

**THE  
CRIMINALS  
OF LIMA  
AND THEIR  
WORLDS**

**THE PRISON EXPERIENCE,**

**1850–1935**

**CARLOS AGUIRRE**





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In memory of my father,

**MARIO AGUIRRE MORALES**



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## INTRODUCTION

This book studies the evolution of institutions of confinement for male criminals in Lima, Peru, between 1850 and 1935. It reconstructs the social, cultural, and doctrinal influences that shaped the ways in which law-breakers were treated, the fate of programs of prison reform, and the ways in which inmates confronted the experience of prison. It argues that the operation of Lima prisons during this period reveals the contradictory and exclusionary nature of modernization in Peru. The implementation of modern rules of discipline and rehabilitative treatment inside the prisons was, at best, ambiguous, and it shows the lack of commitment on the part of state officials and prison authorities to the tenets of prison reform. As a result, a combination of brutality and indifference tended to characterize the way criminals were treated by the criminal justice system, and the operation of prisons came to depend on a double-edged and fragile customary order in which arbitrariness and abuse were much more prevalent than respect for the prisoners' rights and their well-being. Prisons thus became not sites for the regeneration of criminals but bastions of authoritarianism and exclusion.

The reform of prisons—their transformation into regimented institutions for the rehabilitation of prisoners through a strict therapy consisting of mandatory silence and segregation, obligatory work, religious counseling, and constant, total surveillance—was a political and ideological drive initiated in Europe and the United States in the second half of the eighteenth century. By 1820, the movement had consolidated a new institutional structure, the penitentiary, which combined in a single setting all the elements prison reformers deemed necessary to transform unruly criminals into honest, industrious, law-abiding citizens. In Peru, the initial plan for building penitentiaries was formulated in 1853, and in

1862 the first and only penitentiary ever built was inaugurated in Lima. The ambitious plan for reforming the entire prison system by building more penitentiaries was never effected, and none of the other prisons went through a process of renovation or reform. At the Lima penitentiary, in addition, the actual implementation of the new science of punishment was rather problematic, and it definitely departed from the original plan. While it certainly was a more secure prison and exerted greater control over the daily lives of the prisoners, the alleged purposes of disciplining and rehabilitating criminals through humane treatment were never achieved. A variety of circumstances, including financial shortages, lack of adequate personnel, private interests, the inmates' own forms of coping and resistance, and the broader social and cultural matrix of Peruvian society, explain both the deficient operation of the penitentiary and the overall lack of concern with the situation at other prisons. Despite efforts by a group of criminologists in the 1920s, when scientific penology inspired a new wave of enthusiasm with prison reform, little was achieved. The Spanish penologist Luis Jiménez de Asúa offered a highly negative assessment of prisons in 1928, seventy-five years after the original plan for prison reform was made: "In Peru," he wrote to Director General of Prisons Bernardino León y León, "*we have to begin from scratch, as you say, even with feeding prisoners and suppressing torture. Later, we can allow room for sophisticated buildings and bylaws but, for the time being, the first thing we ought to do is to make sure that the prisoner lives like a human being and not like a beast.*"<sup>1</sup>

In the case of Peru, I argue in this book, the project for the reform or modernization of prisons was complicated by at least three interrelated elements. First, although the impulse toward prison reform was mostly a state-centered initiative, the actual implementation of this project reveals the limitations of the state in carrying out its own initiatives. The lack of financial resources is just one side of the problem, although certainly an important one. Much more critical, however, were the deficient mechanisms of personnel recruitment, the lack of adequate institutional forms of control over the personnel of prisons, the patrimonial character of the state, and the presence of widespread corruption. The actual operation of prisons was left to the discretion and mutual bargaining power of two sets of actors: prison staff and inmates. Prison employees and authorities were generally detached from the main issues and goals of prison reform.



They had to operate their institutions on the basis not only of commonsensical forms of "treatment," which included, prominently, the continuous display of violence, but also of the creation and preservation of a customary order that contradicted the alleged purposes of the reform.

