thereof. [--] Unto the first of these, the considerations of the
original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far
it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof,
and many other points, do appertain: which have been not more
laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail
therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way.
But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really
and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold
that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be
subject to deceit and delusion: for as the substance of the soul in
the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven [45] and
earth by the benediction of a PRODUCAT but was immediately inspired
from God: so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by
accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the
subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature
and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the
substance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two
appendices; which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured
forth fables than kindled truth, Divination and Fascination.
2. Divination hath been
anciently and fitly divided into artificial
and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction
by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is when the
mind hath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement
of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts; either when the argument is
coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is
only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is
experimental: whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious;
such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of
sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such as
was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divination,
the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular
knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions,
aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his predictions
of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The
Politique hath his predictions; O URBEM VENALEM, ET CITO PERITURAM,
SI EMPTOREM INVENERIT! which stayed not long to be performed, in
Sylla first, and after in Cesar. So as these predictions are now
impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which
springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now
speak of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by
influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, that the mind,
when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into
the organs of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion;
which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near
death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and
furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind
most to consist in itself By infixion, is grounded upon the conceit
that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from
the foreknowledge of God and spirits: unto which the same regiment
doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself, is
the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions; save that
it is accompanied in this case with fervency and elevation, which the
ancients noted by fury, and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in
the other.
3. Fascination is the
power and act of imagination intentive upon
other bodies than the body of the imagination, for of that we spake
in the proper place: wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the
disciples of pretended Natural Magic have been so intemperate, as
they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with
the power of miracleworking faith; others, that draw nearer to
probability, calling to their view the secret passages of things, and
specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body, do
conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature, that there should
be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without
the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown, now
almost made civil, of the mastering spirit, and the force of
confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to
raise and fortify the imagination: for if the imagination fortified
have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it.
And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great
part of Ceremonial Magic. For it may be pretended that Ceremonies,
Characters, and Charms, do work, not by any tacit or sacramental
contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the
imagination of him that useth it: as images are said by the Roman
church to fix the cogitations, and raise the devotions of them that
pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that
imagination hath power, and that Ceremonies fortify imagination, and
that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose; yet
I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which
God gave unto man, IN SUDORE VULTUS COMEDES PANEM TUUM. For they
propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to be
bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and
slothful observances. Deficiencies in these knowledges I will report
none, other than the general deficience, that it is not known how
much of them is verity, and how much vanity.
XII. 1. The Knowledge
which respecteth the faculties of the mind of
man is of two kinds; the one respecting his Understanding and Reason,
and the other his Will, Appetite, and Affection; whereof the former
produceth Position or Decree, the latter Action or Execution. It is
true that the Imagination is an agent or NUNCIUS, in both provinces,
both the judicial and the ministerial. For Sense sendeth over to
Imagination before Reason have judged: and Reason sendeth over to
Imagination before the decree can be acted: for Imagination ever
precedeth Voluntary Motion. Saving that this Janus of Imagination hath
differing faces: for the face towards Reason hath the print of Truth,
but the face towards Action hath the print of Good; which
nevertheless are faces,
Quales decet esse sororum.
Neither is the
Imagination simply and only a messenger; but is
invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself,
besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle,
THAT THE MIND HATH OVER THE BODY THAT COMMANDMENT, WHICH THE LORD
HATH OVER A BONDMAN; BUT THAT REASON HATH OVER THE IMAGINATION THAT
COMMANDMENT WHICH A MAGISTRATE HATH OVER A FREE CITIZEN; who may
come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of Faith
and Religion, we raise our Imagination above our Reason; which is the
cause why Religion sought ever access to the mind by similitude,
types, parables, visions, dreams. And [46] again, in all persuasions
that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature,
which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief
recommendation unto Reason is from the Imagination. Nevertheless,
because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to
the Imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as
for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of Imagination, than a
work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such
parts of learning as the Imagination produceth, but of such sciences
as handle and consider of the Imagination; no more than we shall
speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth to
all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire the
faculty of reason: so as poesy had its true place. As for the power
of the Imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same,
we have mentioned it in the doctrine DE ANIMA, whereunto it most
fitly belongeth. And lastly, for Imaginative or Insinuative Reason,
which is the subject of Rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the
Arts of Reason. So therefore we content ourselves with the former
division, that human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of
the mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral.
2. The part of human
philosophy which is rational, is of all
knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful; and seemeth but a
net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that
knowledge is PABULUM ANIMI, so in the nature of men's appetite to
this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in
the desert, that would fain have returned AD OLLAS CARNIUM, and were
weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less
nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges
that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality,
policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes do turn
and are conversant; but this same LUMEN SICCUM doth parch and offend
most men's watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of things as
they are in worth, Rational Knowledges are the keys of all other
arts, for as Aristotle saith, aptly and elegantly, THAT THE HAND IS THE
INSTRUMENT OF INSTRUMENTS, AND THE MIND IS THE FORM OF FORMS: so
these be truly said to be the art of arts: neither do they only
direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen: even as the habit of
shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to
draw a stronger bow.
3. The Arts intellectual
are four in number; divided according to
the ends whereunto they are referred: for man's labour is to invent
that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is
invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that
which is retained. So as the arts must be four: Art of Inquiry or
Invention: Art of Examination or Judgment: Art of Custody or Memory:
and Art of Elocution or Tradition.
XIII. 1. Invention is of
two kinds, much differing: the one of Arts
and Sciences; and the other of Speech and Arguments. The former of
these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a
deficience as if in the making of an inventory touching the estate of
a defunct it should be set down THAT THERE IS NO READY MONEY. For as
money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that
which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had
never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle had not been
first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a
small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further
discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been
passed over.
2. That this part of
knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth
plainly confessed; for first, Logic doth not pretend to invent
sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a
CUIQUE IN SUA ARTE CREDENDUM. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely,
speaking of the Empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, THAT
MEDICINES AND CURES WERE FIRST FOUND OUT, AND THEN AFTER THE REASONS
AND CAUSES WERE DISCOURSED; AND NOT THE CAUSES FIRST FOUND OUT, AND
BY LIGHT FROM THEM THE MEDICINES AND CURES DISCOVERED. And Plato, in
his Theaetetus, noteth well, THAT PARTICULARS ARE INFINITE, AND THE
HIGHER GENERALITIES GIVE NO SUFFICIENT DIRECTION: AND THAT THE PITH
OF ALL SCIENCES, WHICH MAKETH THE ARTSMAN DIFFER FROM THE INEXPERT,
IS IN THE MIDDLE PROPOSITIONS, WHICH IN EVERY PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE
ARE TAKEN FROM TRADITION AND EXPERIENCE. And therefore we see, that
they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer
them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds ashes,
serpents, than to men.
Dictamnum genitrix
Cretaea carpit ab Ida, Puberibus caulem foliis
et flore comantem Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres haesere sagittae.
So that it was no marvel,
the manner of antiquity being to
consecrate inventors, that the Egyptians had so few human idols in
their temples, but almost all brute.
Omnigenumque Deum
monstra, et latrator Anubis,
Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, etc.
And if you like better
the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the
first inventions to men; yet you will rather believe that Prometheus
first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when
he first struck the flints he expected the spark: and therefore we
see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the
European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the
first occasion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are rather
beholding to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music,
or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew
open for artillery, or generally to chance, or anything else, than to
logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of
invention which Virgil describeth much other:
Ut varias usus meditando
extunderet artes
Paulatim.
For if you observe the
words well, it is no other method than that
which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a
perpetual intending [47] or practising some one thing, urged and
imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being; for so
Cicero saith very truly, USUS UNI REI DEDITUS ET NATURAM ET ARTEM
SAEPE VINCIT. And therefore if it be said of men,
Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas!
it is likewise said of
beasts,
Quis psittaco docuit suum
< xai=re > ?
Who taught the raven in a
drought to throw pebbles into a hollow
tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she
might come to it; Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea
of air, and to find the way from a field in flower a great way off to
her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she
burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then the
word EXTUNDERE, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word
PAULATIM, which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we
were, even amongst the Egyptians gods; there being little left to the
faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of
invention.
3. Secondly, the
Induction which the Logicians speak of, and which
seemeth familiar with Plato (whereby the Principles of Sciences may
be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by
derivation from the Principles), their form of induction, I say, is
utterly vicious and incompetent: wherein their error is the fouler,
because it is the duty of Art to perfect and exalt Nature; but they
contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced Nature. For he that
shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew
of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of,
Aërei mellis
coelestia dona,
distilling and contriving
it out of particulars natural and
artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that
the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much
better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of
particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a
conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects, upon those
particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the
contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon
those sons of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of
David, which was in the field. And this form, to say truth, is so
gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as have
managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they
hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and
scornful towards particulars; which their manner was to use but as
LICTORES and VIATORES, for sergeants and whifflers, AD SUMMOVENDAM
TURBAM, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in
their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man
with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are
the very same in divine and human truth: for as in divine truth man
cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the
attending the inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a second
infancy or childhood.
4. Thirdly, allow some
principles or axioms were rightly induced,
yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be
deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by
touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is
true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like,
yea, and divinity, (because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the
capacity of the simplest,) that form may have use; and in natural
philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, QUAE
ASSENSUM PARIT, OPERIS EFFOETA EST: but the subtlety of nature and
operations will not be enchained in those bonds: for arguments
consist of propositions, and propositions of words; and words are but
the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which
notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out particulars,
it is not the laborious examination either of consequence of
arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct
that error, being, as the physicians speak, in the first digestion:
and therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent
philosophers became Sceptics and Academics, and denied any certainty
of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the knowledge of
man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that
in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, SCIENTIAM
DISSIMULANDO SIMULAVIT, for he used to disable his knowledge, to the
end to enhance his knowledge: like the humour of Tiberius in his
beginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so much: and
in the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of
ACATALEPSIA, I doubt, was not held sincerely: for that all those
which excelled in copie of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as
that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable
discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure, than journeys
to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold it
in subtilty and integrity: but here was their chief error; they charged
the deceit upon the senses; which in my judgment, notwithstanding all
their cavilations, are very sufficient to certify and report truth
though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of
instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too
subtile for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and
other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon
the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of
collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I
speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek
help: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a
straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be
easily done by help of a ruler or compass.
5. This part of
invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I
purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested
it into two parts; whereof the one I term EXPERIENTIA LITERATA, and
the other INTERPRETATIO NATURAE: the former being but a degree and
rudiment of the latter. But [48] I will not dwell too long, nor speak
too great upon a promise.
6. The invention of
speech or argument is not properly an
invention, for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to
recover or resummon that which we already know: and the use of this
invention is no other but out of the knowledge whereof our mind is
already possessed to draw forth or call before us that which may be
pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as to
speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion,
with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it
after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless,
because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an inclosed park
as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name,
let it be called invention: so as it be perceived and discerned, that
the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of
our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.
7. To procure this ready
use of knowledge there are two courses,
Preparation and Suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a
part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any
artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully,
doth deride the Sophists near his time, saying, THEY DID AS IF ONE
THAT PROFESSED THE ART OF SHOE-MAKING SHOULD NOT TEACH HOW TO MAKE A
SHOE, BUT ONLY EXHIBIT IN A READINESS A NUMBER OF SHOES OF ALL
FASHIONS AND SIZES. But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker
should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he
should be weakly customed. But our Saviour speaking of divine
knowledge, saith, THAT THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN IS LIKE A GOOD
HOUSEHOLDER, THAT BRINGETH FORTH BOTH NEW AND OLD STORE: and we see
the ancient writers of Rhetoric do give it in precept: THAT PLEADERS
SHOULD HAVE THE PLACES, WHEREOF THEY HAVE MOST CONTINUAL USE, READY
HANDLED IN ALL THE VARIETY THAT MAY BE; as that, TO SPEAK FOR THE
LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW AGAINST EQUITY, AND CONTRARY; AND
TO SPEAK FOR PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES AGAINST TESTIMONY, AND
CONTRARY. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great
experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have
occasion to speak of, if he will take the pains, he may have it in
effect premeditate, and handled, IN THESI; so that when he cometh to
a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names and
times and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We see
likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the
great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a
good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations
and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may overweigh
Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a
pair of shears.
8. But the nature of the
collection of this provision or
preparatory store, though it be common both to Logic and Rhetoric,
yet having made an entry to it here, where it came first to be spoken
of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to Rhetoric.
9. The other part of
invention, which I term suggestion, doth
assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite
our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly
collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use,
truly taken, only to furnish argument to dispute probably with
others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright
within ourselves. Neither may these Places serve only to apprompt our
invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise
interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, WHOSOEVER
SEEKETH, KNOWETH THAT WHICH HE SEEKETH FOR IN A GENERAL NOTION: ELSE
HOW SHALL HE KNOW IT WHEN HE HATH FOUND IT? and therefore the larger
your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search.
But the same Places which will help us what to produce of that which
we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were
before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to
instruct us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot report
that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call
Topics, is deficient.'
10. Nevertheless, Topics
are of two sorts, general and special. The
general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by
some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But
leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools, which
is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their
command, and to reject the rest; I do receive particular Topics,
(that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every
particular knowledge,) as things of great use, being mixtures of
Logic with the matter of sciences; for in these it holdeth, ARS
INVENIENDI ADOLESCIT CUM INVENTIS; for as in going of a way, we do
not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the
better sight of that part of the way which remaineth: so every degree
of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth;
which light if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or
places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.
XIV. 1. Now we pass unto
the arts of Judgment, which handle the
natures of Proofs and Demonstrations; which as to Induction hath a
coincidence with Invention. For in all inductions, whether in good or
vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth;
all one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism;
for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the
mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another;
the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore for the real
and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have
spoken of interpretation of nature.
2. For the other judgment
by Syllogism, as it is a thing most
agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and
excellently laboured; for the nature of man doth extremely covet to
have somewhat in his understanding fixed and immovable, and as a rest
and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to
prove, that in all [49] motion there is some point quiescent; and as
he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed,
and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or
axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished; so
assuredly men have a desire to have an ATLAS or axle-tree within to
keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of
falling; therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about
which the variety of their disputations might turn.
3. So then this art of
Judgment is but the reduction of
propositions to principles in a middle term: the principles to be
agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle term to be
elected at the liberty of every man's invention; the reduction to be
of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when the proposition is
reduced to the principle, which they term a PROBATION OSTENSIVE; the
other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the
contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call PER
INCOMMODUM, or PRESSING AN ABSURDITY; the number of middle terms to
be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the
principle.
4. But this art hath two
several methods of doctrine, the one by
way of direction, the other by way of caution: the former frameth and
setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and
deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly
judged. Toward the composition and structure of which form, it is
incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the
parts of propositions, which are simple words: and this is that part
of Logic which is comprehended in the ANALYTICS.
5. The second method of
doctrine was introduced for expedite use
and assurance sake; discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and
illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed
ELENCHES. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it
happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling
feats, which, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well
it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth
not only put a man beside his answer, but doth many times abuse his
judgment.
