Social Interaction Page| Folk Theory of Mind and Behavior | Intentionality | Explanations of Behavior | Representations of Personality | Representations of Mind and Behavior | Coding Schemes |
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One of the key elements of people's folk theory of mind is the concept of intentionality. Lou Moses and Dare Baldwin, developmental psychologists at Oregon, and I have offered a graduate seminar on intentionality, hosted a conference in Eugene, and are editors for a book on the topic that spans the range from developmental, social, and cognitive psychology to primatology, philosophy, and the law (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). In our empirical work, we have documented that people use the concept of intentionality with remarkable consitency and follow a definition that has five components (Malle & Knobe, 1997a): An action is considered intentional if the agent has (a) a desire for an outcome, (b) a belief that the action will lead to the outcome, (c) an intention to perform the action, (d) skill to perform the action, and (e) awareness while performing it. We have also begun to examine in more detail the conceptual and social differences between the components of desire and intention (Malle & Knobe, 2001), and recently the model of people's concept of intentionality has been applied to issues of intent in law and mental health (Malle & Nelson, 2003; Malle, 2003). |
ReferencesMalle, B.F. & Knobe, J. (1997a). The folk concept of intentionality. Jounal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 101-121. Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (2001). The distinction between desire and intention: A folk-conceptual analysis. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J., & Baldwin, D. A. (2001). Introduction: The significance of intentionality. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J., & Baldwin, D. A. (Eds.)(2001). Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Malle, B. F. (2003). The social cognition of intentional action. In P. W. Halligan, C. Bass, & D. Oakley (Eds.), Malingering and illness deception (pp. 81-90). Oxford University Press. Malle, B. F., & Nelson, S. E. (2003). Judging mens rea: The tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of intentionality. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 21, 563-580. |
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