PS
410/510 The Causes and Prevention of War
Cramer&
Peters-Van Essen
11/15/2001
Technologies rarely have decisive effects on war or politics; more often technology is bent to serve politics or military doctrine. Nuclear weapons are an exception. They overwhelm politics and doctrine.
Five cascading technical effects flow from the nuclear revolution. These cascade further into political effects listed below in Section VIII. The technical effects are:
Effect #1: Hydrogen bombs offer an increase of six (6, count them six) orders of magnitude over the power of TNT explosives used in World War II. The atomic bomb = x 1,000 increase on TNT; the hydrogen bomb = x 1,000 increase in atomic bombs.
Effect #2: due to effect #1 (the destructiveness of nuclear weapons), the “cost-exchange ratio” vastly favors defenders (better termed “retaliators”) over attackers seeking to disarm them. Nuclear weapons pack tremendous explosive power in devices that are cheap, light, and easily hidden, protected, and delivered. Hence destroying nuclear weapons is very hard, protecting and delivering them is very easy.
Effect #3: due to effect #2 (the cost-exchange ratio), a relationship of MAD (“Mutually Assured Destruction”) develops between major powers. Both can destroy the other’s society even after absorbing an all-out counterforce attack by the other. In short, both have a “second strike countervalue capability.”
In the Cold War, both the US and USSR sought to avert MAD, preferring instead to deny the other a second-strike countervalue capability, but they could not escape MAD. Technology overrode their desires.
Effect #4: “flat of the curve dynamics.” One of MAD’s special characteristics is the “flat of the curve”: beyond a certain point, the capacity to inflict damage on the other society, or to prevent damage to one’s own, is inelastic to the size and capability of one’s own force or one’s opponent’s force. Capabilities are absolute!
Effect #5: the “multiplier effect.” The efficiency with which one side must strike the other’s forces in order to leave the other unable to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation increases sharply as the arsenals of both sides grow. Even an inefficient strike (a substantial percentage of the attacked weapons survive) can reduce the retaliation to “acceptable levels” if both arsenals are very small; even a very efficient strike (e.g. 99% effective) can fail to reduce retaliation to acceptable levels if both arsenals are very large. Hence first strikes are LEAST thinkable when arsenals are LARGE, suggesting the argument that “the more weapons both sides have, the less the risk of their use.”
II. Alternate Nuclear Doctrines: Countervalue v.
Counterforce Strategies
Nuclear weapons present states with two basic nuclear doctrines: countervalue and counterforce:
1.) Countervalue: the enemy society is targeted. Political aims are achieved by threatening to punish the adversary by destroying its population and industry.
2.) Counterforce: the enemy nuclear forces are targeted. Political aims are achieved by threatening to disarm the adversary—to remove its capacity to inflict punishment on oneself.
Since forces can be used first or second, we have a crude universe of four possible nuclear capabilities:
1.) First-strike countervalue capability: the capacity to launch a first strike that inflicts unacceptable damage on the adversary’s society.
**Easy to build, but quite useless—why?
2.) Second-strike countervalue capability: the capacity to absorb an all-out counterforce first strike and STILL inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary’s society in retaliation.
**This capability is relatively easy to build because weapons are relatively cheap, light, easily hidden, easily protected, and easily delivered (compared to the effort to destroy them either with first strike systems or defensive systems. It is easy to build “plenty” to overcome an adversary’s efforts to oppose them.)
3.) First-strike counterforce capability: the capacity to launch a first strike that removes the adversary’s capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on oneself in retaliation.
** Difficult, if not impossible to build—why?
4.) Second-strike counterforce capability: the capacity to absorb an all-out counterforce attack and mount a counterforce attack that leaves the attacker’s forces unable to inflict unacceptable further damage on one’s own society.