6. This part concerning
ELENCHES is excellently handled by
Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example, not
only in the persons of the Sophists, but even in Socrates himself;
who, professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was
affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of
objection, fallacy, and regardution. And although we have said that
the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the
degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which
passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage:
though the difference be good which was made between orators and
sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound which hath his advantage
in the race, and the other as the hare which hath her advantage in
the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.
7. But yet further, this
doctrine of ELENCHES hath a more ample
latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of
knowledge; whereof some are laboured and others omitted. For first, I
conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat strange, that that part
which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to
metaphysics, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an
ELENCH; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation, or
ambiguity of words and phrase, (especially of such words as are most
general, and intervene in every inquiry,) it seemeth to me that the
true and fruitful use, leaving vain subtilties and speculations, of
the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity,
diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation,
and the like, are but wise cautions against the ambiguities of
speech. So again the distribution of things into certain tribes,
which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against
the confusion of definitions and divisions.
8. Secondly, there is a
seducement that worketh by the strength of
the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation; not so
much perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the
imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall
speak of rhetoric.
9. But lastly, there is
yet a much more important and profound kind
of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or
inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all
others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is
such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some
particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt
the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a
clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect
according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an
enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not
delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false
appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the
mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that instance
which is the root of a superstition, namely, THAT TO THE NATURE OF
THE MIND OF ALL MEN IT IS CONSONANT FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE OR ACTIVE TO
EFFECT MORE THAN THE NEGATIVE OR PRIVATIVE. So that a few times
hitting, or presence, countervails oft-times failing or absence; as
was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune's
temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck,
and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, ADVISE NOW, YOU THAT
THINK IT FOLLY TO INVOCATE NEPTUNE IN TEMPEST: YEA, BUT, saith
Diagoras, WHERE ARE THEY PAINTED THAT ARE DROWNED ? Let us behold it
in another instance, namely, THAT THE SPIRIT OF MAN, BEING OF AN
EQUAL AND UNIFORM SUBSTANCE, DOTH USUALLY SUPPOSE AND FEIGN IN NATURE
A GREATER EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY THAN IS IN TRUTH. Hence it cometh,
that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce
the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting
spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of [50] eccentrics.
Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature as it
were MONODICA, SUI JURIS; yet the cogitations of man do feign unto
them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is;
as they have feigned an element of fire, to keep square with earth,
water, and air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be
opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the similitude of human
actions and arts, together with the making of man COMMUNIS MENSURA,
have brought into natural philosophy; not much better than the heresy
of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary
monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in
heathenism, who supposed the Gods to be of human shape. And therefore
Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked why God should have
adorned the heavens with stars, as if he had been an AEDILIS, one
that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if
that great Workmaster had been of a human disposition, he would have
cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders,
like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a
posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an
infinite number; so differing a harmony there is between the spirit
of man and the spirit of nature.
10. Let us consider again
the false appearances imposed upon us by
every man's own individual nature and custom, in that feigned
supposition that Plato maketh of the cave: for certainly if a child
were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of
age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd
imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the
view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own
complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and
vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we
have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours,
which we ran briefly over in our first book.
11. And lastly, let us
consider the false appearances that are
imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to
the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think
we govern our words, and prescribe it well, LOQUENDUM UT VULGUS,
SENTIENDUM UT SAPIENTES; yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's
bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily
entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in
all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the
mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions
of our words and terms that others may know how we accept and
understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh
to pass for want of this that we are sure to end there where we ought
to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To
conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to
divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because
they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet
nevertheless the caution of them, (for all elenches, as was said, are
but cautions,) doth extremely import the true conduct of human
judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three
false appearances, I find altogether deficient.
12. There remaineth one
part of judgment of great excellency, which
to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that
also deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of
proofs to the differing kinds of subjects; for there being but four
kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the
mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity (which is
that which Aristotle calleth DEMONSTRATION IN ORB OR CIRCLE, and not
A NOTIORIBUS;) every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of
sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain
others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded; and the
rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some
things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the
more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes
of detriment and hinderance to knowledge. The distributions and
assignations of demonstrations, according to the analogy of sciences,
I note as deficient.
XV. 1. The custody or
retaining of knowledge is either in writing
or memoir; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the
character, and the order of the entry; for the art of characters, or
other visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation
with grammar; and therefore I refer it to the due place: for the
disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in
writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places; wherein I
am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of commonplace
books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or
relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in
knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full,
I hold the entry of commonplaces to be a matter of great use and
essence in studying, as that which assureth copie of invention, and
contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the
methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none of any
sufficient worth; all of them carrying merely the face of a school,
and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical
divisions, without all life or respect to action.
2. For the other
principal part of the custody of knowledge, which
is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An
art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are
better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than
those received. It is certain the art, as it is, may be raised to
points of ostentation prodigious: but in use, as it is now managed,
it is barren, (not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is
imagined, but barren,) that is, not dexterous to be applied to the
serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more
estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once
hearing, or the pouring forth [51] of a number of verses or rhymes,
EX TEMPORE, or the making of a satirical simile of everything, or the
turning of everything to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting
of everything by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of the
mind there is great copie, and such as by device and practice may be
exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of the tricks of
tumblers, FUNAMBULOES, BALADINES: the one being the same in the mind
that the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without
worthiness.
3. This art of memory is
but built upon two intentions; the one
prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite
seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a
narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place
of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible,
which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much
better practice than that in use; and besides which axioms, there are
divers moe touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did
in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient,
which are but only ill managed.
XVI. 1. There remaineth
the fourth kind of rational knowledge,
which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our
knowledge to others; which I will term by the general name of
tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three parts; the first
concerning the organ of tradition: the second concerning the method of
tradition; and the third concerning the illustration of tradition.
2. For the organ of
tradition, it is either speech or writing: for
Aristotle saith well, WORDS ARE THE IMAGES OF COGITATIONS, AND
LETTERS ARE THE IMAGES OF WORDS; but yet it is not of necessity that
cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. FOR WHATSOEVER IS
CAPABLE OF SUFFICIENT DIFFERENCES, AND THOSE PERCEPTIBLE BY THE
SENSE, IS IN NATURE COMPETENT TO EXPRESS COGITATIONS. And therefore
we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one
another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and
deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly,
yet to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use
of China, and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in characters
real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or
notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not
one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings,
because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages
do extend; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as
many, I suppose, as radical words.
3. These notes of
cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the
note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion: the other AD
PLACITUM, having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former
sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things
of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most
ancient nations, they are but as continued impresses and emblems. And
as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to
hieroglyphics as words spoken are written, in that they abide not;
but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the
things signified; as Periander, being consulted with how to preserve
a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he
saw him do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest
flowers: signifying, that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping
low of the nobility and grandees. AD PLACITUM, are the characters
real before mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by
curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning to have derived imposition
of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by
reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed
with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, touching
the notes of things and cogitations in general, I find not inquired
but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering
that words and writings by letter do far excel all the other ways;
yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge,
(for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as
moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that
moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver,) I thought good
to propound it to better inquiry.
4. Concerning speech and
words, the consideration of them hath
produced the science of grammar: for man still striveth to
reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he
hath been deprived; and as he hath striven against the first general
curse by the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come
forth of the second general curse, which was the confusion of
tongues, by the art of grammar; hereof the use in a mother tongue is
small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues as
have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned
tongues. The duty of it is of two natures; the one popular, which is
for the speedy and perfect attaining languages as well for
intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other
philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are
the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between
words and reason is handled SPARSIM, brokenly, though not entirely;
and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very
worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.
5. Unto grammar also
belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration
of the accidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or
accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them; whence hath issued
some curious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we
consider it in respect of the verse and not of the argument; wherein
though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient
measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make
new measures of verses as of dances: for a dance is a measured pace, as
a verse is a measured speech. In these things the sense is better
judge than the art;
Coenae fercula nostrae
Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.
[52] And of the servile
expressing antiquity in an unlike and an
unfit subject, it is well said, QUOD TEMPORE ANTIQUUM VIDETUR, ID
INCONGRUITATE EST MAXIME NOVUM.
6. For ciphers, they are
commonly in letters or alphabets but may
be in words. The lands of ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, with
changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants, are many,
according to the nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers,
key-ciphers, doubles, etc. But the virtues of them, whereby they are
to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and
read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that
they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write
OMNIA PER OMNIA; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion
quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded,
and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for
relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as
things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed,
there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. But in
regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through which
they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest
ciphers.
7. In the enumeration of
these private and retired arts, it may be
thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for
show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those
which are skilful in them judge whether I bring them in only for
appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them, though in few
marks, there be not some seed of proficience. And this must be
remembered, that as there be many of great account in their countries
and provinces, which, when they come up to the seat of the estate,
are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here
placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things;
yet to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in
them, they seem great matters.
XVII. 1. For the Method
of Tradition, I see it hath moved a
controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a
meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the
matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in learning, where
there is much controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For
this part of knowledge of Method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as
I shall report it deficient.
2. Method hath been
placed, and that not amiss, in Logic, as a part
of Judgment; for as the doctrine of Syllogisms comprehendeth the
rules of Judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of
Method containeth the rules of Judgment upon that which is to be
delivered; for Judgment precedeth Delivery, as it followeth
Invention. Neither is the Method or the nature of the tradition
material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression
of knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain
to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which
inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore
the most real diversity of method, is of Method referred to use, and
Method referred to progression: whereof the one may be termed
Magistral, and the other of Probation.
3. The latter whereof
seemeth to be VIA DESERTA ET INTERCLUSA. For
as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error
between the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth
knowledge, desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best
believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth
knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant
inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, than not to err: glory making
the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the
disciple not to know his strength.
4. But knowledge that is
delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought
to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same
method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge
induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man
knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet
nevertheless, SECUNDUM MAJUS ET MINUS, a man may revisit and descend
unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant
it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as
it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for
the roots; but it you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more
assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges,
as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots;
good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have
sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree,
so you look well to the taking up of the roots: of which kind of
delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some
shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in
inquisition: and therefore note it for deficient.
5. Another diversity of
Method there is, which hath some affinity
with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the
ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons,
who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises;
and that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to
remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of
knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such
sharpness as can pierce the veil.
6. Another diversity of
Method, whereof the consequence is great,
is the delivery of knowledge in Aphorisms, or in Methods; wherein we
may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a
few axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and
formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with
examples, and digesting it into a sensible Method. But the writing in
Aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, where to the writing in Method
doth not approach.
7. For first, it trieth
the writer, whether he be superficial or
solid: for Aphorisms, except they should be rediculous, cannot be
made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of
illustration is cut [53] off: recitals of examples are cut off;
discourse of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of
practice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the
Aphorisms but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man
can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write Aphorisms, but he
that is sound and grounded. But in Methods,
Tantum series juncturaque
pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris;
as a man shall make a
great shew of an art, which, if it were
disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to
win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they
carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating
another, and therefore satisfy; but particulars, being dispersed, do
best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, Aphorisms,
representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire further;
whereas Methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if
they were at farthest.
8. Another diversity of
Method, which is likewise of great weight,
is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by
questions and their determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be
immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of
learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to
besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the
sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of
themselves: indeed a man would not leave some important piece enemy
at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery
of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong
preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite
disputations and doubts.
9. Another diversity of
methods is according to the subject or
matter which is handled; for there is a great difference in delivery
of the mathematics, which are most abstracted of knowledges, and
policy, which is the most immersed: and howsoever contention hath
been moved touching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter,
yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of
ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce
learning to certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very
husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and
expulsed with the torture and press of the Method. And therefore as I
did allow well of particular topics for invention, so I do allow
likewise of particular Methods of tradition.
10. Another diversity of
judgment in the delivery and teaching of
knowledge is according unto the light and presuppositions of that
which is delivered; for that knowledge which is new, and foreign from
opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that
is agreeable and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to
tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, IF WE
SHALL INDEED DISPUTE, AND NOT FOLLOW AFTER SIMILITUDES, ETC. For
those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only but to
prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular
opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived,
and the other to prove and demonstrate: so that it is of necessity
with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express
themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude
times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the
world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either
have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that
which was offered, before they had understood or judged. So in divine
learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are: for it is a
rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions,
must pray in aid of similitudes.
11. There be also other
diversities of Methods vulgar and received:
as that of Resolution or Analysis, of Constitution or Systasis, of
Concealment or Cryptic, etc., which I do allow well of, though I have
stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I
have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute
one general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the Wisdom
of Tradition.
12. But unto this part of
knowledge concerning Methods doth further
belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but
also the several beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff,
but as to their quantity and figure. And therefore Method considereth
not only the disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the
propositions: not as to their truth or matter, but as to their
limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal
in reviving the good rules of propositions, < Kaqo/lov prowtov kata\
panto/s, > ETC., than he did in introducing the canker of epitomes;
and yet (as it is the conduction of human things that, according to
the ancient fables, THE MOST PRECIOUS THINGS HAVE THE MOST PERNICIOUS
KEEPERS) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him fall upon
the other. For he had need be well conducted that should design to
make axioms convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and
non-promovent, or incurring into themselves; but yet the intention
was excellent.
13. The other
considerations of method, concerning propositions,
are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the
dimensions of sciences; for every knowledge may be fitly said,
besides the profundity (which is the truth and substance of it, that
makes it solid) to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting the
latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action;
that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular precept.
The one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within
the province of another, which is the rule they call < Kaqauto\
>; the other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a
knowledge
should descend: which latter I find passed over in silence, being in
my judgment the more material; for certainly there must be somewhat
left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote
and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge [54] to scorn of
practical men; and are no more aiding to practice than an Ortelius'
universal map is to direct the way between London and York. The
better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of
steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first
they must be filed: so the rules will help, if they be laboured and
polished by practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the
first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the
question; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.
14. There hath been also
laboured and put in practice a method,
which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture; which is to
deliver knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a
show of learning who have it not: such was the travail of Raymundus
Lullius, in making that art which bears his name: not unlike to some
books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a
mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which
use the terms might be thought to understand the art; which collections
are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of
everything, but nothing of worth.
XVIII.1. Now we descend
to that part which concerneth the
illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call
rhetoric, or art of eloquence; a science excellent, and excellently
well laboured. For though in true value it is inferior to wisdom, (as
it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this
faculty, AARON SHALL BE THY SPEAKER, AND THOSE SHALT BE TO HIM AS
GOD:) yet with people it is the more mighty: so Salomon saith,
SAPIENS CORDE APPELLABITUR PRUDENS, SED DULCIS ELOQUIO MAJORA
REPERIET; signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to
a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an
active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation of
Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of
Cicero hath made them in their works of rhetorics exceed themselves.
Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of
Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of
eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore
the deficiencies which I shall note will rather be in some
collections, which may as hand-maids attend the art, than in the
rules or use of the art itself.
2. Notwithstanding, to
stir the earth a little about the roots of
this science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and office of
rhetoric is, to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of
the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration
thereof by three means; by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to
logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and
by passion or auction, which pertains to morality. And as in
negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity,
and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are
undermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by impressions
or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature
of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should
have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it.
For the end of logic is, to teach a form of argument to secure
reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is to procure the
affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric
is, to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it:
for these abuses of art come in but EX OBLIQUO, for caution.
3. And therefore it was
great injustice in Plato, though springing
out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of
rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did
mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the
pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant
in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil;
for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or
think: and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that
because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate,
therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech;
knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And
therefore as Plato said elegantly, THAT VIRTUE, IF SHE COULD BE SEEN,
WOULD MOVE GREAT LOVE AND AFFECTION; so seeing that she cannot be
showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her
to the imagination in lively representation: for to show her to
reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in
Chrysippus and many of the Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon
men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy
with the will of man.
4. Again, if the
affections in themselves were pliant and obedient
to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions
and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and
proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the
affections,
Video meliora, proboque;
Deteriora sequor:
reason would become
captive and servile, if eloquence of
persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the
affections' part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and
imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves
carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is,
that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the
future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the
imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force
of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear
as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason
prevaileth.
5. We conclude,
therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged
with the colouring of the worse part, than logic with sophistry, or
morality with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the
same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic
differeth from rhetoric, not only as the [55] fist from the palm, the
one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that logic
handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is
planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth
wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and
moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both: for
the proofs and demonstrations of logic are towards all men
indifferent and the same; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric
ought to differ according to the auditors:
Orpheus in sylvis, inter
delphinas Arion.
Which application, in
perfection of idea, ought to extend so far,
that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he
should speak to them all respectively and several ways: though this
politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the
greatest orators to want: whilst by the observing their well-graced
forms of speech they leese the volubility of application: and
therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry,
not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which
concerneth policy.
6. Now therefore will I
descend to the deficiencies, which, as I
said, are but attendances: and first, I do not find the wisdom and
diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection
of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and
comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched
before. For example:
S O P H I S M A. Quod
laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.
R E D A R G U T I O.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
MALUM EST, MALUM EST,
INQUIT EMPTOR: SED CUM RECESSERIT, TUM
GLORIABITUR!
The defects in the labour
of Aristotle are three: one, that there
be but a few of many; another, that their elenches are not annexed;
and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for
their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For
many forms are equal in signification which are differing in
impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which
is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the
percussion be the same: for there is no man but will be a little more
raised by hearing it said, YOUR ENEMIES WILL BE GLAD OF THIS:
Hoc Ithacus velit, et
magno mercentur Atridae;
than by hearing it said
only, THIS IS EVIL FOR YOU.
7. Secondly, I do resume
also that which I mentioned before,
touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech
and readiness of invention; which appearetn to be of two sorts; the one
in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of
things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is frequent
and most in request: the former of these I will call ANTITHETA, and
the latter FORMULAE.
8. ANTITHETA are theses
argued PRO ET CONTRA; wherein men may be
more large and laborious: but, in such as are able to do it, to avoid
prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be
cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to
be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they
come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference.
P R O V E R B I S L E G I
S. Non est interpretatio, sed
divinatio, qua. recedit a literâ: Cum receditur a literâ,
judex
transit in legislatorem.
P R O S E N T E N T I A L
E G I S. Ex omnibus verbis est
eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.
9. FORMULAE are but
decent and apt passages or conveyances of
speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of
preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, etc. For as
in buildings, there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of
the staircases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech,
the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.
A C O N C L U S I O N I N
A D E L I B E R A T I V E. So
may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences
future.
XIX. 1. There remain two
appendices touching the tradition of
knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all knowledge
is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper
endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of
knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative part
thereof concerneth reading of books; whereunto appertain incidently
these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and
edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done
great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed, that that
which they understand not is false set down: as the priest that,
where he found it written of St. Paul, DEMISSUS EST PER SPORTAM
mended his book, and made it DEMISSUS EST PER PORTAM; because SPORTA
was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely their errors,
though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same
kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected
copies are commonly the least correct.
The second is concerning
the exposition and explication of authors,
which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over
usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.
The third is concerning
the times, which in many cases give great
light to true interpretations.
The fourth is concerning
some brief censure and judgment of the
authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what
books to read.
And the fifth is
concerning the syntax and disposition of studies;
that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.
2. For pedantical
knowledge, it containeth that difference of
tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers
considerations of great fruit.
[56] As first, the timing
and seasoning of knowledges; as with what
to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.
Secondly, the
consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so
proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more
difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy: for it is one
method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise
dancing with heavy shoes.
A third is the
application of learning according unto the propriety
of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual,
but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies; as, for
example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of
attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if
the wit be caught away but a moment, one is to begin anew. And as
sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so
faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency
or speedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom,
what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what
sciences.
Fourthly, the ordering of
exercises is matter of great consequence
to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in
exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise
their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so there is a great
judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises.
It were too long to particularize a number of other considerations of
this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy.
For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that
that is most important to their thriving: (and as it was noted that
the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in
the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense greatness
of that state which followed:) so the culture and manurance of minds
in youth, hath such a forcible, though unseen operation, as hardly
any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it
afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how small and mean
faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great men or
great matters, do work great and important effects; whereof we see a
notable example in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius and
Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies
into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a mutiny
amongst them upon the death of Augustus Caesar, Blaesus the
lieutenant had committed some of the mutineers, which were suddenly
rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in
this manner: -- THESE POOR INNOCENT WRETCHES APPOINTED TO CRUEL
DEATH, YOU HAVE RESTORED TO BEHOLD THE LIGHT; BUT WHO SHALL RESTORE
ANY BROTHER TO ME, OR LIFE ONTO MY BROTHER, THAT WAS SENT HITHER IN
MESSAGE FROM THE LEGIONS OF GERMANY, TO TREAT OF THE COMMON CAUSE ? AND
HE HATH MURDERED HIM THIS LAST NIGHT BY SOME OF HIS FENCERS AND
RUFFIANS, THAT HE HATH ABOUT HIM FOR HIS EXECUTIONERS, UPON SOLDIERS.
ANSWER, BLAESUS, WHAT IS DONE WITH HIS BODY? THE MORTALEST ENEMIES DO
NOT DENY BURIAL. WHEN I HAVE PERFORMED MY LAST DUTY TO THE CORPSE
WITH KISSES, WITH TEARS, COMMAND ME TO BE SLAIN BESIDE HUE; SO THAT
THESE MY FELLOWS, FOR OUR GOOD MEANING, AND OUR TRY, HEARTS TO THE
LEGIONS, MAY HAVE LEAVE TO BURY US. With which speech he put the army
into an infinite fury and uproar: whereas truth was he had no
brother, neither was there any such matter; but he played it merely
as if he had been upon the stage.
3. But to return: we are
now come to a period of rational
knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than those
that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those
divisions which I do not use. For there is a double necessity imposed
upon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth in
end and purpose, to sort together those things which are next in
nature, and those things which are next in use. For if a secretary of
state should sort his papers, it is like in his study or general
cabinet he would sort together things of a nature, as treaties,
instructions, etc., but in his boxes or particular cabinet he would
sort together those that he were like to use together, though of
several natures; so in this general cabinet of knowledge it was
necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things;
whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I
would have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other,
because the bringing in of the deficiencies did by consequence alter
the partitions of the rest. For let the knowledge extant, for
demonstration sake, be fifteen; let the knowledge with the
deficiencies be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not the parts of
twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three and five; the parts of
twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these things are without
contradiction, and could not otherwise be.
XX. 1. We proceed now to
that knowledge which considereth of the
appetite and will of man: whereof Salomon saith, ANTE OMNIA, FILI,
CUSTODI COR TUUM; NAM INDE PROCEDUNT ACTIONES VITAE. In the handling
of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as
if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair
copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts
or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the
letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies,
carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, duty,
felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects and
scopes of man's will and desires. But how to attain these excellent
marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and
conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or
slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral
virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the
distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and
persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and the
like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of
this part.
2. The reason of this
omission I suppose to be that hidden rock
whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast
away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary
[57] and common matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless
is the wisest doctrine, (for life consisteth not in novelties or
subtilties,) but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly
of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give
glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the eloquence of
discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence; NOCET
ILLIS ELOQUENTIA, QUIBUS NON RERUM CUPIDIDATEM FACIT, SED SUI.
Doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the lesson,
and not with the teacher; being directed to the auditor's benefit,
and not to the author's commendation. And therefore those are of the
right kind which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his
counsel, QUAE SI FECERITIS, NON ORATOREM DUNTAXAT IN PRAESENTIA
LAUDABITIS, SED VOSMETIPSOS ETIAM NON ITA MULTO POST STATU RERUM
VESTRARUM MELIORE.
3. Neither needed men of
so excellent parts to have despaired of a
fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained,
who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing
of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of Aeneas: --
Nec sum animi debius,
verbis ea vincere magnum
Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.
And surely, if the
purpose be in good earnest, not to write at
leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct
and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the mind,
concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than
the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore
the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into
the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the
mind: the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing
rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man
thereunto.
4. The doctrine touching
the platform or nature of good considereth
it either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the
degrees of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputations,
which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term
felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning
which were as the heathen divinity, are by the Christian faith
discharged. And as Aristotle saith, THAT YOUNG MEN MAY BE HAPPY, BUT
NOT OTHERWISE BUT BY HOPE, so we must all acknowledge our minority,
and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world.
5. Freed therefore and
delivered from this doctrine of the
philosopher's heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of
man's nature than was, (for we see in what a height of style Seneca
writeth, VERE MAGNUM, HABERE FRAGILITATEM HOMINIS, SECURITATEM DEI,)
we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their
inquiries and labours. Where in for the nature of good positive or
simple, they have set it down excellently, in describing the forms of
virtue and duty, with their situations and postures; in distributing
them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and
administrations, and the like: nay further, they have commended them
to man's nature and spirit, with great quickness of argument and
beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched them, as
much as discourse can do, against corrupt and popular opinions.
Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also
excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparison
between a contemplative and an active life, in the distinction
between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in their
encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue
with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be reported
for excellently laboured.
6. Notwithstanding, if
before they had come to the popular and
received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest,
they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots
of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in
my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and specially if
they had consulted with nature, they had made their doctrines less
prolix and more profound; which being by them in part omitted and in
part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and
open in a more clear manner.
7. There is formed in
every thing a double nature of good: the one,
as every thing is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it
is a part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in
degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the
conservation of a more general form. Therefore we see the iron in
particular sympathy moveth to the lodestone; but yet if it exceed a
certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the lodestone, and
like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and
country of massy bodies: so may we go forward, and see that water and
massy bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to
suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move
upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the
earth in regard to their duty to the world. This double nature of
good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon man, if
he degenerate not: unto whom the conservation of duty to the public
ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and
being: according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when
being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being
dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him
that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather,
he said only to them, NECESSE EST UT EAM, NON UT VIVAM. But it may be
truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or
other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good
which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and
particular, as the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same
God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature
to inanimate creatures that we spoke of before; for we read that the
elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and razed
out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite
feeling of communion.
8. This being set down
and strongly planted, doth judge and
determine most of the controversies [58] wherein moral philosophy is
conversant. For first, it decideth the question touching the
preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth it
against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he bringeth for the
contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of
a man's self, (in which respects, no question, the contemplative life
hath the pre-eminence) not much unlike to that comparison, which
Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and
contemplation: who being asked what he was, answered, THAT IF HIERO
WERE EVER AT THE OLYMPIAN GAMES, HE KNEW THE MANNER, THAT SOME CAME
TO TRY THEIR FORTUNE FOR THE PRIZES, AND SOME CAME AS MERCHANTS TO
UTTER THEIR COMMODITIES, AND SOME CAME TO MAKE GOOD CHEER AND MEET
THEIR FRIENDS, AND SOME CAME TO LOOK ON; AND THAT HE WAS ONE OF
THEM THAT CAME TO LOOK ON. But men must know, that in this theatre
of man's life it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on:
neither
could the like question ever have been received in the church
(notwithstanding their PRETIOSA IN OCULIS DOMINI MORS SANCTORUM EJUS,
by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular
professions,) but upon this defence, that the monastical life is not
simply contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant
prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an
office in the church, or else of writing or taking instructions for
writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode so long
in the mount. And so we see Enoch the seventh from Adam, who was the
first contemplative, and walked with God, yet did also endow the
church with prophecy, which St. Jude citeth. But for contemplation
which should be finished in itself, without casting beams upon
society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not,
9. It decideth also the
controversies between Zeno and Socrates,
and their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed
felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises
whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on the other
side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and
made virtue, (as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the
mistress and the maid change habits,) to be but as a servant, without
which pleasure cannot be served and attended, and the reformed school
of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from
perturbation, (as if they would have deposed Jupiter again, and
restored Saturn and the first age, when there was no summer nor
winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and season,) and
Herillus, who placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of
the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things
according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; which
opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring
things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or
wavering of belief: all which are manifest to tend to private repose
and contentment, and not to point of society.
10. It censureth also the
philosophy of Epictetus, which
presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are
in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance: as if it
were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends
for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in
our proper fortune; as Gonsalvo said to his soldiers, showing them
Naples, and protesting, HE HAD RATHER DIE ONE FOOT FORWARDS, THAN TO
HAVE HIS LIFE SECURED FOR LONG BY ONE FOOT OF RETREAT. Whereunto the
wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that A
GOOD CONSCIENCE IS A CONTINUAL FEAST; showing plainly that the
conscience of good intensions, howsoever succeeding, is a more
continual joy to nature, than all the provision which can be made for
security and repose.
11. It censureth likewise
that abuse of philosophy, which grew
general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an
occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist
and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of
them, and to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end;
introducing such a health of mind, as was that health of body of
which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life
long but intend his health: whereas if men refer themselves to duties
of society, as that health of body is best, which is ablest to endure
all alterations and extremities; so likewise that health of mind is
most proper, which can go through the greatest temptations and
perturbations. So as Diogenes' opinion is to be accepted, who
commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and
could refrain their mind IN PRAECIPITIO, and could give unto the
mind, as is used in horsemanship, the shortest stop or turn.
12. Lastly, it censureth
the tenderness and want of application in
some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical
men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of
indignities and perturbations: whereas the resolution of men truly
moral ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a
soldier should be, E TELÂ CRASSIORE, and not so fine as that
everything should catch in it and endanger it.
