Editorial part II
After Southworth
The Supreme Court may have unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory student
fee system, but the fight has only just begun.
On the Wednesday of spring break 2000, while many a student was eagerly
shedding his or her towel on the beach of Cancun for MTV's cameras, the
Supreme Court handed down their ruling on the case of Wisconsin
v. Southworth. As the brief amount of time the jury spent deliberating the
OJ Simpson case was telling, so was the timing of this decision. Had the
Court ruled in favor of Scott Southworth and objectors to the mandatory
incidental fee, the ruling would have likely come down at the end of the
academic year - all the better to mute the chaos that would have
inevitably met the decision.
At the University of Oregon, a fee very much similar to the one objected
to by Wisconsin students has already been contested in the circuit court
system. While the mandatory fee subsidizes a wide range of services which
benefit students, the controversy primarily revolves around certain
activities financed by the student governments of both universities. The
ASUO, like the MSU at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, is the very
student government for which mandatory fees are collected in the first
place.
Prior to the Southworth case, Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher
Ed. (1999) challenged the legality of the student fee system, in
particular their subsidy of the Oregon Student Public Interest Research
Group, known colloquially as OSPIRG. In Wisconsin, Southworth and his
fellow petitioners filed their initial suit in 1996 with the analogous
WISPIRG principally in mind. The myriad problems with the PIRG system have
been recounted innumerable times in the pages of the Commentator, and even
the Supreme Court indicated their own doubts in the majority opinion: "For
reasons not clear from the record, WISPIRG receives lump sum cash
distributions from the University... the full extent to which WISPIRG puts
its funds is unclear." What the Court did not know about the PIRGs would
all but surely tip the case in the other direction.
Of course, the specifics of the PIRG system were not central to the
case; it was instead about the mandatory fee system that supports them. In
this decision, the Court for the most part - but not entirely - upheld the
fee.
Were student governments and PIRGs across the nation merely breathing a
sigh of relief, that alone would be understandable. Instead they are
calling it an unequivocal victory for the mandatory fee process, a
statement that is both myopic and easily fallible. Quoted in the Oregon
Daily Emerald on Monday the 27th, ASUO President Wylie Chen claimed
that the ruling "erases any doubt people have about paying the
fee." Either the Emerald used his words out of context, or Chen is
simply unfamiliar with the particulars of the decision - even the Justices
of the Court expressed their own doubts about the fee while upholding it.
A simple assessment of the majority and concurring opinions (issued by
Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter, respectively) reveals the
obvious: the Court issued what can only be defined as a mixed ruling. Some
arguments are less developed than others; key terms have yet to be
defined; and a number of new issues have been raised. A unilateral
endorsement of the current system it is not.
The Court in fact merely acknowledged states' constitutional freedom to
collect money from enrolled students for disbursement by their student
governments. "The First Amendment permits a public university to charge
its students an activity fee... if the program is viewpoint
neutral," Kennedy affirms in the opinion. So long as the appropriation of
fees is based on an impartial process protecting minority speech - as the
first amendment intends - the system is constitutionally protected.
Had Chen or any other student body officer bothered to read the entirety
of the opinion and fully comprehend its implications, they would
understand that the Southworth ruling is by no means the Court's final
statement on the mandatory fee process. Instead, they have drawn up the
blueprints for future debate on the fee issue - and carved out the
specifics of potential litigation in the future.
Viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of student funds - essentially an
impartial distribution of monies to student programs without regard to
their political or religious orientation - is the key principle upon which
the Court supported the fee system. However, even this noble standard
carries with it many questions and uncertainties that the Court has failed
to address in full.
Supporters of the fee system point out that governments collect taxes from
constituents who may not support all of the programs financed by their
dollars. Whether an individual student disagrees with some of the
programs, they argue, is irrelevant - all groups have a right to use the
forum - so long as it is viewpoint neutral. The problem with this argument
is illustrated by Supreme Court precedent:
Prior to AETC v. Forbes (1998), delivered also by Justice Kennedy, the
Court had affirmed three distinct and recognized varieties of fora (it's
the plural of forum, look it up). The distinction was critical to the
Forbes case, as it is to the mandatory fee debate. The 'democratic
exchange of ideas' consists of the following three categories: traditional
public fora, nonpublic fora, and public fora created by government
designation.
The mandatory fee system falls into the third category. The peculiarity of
this funding model is that it blurs the line between private and public
spending, and hence, private and public speech. The Supreme Court, perhaps
rightly, seemed to think they were faced with an all or nothing
proposition. Either they had to affirm the use of student fees for
whatever a university might deem educational - or they had to deny
universities the right to collect fees in the first place.
The Court, of course, opted for the former.
