Sparta as Hegemon

1. The Problem This period, 404-387, is characterized by continuous warfare. The costs, in terms of political stability, standard of living and public morality, were very high. Indeed, it is widely believed that neither Greece nor Athens ever recovered or regained the material or intellectual standards of the period before the Peloponnesian War. Note that this perception is consistent with and influenced by Thucydidean theory about the real costs of war.
   1. Within the cities there was continuous conflict between the democratic and the oligarchic factions, between the 'poor and worthless' and the 'beautiful and good' . So one of the things which are expedient for a polis is for the properties to the citizens to be equal, so that stasis does not occur. For people who are wealthy are likely to object, as not deserving the same treatment as everyone else; so we often see them attacking the system and engaged in stasis. And furthermore human wickedness is something insatiable; originally diobelia [food stamps] were sufficient; but when this became an established institution, people always wanted more, until there was no limit to their demands, ACG 241, a classic example of SSR from Aristotle... for envy creates the beginning of stasis, ACG 243. Also ACG 293.
   2. Between the cities there was an ever-changing set of alliances as various states, each with the desire to retain autonomy, combined against any real or perceived imperialist.
      1. Given the opportunity, each state sought empire (e.g., ACG 254: The Athenians were eager for war ...in the belief that they would recover their empire. in 395). And the Spartans, who claimed to have defended the 'freeedom of the Greeks' from the tyranny of Athens, did not disband the Delian League, but rather took it for themselves. Evidence??
      2. War and civic sedition had produced large numbers of mercenaries, stateless and property-less individuals who were always looking for opportunities. Evidence??
      3. Sparta was not capable of provding effective leadership. Lysander set up men whom the Spartans called harmosts; for they disliked democracies and wished the poleis to have oligarchic governments. They also levied tribute ... he took part in many massacres...it was thus an intolerable example of Spartan rule. ACG 250. He [Lysander] was the first of the Greeks to whom the poleis erected altars an made sacrifices as if to a god ACG 249
   3. In this "power vacuum" ... The Persians provided the money to destabilize the Greek world, to prevent that unity which might threaten their own empire. The Persian governor sent Timokrates to Greece with gold ...to give it to the leading men in the poleis ... for firm guarantees that they would start a war with Sparta ACG 254. Outsiders (Persia first, then Macedonia) became the effective arbiters of the Greek world (see below). Yet it was equally clear to Greeks and Persians that a unified Greece could easily destroy the Persian Empire .
2. The Narrative: Athens in the post war period. Even during the Peloponnesian War, the more conservative elements in the city had lauched a coup, ending the radical democracy. The major problem after the war was reconciliation & amnesty as well as the restoration of the 'ancestral constitution'. The dominant faction in the port of Peiraieus favored the restoration of the radical democracy; those in the astu (city) wanted a more limited democracy. In other words, we are back to the concepts of compromise and inclusion.
   1. The Thirty ACG 244
      1. Exiled Athenian oligarchs (remember the attempt of 411) return to Athens under Lysander and a Board of 30 appointed to revise the constitution. They pack the boulé with their supporters.
      2. Protected by the Spartan garrison they initially do much good and restore order, then become tyrannical, executing without trial their political enemies and confiscating their wealth. Critias the leader.
   2. The Opponents of the 30 Tyrants and the restoration of the democracy. Note the use of the words reconciliation and amnesty in ACG 245-6, and how moderation, compromise and inclusion again become important in re-establishing order and stability. Regarding 'citizens' whose status was uncertain: should we deprive ourselves of so of all these hoplites and cavalrymen? rather keep them, and you will be securer in your democracy
3. Problems associated with Sparta
   1. Governance. The use of harmost, decarchies and mercenary garrison; suspension of autonomy. Retention of taxes but no provision for peace. The corruptibility of her officials; inability of Sparta to stop the corruption. General arrogance toward erstwhile allies. see above for evidence.
   2. Internally. The acquisition of empire had strained her institutions. Growth in personal wealth. Increasing inequities among full citizens.
   3. Agesilaus in Asia Minor ACG 253; 255.
4. The Significance of the 10,000
5. The Corinthian War (394-387)
   1. Prelude in Ionia: Tissaphernes and Ionia ACG 252-3
   2. The War itself. To get the Spartans out of Asia and to keep them out, the Persians encourage dissatisfied mainland Greeks to squander their energies fighting one another.
      1. The causes: see above I, B.3
      2. The allies: Corinth, Megara, Euboea, Thrace, Argos and Thebes, plus (surprise, surprise) Athens.
      3. Sparta wins Pyrrhic victory at Corinth and Coroneia. Important, as new Theban tactics had almost succeeded (394).
      4. More important however was the loss of the Aegean. The exiled Athenian admiral, Konon, now in Persian pay, defeats the Spartan fleet at sea (Knidus, 394), and then 'liberated' the Ionian and Aegean states from the tyranny of the Spartans. With Persian money, he then sails on to Athens where he subsidizes the re-construction of the Athenian 'long walls'. Theban volunteers help!! Athens now in the position to become an important, if not a great power again. ACG 258-60
      5. Iphicrates, an Athenian commander, equips a new force of peltasts who use javelins, longer spears and swords to outmaneuver Spartans near at Corinth; that is they do not have the heavy hoplite defensive armour (vase painting). Still the war dragged on until...
   3. The King's Peace (387) "King Artaxerxes thinks it is just that the cities of Asia should belong to him; that he should leave independent the rest of the Hellenic cities. Should either of the belligerents not accept this peace, I will war against them with those who are in agreement with me, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money. ACG 263
6. The consequences of the King's Peace.
   1. Thebes lost her hegemony in Boiotia --this had been and will continue to be a major problem.
   2. The isopoliteia (of a democratic character) of Corinth and Argos was forcibly disbanded and Corinth required to take back her exiled oligarchs. The latter also compelled to rejoin the Spartan League.
   3. Athens had to give up much of what she had regained of her empire, on the other hand, she was no longer a state of second or third rank.
   4. Sparta was the chief gainer for as prostates of the peace, she had the legal authority (aka Persian gold) to intervene where and when she wished (by hiring mercenaries).
   5. The only real safeguard lay in the fact that the power assumed by Persia had as little foundation in reality as the pretensions of Sparta to care about Greek 'freedom and autonomy'.

Class Reporting Tool How do you account for the fact that Athens, with all her advantages (note them) managed to lose the Peloponnesian War?