XXI. 1. To resume private
or particular good; it falleth into the
division of good active and passive: for this difference of good, not
unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar
or household terms of PROMUS and CONDUS, is formed also in all
things, and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in
creatures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other
to dilate or multiply themselves; whereof the latter seemeth to be
the worthier: for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy,
are the agent; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the
patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is
greater than that of food; in divine doctrine, BEATIUS EST DARE QUAM
ACCIPERE, and in life, there is no man's spirit so soft, but
esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire,
more than sensuality; which priority of the active good, is much
upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to
fortune. For if we might have a [59] perpetuity and certainty in our
pleasures, the state of them would advance their price: but when we
see it is but MAGNI AESTIMAMUS MORI TARDIUS, and NE GLORIERIS DE
CRASTINO, NESCIS PARTUM DIEI, it maketh us to desire to have somewhat
secured and exempted from time; which are only our deeds and works:
as it is said OPERA EORUM SEQUUNTUR EOS. The pre-eminence likewise of
this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural in man
towards variety and proceeding; which in the pleasures of the sense,
which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great
latitude: COGITA QUAMDIU EADEM FECERIS; CIBUS, SOMNUS, LUDUS; PER HUNC
CIRCULUM CURRITUR; MORI VELLE NON TANTUM FORTIS, AUT MISER, AUT
PRUDENS, SED ETIAM FASTIDIOSUS POTEST. But in enterprises, pursuits,
and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are sensible
with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils,
reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends: so as it was
well said VITA SINE PROPOSITO LANGUIDA ET VAGA EST. Neither hath this
active good any identity with the good of society, though in some
case it hath an incidence into it; for although it do many times
bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to
a man's own power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth
plainly, when it findeth a contrary subject. For that gigantine state
of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was
Lucius Sylla, and infinite other in smaller model, who would have all
men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and would
give form to the world, according to their own humours, (which is the
true Theomachy,) pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it
recedeth farthest from good of society, which we have determined to
be the greater.
2. To resume passive
good, it receiveth a subdivision of
conservative and perfective. For let us take a brief review of that
which we have said: we have spoken first of the good of society, the
intention whereof embraceth the form of human nature, whereof we are
members and portions, and not our own proper and individual form: we
have spoken of active good, and supposed it as a part of private and
particular good: and rightly, for there is impressed upon all things
a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves; one
of preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing and
perfecting their form; and a third of multiplying and extending their
form upon other things; whereof the multiplying, or signature of it
upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active
good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, and perfecting or
raising of it; which latter is the highest degree of passive good.
For to preserve in state is the less, to preserve with advancement is
the greater. So in man,--
Igneus est ollis vigor,
et caelestis origo.
His approach or
assumption to divine or angelical nature is the
perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is
that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct
of an advancement formal and essential is carried to seek an
advancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy,
do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove local they
could obtain a remove internal; so is it with men in ambition, when
failing of the means to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual
estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as was said,
either conservative or perfective.
3. To resume the good of
conservation or comfort, which consisteth
in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth
to be the most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and
the lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither
been well judged of, nor well inquired: for the good of fruition or
contentment is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition, or
in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality,
the other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, the
other more impression of good. Which of these is the greater good is
a question controverted; but whether man's nature may not be capable
of both, is a question not inquired.
4. The former question
being debated between Socrates and a
sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of
mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell
from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates'
felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying
that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the
itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions
do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much
upheld by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves, that
virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is,
that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than in
compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the
assertion we last spoke of, that good of advancement is greater than
good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a
show of advancement, as motion though in a circle has a show of
progression.
5. But the second
question, decided the true way, maketh the former
superfluous. For can it be doubted but that there are some who take
more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet
nevertheless are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them ? so
as this same, NON UTI UT NON APPETAS, NON APPETERE UT NON METUAS,
SUNT ANIMI PUSILLI ET DIFFIDENTIS. And it seemeth to me, that most of
the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary
than the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear
of death in offering to cure it. For when they would have a man's
whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must
needs make men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there
is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet: --
Qui spatium vitae
extremum inter munera ponat Naturae.
So have they sought to
make men's minds too uniform and harmonical,
by not breaking them [60] sufficiently to contrary motions: the
reason whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men
dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we
see, upon the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet
and have show of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such
strange and hard stops and passages as a set song or voluntary; much
after the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and a
civil life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers;
who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice, which may be ground
forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it
should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with
it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not
magnanimity.
6. Having therefore
deduced the good of man which is private and
particular, as far as seemeth fit; we will now return to that good of
man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty;
because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and
disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind
well formed and composed in itself: though neither can a man
understand virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without
an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to
science civil and politic: but not if it be well observed; for it
concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself, and
not over others. And as in architecture the direction of framing the
posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with the
manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals,
the direction how to frame an instrument or engine, is not the same
with the manner of setting it on work and employing it, (and yet
nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidentally express the
aptness towards the other;) so the doctrine of conjugation of men in
society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto.
7. This part of duty is
subdivided into two parts: the common duty of
every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective
or special duty of every man, in his profession, vocation, and place.
The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said.
The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient;
which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I
acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to write of the
proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation,
profession, and place ? For although sometimes a looker on may see
more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than
sound, THAT THE VALE BEST DISCOVERETH THE HILL; yet there is small
doubt but that men can write best, and most really and materially, in
their own professions; and that the writing of speculative men of
active matter, for the most part, doth seem to men of experience, as
Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams
and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write
in their own professions, that they magnify them in excess. But
generally it were to be wished, as that which would make learning
indeed solid and fruitful, that active men would or could become
writers.
8. In which kind I cannot
but mention, honoris causa, your
Majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a king; a work richly
compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of
all other arts; and being, in mine opinion, one of the most sound and
healthful writings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of
invention, nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness,
as those are who leese themselves in their order; nor of convulsions,
as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of
perfumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please the reader
more than nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits
thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far removed
from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in
their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it
above measure: for your majesty hath truly described, not a king of
Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a David,
pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese out of my
remembrance, what I heard your majesty, in the same sacred spirit of
Government, deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, THAT
KINGS RULED BY THEIR LAWS AS GOD DID BY THE LAWS OF NATURE; AND OUGHT
AS RARELY TO PUT IN USE THEIR SUPREME PREROGATIVE, AS GOD DOTH HIS
POWER OF WORKING MIRACLES. And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a
free monarchy, you do well give men to understand that you know the
plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of
his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent
writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent example of tractates
concerning special and respective duties: wherein I should have said
as much, if it had been written a thousand years since: neither am I
moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to
praise in presence; no, it is Battery to praise in absence; that is,
when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent; and so
the praise is not natural, but forced, either in truth or in time.
But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, which is nothing
but an excellent table of Cesar's virtue, and made to his face;
besides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a great
deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a full
occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.
9. But to return: there
belongeth further to the handling of this
part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or
opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of
every profession, which hath been likewise handled: but how? rather
in a satire and cynically than seriously and wisely: for men have
rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good
in professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that which
is corrupt. For, as Salomon saith, he that cometh to seek after
knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find
matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: QUAERENTI
DERISORI SCIENTIAM IPSA SE [61] ABSCONDIT; SED STUDIOSO FIT OBVIAM.
But the managing of this argument with integrity and truth, which I
note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications
for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth
of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it; but if you
see him first, he dieth: so it is with deceits and evil arts; which,
if they be first espied they leese their life; but if they prevent,
they endanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others,
that write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not
possible to join serpentine wisdom with columbine innocency, except
men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent: his baseness and
going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and
sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil: for
without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can
do no good upon those that are wicked to reclaim them, without the
help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose
that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of
preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exterior language: so as, except
you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their
own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality; NON RECIPIT STULTUS
VERBA PRUDENTIAE, NISI EA DIXERIS QUAE VERSANTUR IN CORDE EJUS.
10. Unto this part,
touching Respective Duty, doth also appertain
the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and
servant: so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil
bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood,
and all other proportionate duties; not as they are parts of
government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular
persons.
11. The knowledge
concerning good respecting Society doth handle it
also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the
weighing of duties between person and person, case and case,
particular and public: as we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus
against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?
Infelix, utcunque ferent
ea fata minores.
So the case was doubtful,
and had opinion on both sides Again, we
see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose
opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their
associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a
tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding
that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was
better than a civil war: and a number of the like cases there are of
comparative duty; amongst which that of all others is the most
frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a
small injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the
truth: ALIQUA SUNT INJUSTE FACIENDA, UT MULTA JUSTE FIERI POSSINT.
But the reply is good, AUCTOREM PRAESENTIS JUSTITIAE HABES, SPONSOREM
FUTURAE NON HABES. Men must pursue things which are just in present,
and leave the future to the divine Providence. So then we pass on
from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good.
XXII. 1. Now therefore
that we have spoken of this fruit of life,
it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto;
without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair
image, or statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without
life and motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these
words: NECESSE EST SCILICET DE VIRTUTE DICERE, ET QUID SIT, ET EX
QUIBUS GIGNATUR. INUTILE ENIM FERE FUERIT VIRTUTEM QUIDEM NOSSE,
ACQUIRENDAE AUTEM EJUS MODOS ET VIAS IGNORARE: NON ENIM DE VIRTUTE
TANTUM, QUA SPECIE SIT, QUAERENDUM EST, SED ET QUOMODO SUI COPIAM
FACIAT: UTRUMQUE ENIM VOLUMUS, ET REM IPSAM NOSSE, ET EJUS COMPOTES
FIERI: HOC AUTEM EX VOTO NON SUCCEDET, NISI SCIAMUS ET EX QUIBUS ET
QUOMODO. In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate
this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second,
that he had applied himself to philosophy, NON ITA DISPUTANDI CAUSA,
SED ITA VIVENDI. And although the neglect of our times, wherein few
men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life,
(as Seneca excellently saith) DE PARTIBUS VITAE QUISQUE DELIBERAT, DE
SUMMÂ NEMO, may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must
conclude
with that aphorism of Hippocrates, QUI GRAVI MORBO CORREPTI DOLORES
NON SENTIUNT, IIS MENS AEGROTAT, they need medicine, not only to
assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said, that
the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most
true: but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise
servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, THAT THE EYES OF
THE HANDMAID LOOK PERPETUALLY TOWARDS THE MISTRESS, and yet no doubt
many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid, to discern of
the mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant
attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of
herself, within due limits, many sound and profitable directions.
2. This part therefore,
because of the excellency thereof, I cannot
but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry:
the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech
and action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of
men, (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser than
their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the
more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may
acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient; which seemeth almost
incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those
themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads
or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and
whether it be extant.
3. First, therefore, in
this, as in all things which are practical,
we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not;
for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by
way of application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the
nature of the earth, nor the [62] seasons of the weather; no more can
the physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of
accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things
are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune. For
to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is
limited and tied. In these things therefore it is left unto us to
proceed by application;
Vincenda est omnis
fortuna ferendo:
and so likewise,
Vincenda est omnis Natura
ferendo.
But when that we speak of
suffering, we do not speak of a dull and
neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which
draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth
adverse and contrary; which is that property which we call
accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth
principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent
state or disposition, unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a
garment, except we first take measure of the body.
4. So then the first
article of this knowledge is to set down sound
and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and
tempers of men's natures and dispositions; especially having regard
to those differences which are most radical in being the fountains
and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or
commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in
passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can
satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be considered, that
there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others
to small, (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, by the
name of magnanimity;) doth it not deserve as well to be considered,
that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others
to few? So that some can divide themselves: others can perchance do
exactly well, but it must be in few things at once: and so there
cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And
again, that some minds are proportioned to that which may be
dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that
which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit:
Jam tum tenditque
fovetque.
So that there may be
fitly said to be a longanimity, which is
commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved
it to be considered by Aristotle; THAT THERE IS A DISPOSITION IN
CONVERSATION (SUPPOSING IT IN THINGS WHICH DO IN NO SORT TOUCH
OR CONCERN A MAN'S SELF,) TO SOOTHE AND PLEASE; AND A DISPOSITION
CONTRARY TO CONTRADICT AND CROSS: and deserveth it not much better to
be considered, THAT THERE IS A DISPOSITION, NOT IN CONVERSATION OR
TALK, BUT IN MATTER OF MORE SERIOUS NATURE, (AND SUPPOSING IT STILL
IN THINGS MERELY INDIFFERENT,) TO TAKE PLEASURE IN THE GOOD OF
ANOTHER: AND A DISPOSITION CONTRARIWISE, TO TAKE DISTASTE AT THE GOOD
OF ANOTHER? which is that property which we call good nature or ill
nature, benignity or malignity: and therefore I cannot sufficiently
marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters
of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and
policy; considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to
them both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some
pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, according to the
predominances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of action,
lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of
arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest
sort of these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves,
the natures of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted
forth: a man shall meet with in every day's conference, the
denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain,
HUOMO DI PRIMA IMPRESSIONE, HUOMO DI ULTIMA IMPRESSIONE and the like:
and yet nevertheless this kind of observation wandereth in words, but
is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found, many of
them, but we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the
greater; because both history, poesy, and daily experience are as
goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few
posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the
confectionary, that receipts might be made of them for use of life.
5. Of much like kind are
those impressions of nature, which are
imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by
health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are
inherent and not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern
fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want,
magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune,
variable fortune, rising PER SALTUM, PER GRADUS, and the like. And
therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man
beneficent, BENIGNITAS HUJUS UT ADOLESCENTULI EST. St. Paul
concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans,
INCREPA EOS DURE, upon the disposition of their country, CRETENSES
SEMPER MENDACES, MALAE BESTIAE, VENTRES PIGRI. Sallust noteth that it
is usual with kings to desire contradictories: SED PLERUMQUE REGIAE
VOLUNTATES, UT VEHEMENTES SUNT, SIC MOBILES, SAEPEQUE IPSAE SIBI
ADVERSAE. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth
the disposition: solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius. Pindarus maketh
an observation, that great and sudden fortune for the most part
defeateth men QUI MAGNAM FELICITATEM CONCOQUERE NON POSSUNT. So the
psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of
fortune, than in the increase of fortune: DIVITIAE SI AFFLUANT,
NOLITE COR APPONERE. These observations, and the like, I deny not but
are touched a little by Aristotle, as in passage in his Rhetorics,
and are handled in some scattered discourses: but they were never
incorporated into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially
appertain; as the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds
doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of
complexions and constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean
to follow the [63] indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same
medicines to all patients.
6. Another article of
this knowledge is the inquiry touching the
affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to
know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the
diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after
knowledge of the divers characters of men's natures, it followeth, in
order, to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no
other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections. For as
the ancient politiques in popular states were wont to compare the
people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea
would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and
trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the
seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation: so it
may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be
temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it
into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as
before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of ethics,
and never handled the affections, which is the principal subject
thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but
collaterally, and in a second degree, as they may be moved by speech,
he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity;
but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not
his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this
inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of
light can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and
pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular
colours.
Better travails, I
suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument,
as far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet,
it is like, it was after their manner, rather in subtilty of
definitions, (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities,)
than in active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I
find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of
the affections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of
tenderness of countenance, and other.