**Hardest to build, but also probably quite useless—why?
NOTICE: Debates over US Doctrine have focused on #2 and #3—should the US be content with MAD and second-strike countervalue capabilities, or should it strive for a first-strike counterforce capability? Why this debate? What advantages to each policy? What do you give up with each policy? How does each policy affect the likelihood of conventional war? Which policy limits the dangers of escalation from a conventional war? Which policy makes nuclear war more “thinkable”?
III. Five Theoretically Possible Nuclear Orders:
A. MAD: “Mutually Assured Destruction”
B. BAD: “Both Are Defended” (e.g. 1980s--Star Wars works!)
C. WORSE: “Winning Only Requires Striking Early” (both sides!)
D. MARNE: “Mankind Absolutely Rejects Nuclear Explosives”
E. USA: “Unilateral Superiority—American”—U.S. has defense!
What are the implications of each of these possible/hypothetical worlds?
IV. MAD: The Political effects of the Nuclear Revolution if States are Casualty-Sensitive, Clear-Perceiving, Not Hyper-Aggressive, cannot transfer nuclear weapons anonymously, and can build secure arsenals:
Assume states have these five attributes:
1.) They are casualty-sensitive.
2.) They do not value conquest unduly, (e.g. they do not value it more than others value freedom.)
3.) Their perceptions of their surroundings are fairly accurate, (e.g. assessing capabilities and intentions of others is not wildly distorted.)
4.) They are not able to use or transfer nuclear weapons anonymously.
5.) They have the industrial capacity to build large, secure arsenals.
If so, the nuclear revolution has seven positive effects:
1.) First-strike advantages disappear, hence “crisis instability” and preemptive war also disappear. Flat-of-the-curve dynamics erase first-strike payoffs. Even if a country can shift the force ratio in its favor by striking first, it merely moves itself and its enemy laterally on the flat-of-the-curve. The relative ability to bounce rubble changes, but nothing else.
2.) “Windows” of opportunity and vulnerability disappear, hence temptation to preventive war also disappears—for similar flat-of-the curve reasons as above.
3.) Resources are less cumulative. Even large shifts in the control of industrial resources or advantageous geographic positions will not affect the physical security of states because of the flat-of-the curve.
4.) Less false optimism. Nuclear weapons create very certain physical results, eliminating miscalculations of relative capability. They still leave room for miscalculations of relative will, however.
5.) Defense-dominance, hence fewer wars for security and wars of opportunity. This leaves contests of will to settle disputes. Disputes are won by those who care more about the issue and this usually means the defender—generally, defenders value freedom more than aggressors value conquest. If so, conquest among great powers is impossible unless one power acquires a first-strike counterforce capability against others—which is essentially unreachable among powers of remotely comparable resources, hence conquest is also impossible among them.
6.) Limited war. Logic suggests that the causes of war and intense war are similar; and if so, logic suggests that the nuclear revolution will cause less war—and could thereby promote limited war rather than intense war.
7.) Slower arms racing. (why?)
V. MAD: The Political effects of the Nuclear
Revolution if States are NOT casualty-sensitive or clear perceiving, are
hyper-aggressive, can transfer nuclear weapons anonymously, & cannot build
secure arsenals:
If we relax the five assumptions—the benefits of MAD evaporate and the dark face of MAD appears:
1.) If the first four assumptions are relaxed, the benefits of the nuclear revolution are lost, even reversed. Defenders no longer have the clear upper hand. Moreover, a new danger appears: states must now face the possibility of being destroyed (by a crazed, non-deterrable adversary) even if they cannot be conquered. This may impel them to take drastic steps if a nuclear-armed neighbor seems certain to attack eventually, killing hundreds of millions, a preemptive strike against it becomes sensible, even though the neighbor’s retaliation will kill tens of millions. (In short, a “survival dilemma” arises, parallel to the “security dilemma.” “The measures each state must take to ensure its physical survival threaten the physical survival of other states.”) States also face the risk of anonymous use by rogue states or movements. Such rogues are less deterred because they can hope that their responsibility will not be discovered.
