Radio: Hope, Fear,

and Public Opinion

‘War of the Worlds’

Theories of Media Effects

Bullet Theory

‘Minimal’ Effects

1940 Election

Web of Influence

Individual Response

Selective Perception

Reinforcement, Not

Conversion

World War II Propaganda

‘Why We Fight’ Series

(Frank Capra)

Review – Week 3

1. Communication in wartime is different historically in the U.S. To generate popular support, the federal government has used communications strategies to promote and distribute supportive information while restricting access to news and viewpoints deemed unfavorable to the war effort. These strategies and restrictions have been generally accepted in past wars by most, but not all, citizens and journalists as necessary for national security.

2. In World War I (1914-1918), the major nations involved (Britain, Germany, France, U.S.) restricted freedom of speech and press as well as using recognizably modern means of communications (newspapers, magazines, film, radio) to portray the “enemy” and persuade their own citizens to enlist in the military or to accept the war’s sacrifices.

3. In the U.S. in 1917, the Wilson administration created the first wartime propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information, and many of the nation’s leading journalists, publicists, and advertising experts volunteered to craft its messages.

4. The wartime experience and its aftermath prompted a widespread debate in the U.S. in the 1920s-1930s over the propriety of government “propaganda” and the role of communications in wartime in a presumably democratic society. Professional groups adopted new codes of ethics and news journalists began a lengthy discussion about the prospect of “objectivity,” however defined.

5. The World War I experience also prompted concerns in the 1920s and 1930s over the possible impact of messages from popular media (especially film and radio) on individual viewers and listeners, as well as on society as a whole.

6. Assumptions about the emotional impact of World War I propaganda led numerous scholars (psychologists, political scientists, philosophers, social scientists) to offer theories about communications “effects” on people and society and to begin experiments testing the extent of those impacts. This was the beginning of modern communications science.

7. Scholars began with the assumption that these new “mass” media had an overwhelming effect on individuals – communications messages entered the brain as if they were “magic bullets” (aka “silver bullets,” “hypodermic”) and had major effects on cognition, especially among children.

8. Often-claimed examples of this overwhelming impact, especially from radio, included social corrosion from soap operas, audio violence from crime shows, the political persuasiveness of FDR’s “fireside chats,” and audience panic following broadcast of Orson Welles’s wartime-themed “War of the Worlds” radio play in 1938.

9. However, evidence from increasingly sophisticated experiments in communications science raised questions about the “magic bullet” theory, suggesting instead that humans were selective in interpreting media messages. Hadley Cantril pointed out that most listeners to Welles’ radio play did not, in fact, panic or even respond strongly.

10. In World War II, the U.S. government created a new Office of War Information, modeled after the experience of World War I, and launched expanded persuasive experiments in film and radio to generate public support for the war effort. However intrusive these patriotic broadcasts and films were, however, continuing experiments by communications scientists indicated their impact on public opinion depended greatly on the context, leading to what was called the “minimal effects” theory.