But the poets and writers
of histories are the best doctors of this
knowledge; where we may find painted forth with great life, how
affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained;
and how again contained from act and further degree; how they
disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather
and fortify; how they are inwrapped one within another; and how they
do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like
particularities: amongst the which this last is of special use in
moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against
affection, and to master one by another; even as we use to hunt beast
with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could
not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected that
excellent use of PRAEMIUM and POENA, whereby civil states consist:
employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the
suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of states
it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it
is in the government within.
7. Now come we to those
points which are within our own command,
and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and
appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled
custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation,
company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books,
studies: these as they have determinate use in moralities, from these
the mind suffereth; and of these are such receipts and regiments
compounded and described, as may seem to recover or preserve the
health and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human
medicine: of which number we will insist upon some one or two, as an
example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and
therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of.
8. The opinion of
Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that
of those things which consist by nature nothing can be changed by
custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand
times up, it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or
hearing, we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though this
principle be true in things wherein nature is peremptory (the reason
whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in
things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a
strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by
use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we
speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold,
we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have a
nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than
those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that
virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have
taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many
precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is
of ordering the exercises of the body; whereof we will recite a few.
9. The first shall be,
that we beware we take not at the first
either too high a strain, or too weak: for if too high, in a
diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you breed an
opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a
further expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in
the end: if too weak on the other side, you may not look to perform
and overcome any great task.
10. Another precept is,
to practise all things chiefly at two
several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when
it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by
the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make
the middle times the more easy and pleasant.
11. Another precept is,
that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way,
which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we
are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the [64] stream,
or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural
crookedness.
12. Another precept is,
that the mind is brought to anything
better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you
pretend be not first in the intention, but TANQUAM ALIUD AGENDO,
because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and
constraint. Many other axioms there are touching the managing of
exercise and custom; which being so conducted doth prove indeed
another nature; but being governed by chance doth commonly prove but
an ape of nature, and bringing forth that which is lame and
counterfeit.
13. So if we should
handle books and studies, and what influence
and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts
of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of
the fathers in great indignation call poesy, VINUM DAEMONUM, because
it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not
the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith,
THAT YOUNG MEN ARE NO FIT AUDITORS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, BECAUSE THEY
ARE NOT SETTLED FROM THE BOILING HEAT OF THEIR AFFECTIONS, NOR
ATTEMPERED WITH TIME AND EXPERIENCE. And doth it not hereof come,
that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers,
(whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by
representing her in state and majesty, and popular opinions against
virtue in their parasites' coats fit to be scorned and derided,) are of
so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read
and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but confined
almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less
young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been
thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgments be
corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true differences
of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse
describes it,
Prosperum et felix scelus
virtus vocatur;
and again,
Ille crucem pretium
sceleris tulit, hic diadema:
which the poets do speak
satirically, and in indignation on
virtue's behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously and
positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, THAT IF CAESAR HAD
BEEN OVERTHROWN, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ODIOUS THAN EVER WAS
CATILINE; as if there had been no difference but in fortune, between
a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent spirit (his
ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there not a caution
likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves, (some
kinds of them,) lest they make men too precise, arrogant,
incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, IN MARCO CATONE HAEC BONA QUAE
VIDEMUS DIVINA ET EGREGIA, IPSIUS SCITOTE ESSE PROPRIA; QUAE
NONNUNQUAM REQUIRIMUS, EA SUNT OMNIA NON A NATURÂ, SED A MAGISTRO
? Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties
and effects which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so
likewise is there touching the use of all those other points, of
company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning
in the doctrine of morality.
14. But there is a kind
of culture of the mind that seemeth yet
more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this
ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more
perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose
therefore of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of
the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of
the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant
resolutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be
regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in
continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised
by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is
past, and an inception or account DE NOVO, for the time to come. But
this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good
moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion.
15. Wherefore we will
conclude with that last point, which is of
all other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most
noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good
estate; which is the electing and propounding unto a man's self good
and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort
within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed,
that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be
resolute, constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall
mould himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the
work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of the
hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part
whereupon he worketh, (as if he be upon the face, that part which
shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such time as he
comes to it;) but, contrariwise, when nature makes a flower or living
creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time: so in
obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth
not profit much to fortitude, nor the like: but when he dedicateth
and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the
pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is
invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto.
Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself that
it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine: his words are these:
IMMANITATI AUTEM CONSENTANEUM EST OPPONERE EAM, QUAE SUPRA
HUMANITATEM EST, HEROICAM SIVE DIVINAM VIRTUTEM: and a little after,
NAM UT FERAE NEQUE VITIUM NEQUE VIRTUS EST, SIC NEQUE DEI: SED HIC
QUIDEM STATUS ALTIUS QUIDDAM VIRTUTE EST, ILLE ALIUD QUIDDAM A VITIO.
And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus
attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration; where he said, THAT MEN
NEEDED TO MAKE NO OTHER PRAYERS TO THE GODS, BUT THAT THEY WOULD
CONTINUE AS GOOD LORDS TO THEM AS TRAJAN HAD BEEN; as if he had not
been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But
these be [65] heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of
that divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth
conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is
excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth
and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly said by
Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love,
AMOR MELIOR SOPHISTA LAEVO AD HUMANAM VITAM, that love teacheth a man
to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he
calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules and precepts, he
cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize
himself and govern himself, as love can do: so certainly, if a man's
mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into a
greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is
but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon
observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise the
mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or
excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the
same instant doth settle and compose it; so in all other
excellencies, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to
excess; only charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to
be like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell; ASCENDAM, ET
ERO SIMILIS ALTISSIMO: by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man
transgressed and fell; ERITIS SICUT DII, SCIENTES BONUM ET MALUM: but
by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither
man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that
imitation we are called: DILIGITE INIMICOS VESTROS, BENEFACITE EIS
QUI ODERUNT VOS, ET ORATE PRO PERSEQUENTIBUS ET CALUMNIANTIBUS VOS,
UT SITIS FILII PATRIS VESTRI QUI IN COELIS EST, QUI SOLEM SUUM ORIRI
FACIT SUPER BONOS ET MALOS, ET PLUIT SUPER JUSTOS ET INJUSTOS. So in
the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion
speaketh thus, OPTIMUS MAXIMUS: and the sacred Scriptures thus,
MISERICORDIA EJUS SUPER OMNIA OPERA EJUS.
16. Wherefore I do
conclude this part of moral knowledge,
concerning the culture and regimen of the mind; wherein if any man,
considering the parts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that
my labour is but to collect into an art of science that which hath
been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and
experience, he judgeth well, But as Philocrates sported with
Demosthenes, YOU MAY NOT MARVEL, ATHENIANS, THAT DEMOSTHENES AND I DO
DIFFER; FOR HE DRINKETH WATER, AND I DRINK WINE; and like as we read
of an ancient parable of THE TWO GATES OF SLEEP,
Sunt geminae somni
portae: quarum altera fertur Cornea, qua veris
facilis datur exitus umbris: Altera candenti perfecta nitens
elephanto, Sed falsa ad coelum mittunt insomnia manes:
so if we put on sobriety
and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim
in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor of wine is the more
vaporous, and the braver gate of ivory sendeth forth the falser
dreams.
17. But we have now
concluded that general part of human
philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth
of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth
to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the
good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health,
beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired in
rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind
sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency;
and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the
body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy
to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but have
neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their
doings; some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage, which
have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency: and
some again have honest and reformed minds, that can neither become
themselves nor manage business: and sometimes two of them meet, and
rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that
the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to retain plea.sure;
confined rather in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour
of it.
XXIII. 1. CIVIL knowledge
is conversant about a subject which of all
others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom.
Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, THAT THE ROMANS WERE LIKE
SHEEP, FOR THAT A MAN MIGHT BETTER DRIVE A FLOCK OF THEM, THAN ONE OF
THEM; FOR IN A FLOCK, IF YOU COULD BUT GET SOME FEW TO GO RIGHT, THE
REST WOULD FOLLOW: so in that respect moral philosophy is more
difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself
the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only
an external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore
it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments:
for so we find in the holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is
added, SED ADHUC POPULUS NON DIREXERAT COR SUUM AD DOMINUM DEUM
PATRUM SUORUM. Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and are
not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years
sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time well grounded, do
bear out errors following; but the resolution of particular persons
is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the
extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.
2. This knowledge hath
three parts, according to the three summary
actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and
government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection:
and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever:
wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.
3. The wisdom of
conversation ought not to be over much affected,
but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but
an influence also into business and government. The poet saith,
Nec vultu destrue verbo
tuo:
a man may destroy the
force of his words with his countenance: so
may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his [66] brother
affability and easy access; NIL INTEREST HABERE OSTIUM APERTUM,
VULTUM CLAUSUM; it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and
to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So, we see,
Atticus, before the first interview between Caesar and Cicero, the
war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and
ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the
countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and
other carriage appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof
seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant for this
purpose: NE AUT ARROGANS VIDEAR, AUT OBNOXIUS; QUORUM ALTERUM EST
ALIENAE LIBERTATIS OBLITI, ALTERUM SUAE: The sum of behaviour is to
retain a man's own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of
others. On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be
intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, and then QUID
DEFORMIUS QUAM SCENAM IN VITAM TRANSFERRE (to act a man's life)? But
although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and
employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to advise young
students from company keeping, by saying, AMICI FURES TEMPORIS: so
certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief
of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that hour of
urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue;
whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by
reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything becometh; but
where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos, and compliments.
Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious
observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and
season. For as Salomon saith, QUI RESPICIT AD VENTOS, NON SEMINAT; ET
QUI RESPICIT AD NUBES, NON METET: a man must make his opportunity, as
oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of
the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be
made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be
shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind, and hide any
deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or
restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge
hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for
deficient.
4. The wisdom touching
negotiation or business hath not been
hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning,
and the professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly
that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this
effect, that there is no great concurrence between learning and
wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to
civil life, for wisdom of behaviour it is by learned men for the most
part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and an enemy to meditation;
for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well, when they are
called to it, but that happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of
business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be no books of
it, except some few scattered advertisements, that have no proportion
to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were written of this,
as the other, I doubt not but learned men with mean experience, would
far excel men of long experience without learning, and outshoot them
in their own bow.
5. Neither needeth it at
all to be doubted, that this knowledge
should be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much
less infinite than science of government, which, we see, is laboured
and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom, it seemeth some of the
ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest times were professors; for
Cicero reporteth that it was then in use for senators that had name
and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Laelius,
and many others, to walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give
audience to those that would use their advice; and that the
particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of
the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a
purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion
incident to man's life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice
even in private causes, arising out of a universal insight into the
affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon particular causes
propounded, but is gathered by general observation of cases of like
nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his
brother, DE PETITIONE CONSULATUS, (being the only book of business
that I know written by the ancients,) although it concerned j a
particular action set on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth
of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a
perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we
may see in those aphorisms which have place among divine writings,
composed by Salomon the king, (of whom the Scriptures testify that
his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all
worldly matters,) we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent
cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of
occasions; whereupon we will stay awhile, offering to consideration
some number of examples.
6. SED ET CUNCTIS
SERMONIBUS QUI DICUNTUR NE ACCOMMODES AUREM TUAM,
NE FORTE AUDIAS SERVUM TUUM MALEDICENTEM TIBI. Here is concluded the
provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as
it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned
Sertorius' papers unperused.
VIR SAPIENS, SI CUM
STULTO CONTENDERIT, SIVE IRASCATUR, SIVE
RIDEAT, NON INVENIET REQUIEM. Here is described the great
disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person
than himself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the
matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he
can no ways quit himself well of it.
QUI DELICATÈ A
PUERITIÂ NUTRIT SERVUM SUUM, POSTEA SENTIET EUM
CONTUMACEM. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch
in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and
unthankfulness.
[67] VIDISTI VIRUM
VELOCEM IN OPERE SUO ? CORAM REGIBUS STABIT, NEC
ERIT INTER IGNOBILES. Here is observed, that of all virtues for
rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors
many times love not to have those they employ too deep or too
sufficient, but ready and diligent.
VIDI CUNCTOS VIVENTES QUI
AMBULANT SUB SOLE, CUM ADOLESCENTE
SECUNDO QUI CONSURGIT PRO EO. Here is expressed that which was noted
by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; Plures adorant solem
orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum.
SI SPIRITUS POTESTATEM
HABENTIS ASCENDERIT SUPER TE, LOCUM TUUM NE
DEMISERIS; QUIA CURATIO FACIET CESSARE PECCATA MAXIMA. Here caution
is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the
unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself
of means to make them better.
ERAT CIVITAS PARVA, ET
PAUCI IN EA VIRI: VENIT CONTRA EAM REX
MAGNUS, ET VADAVIT EAM, INSTRUXITQUE MUNITIONES PER GYRUM, ET
PERFECTA EST OBSIDIO; INVENTUSQUE EST IN EA VIR PAUPER ET SAPIENS, ET
LIBERAVIT EAM PER SAPIENTIAM SUAM; ET NULLUS DEINCEPS RECORDATUS EST
HOMINIS ILLIUS PAUPERIS. Here the corruption of states is set forth,
that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it.
MOLLIS RESPONSIO FRANGIT
IRAM. Here is noted that silence or rough
answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.
ITER PIGRORUM QUASI SEPES
SPINARUM. Here is lively represented how
laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till
the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth
a brier or an impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.
MELIOR EST FINIS
ORATIONIS QUAM PRINCIPIUM. Here is taxed the
vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and
inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of speech.
QUI COGNOSCIT IN JUDICIO
FACIEM, NON BENE FACIT; ISTE ET PRO
BUCELLA PANIS DESERET VERITATEM. Here is noted, that a judge were
better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge
offendeth not so lightly as a facile.
VIR PAUPER CALUMNIANS
PAUPERES SIMILIS EST IMBRI VEHEMENTI, IN QUO
PARATUR FAMES. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous
extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry
horseleech.
FONS TURBATUS PEDE, ET
VENA CORRUPTA, EST JUSTUS CADENS CORAM
IMPIO. Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the
face of the world, doth trouble the fountains of justice more than
many particular injuries passed over by connivance.
QUI SUBTRAHIT ALIQUID A
PATRE ET A MATRE, ET DICIT HOC NON ESSE
PECCATUM, PARTICEPS EST HOMICIDII. Here is noted, that whereas men in
wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they
might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed
aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.
NOLI ESSE AMICUS HOMINI
IRACUNDO, NEC AMBULATO CUM HOMINE FURIOSO.
Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do
principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will
espouse us to many factions and quarrels.
QUI CONTURBAT DOMUM SUAM,
POSSIDEBIT VENTUM. Here is noted, that in
domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves
quieting of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived
of their expectation, and it turneth to wind.
FILIUS SAPIENS LAETIFICAT
PATREM: FILIUS VERO STULTUS MAESTITIA EST
PATRI SUAE. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of
the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of
their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but
of fortune.