2.) If the fifth assumption is relaxed, if states cannot build secure arsenals, then MAD itself will be frail, or may never develop. A first strike may be feasible by one or both sides. Hence MAD between superpowers can be good, but nuclear proliferation to small states may be bad (i.e. de-stabilizing.)
Bottom line: Nuclear weapons are Janus-faced. They can cause peace or war, security or insecurity, depending on . . .us!!! They pacify a world of states that are casualty-sensitive, fairly clear perceiving, not hyper-aggressive, unable to use or transfer weapons anonymously, and able to build secure arsenals. If these conditions are relaxed the benefits of the nuclear revolution evaporate and a dark side appears; nuclear weapons themselves become causes of war! (Think about this! What do I mean? Why do nuclear weapons become causes of war?)
VI. Nuclear Transitions:
A. MAD may be pacifying, but the road to MAD is dangerous.
--the transition opens “windows” of opportunity and vulnerability!
B. Nuclear disarmament would possibly open these same transition “windows” if it proved to be impermanent!
VII. The Impact of Nuclear Proliferation:
Many who like the nuclear revolution also fear proliferation to more states for two reasons:
A. New nuclear states may not meet the five conditions discussed above. Hence relations between them, and with the established nuclear powers may be worsened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
B. BIGGEST PROBLEM TODAY: As the
number of nuclear weapons states grows, so does the feasibility of anonymous use
and transfer. Nuclear users can lose
themselves in the crowd, erasing their victim’s capacity to hold them
accountable.
VIII. Compare Four Nuclear Worlds:
1.) Few, (5-10) nuclear powers.
2.) Many (80-100) nuclear powers.
3.) No nuclear powers in a world of nuclear knowledge.
4.) No nuclear powers—nuclear weapons were never invented. This is a now an impossible world—but is it more desirable?
A. “Destructive Weapons Cause
Destructive War” -- and its less
popular opposite: “Mutual Deterrence Prevents Destructive War.”
Consider four hypotheses on arms and the intensity of war:
1.) States destroy what they can. The violence of war corresponds to the destructive power of states.
2.) States destroy what they cannot avoid destroying. The violence of war depends on whether weapons are discriminating, e.g. accurate or not.
3.) States destroy what they must to accomplish their war goals. The violence of war corresponds to the scope of these goals, and hence to the scope of the political conflict between the belligerents.
4.) States destroy in inverse proportion to the punishment they will receive in return. The violence of war corresponds inversely to the ability of both belligerents to punish the other.
Note: Propositions #A1 and #A4 are mirror opposites. What to make of this?
Solutions implied by proposition #A1:
1.) Disarmament.
2.) Deploy forces that can disarm the other side—e.g., strategic nuclear counterforce forces (accurate silo-busting ICBMs and strategic defenses (NMD) for cities.)
Solution implied by proposition #A2:
1.) Deploy discriminating weapons that can be used without collateral damage—e.g. laser-guided bombs. Ban land mines, especially hard-to-clear anti-personnel mines.
Solution implied by proposition #A3:
1.) All states should adopt defensive force postures, so that their neighbors will not be insecure, hence will not feel the need to adopt desperate measures in a search for security. [Provide peaceful resolution options for other grievances—economic, environmental, demographic etc….]
Solution implied by proposition #A4:
1.) All states should arm themselves abundantly with well-protected weapons of mass destruction. “Nuclear weapons cause greater security.”
B. “Total War Doctrine Causes Total War.” and “Limited War Doctrines Allow Limited War.”
--Are these ideas true?
-- Is it best to plan only for total war, in hopes of avoiding all war?
-- Are limited wars more dangerous because they allow for “gradual escalation” or safer (possible to keep limited) because they resolve problems?
C. “Defining and Observing Thresholds Helps Keep War Limited” – e.g. “I won’t use gas if you won’t.”
D. “Don’t destroy your opponent’s command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I)” -- otherwise they cannot observe your restraint, or make peace with you.