

**Lecture 3**  
**6 October 2009**  
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- I. News articles:
  - A. In May 2009, North Korea tested short-range missiles, calling them “self-defensive measures.” Should South Korea, Japan, and other countries be unconcerned, since these are simply “defensive” missiles?
- II. Introduction
  - A. This lecture blends with the next lecture - bring both sets of lecture notes to both classes
  - B. Power
    1. Relational and Situational
    2. Control over resources and Influence over outcomes
    3. Paradox of unrealized power
      - a) In most cases, control over resources equates to influence over outcomes
      - b) When it doesn't there is a paradox of unrealized power, i.e., those with control over resources, surprisingly, do not influence outcomes as we would generally expect
  - C. Brief history of realism
    1. Six tenets of realism
      - a) Focus: conflict
      - b) Actors: states who act as unitary rational actors
      - c) Goal: survival and power; therefore zero-sum gain concern with relative gains
      - d) Organizing principle: anarchy & self-help
      - e) Means: force is usable, effective and fungible.
      - f) Dynamics of system: acquisition and attempts to balance power
- III. Realism
  - A. For years, academics and diplomats have been seeking, "to detect and understand the forces that determine political relations among nations, and to comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon each other and upon international political relations and institutions" (Morgenthau, 1993, 17).
    1. Realism in a Nutshell: International politics is the struggle for power. We can understand the outcomes we observe in international relations by examining the interests and power of the various nations involved.
    2. A short history of realism: Thucydides, WWI with Carr's skepticism regarding idealism; WWII with Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, Kennan, Lippmann. and others developing theory; Neorealism and structural realism with Waltz.
    3. Two strains of realism
      - a) Traditional realism (a la Hans Morgenthau): war results from human nature
      - b) Structural realism or neo-realism (a la Kenneth Waltz): war results from structure or structural characteristics (anarchy) of international system
- IV. An outline of realist theory.
  - A. Focus = conflict. Most salient aspect of international relations is the constancy of conflict. International politics is a struggle for power dominated by conflict and violence. Puzzle: across time and across cultures, why has war kept recurring? Nations are "continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from war" (Morgenthau, 1993, 36). Conflict is the outcome we want to explain. Peace possible but only/mainly through balancing of power – i.e., weak states band together to resist oppression of stronger states
  - B. Actors = states as unitary, rational actors dominate the international system.
    1. States acts as if they calculate costs and benefits of options before acting.
      - a) Identify and prioritize objectives;
      - b) Develop policy options/means for achieving them,
      - c) Use resources to implement preferred options/means, and
      - d) Learn and reevaluate goals and means.
    2. Simplifying assumption that fits behavior of many states much of the time. Domestic policy process not important to decisions made. Attempt at explanatory accuracy, not descriptive accuracy (they don't necessarily go through this process, but they act as if they do).
    3. Nations and governments are dominant actors influencing the international system, though not only actors influencing system.
  - C. Goals = survival and security.

