



- b) All states view themselves as worse off if they do not make their behavior contingent on that of others. But, once rules agreed to, no reason to cheat.
    - c) Some involve few distributional problems; others involve major distributional problems
    - d) Distributional issues may exist but enforcement issues don't exist
  - 2. Collaboration: Standard PD game and Tragedy of the Commons
    - a) All states view themselves as worse off if they do not make their behavior contingent on that of others. But, once rules agreed to, still reasons to cheat.
    - b) Fear of cheating raises distributional issues as well as enforcement issues
  - 3. Asymmetric externalities
    - a) Upstream-downstream problems and upwind-downwind problems
    - b) Some states prefer the status quo while others prefer a change. The latter have to convince the former to change their behavior.
    - c) Distributional issues are explicit & must be addressed either with sanctions or rewards.
    - d) Enforcement issues remain for both sides
- IV. How do international institutions (regimes) form: negotiated regimes:
  - A. Collective action
    - 1. States involved realize they have a problem and try to resolve it collectively.
    - 2. Despite difficulty can work sometime
  - B. Political and normative entrepreneurs
    - 1. Suggest a regime that no one expects to work at first
    - 2. Gains power over time
- V. Functions of regimes: because regimes provide means of doing these things better than could accomplish independently, states are willing to invest in them.
  - A. Generally, attempt to make it more likely that others behave as you desire and less likely that they don't.
    - 1. Increase costs of noncompliance
    - 2. Increase benefits of compliance
    - 3. Clarify what is expected.
  - B. **Manage complexity:** reduce decisions to be made, e.g., tariff levels, environmental legislation
  - C. **Reduce transaction costs:** easier to negotiate single multilateral trade or environment treaty, rather than multitude of bilateral ones. One long agreement within single forum (e.g., oil pollution regulation) rather than string of separate agreements.. GATT/WTO is perfect example
  - D. **Create rules:** distinguish "good" behaviors from "bad" behaviors
  - E. **Increase reciprocity:** specific (arms control, tariff levels) and diffuse (human rights)
    - 1. Increase iteration: single behavior seen as part of larger game, e.g., political dissidents
    - 2. Formalize linkages: financial mechanisms in ozone treaty
    - 3. Reciprocity through operation of norms
    - 4. Receive and review reports; consider interstate complaints; Commission on Human Rights investigations or focus spotlight on certain states
  - F. **Improve information:** joint information has more credibility, can't collect information individually. Reduces misperception and miscommunication. Informational - gather data on general indicators, monitor performance, exchange information, do research and publicize issues
  - G. **Create/strengthen norms:** Establish normative expectations and increase costs of certain rhetorical strategies relative to others. Changes legitimacy of actions: need to justify certain actions in different ways. General declarations: Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specific resolutions about certain countries' violations: Condemned Israel re: occupied territories after 1967 war
- VI. Sources of regime success: **some regimes succeed and others fail.** Why?
  - A. Defining effectiveness: different definitions
    - 1. Variety of definitions for any regime – what would it mean in a given regime?
    - 2. Goal achievement vs. Counterfactual definition of effectiveness
      - a) Did regime lead to achievement of goals?
      - b) Did regime lead to outcomes that were different than would have been otherwise?
      - c) Glass is half empty, Glass is half full: often regimes fail at goal achievement effectiveness but succeed at counterfactual effectiveness. E.g., whaling, endangered species, tariffs (not yet zero)
    - 3. Whaling graphic: see slide presentation during class
  - B. Strategies for altering state behavior

1. "Sticks:" Punishment and deterrence. GATT reciprocity. Sanctions for violation of pollution rules. Noncompliers conceal themselves. Sanctions rarely used in international institutions.
  2. "Carrots:" Rewards and incentives. Ozone case and North Korea nuclear case. Noncompliers reveal themselves.
  3. "Locks:" Prevention and coercion. Oil pollution equipment requirements.
  4. "Fields of Dreams:" Opportunity creation. Swedish nuclear weapons case.
  5. "Labels:" Information. Acid rain case.
  6. "Sermons:" Normative education. Human rights and democracy. Convincing that in their interest.
- C. Conditions for success
1. Capacity of governments to implement: financial, administrative, infrastructural
  2. Asymmetries in power determine who's behavior is changed: strong disobey, but weak obey
  3. Interdependence - more is better since increases fear of disturbing web of relationships
  4. Knowledge creation/intellectual order - underpins regime and needs to be consistent with regime
- VII. Institutional critiques
- A. Aims and goals are lofty, but power and authority are modest
  - B. Normative and rule-creating activities have no teeth - no enforcement power, and less likely to use even tools they do have, which at best are usually just bad publicity.
  - C. Voluntary agreements among states - Saudi Arabians objected to clause in Universal Declaration of Human Rights calling for equal rights for women.
  - D. Democratic deficit mentioned by Keohane -- not transparent or accountable
  - E. Realist critique: strong disobey, weak obey, no different than no-institution. May make states complacent.
  - F. Feminist theory perspective:
    1. International institutions often ignore or reinforce gendered roles in domestic & international society
    2. But, international institutions may offer one opportunity to overcome some elements of the current gendered structure of society.
- VIII. Thoughts on the European Union for next lecture (this section from Craig Parsons)
- A. MAIN reason that European Union process was started by Frenchmen Schumann and Monnet in the 1950s to increase the chances for peace by increasing interdependence.
  - B. The EU and IR theories
    1. Realism: huh?
      - a) Why does the EU seem to challenge realism?
        - (1) Basically the opposite of realism: voluntary transfers of major sovereignty to institutions with explicit autonomous power
        - (2) Realist John Mearsheimer predicted intra-European conflict would grow after 1990...
      2. Do you buy Grieco's argument that realism still has something to say here??
        - a) Sure, power still matters...
        - b) But do responses of other Europeans to German power—binding them in supranational institutions—make any sense for realists?
  - C. The EU and institutionalism
    1. IR institutionalism: fits fairly well
      - a) Not surprising: EU case has been prominent in emergence of this school of thought
      - b) EU is indeed set of institutional tools created by states to manage their interdependence
    2. But this school too has problems...
      - a) If EU just states' tool to manage interdependence, why give away so much power?
      - b) Shouldn't states be more jealous about their sovereignty—find ways to collaborate that aren't so supranational?
        - (1) For ex., most economists didn't think monetary union was necessary—or even good—for solving many econ problems
        - (2) And political arg for monetary union weak too: if France sees it, why doesn't Britain?
  - D. The EU and norms/ideas
    1. Basic notion of these approaches: that action reflects certain ideas, norms, ideologies
    2. In EU context, raises new possibility
      - a) Realists only think states would give up sovereignty if forced to
        - (1) And they weren't.
      - b) Institutionalists only think states would give up sovereignty if absolutely necessary to manage interdependence

- (1) And this is unclear: much disagreement among Europeans themselves about how necessary...
- c) But norms/ideas approaches suggest we might take the ideology of "Europeanism" seriously:
  - (1) Supranationality as desirable (for some!)
  - (2) EU as elite ideological project to bind all Europeans into a new anti-nationalist arena

IX. Conclusion

- A. Definition: what they are
- B. Functions - what they do
- C. Effectiveness - definitions of success
- D. Strategies - how they accomplish it