The Athenian Empire: The Problem. In the 50 years after 480 Athens became the dominant (tho hardly the sole) power in the Aegean. How did a city state of about 40,000 adult males acquire this status? and how did the other states respond? Ancient historians describe Athenian domination as as "empire", and suggest that she became a "tyrant" state. But what do these words mean?

Note that Ch 9 of PHAG discusses the problem in some detail and has most of the key documents.

• Imperialism:
  • Classical realism: a nation's policies and interests are determined by its power (material resources) relative to other nations; nations thus expand their contronlwhen the can and do so in a rational manner; it is natural for states expand their power
  • Defensive realism: states seek security rather than direct control of ever more territory; hence they expand their interests / control when threatened.
  • The moral issue?
• Tyranny --in origin more morally neutral; but gradually distinctly negative:
  • when the regime rules its own people or others solely or mostly in its own interest.
  • The tyrant nominally operates within a set of rules (laws), but subverts those rules and imposes his will by intimidation.
  • Note that these definitions are not identical to the original Greek concept; but all raise questions of legitimacy.

• "League" = "koinon" or what is "in common" ...and how the Athenians described the structure of their system;
• "hegemon" = the leader of a league, but the autonomy and freedom of the members respected.
• "arché" = empire. The Athenians were accused of converting a koinon (with its set of protections and rules) into an "arché" (so Thucydides reports) and of becoming a "tyrant-state" (tyrannos polis, Thucydides 1 122; and Plutarch, Pericles 12) and treated their 'allies' as 'subjects'.

The chronology of the "inter-war" period.

• It is important to bear in mind that the victory in the war against Persia and the Athenian tendency to attribute her own success (at Salamis) to the democratic reforms and inclusion that invigorated the state both politically and intellectually; indeed,Athens was the most dynamic state in the Greek world because she had pushed democracy (inclusion) the furthest. The dynamism [inclusion ==> greater number of committed citizens] certainly contributed to political dominance.
• Moreover, Athens was also much more oriented to commerce and manufacturing than toward agriculture; she was relatively more capitalistic in her orientation. Aristeides advised the Athenians "to lay claim to the hegmonia (that is the leadership of a league) and leaving their fields to live in the town; for there would be livelihood for all (at the public trough?? nic asks)... and this would ensure the hegemonia. Obeying this advice and seizing empire, they treated their allies more like subjects, as reported by Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 24 Bourgeois and Marxist historians have long debated whether the imperialism is an inevitable consequence of capitalist democracies.

• The Persians
• The Athenians
• The Spartans
• The Greek cities along the Aegean