QUI CELAT DELICTUM,
QUAERIT AMICITIAM; SED QUI ALTERO SERMONE
REPETIT, SEPARAT FOEDERATOS. Here caution is given, that
reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that
which is past, than by apologies and excusations.
IN OMNI OPERE BONO ERIT
ABUNDANTIA; UBI AUTEM VERBA SUNT PLURIMA,
IBI FREQUENTER EGESTAS. Here is noted, that words and discourse
abound most where there is idleness and want.
PRIMUS IN SUA CAUSA
JUSTUS; SED VENIT ALTERA PARS, ET INQUIRET IN
EUM. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth
much; in sort that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly
removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.
VERBA BILINGUIS QUASI
SIMPLICIA, ET IPSA PERVENIUNT AD INTERIORA
VENTRIS. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which
seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep
which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.
QUI ERUDIT DERISOREM,
IPSE SIBI INJURIAM FACIT; ET QUI ARGUIT
IMPIUM, SIBI MACULAM GENERAT. Here caution is given how we tender
reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to
esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.
DA SAPIENTI OCCASIONEM,
ET ADDETUR EI SAPIENTIA. Here is
distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but
verbal, and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon occasion
presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and
confused.
QUOMODO IN AQUIS
RESPLENDENT VULTUS PROSPICIENTIUM, SIC CORDA
HOMINUM MANIFESTA SUNT PRUDENTIBUS. Here the mind of a wise man is
compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures
and customs are represented; from which representation proceedeth
that application,
Qui sapit, innumeris
moribus aptus erit.
7. Thus have I stayed
somewhat longer upon these sentences politic
of Salomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led
with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I
noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also
attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding
offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a
more divine use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some
interpretations, yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle than
others; but taking them as instructions for life, they might have
received large [68] discourse, if I would have broken them and
illustrated them by deducements and examples.
8. Neither was this in
use only with the Hebrews, but it is
generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that
as men found out any observation that they thought was good for life,
they would gather it, and express it in parable, or aphorism, or
fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where
examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is
better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing
which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of
negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and
aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples.
For knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars,
knoweth the way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater
life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than
when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point
of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the
example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is
set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the
discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for
action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse' sake are
cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile
aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good.
9. But this difference is
not amiss to be remembered, that as
history of Times is the best ground for discourse of government, such
as Machiavel handleth, so history of Lives is the most proper for
discourse of business, as more conversant in private actions. Nay,
there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them
both, which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty,
as many are of Cicero AD ATTICUM, and others. For letters have a
great and more particular representation of business than either
chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form
of this part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note
to be deficient.
10. But yet there is
another part of this part, which differeth as
much from that whereof we have spoken as SAPERE and SIBI SAPERE, the
one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre.
For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of
pressing a man's own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often
sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak for
government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for
itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did
take much knowledge of: NAM POL SAPIENS, saith the comical poet,
FINGIT FORTUNAM SIBI; and it grew to an adage, FABER QUISQUE FORTUNAE
PROPRIAE; and Livy attributed it to Cato the first, IN HOC VIRO TANTA
VIS ANIMI ET INGENII INERAT, UT QUOCUNQUE LOCO NATUS ESSET SIBI IPSE
FORTUNAM FACTURUS VIDERETUR.
11. This conceit or
position, if it be too much declared and
professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was
observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great
services to the estate in his government, and giving an account
thereof to the people, as the manner was, did conclude every
particular with this clause, and in this fortune had no part. And it
came so to pass, that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand
afterwards: for this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that
which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, DICIS, FLUVIUS EST MEUS ET EGO FECI
MEMET IPSUM: or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men
offer sacrifices to their nets and snares: and that which the poet
expresseth,
Dextra mihi Deus, et
telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint!
for these confidences
were ever unhallowed, and unblessed: and
therefore those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their
successes to their felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For so
Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus: so Caesar said to the
master of the ship, CAESAREM PORTAS ET FORTUNAM EJUS.
12. But yet nevertheless
these positions, FABER QUISQUE FORTUNAE
SUAE: SAPIENS DOMINABITUR ASTRIS: INVIA VIRTUTI NULLA EST VIA, and
the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as
stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for presumption or
outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are,
no question, imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of
this opinion, as they can scarce contain it within. As we see in
Augustus Caesar, (who was rather diverse from his uncle, than
inferior in virtue,) how when he died, he desired his friends about
him to give him a PLAUDITE, as if he were conscient to himself that
he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of knowledge we
do report also as deficient: not but that it is practised too much,
but it hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore lest it should
seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite,
as we did in the former, that we set down some heads or passages of
it.
13. Wherein it may appear
at the first a new and unwonted argument
to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein
every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till
he see the difficulty; for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as
virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique,
as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning
greatly, both in honour and in substance: in honour, because
pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like
a lark, that can mount, and sing, and please herself, and nothing
else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can
soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey: in
substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that
nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in
the globe of crystal, or form; that is, that there be not any thing
in being and action, which should not be drawn and collected into
contemplation and doctrine. [69] Neither doth learning admire or
esteem of this architecture of fortune, otherwise than as of an
inferior work: for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his
being; and many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune
willingly for better respects: but nevertheless fortune, as an organ
of virtue and merit, deserveth the consideration.
14. First, therefore, the
precept which I conceive to be most
summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window
which Momus did require: who seeing in the frame of man's heart such
angles and recesses, found fault that there was not a window to look
into them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars
touching persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their
customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they
chiefly stand: so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where
they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, and
dependencies; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their
moods and times,
Sola viri molles aditus
et tempora noras;
their principles, rules,
and observations, and the like: and this
not only of persons, but of actions; what are on foot from time to
time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they
import, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not
only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons
is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whiles they
are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their nature
they are another. These informations of particulars, touching persons
and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism;
for no excellency of observations, which are as the major
propositions, can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error
and mistaking in the minors.
15. That this knowledge
is possible, Salomon is our surety; who
saith, CONSILIUM IN CORDE VIRI TANQUAM AQUA PROFUNDA; SED VIR PRUDENS
EXHAURIET ILLUD. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under
precept, because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the
obtaining of it may.
16. We will begin,
therefore, with this precept, according to the
ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and
distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to
words: and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words
than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is
said, FRONTIS NULLA FIDES: which is meant of a general outward
behaviour, and not of the private and subtile motions and labours of
the countenance and gesture; which as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is
ANIMI JANUA, THE GATE OF THE MIND. None more close than Tiberius, and
yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, ETENIM VULTU OFFENSIONEM CONJECTAVERAT.
So again, noting the differing character and manner of his commending
Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his fashion
wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; MAGIS IN SPECIEM
ADORNATIS VERBIS, QUAM UT PENITUS SENTIRE CREDERETUR: but of Drusus
thus: PAUCIORIBUS, SED INTENTIOR, ET FIDA ORATIONE: and in another
place, speaking of his character of speech, when he did any thing
that was gracious and popular, he saith, that in other things he was
VELUT ELUCTANTIUM VERBORUM; but then again, SOLUTIUS VERO LOQUEBATOR
QUANDO SUBVENIRET. So that there is no such artificer of
dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance, VULTUS JUSSUS, that
can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more
slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious
and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly.
17. Neither are deeds
such assured pledges, as that they may be
trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and
nature: FRAUS SIBI IN PARVIS FIDEM PRAESTRUIT, UT MAJORE EMOLUMENTO
FALLAT: and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought
and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, without
manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men asleep, both
as to caution and as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth
them, ALIMENTA SOCORDIAE. So again we see how false the nature of
some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon
Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which
was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the
friends of Antonius: SIMUL AMICIS EJUS PRAEFECTURAS ET TRIBUNATUS
LARGITUR: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate
him, and won from him his dependences.
18. As for words, though
they be like waters to physicians, full of
flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised, especially
with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius,
upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth
of his dissimulation, when he said, YOU ARE HURT BECAUSE YOU DO NOT
REIGN; of which Tacitus saith, AUDITA HAEC RARAM OCCULTI PECTORIS
VOCEM ELICUERE; CORREPTAMQUE GRAECO VERSU ADMONUIT, IDEO LAEDI, QUIA
NON REGNARET. And therefore the poet doth elegantly call passions,
tortures that urge men to confess their secrets:
Vino tortus et ira.
And experience showeth,
there are few men so true to themselves and
so settled, but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery,
sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness,
they open themselves; especially if they be put to it with a
counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, DI MENTIRA,
Y SACARAS VERDAD (Tell a lie and find a truth).
19. As for the knowing of
men which is at second hand from reports;
men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their
virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from
their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar
friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and
the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to
such men are more masked: VERIOR FAMA E DOMESTICIS EMANAT.
20. But the soundest
disclosing and expounding of men is by their
natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best
interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it
was both [70] pleasantly and wisely said, though I think very
untruly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning from a certain nation
where he served as lidger; whose opinion being asked touching the
appointment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case
they did not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man
would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do. And
certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to
suppose deeper ends and more compass-reaches than are: the Italian
proverb being elegant, and for the most part true: --
Di danari, di senno, e di
fede,
Ce ne manco che non credi.
There is commonly less
money, less wisdom, and less good faith than
men do account upon.
21. But princes, upon a
far other reason, are best interpreted by
their natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being
at the top of human desires, they have for the most part no
particular ends whereto they aspire, by distance from which a man
might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and
desires; which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more
inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's
ends and natures, of the variety of them only, but also of the
predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally
sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by
Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humours of pleasures, METUS EJUS
RIMATUR, he wrought upon Nero's fears, whereby he brake the other's
neck.
22. But to all this part
of inquiry the most compendious way
resteth in three things: the first, to have general acquaintance and
inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and look most
into the world; and especially according to the diversity of
business, and the diversity of persons, to have privacy and
conversation with some one friend at least which is perfect and well
intelligenced in every several kind. The second is, to keep a good
mediocrity in liberty of speech and secresy; in most things liberty;
secresy where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth and
provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to a man's
knowledge; and secresy, on the other side, induceth trust and
inwardness. The last is, the reducing of a man's self to this
watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every
conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus
would have a philosopher in every particular action to say to
himself, ET HOC VOLO, ET ETIAM INSTITUTUM SERVARE, so a politic man
in everything should say to himself, ET HOC VOLO, AC ETIAM ALIQUID
ADDISCERE. I have stayed the longer upon this precept of obtaining
good information, because it is a main part by itself, which
answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution must be
taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this
much knowledge do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is more
unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many matters. So
that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to
this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may
concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more
dexterity.
23. The second precept
concerning this knowledge is, for men to
take good information touching their own person, and well to
understand themselves: knowing that, as St. James saith, though men
look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein
as the divine glass is the word of God, so the politic glass is the
state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the which we are to
behold ourselves.
24. For men ought to take
an impartial view of their own abilities
and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting
these with the most, and those other with the least; and from this
view and examination to frame the considerations following.
25. First, to consider
how the constitution of their nature sorteth
with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and
fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but
if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to
be more close, retired, and reserved: as we see in Tiberius, who was
never seen at a play, and came not into the Senate in twelve of his
last years; whereas Augustus Caesar lived ever in men's eyes, which
Tacitus observeth, ALIA TIBERIO MORUM VIA.
26. Secondly, to consider
how their nature sorteth with professions
and courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be
free; and, if engaged, to make the departure at the first
opportunity: as we see was done by Duke Valentine, that was designed
by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after
in regard of his parts and inclination; being such, nevertheless, as
a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a prince or for a
priest.
27. Thirdly, to consider
how they sort with those whom they are
like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course
wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most
eminent: as Caesar Julius did, who at first was an orator or pleader;
but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and
others, for eloquence, and saw there was no man of reputation for the
wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook
his course begun towards a civil and popular greatness and
transferred his designs to a martial greatness.
28. Fourthly, in the
choice of their friends and dependences, to
proceed according to the composition of their own nature: as we may
see in Caesar; all whose friends and followers were men active and
effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation.
29. Fifthly, to take
special heed how they guide themselves by
examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas
perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing. In which error
it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont often
to say, SYLLA POTUIT --- EGO NON POTERO ? Wherein he was much
abused, the [71] natures and proceedings of himself and his example
being the unlikest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and
pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and
circumstance, and therefore the less effectual. But this precept
touching the politic knowledge of ourselves, bath many other
branches, whereupon we cannot insist.
30. Next to the well
understanding and discerning of a man's self,
there followeth the well opening and revealing a man's self; wherein
we see nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less
show. For there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a
man's virtues, fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial
covering of a man's weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the
one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circumstances,
gracing the other by exposition, and the like: wherein we see what
Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of his
time, OMNIUM QUAE DIXERAT FECERATQUE ARTE QUÂDAM OSTENTATOR:
which
requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet
so as ostentation, though it be to the first degree of vanity, seemeth
to me rather a vice in manners than in policy: for as it is said,
AUDACTER CALUMNIARE, SEMPER ALIQUID HAERET: so, except it be in a
ridiculous degree of deformity, AUDACTER TE VENDITA, SEMPER ALIQUID
HAERET. For it will stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of
men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it, and despise it;
and yet the authority won with many doth countervail the disdain of a
few. But if it be carried with decency and government, as with a
natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at times when it is
mixed with some peril and unsafety, as in military persons; or at
times when others are most envied; or with easy and careless passage
to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious;
or with an equal freedom of taxing a man's self, as well as gracing
himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others' injury
or insolence; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a few
solid natures, that want this ventosity, and cannot fail in the
height of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage
by their moderation.
31. But for these
flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they
are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that
virtue be not disvalued and imbased under the just price; which is
done in three manners: by offering and obtruding a man's self;
wherein men think he is rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too
much, which will not give that which is well done leave to settle, and
in the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon the fruit of a
man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a
man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said: CAVE
NE INSUETUS REBUS MAJORIBUS VIDEARIS, SI HAEC TE RES PARVA SICUTI
MAGNA DELECTAT.
32. But the covering of
defects is of no less importance than the
valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners,
by caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do
ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for
which they are not proper: whereas, contrariwise, bold and unquiet
spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and
so publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour is, when men make a
way for themselves, to have a construction made of their faults or
wants, as proceeding from a better cause, or intended for some other
purpose: for of the one it is well said,
Saepe latet vitium
proximitate boni,
and therefore whatsoever
want a man hath, he must see that he
pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must
affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest: for the
second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not do his
best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and for that purpose
must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him, to
give colour that his true wants are but industries and
dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but surest remedy;
namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot attain;
observing the good principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise
the price of their own commodities, and to beat down the price of
others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other; which is
to face out a man's own defects, in seeming to conceive that he is
best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again,
to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in
those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in
poets, that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they
will say, THAT THAT LINE COST THEM MORE LABOUR THAN ANY OF THE REST;
and presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other
line, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But
above all, in this righting and helping of a man's self in his own
carriage, he must take heed he show not himself dismantled, and
exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and
facility of nature; but show some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and
edge. Which kind of fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a
man's self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by
somewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with good
felicity.