1. National security always highest priority because necessary to any other goals. Each citizen expects protection. Economics, environment, HR lesser concerns. Consider defense budgets.
  2. States constantly seek to increase power, measured in relative, not absolute terms. Obstacle to cooperation is relative gains concerns.
  3. National interest defined as consolidating power to preserve security and sovereignty.
  4. Search for survival becomes search for power for three reasons:
    - a) Hobbes and Morgenthau say, because conflict is inherent, more power means more likely you can get your needs met.
    - b) Power is fungible and can provide security and survival.
    - c) "Because some states may, at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so" (Waltz, 1979, 102). All states are not aggressive, but because some are, all must take care of own survival.
- D. Means = force as useful and effective.
1. "Difference of national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it" (Waltz, 99).
  2. Force is fungible. Military power can help achieve all goals. America converted military power into land for farming/settlement. Colonial powers converted military power into access to natural resources. Crusades/Jihad seek to convert military power into religious converts and glory of God.
  3. Force is usually effective. States with enough power can usually get what they want. Force so effective that most powerful states often do not have to use it.
- E. Organizing principle = anarchy and self-help: no government to prevent use of force by one state against another.
1. Domestically, governments have exclusive claim to legitimate use of force and will prevent others from using it. Internationally, nobody will protect one nation from the use of force by another nation.
  2. Anarchy means each state can decide for itself whether to use force to achieve its ends. This leads to insecurity and self-help.
  3. Capacity matters more than intention: India vs. Pakistan example.
    - a) "India's Pokharan explosion in 1974 had a traumatic effect upon Pakistan. A passage of letters ensued between the two Premiers immediately after the event, and following Indira Gandhi's public description of the PNE [peaceful nuclear explosion] as 'the result of a normal research and study of our scientists,' adding, '...we are firmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.' In his letter Bhutto [Premier of Pakistan] set forth Pakistan's apprehensions thus: 'It is a question not only of intentions but of capabilities. It is well-established that the testing of a [peaceful] nuclear device is no different from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Given this indisputable fact, how is it possible for our fears to be assuaged by mere assurances, which may in any case be ignored in subsequent years. Governments change, as do national attitudes. But the acquisition of a capability, which has direct and immediate military consequences, becomes a permanent factor to be reckoned with.'" (Chari, 1995, 17). In a similar response, K. Subrahmanyam of India, noted that "As regards Pakistan's intention, it is futile to make any assessment, since this is capable of changing, depending upon the decision-maker and the circumstances. General Zia may mean what he says when he asserts that he has no intention of making the weapon. The relevant fact is that he has created the capability for Pakistan to make the weapon" (Sreedhar, 1986, vii).
- F. Dynamics of system = acquisition, balancing, and shifting of distribution of power.
1. Strong states make rules while weak states follow them.
  2. Power resources constantly changing. Power is relative so merely maintaining current wealth and resources leads to decline relative to those acquiring more.
  3. Wars deplete power resources, causing changes in distribution of power
  4. Peace possible only when states are deterred by balancing behavior of states they are seeking to gain power over. Two types of balancing:
    - a) Internal balancing: self-reliance, build up own weapons and armaments to resist power of stronger states. France building own nuclear weapons
    - b) External balancing: reliance on other states WHO CLEARLY HAVE SOME SELF-INTEREST IN DEFENDING YOU (otherwise its unreliable). Dutch, Swedes, and Spanish using NATO even though could have built own nuclear weapons

V. Prisoner's Dilemma

- A. Leaders of most nations are not dummies. Why do they engage in war and arms races even though they don't want to? Why does it make sense for nations to build arms and seek greater military power when they know that doing so will only increase the insecurity of other nations, causing them to build more arms, in the long run leading to the expenditure of money but no greater security? How can two nations that both want peace and security create conditions that make war occur, or at least very likely?
- B. Prisoners' Dilemma as metaphor.
1. Prosecutor seeking to convict drug dealers named Row and Col. Enough evidence to convict both of possession, but not enough to convict of dealing without one confessing. Prosecutor tries to convince them to confess by threatening what will happen under possible outcomes.
  2. If neither one confesses, the jury will send both of them to jail for a year on possession charges.
  3. If Row confesses and Col doesn't, then Row will be rewarded by being released and the jury will send Col to jail for ten years. Likewise, if Col confesses and Row doesn't, then Col will be released and Row will go to jail for ten years.
  4. However, if both confess, the jury will convict both of them but the conflicting testimony will lead to a shorter sentence.
  5. Look at from Row's point of view.
    - a) Assume Col confesses. If Row silent, 10 years; if confesses 5 years, so Row definitely better off confessing.
    - b) Assume Col silent. If Row silent, 1 year; if confesses no time at all, so again Row definitely better off confessing.
    - c) Structure means that Row always better off confessing regardless of Col. Same true for Col. So, even though both prefer to be in the upper left hand corner, they end up confessing and land in the lower right hand one, doing five years apiece.

**ROW'S PERSPECTIVE:**

		COL	
		Silence (Cooperate with Other)	Confess (Defect from Other)
ROW	Silence (Cooperate with Other)	R = 2 yr	R = 10 yr
	Confess (Defect from Other)	R = 0 yr	R = 5 yr

**COL'S PERSPECTIVE:**

		COL	
		Silence (Cooperate with Other)	Confess (Defect from Other)
ROW	Silence (Cooperate with Other)	C = 2 yr	C = 0 yr
	Confess (Defect from Other)	C = 10 yr	C = 5 yr

**OVERALL GAME:**

		COL	
		Silence (Cooperate with Other)	Confess (Defect from Other)
ROW	Silence (Cooperate with Other)	R = 2 yr                      C = 2 yr	R = 10 yr                      C = 0 yr
	Confess (Defect from Other)	R = 0 yr                      C = 10 yr	R = 5 yr                      C = 5 yr

- C. Will play game of Prisoner's Dilemma in section
- D. Captures essence of security dilemma. Peloponnesian War. Sparta and Athen's decisions to spend more money on armaments. If both had been satisfied with international status, could have had both peace and

spent less on weapons. If either one, however, spent more money on weapons without the other doing so, they could expect to gain control over the others territory with little or no real contest. But, not unlike the prisoners, they both spent more on weapons and went into a costly arms race and the constant threat of war for decades.