1. Introduction: This period is usually divided into three periods based on the changes in the structure of the Athenian / Delian League.
   1. 478-461: characterized by the establishment of the League (by 'consent' of the allies and by Spartan acknowledgement of Athenian equality with Sparta (The Athenians took over with the consent of the allies...Thuc. I 89-99). Persia checked. Note the polis model: structure, vote, rules.
   2. 460-448: the transition from a consensual confederacy to "empire" and the introduction of the "radical democracy" at Athens. the way in which rule arche of the Athenians became established...and how the allied cities lost their freedom contrary to the prevailing customs, Thucydides. Formally the transition is marked by the decision to move the treasury of the League to Athens (from Delos). The central question: where were the resources to come to subsidize expanded participation in the fleet and assembly?
   3. 448-432: formal peace with Persia [of Callias]and Sparta, but both sides (Athens and Sparta) prepare for war. Though official justification for the league is apparently gone, Athens continues to exploit it to support programs at home.
   4. The general strategy of this period was to secure the Aegean from the Persians. To do so meant a naval policy, for only through a fleet could Xerxes really threaten Greece. After the capture of the Hellespont (479), the Spartans sail for home, the Athenians and Ionians remain and besiege Sestos. This was an independent action and where Thucydides begins his history.
      1. Athens had, till Sestos, accepted the leadership of Sparta. Now she is motivated to pursue an independent policy by ties of sentiment, of the necessity to strengthen her naval and commercial ties and by the confidence of her citizens.
      2. The re-construction of her walls and their extension to the port of the Peiraeus gave the Athenians the base they needed on the mainland.
2. Forces at Work ... The strategic dilemma in more detail
   1. At Sparta
      1. Tension within the governing ranks as corruption disturbs the equilibrium (ACG 130); outside influences make helots restless and lead to an outright revolt that was finally suppressed in 460. Thereafter, Sparta pursues a cautious foreign policy.
      2. The allies of Sparta: concerned about her apparent inability to deal effectively with Athenian expansion. Only in the 430s did the problems at Corcyra and at Potidaea and then the Megarian Decree induce the allies to force Sparta to declare war or lose her allies.
   2. At Athens.
      1. In general
         1. At the end of the Persian Wars, Athens had the means (her fleet) and the reasons (traditional and commercial ties with Ionia) to pursue an independent foreign policy in those areas where Sparta had neither the will nor the means.
         2. The justification for the league was first and foremost to liberate and to defend the Greek states, but also to ensure peace and to secure trade in the Aegean. The maritime Greek states stood to benefit. Piracy, an endemic problem without a dominant naval force, was suppressed.
      2. The structure of the league: analogous to Peloponnesian League (two bodies, the Athenian assembly and the 'allies', the latter meeting on the sacred island of Delos, hence called the 'Delian League'. Each of the allies made a contribution (phoros) in ships, money or some combination based on an assessment.
      3. Until 448, she pursues an active anti-Persian policy. Thereafter, she "exploits" her allies; i.e., she moves the treasury to Athens for the sake of "security", and uses the income of the league to support internal programs and to expand the democracy.
3. Was Athens an Empire? Does she rule unwilling states by force and intimidation? and in her own interest? Note the comments above at I,B
   1. Her allies, after 25 years of satisfaction with her leadership, become restless and disaffected as their autonomy is gradually, but systematically, lost (as they convert their phoros to money. Note the revolts indicated on this map by the underlined name. Implications of revolts?" are we dealing with willing states?
   2. there were various reasons for the revolts, but the most important were failure to provide phoros or ships...for the Athenians made no allowances in their demands and were severe in applying pressure; moreover in doing so [choosing to provide money instead of ships] the allies / subjects were ...rendering themselves unprepared and incompetent in war when they revolted" Thuc 1 89-99; III 10).
   3. After the Athenians had gained their empire, they treated their allies tyrannically, except for Chios, Lesbos and Samos [only these still provided ships]. These they regarded as guardians of the empire, allowing them to keep their own constitution and rule over any subjects they happened to have. (Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 24). The implication here is that Athens too intervened in the constitutional order of her subjects.
   4. Oath of the allies: I will not revolt from the demos of the Athenians by any means or artifice, or be disloyal in word or deed, nor will I obey anyone who does revolt...I will pay the phoros [tribute] at the level set by the Athenians...I will be a good and true ally...defend theAthenian demos...I will obey the demos of the Athenians. [an inscription recording the oath, Meiggs&Lewis, no. 52
