Thucydides, I 1-19

The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the
moment that it broke out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of relation than any that had
preceded it. This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations of both the combatants were in every department
in the last state of perfection; and he could see the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those who
delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest movement yet known in history, not
only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian world- I had almost said of mankind. For though the events of
remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly
ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the
conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other matters.

For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in ancient times no settled population; on the contrary,
migrations were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their homes under the pressure of
superior numbers. Without commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of
their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell
when an invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking
that the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they cared little for shifting
their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness. The richest soils
were always most subject to this change of masters; such as the district now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the
Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness of the land favoured the
aggrandizement of particular individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited
invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction,
never changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion that the migrations were the
cause of there being no correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war or faction from the rest
of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, swelled the
already large population of the city to such a height that Attica became at last too small to hold them, and they had to
send out colonies to Ionia.

There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my conviction of the weakness of ancient times.
Before the Trojan war there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of the universal prevalence of
the name; on the contrary, before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the country
went by the names of the different tribes, in particular of the Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in
Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one by one they gradually acquired from the connection
the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten itself upon all. The best proof of this is
furnished by Homer. Born long after the Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them by that name, nor indeed any of
them except the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they are called
Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use the term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had not yet
been marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that the several Hellenic
communities, comprising not only those who first acquired the name, city by city, as they came to understand each
other, but also those who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before the Trojan war
prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective action.

Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained increased familiarity with the sea. And the first
person known to us by tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master of what is now called
the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians and
appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a necessary step to secure
the revenues for his own use.

For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and islands, as communication by sea became more
common, were tempted to turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives being to serve their
own cupidity and to support the needy. They would fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and consisting of a mere
collection of villages, and would plunder it; indeed, this came to be the main source of their livelihood, no disgrace being
yet attached to such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration of this is furnished by the honour with which
some of the inhabitants of the continent still regard a successful marauder, and by the question we find the old poets
everywhere representing the people as asking of voyagers- "Are they pirates?"- as if those who are asked the question
would have no idea of disclaiming the imputation, or their interrogators of reproaching them for it. The same rapine
prevailed also by land.

And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians,
the Acarnanians, and that region of the continent; and the custom of carrying arms is still kept up among these
continentals, from the old piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their habitations being
unprotected and their communication with each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life
with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts of Hellas are still living in the old way
points to a time when the same mode of life was once equally common to all. The Athenians were the first to lay aside
their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately that their rich old men
left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden
grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and long prevailed among the old men there. On the
contrary, a modest style of dressing, more in conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians,
the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of the common people. They also set the example of
contending naked, publicly stripping and anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, even in
the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across their middles; and it is but a few years since that
the practice ceased. To this day among some of the barbarians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing and wrestling
are offered, belts are worn by the combatants. And there are many other points in which a likeness might be shown
between the life of the Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of to-day.

With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased facilities of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we
find the shores becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being occupied for the purposes of commerce and
defence against a neighbour. But the old towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy, were built away from the
sea, whether on the islands or the continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used to plunder one
another, and indeed all coast populations, whether seafaring or not.

The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians and Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands
were colonized, as was proved by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in this war all the
graves in the island were taken up, and it was found that above half their inmates were Carians: they were identified by
the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the method of interment, which was the same as the Carians still
follow. But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea became easier, as he colonized most of the
islands, and thus expelled the malefactors. The coast population now began to apply themselves more closely to the
acquisition of wealth, and their life became more settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the strength of
their newly acquired riches. For the love of gain would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the
possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat
later stage of this development that they went on the expedition against Troy.

What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion, his superiority in strength, than the oaths of
Tyndareus, which bound the suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those Peloponnesians who have been
the recipients of the most credible tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy population from Asia with
vast wealth, acquired such power that, stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this power fortune
saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids.
Atreus was his mother's brother; and to the hands of his relation, who had left his father on account of the death of
Chrysippus, Eurystheus, when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government. As time went
on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus complied with the wishes of the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by fear of
the Heraclids- besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not neglected to court the favour of the populace-
and assumed the sceptre of Mycenae and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the power of the
descendants of Pelops came to be greater than that of the descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon succeeded.
He had also a navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear was quite as strong an element as
love in the formation of the confederate expedition. The strength of his navy is shown by the fact that his own was the
largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians was furnished by him; this at least is what Homer says, if his testimony is
deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of the transmission of the sceptre, he calls him

Of many an isle, and of all Argos king. Now Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could not have been
master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be many), but through the possession of a fleet.

