PS410/510: International Regimes:
How States Govern in an Anarchic World

Goals of course

Thousands of treaties and less formal types of international regimes address issues ranging from arms control, trade and economic affairs, human rights, and environmental problems. Indeed, regulation of the behavior of states through international agreements seems increasingly common. Even the briefest review of scholarship on treaties and interstate regulation quickly demonstrates, however, that we know very little about what are the best approaches to international regulation.

The anarchic nature of international relations poses challenges to states in their efforts to cooperate, creating incentives for states not to form regimes when doing so might be beneficial and causing them to renege on commitments after they sign them. Yet, considerable research shows that regimes sometimes do form to mitigate the "natural" anarchy of international relations and some regimes have been quite successful at getting states to adopt new behaviors that they would have been unlikely to adopt in the absence of a treaty’s requirements.

This course focuses on two major questions in international relations and international policy: why do some problems lead to regime formation and why do some international regimes prove effective while others do not? It approaches these questions from both theoretical and practical perspectives. The course seeks to engage the student in becoming theoretically sophisticated about what "regime formation" and "regime effectiveness" really are and the factors that influence them. In that vein, together we will learn, develop, and build on a model of factors such as interests, power, problem structure, situation structure, and contextual factors that influence regime formation and regime effectiveness. In a more practical and empirical vein, we will test theories put forth by various authors to see if they help explain cases of regime formation and of regime success and failure. Students will be urged to think about how their insights would help policy makers design more effective treaties.

Required books

Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1997. Theories of international regimes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. On sale at the bookstore and on reserve in the library.

Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons, eds. 2001. International Institutions: An International Organization Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. On sale at the bookstore and on reserve in the library.

Additional readings may be provided and assigned during the course of the term.

Course Webpage: There will be a class web page (http://www.uoregon.edu/~rmitchel/regimes) that I MAY use to provide material relevant to the class. This is where you will find the syllabus, course assignments, etc.

Requirements and grading

No points, but all the other elements of the class and your grade will depend on staying abreast of the readings. The reading is not particularly heavy but I expect you to have it done completely and thoroughly before the relevant class.

This one’s also simple: don’t do it either. There are so many ways to cheat, I cannot define and describe all of them. Cheating includes any violations of the Student Code of Conduct and anything else that involves presenting the work, words, or thoughts of others as your own. I want to grade your work on all assignments – when you hand in an assignment, make sure that everything in it is your own work. Otherwise, don’t hand it in. Again, the minimum penalty for cheating will be a failing grade for the course. Ignorance of this policy will not be considered a legitimate defense. If you have questions, see me before you submit the assignment.

 

 

PS410/510: International Regimes:
How States Govern in an Anarchic World

Introduction

Convention On The Prohibition Of The Development, Production And Stockpiling Of Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin Weapons And On Their Destruction (1972)

Declaration On The Elimination Of Discrimination Against Women (1967)

Southern Common Market (Mercosur) Agreement (1991)

Convention On The Prevention Of Marine Pollution By Dumping Of Wastes And Other Matter (1972)

Why did countries want to negotiate a treaty on this topic? What interests drove them to sign it?

Would you expect powerful or weak states to have been the major countries supporting this treaty?

What are the major requirements of the treaty?

What evidence would you collect to evaluate if this treaty was effective at accomplishing its goals?

Would you expect it to have been effective and, if so, would you expect its effectiveness to vary over time or across different countries?

Introduction to the Field of Regime Research

Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger: chs. 1, "Introduction" and ch. 2, "Conceptual issues."

Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state," in Martin and Simmons – use this chapter to identify research questions for your final paper.

Martin and Simmons, "Theories and empirical studies of international institutions," in Martin and Simmons – use this chapter to identify research questions for your final paper.

State Interests, Regime Formation, and Problem Structure

Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger: ch. 3, "Interest-based theories."

Young, in Martin and Simmons.

Martin, "Interests, power, and multilateralism," in Martin and Simmons.

Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, "Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations," in Martin and Simmons.

Power and Conflict in International Regimes

Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger: ch. 4, "Power-based Theories."

Alter, "Who are the ‘masters of the treaty’? European governments and the European Court of Justice," in Martin and Simmons.

Gallarotti, "The limits of international organization: systematic failure in the management of international relations," in Martin and Simmons.

Smith, "The politics of dispute settlement design: explaining legalism in regional trade pacts," in Martin and Simmons.

Ideas and Knowledge in International Regimes

Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger: ch. 5, "Knowledge-based Theories."

Finnemore, "International organizations as teachers of norms," in Martin and Simmons.

Barnett and Finnemore, "The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations," in Martin and Simmons.

The Compliance Debate

Chayes and Chayes, "On compliance," in Martin and Simmons.

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," in Martin and Simmons.

Mitchell, "Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance," in Martin and Simmons.

Simmons, "The legalization of international monetary affairs," in Martin and Simmons.

Presentation of Student Papers

Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger: ch. 6, "Conclusion."

Read abstracts of all students’ papers provided over email list prior to class.