Second, prisoners themselves were a major factor in the lack of correspondence between the ideals of prison reform and the actual operation of the prisons. Especially at the penitentiary, whose design called for the enforcement of rules of silence, discipline, and work, inmates subverted that endeavor by engaging in individual and collective forms of bargaining, coping, and resistance. They were not necessarily docile victims of an oppressive structure but instead, as we will see in part 3 of this book, resolute and creative actors who helped shape the world they lived in.

Third, the limitations and ambiguities of prison reform in Peru can be attributed, to a large extent, to the prevailing cultural values, sensibilities, and political cultures of the larger society. The implementation of a program of prison reform required a change in attitudes toward criminals—indeed, toward the lower classes generally—and the allocation of citizenship rights that, in the context of Peruvian society, were largely absent. As many studies have demonstrated, Peruvian society underwent a process of modernization without altering the structures of power and exclusion that had been in place since the birth of the republic. Instead of a republic of citizens enjoying equality before the law, Peruvian society was dramatically shaped by exclusionary practices along social, cultural, gender, and racial lines. Any call to transform prisons into institutions displaying humanitarian attitudes and respect for the rights of prisoners was a cry in the desert in view of the oppressive force of widespread and pervasive authoritarian and discriminatory social practices. The impulse behind the adoption of the penitentiary, that is, the imitation of Western models, was part of a broader set of attitudes and practices in which racism and exclusionary practices occupied a central space.

Nevertheless, evaluated on the basis of the actual operation of institutions of confinement, the state did accomplish a number of goals: more centralized, intrusive, and powerful mechanisms of surveillance, policing, and repression were implemented, especially, but not exclusively, at the Lima penitentiary. Prisons became more secure institutions of confinement, and new and more effective methods of identification and classification were adopted. They were primarily used, however, not to

combat crime or to “regenerate” allegedly deviant individuals, but to help reproduce and maintain an essentially unjust and exclusionary social order.



For most historians, the birth of modern Peru occurred in the aftermath of the disastrous War of the Pacific (1879–83) and especially after 1895, when the civil *caudillo* Nicolás de Piérola gained the presidency and initiated a period of steady economic growth and political stability. This process is generally associated with the growing presence of foreign capital, the slow but steady expansion of capitalist relations of production, the acceleration of migration and urbanization, the importation of numerous modern technological innovations (railroads, streetcars, telegraph, and so forth), the adoption of modern ideologies like positivism, anarchism, and socialism, and the emergence of the organized working class and mass political parties.<sup>2</sup> The birth of modern Peru coincided with the inauguration of what the Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre called, in deliberately contradictory terms, the “Aristocratic Republic” (1895–1919). This was a period of economic growth and political stability during which Peruvian society and politics were controlled by a small number of families whose interests were mostly associated with coastal export agriculture (cotton and sugar) and who were the beneficiaries of a system of restricted political participation based upon the exclusion of the majority of the Peruvian population.<sup>3</sup> The institutional expression of this system of domination was what historians and sociologists call the oligarchic state, a structure that, with minor changes and occasional challenges, would last until the late 1960s. This oligarchic state was built upon a variety of components: a conflictual but nonetheless effective alliance between foreign capital, coastal landowners, and Andean *gamonalismo*,<sup>4</sup> or bossism, the political exclusion of large portions of the population, especially the indigenous and rural segments, the preeminence of seignorial and patrimonial relations between state and society, an incipient development of civil society, the partial privatization of power and violence, and an accentuated political and economic centralism.<sup>5</sup>