And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier enterprises. Now Mycenae may have been a small place,
and many of the towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact observer would therefore feel
justified in rejecting the estimate given by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of the armament. For I suppose if
Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the temples and the foundations of the public buildings were left, that as
time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to accept her fame as a true exponent of her
power. And yet they occupy two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their numerous allies
without. Still, as the city is neither built in a compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices,
but composed of villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if
Athens were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose that any inference from the appearance presented to the eye
would make her power to have been twice as great as it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content
ourselves with an inspection of a town to the exclusion of a consideration of its power; but we may safely conclude that
the armament in question surpassed all before it, as it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept the
testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for the exaggeration which a poet would feel himself licensed
to employ, we can see that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting of twelve hundred vessels;
the Boeotian complement of each ship being a hundred and twenty men, that of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I
conceive, he meant to convey the maximum and the minimum complement: at any rate, he does not specify the amount
of any others in his catalogue of the ships. That they were all rowers as well as warriors we see from his account of the
ships of Philoctetes, in which all the men at the oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable that many supernumeraries
sailed, if we except the kings and high officers; especially as they had to cross the open sea with munitions of war, in
ships, moreover, that had no decks, but were equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we strike the average of
the largest and smallest ships, the number of those who sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the
whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of men as of money. Difficulty of subsistence made
the invaders reduce the numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country during the prosecution of
the war. Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival- and a victory there must have been, or the fortifications
of the naval camp could never have been built- there is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the
contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to piracy from want of supplies. This was what
really enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of the enemy making them always
a match for the detachment left behind. If they had brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in the war
without scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the field, since they could
hold their own against them with the division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy
would have cost them less time and less trouble. But as want of money proved the weakness of earlier expeditions, so
from the same cause even the one in question, more famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence
of what it effected to have been inferior to its renown and to the current opinion about it formed under the tuition of the
poets.

Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing and settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet
which must precede growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and factions ensued
almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years after the capture of
Ilium, the modern Boeotians were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the former
Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of whom joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years
later, the Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done and many years had
to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out
colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some
places in the rest of Hellas. All these places were founded subsequently to the war with Troy.

But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became more an object, the revenues of the states
increasing, tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere- the old form of government being hereditary
monarchy with definite prerogatives- and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is
said that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of naval architecture, and that Corinth was the first
place in Hellas where galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for the
Samians. Dating from the end of this war, it is nearly three hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again,
the earliest sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty
years ago, dating from the same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial
emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on
overland, and the Corinthian territory was the highway through which it travelled. She had consequently great money
resources, as is shown by the epithet "wealthy" bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled her, when
traffic by sea became more common, to procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for both
branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which a large revenue affords. Subsequently the Ionians
attained to great naval strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, and while
they were at war with the former commanded for a while the Ionian sea. Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, had a
powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced many of the islands, and among them Rhenea, which
he consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time also the Phocaeans, while they were founding Marseilles, defeated
the Carthaginians in a sea-fight. These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although so many generations
had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to
have counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly the Persian war, and the death of Darius the
successor of Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any large number of galleys. For after
these there were no navies of any account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and others may have
possessed a few vessels, but they were principally fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with
Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet
with which they fought at Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks.

The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed were what I have described. All their
insignificance did not prevent their being an element of the greatest power to those who cultivated them, alike in
revenue and in dominion. They were the means by which the islands were reached and reduced, those of the smallest
area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired; we have the
usual border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear nothing among the Hellenes. There
was no union of subject cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions;
what fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival neighbours. The nearest approach to a coalition
took place in the old war between Chalcis and Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to
some extent take sides.

Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered in various localities. The power of the Ionians
was advancing with rapid strides, when it came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who, after having
dethroned Croesus and overrun everything between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had reduced the cities of
the coast; the islands being only left to be subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy.

Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for themselves, of looking solely to their personal
comfort and family aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and prevented anything great proceeding
from them; though they would each have their affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is only true of the
mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very great power. Thus for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find
causes which make the states alike incapable of combination for great and national ends, or of any vigorous action of
their own.

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the
exception of those in Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though after the settlement of the
Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early period
obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of
government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a position to
arrange the affairs of the other states. Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of Marathon was
fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards, the barbarian returned with the armada for the
subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the
Lacedaemonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians, having made up their minds to abandon their city,
broke up their homes, threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after repulsing the
barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which included the Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well
as those who had aided him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens, at the head of the other Lacedaemon, one
the first naval, the other the first military power in Hellas. For a short time the league held together, till the
Lacedaemonians and Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each other with their allies, a duel into which all the
Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though some might at first remain neutral. So that the whole period from the
Median war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power in war, either with its rival, or with its own
revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant practice in military matters, and that experience which is learnt
in the school of danger.

The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but merely to secure their subservience to her
interests by establishing oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived hers of their ships,
and imposed instead contributions in money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their resources for this war
separately to exceed the sum of their strength when the alliance flourished intact.