33. Another precept of
this knowledge is, by all possible endeavour
to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing
hindereth men's fortunes so much as this: IDEM MANEBAT, NEQUE IDEM
DECEBAT, men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to
Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth, that
he had VERSATILE INGENIUM. And thereof it cometh that these grave
solemn wits, which must be like themselves, and cannot make
departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature
to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn; in some
it is a conceit, that is almost a nature, which is, that men can
hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their
course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For
Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have been
temporizing [72] still, according to his old bias, when the nature of
the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is
want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not
discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the
occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country
fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow,
then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some
other it is a lothness to leese labours passed, and a conceit that
they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when
they see no other remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as
Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla's books the
treble price, when he might at first have had all three for the
simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind
proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and nothing is more politic
than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the
wheels of fortune.
34. Another precept of
this knowledge, which hath some affinity
with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is
well expressed, FATIS ACCEDE DEISQUE, that men do not only turn with
the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their
credit or strength to over hard or extreme points; but choose in
their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve men
from foal, not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of
moderation, please the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity
in all they undertake; which cannot but mightily increase reputation.
35. Another part of this
knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy
with the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which
Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; ET QUEMADMODUM RECEPTUM EST, UT
EXERCITUM DUCAT IMPERATOR, SIC ET A CORDATIS VIRIS RES IPSAE
DUCENDAE; UT QUAE IPSIS VIDENTUR, EA GERANTUR, ET NON IPSI EVENTUS
TANTUM PERSEQUI COGANTUR. For, if we observe, we shall find two
differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business; some can make
use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can
urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take
in; either of which is very imperfect without the other.
36. Another part of this
knowledge is the observing a good
mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man's self: for
although depth of secrecy, and making way, QUALIS EST VIA NAVIS IN
MARI,
(which the French calleth SOURDES MENÉES, when men set things in
work
without opening themselves at all,) be sometimes both prosperous and
admirable; yet many times DISSIMULATIO ERRORES PARIT, QUI
DISSIMULATOREM IPSUM ILLAQUEANT; and therefore, we see the greatest
politiques have in a natural and free manner professed their desires,
rather than been reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that
Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, that he wishcd all men happy
or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies. So Caesar, when he
went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess THAT HE HAD RATHER
BE FIRST IN A VILLAGE, THAN SECOND AT ROME. So again, as soon as he
had begun the war, we see what Cicero saith of him, ALTER (meaning of
Caesar) NON RECUSAT, SED QUODAMMODO POSTULAT, UT, UT EST, SIC
APPELLETUR TYRANNUS. So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus,
that Augustus Caesar, in his very entrance into affairs, when he was
a darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would
swear, ITA PARENTIS HONORES CONSEQUI LICEAT, which was no less than
the tyranny; save that, to help it, he would stretch forth his hand
towards a statua of Caesar's that was erected in the place: and men
laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible? or, Did you ever
hear the like? and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so
handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas
Pompey, who tended to the same end, but in a more dark and dissembling
manner, as Tacitus saith of him, OCCULTIOR, NON MELIOR, wherein
Sallust concurreth, ORE PROBO, ANIMO INVERECUNDO, made it his design,
by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute
anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms
for necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon
him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it, as he
thought, to that point, when he was chosen consul alone, as never any
was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men understood
him not; but was fain, in the end, to go the beaten track of getting
arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of Caesar's designs: so
tedious, casual, and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations:
whereof it seemeth Tacitus made his judgment, that they were a
cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing the
one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius; where speaking of Livia, he
saith, ET CUM ARTIBUS MARITI SIMULATIONE FILII BENE COMPOSITA: for
surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and
sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic.
37. Another precept of
this architecture of fortune is, to accustom
our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they
conduce and are material to our particular ends: and that to do
substantially, and not superficially. For we shall find the logical
part, as I may term it, of some men's minds good, but the
mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of
consequences, but not of proportions and comparisons, preferring things
of show and sense before things of substance and effect. So some fall
in love with access to princes, others with popular fame and
applause, supposing they are things of great purchase: when in many
cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. [--] So
some measure things according to the labour and difficulty, or
assiduity, which are spent about them; and think, if they be ever
moving, that they must needs advance and proceed; as Caesar saith in
a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how
laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose; HAEC OMNIA
MAGNO STUDIO AGEBAT. So in most things men are ready to abuse
themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should
be the fittest.
[73] 38. As for the true
marshalling of men's pursuits towards
their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to
stand thus: first the amendment of their own minds. For the remove of
the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of
fortune, than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of
the mind. In the second place, I set down wealth and means; which I
know most men would have placed first, because of the general use
which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I
may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that
moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas, saith he, the true
sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant,
populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of
Solon, who, when Croesus showed him his treasury of gold, said to
him, that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of
his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not
moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel
of men's minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry,
and the like. In the third place I set down reputation, because of
the peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they be not
taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being extreme hard
to play an after game of reputation. And lastly, I place honour,
which is more easily won by any of the other three, much more by all,
than any of them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this
precept, as there is order and priority in matter, so is there in
time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest
errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend their
beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come on,
but marshal them according to greatness, and not according to
instance; not observing the good precept, QUOD NUNC INSTAT AGAMUS.
39. Another precept of
this knowledge is not to embrace any matters
which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that
sounding in a man's ears,
Sed fugit interea, fugit
irreparabile tempus:
and that is the cause why
those which take their course of rising
by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the
like, are not commonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise
than in their ordinary way, because they want time to learn
particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots.
40. Another precept of
this knowledge is, to imitate nature, which
doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well
interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that
which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular
action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing
under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best
degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can
have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to
somewhat else; and if he cannot make anything of it for the present,
yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can
contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good opinion
by it, or the like. So that he should exact an account of himself of
every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused
if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impolitic
than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth so leeseth
infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper
and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than for
that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be
perfect in that rule, HAEC OPORTET FACERE, ET ILLA NON OMITTERE.
41. Another precept of
this knowledge is, not to engage a man's self
peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; but
ever to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following
the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted
when their plash was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to
go down into a pit, because it was not likely the water would dry
there; but the other answered, TRUE, BUT IF IT DO, HOW SHALL WE GET
OUT AGAIN ?
42. Another precept of
this knowledge is, that ancient precept of
Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but only to
caution and moderation, ET AMA TANQUAM INIMICUS FUTURUS, ET ODI
TANQUAM AMATURUS; for it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to
embark themselves too far in unfortunate friendships, troublesome
spleens, and childish and humorous envies or emulations.
43. But I continue this
beyond the measure of an example; led,
because I would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient,
to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or
two much made of, but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is
hardlier made than a beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that
in these points which I mention and set down, they are far from
complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for patterns.
And lastly, no man, I suppose, will think that I mean fortunes are
not obtained without all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into
some men's laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a
plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross
errors.
44. But as Cicero, when
he setteth down an idea of a perfect
orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so
likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as
have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made according
to the perfection of the art, and not according to common practice:
so I understand it, that it ought to be done in the description of a
politic man, I mean politic for his own fortune.
45. But it must be
remembered all this while, that the precepts
which we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and
called BONAE ARTES. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for
himself that principle of Machiavel, THAT A MAN SEEK NOT TO ATTAIN
VIRTUE ITSELF, BUT THE APPEARANCE ONLY THEREOF; BECAUSE THE CREDIT OF
VIRTUE IS A HELP, BUT THE USE OF IT IS CUMBER: or that other of his
principles, THAT HE PRESUPPOSE, THAT MEN ARE NOT FITLY TO BE WROUGHT
OTHERWISE BUT BY FEAR; AND THEREFORE [74] THAT HE SEEK TO HAVE EVERY
MAN OBNOXIOUS, LOW, AND IN STRAIT, which the Italians call SEMINAR
SPINE, to sow thorns: or that other principle, contained in the verse
which Cicero citeth, CADANT AMICI, DUMMODO INIMICI INTERCIDANT, as
the triumvirs, which sold, every one to other, the lives of their
friends for the deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation
of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish
in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes, EGO SI QUID IN
FORTUNIS MEIS EXCITATUM SIT INCENDIUM, ID NON AQUA SED RUINA
RESTINGUAM: or that other principle of Lysander, THAT CHILDREN ARE
TO BE DECEIVED WITH COMFITS, AND MEN WITH OATHS: and the like evil
and corrupt positions, whereof, as in all things, there are more in
number than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from the
laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man's fortune may be
more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the
shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is
not much about.
46. But men, if they be
in their own power, and do bear and sustain
themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of
ambition, ought, in the pursuit of their own fortune, to set before
their eyes not only that general map of the world, THAT ALL THINGS
ARE VANITY AND VEXATION OF SPIRIT, but many other more particular
cards and directions: chiefly that -- that being without wellbeing is
a curse -- and the greater being the greater curse; and that all
virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished in itself:
according as the poet saith excellently:
Quae vobis, quae digna,
viri, pro laudibus istis
Praemia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Dii moresque dabunt vestri.
And so of the contrary.
And, secondly, they ought to look up to the
eternal providence and divine judgment, which often subverteth the
wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according to that Scripture,
HE HATH CONCEIVED MISCHIEF, AND SHALL BRING FORTH A VAIN THING. And
although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet
this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man's fortune leaveth not
the tribute which we owe to God of our time; who we see demandeth a
tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our
time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards
heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust, as
doth the serpent,
Atque affigit humo
divinae particulam aurae.
And if any man flatter
himself that he will employ his fortune
well, though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus
Cesar, and after of Septimius Severus, THAT EITHER THEY SHOULD NEVER
HAVE BEEN BORN, OR ELSE THEY SHOULD NEVER HAVE DIED, they did so much
mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so much
good when they were established; yet these compensations and
satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. And
lastly, it is not amiss for men in their race toward their fortune,
to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly
expressed by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, in his instructions to
the king his son, THAT FORTUNE HATH SOMEWHAT OF THE NATURE OF A
WOMAN, THAT IF SHE BE TOO MUCH WOOED, SHE IS THE FARTHER OFF. But
this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let
men rather build upon that foundation which is a cornerstone of
divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, namely, that same
PRIMUM QUAERITE. For divinity saith, PRIMUM QUAERITE REGNUM DEI, ET
ISTA OMNIA ADJICIENTUR VOBIS: and philosophy saith, PRIMUM QUAERITE
BONA ANIMI; CAETERA AUT ADERUNT, AUT NON OBERUNT. And although the
human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. Brutus,
when he brake forth into that speech,
Te colui, Virtus, ut rem;
at tu nomen inane es;
yet the divine foundation
is upon the rock. But this may serve for
a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.
47. Concerning
Government, it is a part of knowledge secret and
retired, in both these respects in which things are deemed secret;
for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some
because they are not fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure
and invisible:
Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
Such is the description
of governments. We see the government of
God over the world is hidden, inasmuch as it seemeth to participate
of much irregularity and confusion: the government of the soul in
moving the body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof
hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of
antiquity, (the shadows whereof are in the poets,) in the description
of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was
the giants' offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in
Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars:
nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy and
government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.
48. But contrariwise, in
the governors toward the governed, all
things ought, as far as the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest
and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the
government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and
shady body, is in the view of God as crystal: ET IN CONSPECTU SEDIS
TANQUAM MARE VITREUM SIMILE CRYSTALLO. So unto princes and states,
especially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and
dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their
factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought
to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of
their observations, and the height of their station where they keep
sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering
that I write to a King that is a master of this science, and is so
well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence,
as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient
philosophers aspired unto; [75] who being silent, when others
contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired
it might be certified for his part, THAT THERE WAS ONE THAT KNEW HOW
TO HOLD HIS PEACE.
49. Notwithstanding, for
the more public part of government, which
is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all
those which have written of laws, have written either as philosophers
or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they
make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses
are as the stars, which give little light, because they are so high.
For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live,
what is received law, and not what ought to be law: for the wisdom of
a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in
nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are
derived but as streams: and like as waters do take tinctures and
tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary
according to the regions and governments where they are planted,
though they proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a
lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the
application thereof; taking into consideration by what means laws may
be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the
doubtfulness and incertainty of law; by what means laws may be made
apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and
remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching
private right of MEUM and TUUM have into the public state, and how
they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and
delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief or large, with
preambles, or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from
time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being too
vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and crossness; how they
are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and judicially
discussed, and when upon responses and conferences touching general
points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or
tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience,
and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same
courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how the practice,
profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed; and
many other points touching the administration, and, as I may term it,
animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I purpose,
if God give me leave, (having begun a work of this nature in
aphorisms,) to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for
deficient.
50. And for your
Majesty's laws of England, I could say much of
their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but
excel the civil laws in fitness for the government: for the civil law
was NON HOS QUAESITUM MUNUS IN USUS; it was not made for the
countries which it governeth: hereof I cease to speak because I will
not intermingle matter of action with matter of general learning.
XXIV. THUS have I
concluded this portion of learning touching civil
knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy;
and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at
some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this
writing seemeth to me, SI NUNQUAM FALLIT IMAGO, (as far as a man can
judge of his own work,) not much better than that noise or sound
which musicians make while they are tuning their instruments: which
is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is
sweeter afterwards: so have I been content to tune the instruments of
the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely,
when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning
hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities
thereof -- as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age;
the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient
writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of all
fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath
disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history;
the leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so
generally in civil business, as the states of Graecia did, in respect
of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the
greatness of their monarchy; the present disposition of these times
at this instant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be
said in controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men
from other sciences; the perfection of your Majesty's learning, which
as a Phoenix may call whole vollies of wits to follow you; and the
inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to
disclose truth -- I cannot but be raised to this persuasion that this
third period of time will far surpass that of the Grecian and Roman
learning: only if men will know their own strength, and their own
weakness both; and take one from the other, light of invention, and
not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as
of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit
and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things
vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall
please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make
that ancient and patient request, VERBERA, SED AUDI; let men
reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them: for the appeal is
lawful, though it may be it shall not be needful, from the first
cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the
times further off. Now let us come to that learning, which both the
former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired
divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men's labours and
peregrinations.
XXV. 1. THE prerogative
of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man; so that
as we are to obey His law, though we find
a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we
find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which
is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter, and not to
the author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected
[76] and discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to
Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah
laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason.
2. Howbeit, if we will
truly consider it, more worthy it is to
believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's
mind suffereth from sense; but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such
one as it holdeth for more authorized than itself, and so suffereth
from the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man
glorified; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are
known.
