Kate Darby

PS 510

Presentation Paper

Why does Pascoe argue against Loving v. Virginia as a signal moment in racial liberation? Do you find her argument convincing?

In her article, “Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of ‘Race’ in Twentieth-Century America,” Peggy Pascoe uses miscegenation court cases to frame her concerns about changing racial ideologies in the United State. In doing so, Pascoe suggests that courts have the opportunity to play a significant role in the formation of racial ideologies.

The Loving v. Virginia case involves an interracial Virginian couple who traveled to Washington D.C. for their wedding ceremony to avoid the Virginia miscegenation law. A month after the Lovings’ return to Virginia, the couple was arrested in their home in middle of the night for violating the miscegenation law. The judge allowed the couple to avoid a jail sentence if they agreed not to return to the state of Virginia for 25 years. Years later, the couple appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court took the case. The Supreme Court ruled the miscegenation law unconstitutional, because it violated the 14^th Amendment and equal protection.

This court case is significant because it led to the abolishment of other state miscegenation laws. Despite this success, Pascoe argues that Loving v. Virginia does not act as a catalyzing moment in racial liberation because the ruling did not confront biological racism and because it led to a legal precedent of “color-blindness”. The Court ruled unconstitutionality without hearing expert testimony, making it clear that the legal system still was not ready to confront biological racism. In fact, Pascoe argues that for the justices, “ . . .the scope of the term ‘race’ had shrunk to a point where biology was all that was left. . . (119)”

The case also led to a legal deconstruction of racial categories and indicated a shift of racial ideologies. After the case, the legal and political struggle began looking towards “color-blindness” as a policy to avoid racism. Pascoe refers to this as “modernist racial ideology”. “Color blindness” creates several problems. First, “color blindness” and the elimination of racial categories make it difficult to establish policies, like affirmative action, that aim to even the racial playing field. Also, “color blindness” gives conservatives a politically correct device in which to frame racist policies.

I agree with Pascoe that Loving v. Virginia does not indicate a moment of racial liberation, although I think it certainly helped give minorities confidence in the judicial system and a bit more mandated equality. Yes, in the context of long-term ideological shaping, the case was not particularly helpful to the cause of racial equality, since it simply shifted from a blatantly racists policy schema (biological racism) to a more concealed racism (“color-blindness”). However, I think Pascoe neglects to give significant credit to the material benefits the court decision produced. These sorts of court decisions can added needed support to social movements by providing a “political opportunity structure”, an idea confirmed by social movement theorists like Tarrow (Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, 1994). By formally legalizing interracial marriage, Loving v. Virginia provides an improvement in legally recognized equality, and that improvement should not be downplayed.