Peru entered its “modern” period, thus, by consolidating a model of state–society relations whose most persistent feature was the systematic exclusion of the lower, rural, and colored classes from political participation and the effective exercise of their civil rights. In electoral terms, for

example, voting was restricted to a minority composed of male, propertied, and literate individuals.<sup>6</sup> Recent scholarship has shown the multiple ways in which different groups of subordinate peoples—in particular, indigenous peasants—actively and vigorously participated in the negotiation of political and social boundaries and the contestation of hegemonic projects. The overwhelming outcome was, however, the defeat of popular political projects and the continual exclusion and repression of the lower classes. The Peruvian state and nation were built on the basis of exclusionary practices, racially informed policies, and discriminatory cultural and institutional models.<sup>7</sup> As Florencia Mallon has written, “The Peruvian state, consolidated through the repression and fragmentation of popular political cultures, had no capacity for inclusion or hegemony . . . official political discourse conceptualized a limited national polity defined by quality rather than quantity. Thus structured around neocolonial principles of ethnic and spatial fragmentation, the first ‘modern’ Peruvian state of the Aristocratic Republic would throw its long shadow of authoritarianism and exclusion across the entire twentieth century.”<sup>8</sup> In 1919, Augusto B. Leguía came to power through a coup d’état. A political maverick and successful businessman closely linked to foreign, especially North American, interests, he challenged the political basis of the Aristocratic Republic. Leguía came to represent a new and dynamic sector within the ruling block, one much more committed to the goal of modernizing Peruvian society along capitalist lines. Promising the construction of a *Patria Nueva* (“New Fatherland”), demagogically flirting with populist and *Indigenista* rhetoric, opening the Peruvian economy to unprecedented levels of foreign investment, especially from the United States, and launching an ambitious plan for the modernization of state and society on the basis of supposedly rational and scientific governmental policies, Leguía was able to break the political (but only to a limited extent the economic) hegemony of the traditional oligarchy.<sup>9</sup> The Leguista project tried, with some success, to incorporate new actors into the political scenario, especially the urban middle classes, some sectors of the provincial elites, and portions of the working classes; but it did so within a framework dominated by a personalistic, centralist, and authoritarian style of leadership. When cooptation failed, Leguía resorted to brutal repression, exile, and imprisonment of political rivals and unruly subaltern groups. The army and the police were both modernized, and Leguía was able to partially dismantle the power of provincial lords.<sup>10</sup> The

Leguista state was also an instrument of capitalist penetration, especially in the form of foreign investment, a fact which was to have dramatic implications for the regions thus affected.<sup>11</sup> Finally, the Leguista administration effectively used traditional patron/client relationships to procure the allegiance of various segments of the Peruvian population. The *oncenio*, as the eleven-year Leguía administration is called, brought to new heights the traditionally personalistic nature of Peruvian politics, and adulation became a prerequisite for inclusion in the networks of political and economic power. Leguía was called Wiracocha, the Jupiter President, the New Messiah, and the Giant of the Pacific; he was compared to Simón Bolívar and Napoleon; the twentieth century was proclaimed "Leguía's century."<sup>12</sup>

This state was not, however, an omnipotent machine that functioned smoothly and flawlessly. Not even during the Leguía administration, when attempts were made to rationalize and modernize it, did the state experience significant improvement in its mechanisms of operation and control. It expanded its reach, but it could not get rid of the pervasive presence, within the public administration, of traditional, even colonial, bureaucratic practices. The patrimonial character of the Peruvian state, its clientelistic mechanisms of recruitment and operation (the well-known *tarjetazo*), its centralism, and the widespread corruption it nurtured all affected the implementation of state initiatives and presented serious obstacles to the consolidation of modern structures of state-society relations.<sup>13</sup>

Despite its traditional components, however, the modernization of Peruvian society did occur during the long period between 1850 and 1935, and it was in Lima where it was mostly felt. The population of Lima increased from ninety-five thousand inhabitants in 1858 to more than two hundred thousand in the late 1920s, while the percentage of *provincianos*, people from the interior, rose from 37 percent in 1858 to 58.5 percent in 1908 to 63.5 percent in 1920.<sup>14</sup> The movement of people paralleled the physical growth and urban development of the city. The first major impulse toward urban change took place in the late 1860s and 1870s, when the colonial walls were demolished to allow for the city's expansion, and new avenues, boulevards, parks, and public buildings were erected. A second moment of notable urban development came about after 1895. Spacious avenues were opened, and public services such as running water and sewage were installed. The third and most ambitious plan of urban



