Social Interaction Lab| Folk Theory of Mind and Behavior | Intentionality | Explanations of Behavior | Representations of Self and Personality | Representations of Mind and Behavior | Coding Schemes |
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Behavior explanations lie at the intersection of social cognition and social interaction. They are a cognitive tool by which people make sense of themselves and others, and they are a social tool that is used to communicate sense-making and to manage impressions. I have been developing a theoretical framework for the study of behavior explanations that provides an alternative to more recent attribution theories (Malle, 1999, 2001, 2004). People's behavior explanations do not differ along a simple person-situation dimension; rather, they fall into four modes of explanation, one used for unintentional behavior and three used for intentional behavior. Each of these modes has subtle linguistic and conceptual features that must be considered when studying the structure and social function of explanations. (A slightly more detailed statement of the theory can be found at darkwing.uoregon.edu/~interact/theory.html.) Using this framework, my co-workers and I have studied the structure and function of reason explanations (Malle, Knobe, O'Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000), including the use of specific explanation features to appear rational. We have also documented the differences in explaining actions performed by groups and individuals (O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002) and are currently completing a project on the multiple ways in which actors and observers differ in explaining behavior (Knobe & Malle, 2002; Malle, 2002; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2004). We have also begun studies on various social functions that explanations may serve: Sarah Nelson, for example, examines the specific ways in which people use explanations to manage others' blame and praise (Nelson & Malle, in preparation). |
ReferencesMalle, B.F. (1999). How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 23-48.Malle, B. F., Knobe, J., O'Laughlin, M., Pearce, G. E., & Nelson, S. E. (2000). Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: Beyond person-situation attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 309-326. Malle, B. F. (2001). Folk explanations of intentional action. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Malle, B. F. (2001). Attribution processes. In N. J. Smelser and P. B Baltes (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences (Vol. 14, Developmental, social, personality, and motivational psychology; section editor N. Eisenberg). Amsterdam: Pergamon/Elsevier. Malle, B. F. (2002). The social self and the social other. Actor-observer asymmetries in making sense of behavior. In J. P Forgas & K. D. Williams (Eds.), The social self: Cognitive, interpersonal, and intergroup perspectives(pp. 189-204). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. Knobe, J., & Malle, B. F. (2002). Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later. Special issue on self-other asymmetries: Psychologica Belgica, 42, 113-130. O’Laughlin, M., &. Malle, B. F. (2002). How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 33-48. Malle, B. F. (2004). How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Malle, B. F. (in press). Attributions as behavior explanations: Toward a new theory. In D. Chadee and J. Hunter (Eds.), Current themes and perspectives in social psychology. St. Augustine, Trinidad: SOCS, The University of the West Indies. Malle, B.F., Knobe, J., & Nelson, S. (2004). Actor-observer asymmetries in behavior explanation: New answers to an old question. Manuscript under revision. |
Social Interaction Lab