   5. The clearest sign of autonomy and freedom for Greek state was to strike its own coinage, but "If anyone in the cities [of the Delian League] strikes silver coins and does not use the currency, weights and measures of the Athenians, but foreign currency, weights and measures ... [the Athenians will] exact penal retribution (Klearkhos? Decree, ESHAG 101 of about 448??). Note: the treasury of the League moved from Delos to Athens in about 450 BC.
4. The relationship between league and domestic affairs at Athens...The test here is whether Athens was a tyrant, using the resources of their subjects for their own purposes.
1. Thucydides records that Athens was labeled by others as a tyrannos polis, (see above).
2. The misthos = state salaries: Kimon (the 'conservative' leader) was using [his wealth] to win over the poor...providing dinner every day to any needy Athenian...clothing...it was because Perikles (the more 'liberal' leader) found himself outdone in these demagogic techniques that he turned to the distribution of public funds...[and] bribed the multitude with theater tickets and salaries [misthos] Plut, Pericles 9]. More than 20,000 men were supported from the tribute and the taxes of the allies. Aristotle, Ath Pol 24. Note that the "public sector" benefits have to be paid somehow, true today and then?
3. for the building program: Greece was seen suffering a grievous insult to be ruled by an open tyranny as it watched the Athenians gilding their polis with monies that it (the leagues / allies) had been compelled to contribute for war... Plut. Per. 12.
4. distribution of booty: Plut. Kimon 12 when the spoils that had been captured had been sold, the demos had a plentiful supply of money for all its needs; also Old Oligarch II 11 and Plut Per 13 and 16
5. Athens' ability to pursue this policy successfully depended not only on her allies, but also on the continuation and development of her democracy (see below).
   1. That her policy was, to varying degrees anti-Spartan, was based on several considerations:
      1. mutual suspicion arising out of distinctly antithetical interpretations of what 'rule' should mean in a polis. Careful: both agreed that those who fight should vote, the questions was how inclusive the system should be. Athens was considered to be 'radically' different.
      2. a justifiable belief...
         1. that Sparta would not tolerate a rival of equal power for long; and that
         2. her allies, suffering under Athenian demands, would not long support her,
      3. it is not clear what the ultimate goal of the Athenians was; nonetheless, many Athenians recognized that the expansion of her power and domination would be opposed, and many were ready to use intimidation to insure their dominion.
   2. In order for Athens' position to be secured and her ambitions realized, Athens had to expand her democracy further. If the institutions (i.e., the participation in those institutions, a key factor in any city-state, the key principle of the radical democracy is this: that there be misthos [a state subsidy] for everyone participating in the state, Aristotle, Politics, VI, 1317.were to be expanded, then means had to be found to subsidize the participation of the lower classes. Effectively up to 50% of the citizens received such a subsidy tho in varying amounts and services. Funds for this purpose were obtained from the allied contributions (i.e., she had to expand the number of citizens and to find ways to support their participation as 'fighters/voters'). Participation, 'citizenship', then came to be more privileged (cf. ESHAG 64) and as such was also now more restricted.
   3. Justification of the Athenian position: arguments could be produced on both sides of this important issue.
      1. Athens did offend nomos by her "taxation without representation", but she also provided security, a service.
      2. It was both 'expedient' and 'rational' to adopt such a policy (we will cover this issue in another lecture).
      3. A footnote to history: Athens lost the war and lost her empire, nonetheless, she retained and continued to develop the radical democracy out of her own commercial resources. Implications??
6. Social and military resources of Athens --Grew substantially with empire. General Population 400,000; 186,000 Athenian citizens. The navy and democracy related
   1. Athenian society: 186,000 Athenian citizens of whom ca 4,000 in upper two classes, 100,000 in middle and 65,000 thetes. Also: 30,000 resident aliens and 200,000 slaves (a major problem, but not racial or agrarian; generally humane, slaves competed with free labor for wage, manumission easily obtained ESHAG Doc 73).
   2. Military resources
      1. hoplites (heavy and light): 23,000.
      2. cavalry & trierachs: 1,400
      3. thetes: 18,000 = rowers
      4. fleet: standing fleet of 100 ships = 12-20,000 men
   3. Public service. Of 40,000 adult males and in any one year, 500 would serve as members of boulé [council], 6000 jurymen, 1400 magistrates at home or abroad = 7900 or 25% of the adult male population. In war, up to 20,000 served in fleet.
   4. The empire made Athens the only state with a substantial cash income (about 600 T = approx $700 million). Latter essential for a fleet, one third of ships had to be replaced every year. Rest used to pay for public service. Still, Athens had built up a substantial reserve (8000 T = $10,5000,000,000) originally on Delos, later in temple of Athena in Athens (Tribute Lists). 1 T = 25 Kg (60 lbs.) of Ag; some costs: 3 T for one trireme; construction of Propylaea and Parthenon 2000 T; siege at Potidaea ca 6000T. N.B.: 1T=6000 work-days or 230 years of labor.

• What does it mean to say that Athens became a tyrant state?
• What is the evidence for this proposition?