Student groups must obviously compete for access to this money, as it is a
limited, if bloated, resource. Southworth's argument was that unpopular
causes will not be granted equal access in the politically biased nature
of government, and therefore a standard of viewpoint neutrality must be
adhered to.
But what does "viewpoint neutral" mean, anyway? The concept sounds
strangely oxymoronic. Can a viewpoint be neutral? Rather, can an opinion
be impartial? This reasoning is confusing at best and inconceivable at
worst. Nevertheless, this is the Supreme Court's qualifier on the legality
of the mandatory fee system.
Kennedy explains, "Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring
the student to pay the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the
integrity of the program's operation once the funds have been
collected." Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion (joined by Justices
Stevens and Breyer), takes the University's assurance that their process
is viewpoint neutral at face value: "I would hold that the First Amendment
interest claimed by [Southworth] ... is simply insufficient to merit
protection by anything more than the viewpoint neutrality already accorded
by the University, and I would go no further."
Is the fee allocation process at the University of Oregon viewpoint
neutral? Clearly, there are dozens of ASUO programs that lean to the
left-of-center, while the Oregon Commentator is the only funded
organization that regularly espouses conservative beliefs. The empirical
evidence at the University of Oregon, at Wisconsin, and elsewhere would
indicate that the system is clearly biased in its orientation.
Popular bias does influence speech created by the fee; minority voices are
often neglected.
One of the silver linings to the decision is the Court's position that
"the student referendum mechanism of the University's program... appears
to permit the exactation of fees in violation of the viewpoint neutrality
principle." A ballot measure inherently favors popular speech over
unpopular, thereby violating this already vague principle.
OSPIRG, for example, has traditionally gone to the ballot to obtain their
budget; under the Southworth ruling, OSPIRG would have to seek ASUO
funding in the same manner as virtually all other student-funded programs.
Were OSPIRG to go before the ASUO Programs Finance Committee (PFC) each
year, what would be the likely outcome? Two facts about the PFC's
operational procedure are integral to understanding this.
First, the PFC presumably bases its allocation to programs on, inter alia,
each individual organization's financial solvency and
accountability. OSPIRG currently receives a flat $126,000 by mandate of
the popular vote, all of which is sent directly to its parent
organization in Portland. No specific records have ever shown if, or how
much, any of that money returns to the University of Oregon
campus. Calling OSPIRG accountable to students is a stretch by any
definition. It stands to reason that the PIRG system to which many object
would have to demonstrate how their money is spent, lest they lose their
budget.
On the other hand, OSPIRG has historically held a powerful sway both in
the ASUO Executive office and the Student Senate, of which the PFC is
part. Despite frequent criticism, their influence is substantial. Whether
the PFC will continue to fund an unaccountable program without the student
mandate has yet to be seen.
The only way to ensure that student fees are distributed properly
(i.e. fairly and impartially) is to remove human decision from the
process. This is patently impossible. Whether a group is funded by a
popular vote or by government officials elected by a popular vote, the
result is the same. Political influence cannot be divorced from the
process fee allocation process.
This is one of the Court's less developed arguments. While Kennedy is
correct to recognize the referendum process as flawed, he does not carry
this reasoning to its full extent. This stands as a likely point of
contention upon which further lawsuits might be based.
Another significant aspect of the ruling concerns to what degree
incidental fee programs are germane to the academic atmosphere of a
university, and what this even means specifically. The ramifications of
the Court's decision on this matter are quite ominous.
The Court recognized that the incidental fee is collected to help state
universities fulfill their educational role outside of the strict
classroom setting. The mission of the University of Wisconsin, as cited
from the majority of the opinion is: "to develop human resources, to
discover and disseminate knowledge, to extend knowledge and its
application beyond the boundaries of its campuses and to serve and
stimulate society by developing in students heightened intellectual,
cultural, and humane sensitivities... and a sense of purpose."
It is no great leap of logic to call this a broad definition. Over the
years, state systems of higher education have developed thousands of
programs, departments, and policies, and the existing mandatory fee is one
tax among many. What a University can squeeze under the definition of its
"educational mission" could fill Autzen stadium a dozen times over.
The Court understandably walks a fine line in trying to interpret what a
University's educational mission encompasses and what does not. Err too
far to either side and the educational atmosphere of a state university is
compromised. Souter writes, "it is enough to say that protecting a
university's discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be
an important consideration in First Amendment analysis of objections to
student fees."
Essentially, the Court refuses to define the educational mission of a
public university. Nearly anything could be potentially educaitonal,
political and religious groups included. If the actions of WISPIRG (or
perhaps a WISNational Rifle Association) meet the state's requirements as
an educational extension of the university's programs, then a university
may require its students to fund it without relief on First Amendment
grounds.
By opening up the criteria for appropriate student groups to include
political and religious groups, the Supreme Court has written a blank
check for any organized union to seek incidental fees which it may put to
virtually any use it sees fit.