3. Wherefore we conclude
that sacred theology, (which in our idiom
we call divinity,) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God,
and not upon the light of nature: for it is written, COELI ENARRANT
GLORIAM DEI; but it is not written, COELI ENARRANT VOLUNTATEM DEI:
but of that it is said, AD LEGEM ET TESTIMONIUM: SI NON FECERINT
SECUNDUM VERBUM ISTUD, etc. This holdeth not only in those points of
faith which concern the mysteries of the Deity, of the Creation, of
the Redemption, but likewise those which concern the moral law truly
interpreted: LOVE YOUR ENEMIES: DO GOOD TO THEM THAT HATE YOU; BE
LIKE TO YOUR HEAVENLY FATHER, THAT SUFFERETH HIS RAIN TO FALL UPON
THE JUST AND UNJUST. To this it ought to be applauded, NEC VOX
HOMINEM SONAT: it is a voice beyond the light of nature. So we see
the heathen poets, when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still
expostulate with laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and
malignant to nature;
Et quod natura remittit,
Invida jura negant.
So said Dendamis the
Indian unto Alexander's messengers, THAT HE
HAD HEARD SOMEWHAT OF PYTHAGORAS, AND SOME OTHER OF THE WISE MEN OF
GRAECIA, AND THAT HE HELD THEM FOR EXCELLENT MEN: BUT THAT THEY HAD A
FAULT, WHICH WAS THAT THEY HAD IN TOO GREAT REVERENCE AND VENERATION
A THING WHICH THEY CALLED LAW AND MANNERS. So it must be confessed,
that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection, whereunto
the light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to
have, by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of
virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the
light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, that which
springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the
laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the
spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of
conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate; in
which latter sense only he is participant of some light and
discerning touching the perfection of the moral law. but how?
sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the
doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be
attained but by inspiration and revelation from God.
4. The use,
notwithstanding, of reason in spiritual things, and the
latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for
nothing that the apostle calleth religion OUR REASONABLE SERVICE OF
GOD; insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were
full of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of
idolatry and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd
characters. But most especially the Christian faith, as in all
things, so in this deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and
preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the
heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced the two extremes.
For the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or confession,
but left all to the liberty of argument; and the religion of Mahomet,
on the other side, interdicteth argument altogether: the one having
the very face of error, and the other of imposture: whereas the faith
doth both admit and reject disputation with difference.
5. The use of human
reason in religion is of two sorts: the former,
in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us
revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and
direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries
themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of
argument: the latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In
the former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in
the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us;
and doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of
our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding,
as the form of the key to the ward of the lock: for the latter, there
is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and respective,
although not original and absolute. For after the articles and
principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of
reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and
inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better
direction. In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are
examinable by induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and
besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with
that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions.
But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in many knowledges,
both of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not
only POSITA but PLACITA; for in such there can be no use of absolute
reason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like:
the draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but how? merely
AD PLACITUM, and not examinable by reason; but then how to direct our
play thereupon with best advantage to win the game, is artificial and
rational. So in human laws, there be many grounds and maxims which
are PLACITA JURIS, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and
therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely
but relatively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long
field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason, which
hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the PLACETS of God.
6. Here therefore I note
this deficiency, that there hath not been,
to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true
limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine
dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing
usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which [77] is revealed, to
search and mine into that which is not revealed; and by pretext of
enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is
positive: the one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding
to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal
them, QUOMODO POSSIT HOMO NASCI CUM SIT SENEX ? the other sort into
the error of the disciples, which were scandalized at a show of
contradiction, QUID EST HOC QUOD DICIT NOBIS ? MODICUM, ET NON
VIDEBITIS ME; ET ITERUM MODICUM, ET VIDEBITIS ME, etc.
7. Upon this I have
insisted the more, in regard of the great and
blessed use thereof; for this point, well laboured and defined of,
would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the
vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the
fury of controversies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot
but open men's eyes, to see that many controversies do merely pertain
to that which is either not revealed, or positive; and that many
others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which
latter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that great
doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, EGO, NON DOMINUS; and
again, SECUNDUM CONSILIUM MEUM, in opinions and counsels, and not in
positions and oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the
style, NON EGO, SED DOMINUS; and not so only, but to bind it with the
thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of
those which have not sufficiently learned out of Salomon, that THE
CAUSELESS CURSE SHALL NOT COME.
8. Divinity hath two
principal parts; the matter informed or
revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation: and with
the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence with that
which we have now last handled. The nature of the information
consisteth of three branches; the limits of the information, the
sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining the
information. Unto the limits of the information belong these
considerations; how far forth particular persons continue to be
inspired; how far forth the Church is inspired; how far forth reason
may be used: the last point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto
the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations; what
points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective, being matter
of further building and perfection upon one and the same foundation;
and again, how the gradations of light, according to the dispensation
of times, are material to the sufficiency of belief.
9. Here again I may
rather give it in advice, than note it as
deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of further
perfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished: a
subject tending to much like end as that I noted before; for as that
other were like to abate the number of controversies, so this is
likely to abate the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw
the Israelite and the egyptian fight, he did not say, WHY STRIVE YOU?
but drew his sword and slew the egyptian: but when he saw the two
Israelites fight, he said, YOU ARE BRETHREN, WHY STRIVE YOU ? If the
point of doctrine be an Aegyptian, it must be slain by the sword of the
spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, though in the
wrong, then, WHY STRIVE YOU ? We see of the fundamental points, our
Saviour penneth the league thus, HE THAT IS NOT WITH US, IS AGAINST
US; but of points not fundamental, thus, HE THAT IS NOT AGAINST AS,
IS WITH US. So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire without
seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; but the
garment of the Church was of divers colours, and yet not divided: we
see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear,
but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field. So as
it is a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude
those points are, which do make men merely aliens and disincorporate
from the Church of God.
10. For the obtaining of
the information, it resteth upon the true
and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains
of the water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of
two sorts; methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water,
which excelleth so much that of Jacob's Well, is drawn forth much in
the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and
fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from
thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received
in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former
sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment
is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath exhibited
unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced
into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrine or
positions fetched and derived from thence.
11. In this men have
sought three things, a summary brevity, a
compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first
they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to
brevity we see, in all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge,
they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgment by contraction
becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition, and the
exposition is diduced into large commentaries, or into common places
and titles, which grow to be more vast than the original writings,
whence the sum was at first extracted. So, we see, the volumes of the
schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the fathers,
whence the Master of the Sentences made his sum or collection. So,
in like manner, the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law
exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian compileth
the digest. So as this course of sums and commentaries is
that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in
quantity, and more base in substance.
12. And for strength, it
is true that knowledges reduced into exact
methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support
and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than
substantial: like unto buildings which stand by architecture and
compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those which are built
more strong in their several [78] parts, though less compacted. But
it is plain that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker do
you conclude: and as in nature, the more you remove yourself from
particulars, the greater peril of error you do incur: so much more in
divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures by inferences and
consequences, the more weak and dilute are your positions.
13. And as for perfection
or completeness in divinity, it is not to
be sought; which makes this course of artificial divinity the more
suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make
it round and uniform: but in divinity many things must be left
abrupt, and concluded with this: O ALTITUDO SAPIENTIAE ET SCIENTIAE
DEI! QUAM INCOMPREHENSIBILIA SUNT JUDICIA EJUS, ET NON INVESTIGABILES
VIAE EJUS! So again the apostle saith, EX PARTE SCIMUS: and to have
the form of a total, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be
without supplies by supposition and presumption. And therefore I
conclude, that the true use of these sums and methods hath place in
institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge: but in
them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and
substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, and in
divinity dangerous.
14. As to the
interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large,
there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them
rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding,
thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures being given by
inspiration, and not by human reason, do differ from all other books
in the author: which, by consequence, doth draw on some difference to
be used by the expositor. For the inditer of them did know four
things which no man attains to know; which are, the mysteries of the
kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets
of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages. For as to
the first it is said, HE THAT PRESSETH INTO THE LIGHT, SHALL BE
OPPRESSED OF THE GLORY. And again, NO MAN SHALL SEE MY FACE AND LIVE.
To the second, WHEN HE PREPARED THE HEAVENS I WAS PRESENT, WHEN BY
LAW AND COMPASS HE INCLOSED THE DEEP. To the third, NEITHER WAS IT
NEEDFUL THAT ANY SHOULD BEAR WITNESS TO HIM OF MAN, FOR HE KNEW WELL
WHAT WAS IN MAN. And to the last, FROM THE BEGINNING ARE KNOWN TO THE
LORD ALL HIS WORKS.
15. From the former two
have been drawn certain senses and
expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the
bounds of sobriety; the one anagogical, and the other philosophical.
But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: VIDEMUS NUNC
PER SPECULUM IN AENIGMATE, TUNC AUTEM FACIE AD FACIEM: wherein
nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as
the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication to this
aenigma. But to press too far into it, cannot but cause a dissolution
and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three
degrees of that we receive into it, aliment, medicine, and poison;
whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter
and overcome: medicine is that which is partly converted by nature,
and partly converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly
upon nature, without that, that nature can in any part work upon it.
So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work upon
and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a dissolution of
the mind and understanding.
16. But for the latter,
it hath been extremely set on foot of late
time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have
pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the
Scriptures; scandalizing and traducing all other philosophy as
heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between God's
word and His works; neither do they give honour to the Scriptures, as
they suppose, but much imbase them. For to seek heaven and earth in
the word of God, (whereof it is said, HEAVEN AND EARTH SHALL PASS,
BUT MY WORD SHALL NOT PASS,) is to seek temporary things amongst
eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living
amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the
dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place
was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest
place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again,
the scope or purpose of the spirit of God is not to express matters
of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for
application to man's capacity, and to matters moral or divine. And it
is a true rule, AUCTORIS ALIUD AGENTIS PARVA AUCTORITAS; for it were
a strange conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament
or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or history according to
vulgar conceit, as of a Basilisk, an Unicorn, a Centaur, a Briareus,
an Hydra, or the like, that therefore he must needs be thought to
affirm the matter thereof positively to be true. To conclude,
therefore, these two interpretations, the one by reduction or
enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which have been
received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists, are
to be confined with a NOLI ALTUM SAPERE, SED TIME.
17. But the two latter
points, known to God and unknown to man,
touching the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time, do
make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition
of the Scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent
observation which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour
Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how
that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded; the
reason whereof is, because, not being like man, which knows man's
thoughts by his words, but knowing man's thoughts immediately, he
never answered their words, but their thoughts: much in the like
manner it is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts
of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all
heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, yea and
particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according
to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively
towards that present occasion whereupon the words [79] were uttered,
or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or after,
or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have in
themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in
clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water
the church in every part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as
it were, the main stream or river; so the moral sense chiefly, and
sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the church
hath most use; not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or
indulgent or light in allusions: but that I do much condemn that
interpretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as men
use to interpret a profane book.
18. In this part,
touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can
report no deficience; but by way of remembrance this I will add: in
perusing books of divinity, I find many books of controversies; and
many of commonplaces and treaties; a mass of positive divinity, as it
is made an art; a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix
commentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances:
but that form of writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all
others most rich and precious, is positive divinity, collected upon
particular texts of Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated
into commonplaces, not chasing after controversies, not reduced into
method of art; a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but
defective in books which will remain; and a thing wherein this age
excelleth. For I am persuaded, (and I may speak it with an ABSIT
INVIDIA VERBO, and no ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a
good emulation between the vine and the olive,) that if the choice
and best of those observations upon texts of Scriptures, which have
been made dispersedly in Sermons within this your Majesty's island of
Britain by the space of these forty years and more, leaving out the
largeness of exhortations and applications thereupon, had been set
down in a continuance, it had been the best work in divinity which
had been written since the Apostles' times.
19. The matter informed
by divinity is of two kinds; matter of
belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration;
which is also judged and directed by the former: the one being as the
internal soul of religion, and the other as the external body
thereof. And therefore the heathen religion was not only a worship of
idols, but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for it had no
soul, that is, no certainty of belief or confession: as a man may
well think, considering the chief doctors of their church were the
poets: and the reason was, because the heathen gods were no jealous
gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason.
Neither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they might have
external honour and rites.
20. But out of these two
do result and issue four main branches of
divinity; faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith containeth
the doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of
the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in
unity of Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the
Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God summary are
two, that of the creation and that of the redemption: and both these
works, as in total they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in
their parts they refer to the three persons: that of the creation, in
the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the disposition of the
form, to the Son; and in the continuance and conservation of the
being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the redemption, in the election
and counsel, to the Father; in the whole act and consummation to the
Son; and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy
Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the
elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either
effectually, in the elect; or privatively in the reprobate; or
according to appearance, in the visible church.
21. For Manners, the
doctrine thereof is contained in the law,
which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the
edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law
positive; and according to the style, into negative and affirmative,
prohibitions and commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject
thereof, is divided according to the commandments; in the form
thereof, it referreth to the three persons in Deity: sins of
infirmity against the Father, whose more special attribute is power;
sins of ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is wisdom; and
sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or
love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to
the left; either to blind devotion, or to profane and libertine
transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth
liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the
degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or
act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God
to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and
not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth
both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the elevation and
consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy
meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.
22. For the Liturgy or
service, it consisteth of the reciprocal
acts between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the
preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the
covenant, or as the visible word; and on the part of man, invocation
of the name of God; and under the law, sacrifices; which were as
visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration being IN
SPIRITU ET VERITATE, there remaineth only VITULI LABIORUM; although
the use of holy vows of thankfulness and retribution may be accounted
also as sealed petitions.
23. And for the
Government of the church, it consisteth of the
patrimony of the church, the franchises of the church, and the
offices and jurisdictions of the church, and the laws of the church
directing the whole; all which have two considerations, the one in
themselves, the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the
civil estate.
24. This matter of
divinity is handled either in form [80] of
instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The
declinations from religion, besides the privative, which is atheism,
and the branches thereof, are three; Heresies, Idolatry, and
Witchcraft; heresies, when we serve the true God with a false
worship; idolatry, when we worship false gods, supposing them to be
true: and witchcraft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be
wicked and false: for so your Majesty doth excellently well observe,
that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see though
these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a
nature, when there is once a receding from the word of God; for so he
saith, QUASI PECCATUM ARIOLANDI EST REPUGNARE ET QUASI SCELUS
IDOLOLATRIAE NOLLE ACQUIESCERE.
25. These things I have
passed over so briefly because I can report
no deficience concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that
lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity: so diligent have
men been, either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.
---------
THUS have I made as it
were a small globe of the intellectual
world, as truly and faithfully as I could discover: with a note and
description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate,
or not well converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in
any point receded from that which is commonly received, it hath been
with a purpose of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud; a mind of
amendment and proficience, and not of change and difference. For I
could not be true and constant to the argument I handle, if I were
not willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to
have others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by this,
that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to
preoccupate the liberty of men's judgments by confutations. For in
anything which is well set down, I am in good hope, that if the first
reading move an objection, the second reading will make an answer.
And in those things wherein I have erred, I am sure I have not
prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which certainly have
this contrary effect and operation, that they add authority to error,
and destroy the authority of that which is well invented: for
question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on the other
side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and challenge
to myself as mine own: the good, if any be, is due TANQUM ADEPS
SACRIFICII, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine Majesty,
and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.
DEO GLORIA
***