MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley intermittently for 18 years,
during which time they had three children. When Joan Stanley died,
Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children. Under Illinois
law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon
the death of the mother. Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley’s
death, in a dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois,
Stanley’s children were declared wards of the State and placed
with court-appointed guardians. Stanley appealed, claiming that
he had never been shown to be an unfit parent and that since married
fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of their children
without such a showing, he had been deprived of the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Illinois
Supreme Court accepted the fact that Stanley’s own unfitness
had not been established but rejected the equal protection claim,
holding that Stanley could properly be separated from his children
upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead mother had not
been married. Stanley’s actual fitness as a father was irrelevant.
Stanley presses his equal protection claim here. The State continues
to respond that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their
children and that it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings
to determine whether particular fathers are in fact unfit parents
before they are separated from their children. We granted certiorari
to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could
be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married
fathers—whether divorced, widowed, or separated—and
mothers—even if unwed—the benefit of the presumption
that they are fit to raise their children. . . .
We must therefore examine the question that Illinois would have
us avoid: Is a presumption that distinguishes and burdens all unwed
fathers constitutionally repugnant? We conclude that, as a matter
of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and
that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents
whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied
Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . .
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family.
The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been
deemed “essential,” “basic civil rights of man,”
and “rights far more precious. . .than property
rights.” “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder.” The integrity of the family
unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, and the
Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut. . . .
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are
unsuitable and neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is
such a parent and that his children should be placed in other hands.
But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly
suited to have custody of their children. This much the State readily
concedes, and nothing in this record indicates that Stanley is or
has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children.
Given the opportunity to make his case, Stanley may have been seen
to be deserving of custody of his offspring. Had this been so, the
State’s statutory policy would have been furthered by leaving
custody in him. . . .
The State of Illinois assumes custody of the children of married
parents, divorced parents, and unmarried mothers only after a hearing
and proof of neglect. The children of unmarried fathers, however,
are declared dependent children without a hearing on parental fitness
and without proof of neglect. Stanley’s claim in the state
courts and here is that failure to afford him a hearing on his parental
qualifications while extending it to other parents denied him equal
protection of the laws. We have concluded that all Illinois parents
are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before
their children are removed from their custody. It follows that denying
such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to
other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection
Clause.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered. . . .
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs,
dissenting. . . .
In regard to the only issue that I consider properly before the
Court, I agree with the State’s argument that the Equal Protection
Clause is not violated when Illinois gives full recognition only
to those father-child relationships that arise in the context of
family units bound together by legal obligations arising from marriage
or from adoption proceedings. Quite apart from the religious or
quasi-religious connotations that marriage has—and has historically
enjoyed—for a large proportion of this Nation’s citizens,
it is in law an essentially contractual relationship, the parties
to which have legally enforceable rights and duties, with respect
both to each other and to any children born to them. Stanley and
the mother of these children never entered such a relationship.
The record is silent as to whether they ever privately exchanged
such promises as would have bound them in marriage under the common
law. In any event, Illinois has not recognized common-law marriages
since 1905. Stanley did not seek the burdens when he could have
freely assumed them. . . .
The Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that the State may constitutionally
distinguish between unwed fathers and unwed mothers. Here, Illinois’
different treatment of the two is part of that State’s statutory
scheme for protecting the welfare of illegitimate children. In almost
all cases, the unwed mother is readily identifiable, generally from
hospital records, and alternatively by physicians or others attending
the child’s birth. Unwed fathers, as a class, are not traditionally
quite so easy to identify and locate. Many of them either deny all
responsibility or exhibit no interest in the child or its welfare;
and, of course, many unwed fathers are simply not aware of their
parenthood.
Furthermore, I believe that a State is fully justified in concluding,
on the basis of common human experience, that the biological role
of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger
bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting from the
male’s often casual encounter. This view is reinforced by
the observable fact that most unwed mothers exhibit a concern for
their offspring either permanently or at least until they are safely
placed for adoption, while unwed fathers rarely burden either the
mother or the child with their attentions or loyalties. Centuries
of human experience buttress this view of the realities of human
conditions and suggest that unwed mothers of illegitimate children
are generally more dependable protectors of their children than
are unwed fathers. While these, like most generalizations, are not
without exceptions, they nevertheless provide a sufficient basis
to sustain a statutory classification whose objective is not to
penalize unwed parents but to further the welfare of illegitimate
children in fulfillment of the State’s obligations as parens
patriae.
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