Thereby, the Oregon State PIRG, along with the College Democrats,
Republicans, and the Libertarian National Socialist Green Party (were one
to exist here) could all receive University funding.
One of two things is likely to happen as a result of this decision. Now
that a wider array of organizatons are eligible to receive funding under a
"viewpoint neutral" system, more student groups will be competing for the
same incidental fee - $163 per term, nearly five hundred dollars per year
- diluting the budgets of existing programs. The more plausible outcome,
however, is that the incidental fee will not remain at the current
level. As recently as the 1996-97 school year, the fee was approximately
$137 per term, and each year the fee has increased by as much as ten
percent. More groups entering the fray means a greater strain on the
ASUO's resources, and potentially, fee increases unlike those previously
seen at the UO. Neither scenario is particularly conducive to the
so-called 'marketplace of ideas and free speech.'
This year, the ASUO Student Senate set a zero percent benchmark, keeping
the incidental fee at the same level for next year as it was for this
one. Undoubtedly, the looming Southworth case was the principal, if not
sole, motive for this sudden bout of fiscal conservatism. Now that this
bullet has been temporarily dodged (to use a currently popular
idiom) student governments - who by and large control fee increases - will
be free to continue along their trajectory of an ever-upward spiralling
incidental fee.
Attending a public university is expensive enough as it is - now it will
become even more inaccessible to those of lesser means. Five hundred
dollars per year may be a drop in the bucket for some, but for many more
it could mean the difference between attending the University of Oregon or
attending Lane Community College - where students paid a total of $24.38
per term in incidental fees last year.
The potential for abuse should be self-evident, and this threat is far
from theoretical. OSPIRG has already demonstrated what can happen when
public funds and private interests are mixed.
Student PIRGs, which are registered with the state as 501(c)3 non-profit
corporations, may collect public fees but may not spend them on political
activities such as lobbying. State PIRGS are separate legal entities
registered as 501(c)4 non-profit corporations. By contrast they may not
receive public funds, but they are permitted to spend money on lobbying
efforts. The great bulk of the Student PIRG's budget is paid to the State
PIRG as rent and to pay staffers' salaries - money that is in turn spent
on the organization's political activities. The fact that this is in
violation of tax code is obviously not one the Court was familiar with.
The streamwalks, voter registration drives and comparable activities that
the Student PIRGs conduct on campus are volunteer efforts with scant
overhead, requiring an infinitessimal fraction of their overall budget.
When you come down to it, PIRGs are not legitimate student groups acting
on behalf of a university's educational atmosphere - they are fronts for a
political lobby that exploits the mandatory fee system for its own
gain. Students at the University of Oregon have been taken advantage of
for decades - now Justice Kennedy has given OSPIRG and other political
factions the constitutional protection to continue doing so.
However, the Court did grant objectors to the fee and to the PIRGs'
funding model an invaluable weapon: while the Court refused to limit the
spending of fee money off-campus, they did affirm the right of state
universities to do this themselves, should they determine a group's
activities not germane to the academic development of its students.
"We make no distinction between campus activities and the off-campus
expressive activities of objectionable [fee-funded programs]," Justice
Kennedy writes. "If the University shares those concerns, it is free to
enact viewpoint neutral rules restricting off-campus travel or other
expenditures... for it may create what is tantamount to a limited public
forum if the principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected."
Were the Oregon University System, Dave Frohnmayer, or even Wylie Chen to
decide that OSPIRG does not fall under university's educational umbrella -
an argument for which there is no shortage of evidence - the PIRG could be
out of a funding base.
Dave?
Quoted in newspapers and on television toward the end of spring break,
many student representatives (including one ASUO presidential candidate
and his campaign manager, who shall remain nameless) proclaimed the
Supreme Court's affirmation of "student control over student fees."
Not only is this claim short-sighted and incompatible with the facts, it
is misleading. Student fees are paid by every matriculated student on the
University of Oregon campus. Student control of these fees is held and
fiercely guarded by an active but self-interested minority, a minority
which includes OSPIRG. When student government leaders extol the virtue of
"student control of student fees," what they are celebrating is their
right to control your money.
Whether you want to count students by voter turnout or by actual
participation in ASUO programs, the numbers speak for themselves: the ASUO
does not accurately represent the student body of the University of
Oregon.
All things told, calling the Southworth decision a victory for either
party is not easy to do. The incomplete nature of the ruling - especially
the remanded referedum process - ensures that this will not be the last
case heard on the subject. The direction the debate heads in is very much
up to the students who have for years endured a contemporary and very real
form of taxation without representation.
Perhaps one thing alone is clear: the battle lies still ahead of
us. Thanks to Wisconsin v. Southworth, the lines are now better
distinguishable - if only just a little.
|