- E. Security dilemma arises even when we don't assume that nations and their leaders are inherently evil, war-mongering people. Arises from structure of self-help international system with lack of trust, miscommunication and misperception create perceived threats to that security. Obviously, some countries can trust one another. Thus, Australia and New Zealand or the U.S. and Canada have not been stuck in security dilemmas. Why?

#### VI. The Security Dilemma (see graphic at end of notes)

- A. No state can be sure another state's intentions are peaceful or will remain so, so each seeks to maintain power for defense. Other states can not be sure this power will not be used for an offensive attack and therefore builds up its power for defense. Thus, the states continually match the power-seeking efforts of the other, with both sides feeling no more secure but with far less resources. In a spiral that can produce both arms races and the threat or actuality of war:
  1. Country A, not trusting country B, acquires power for its own defense.
  2. Country B, not trusting A, sees A's power as, at least, potentially, for aggressive, offensive, purposes.
  3. B therefore seeks more power to strengthen its own defense.
  4. A sees B's actions, interprets them as offensive, and takes it as strictly confirmation of its original distrust of B. It therefore starts the whole cycle over again.
- B. Due to four factors:
  1. **Anarchic/self-help structure of international system.** Each state depends on self for survival.
  2. **Lack of trust.** Fear breeds lack of trust. Plenty of evidence that other states should not be trusted. Bosnia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Vietnam, Afghanistan, all have been invaded. Even if trust country today, may not trust tomorrow. Winston Churchill: "no permanent alliances, only permanent interests."
  3. **Misperception and miscommunication.** Sovereignty and national pride lead to view of other countries as threatening and misperception of motives. Barriers of language and culture. U.S. in Gulf War didn't understand why Iraqis did what they did. Cuban missile crisis.
  4. **Ambiguity regarding offense/defense of military forces and actions.** Athenian wall. Star Wars. Intentions vs. capabilities. Need to make worst case assumptions. Costs of losing nation to invasion if they wrongly assume good intentions are greater than the costs of spending too much on defense if wrongly assume bad intentions.
- C. Can countries escape the Security Dilemma?
  1. When defensive weapons look different than offensive
  2. When easier to defend than attack: No incentive to escalate because you know the other has advantage
  3. Depends on the technology and geography - e.g., nuclear missiles on submarines: Soviets used Eastern Europe; DMZs

#### VII. Security Dilemma and Prisoner's Dilemma

- A. Relative gains concerns – if face strong relative gains concerns than likely that there is no possibility of cooperation
- B. Role of trust – if trust is lacking than likely to have strong relative gains concerns
- C. Even when only absolute gains are involved cooperation may be difficult
- D. Role of iteration
- E. Role of external sanctions – targeting problem
- F. Multiple actors problem
- G. Role of information
- H. Role of diffuse reciprocity
- I. How many situations are really like this? Most, not many, all, none? Empirical question
  1. Don't play the game
  2. What gets defined as cooperation or defection

#### VIII. Conclusion

- A. Review of major tenets: Power And Interests Determine Outcomes In International Relations. Implication is that international institutions and international organizations have little effect on behavior and outcomes in real world.

1. Focus: conflict. Notice this is puzzle realists are trying to explain.
  2. Actors: states are primary actors who act as unitary rational actors
  3. Goal: survival and power; therefore zero-sum gain concern with relative gains
  4. Organizing principle: anarchy, self-help
  5. Means: force is usable, effective and fungible.
  6. Dynamics of system: acquisition and balancing of power
- B. Saw how security dilemmas can arise between states in the anarchic international system due to lack of trust, misperception and miscommunication, and the inherent ambiguity of every state's attempt to acquire military power to survive. Saw how security dilemma is similar to Prisoner's Dilemma model and that we need not assume that states are inherently aggressive to understand why they often fail to cooperate and end up in arms races, conflicts and wars that neither side really wants.

## Security Dilemma Spiral