reform took place during the oncenio. Lima was transformed in multiple ways, the most significant being probably the gradual emergence of distinct class-based neighborhoods. Lima began to have working-class districts, middle-class neighborhoods, and upper-class *balnearios* (beach resorts) and residential areas. The proliferation of foreign boutiques and department stores (Bon Marché, Oeschle), cafes, theaters, an active cultural life, and other cosmopolitan amenities gave Lima a belle-epoque flavor that seemed to fulfill the dreams of modernizing elites eager to enjoy a European lifestyle.<sup>15</sup> The urban and human landscape of Lima was also being altered by the growing numbers of industrial factories, which went from 69 in 1890 to 244 in 1920, some of which, like the textile factories at Vitarte, employed more than 400 workers.<sup>16</sup> The overall number of industrial workers in Lima was still small compared, for instance, to the number of artisans or commercial employees,<sup>17</sup> but a young and combative working class emerged, nonetheless, under the organizational and ideological auspices of anarchism and socialism. This emergence had an impact that went well beyond the small size of the working class. The 1910s and 1920s was a period of intense organization and political mobilization of the working class. An effort was made to create a distinctive working-class culture, with great emphasis on self-education. As a result, the working classes of Lima made their presence felt in the city and decisively shaped the contours of its political and social life.<sup>18</sup>

Away from the flamboyant parts of Lima and close to, but to a certain extent separate from, the nascent working classes there was a sector of the population that did not seem to be participating in either the modernization process or the efforts at political mobilization mentioned above. Alternatively known as urban plebeians, marginal sectors, parasites, or simply criminals, this population of unemployed, wandering, and frequently lawless individuals was also an important, if usually neglected, actor in Lima's urban life. They were the target of police action and made up a significant portion of the prison population. They were either left behind by the modernization drive or refused to be a part of it. They lived lives that, in the eyes of authorities and commentators, deserved punishment and containment, if not extermination. Blamed for many of the shortcomings of Peruvian society, including the alleged lack of civilization and progress, they developed distinctive forms of socialization and culture which were generally at odds with the values of those who harassed and punished them. They coexisted with other sectors of the




Figure 1. Map of Lima in 1908, showing the division of the city into quarters (roman numerals) and some key locations: (1) Plaza de Armas; (2) Lima penitentiary; (3) Guadalupe jail; (4) Chinatown; (5) Tjamar; (6) Malambo. Adapted by Ariel Vaughn of the Wired Humanities Project, University of Oregon, from the original “Plano de Lima” by Ricardo Tizón y Bueno (Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1908).

laboring poor, sharing with them housing arrangements (in *callejones* [tenement houses] and *casas de vecindad* [working-class housing units]), public spaces (taverns, marketplaces), and socialization practices (*jaranas*, cult of bravery), but they were looked upon by important sectors of the working classes as undesirable and undeserving. Neither suppressed nor integrated, this sector of the population represented the other Lima, not the one of *café*s, boutiques, and intellectual *tertulias* (salons) or that of the factory, the union, and the political party, but the Lima of the *faite* (bully), the *ratero* (petty thief), and the vagrant.<sup>19</sup>

The numerous visible changes affecting Lima’s society during this period should not overshadow stubborn continuities that also must be



accounted for in explaining attitudes toward criminals and prisoners. I argue that attitudes toward criminals reflected the continuities affecting Peruvian society during the long period of modernization. The social and cultural scenario of Lima was continuously shaped by a central ingredient that survived the modernization process: the authoritarian and hierarchical nature of social relations. What has been called the "authoritarian tradition" of Peruvian society can be traced back to the colonial period.<sup>20</sup> A system of values underscoring the existence of so-called natural racial, social, generational, and gendered hierarchies, appropriate ways of interaction between superiors and subordinates, and legitimate forms of achieving conformity and obedience, including corporal punishment and other forms of mistreatment, was maintained and even reinforced throughout the nineteenth century and the early twentieth. As the historian Steve Stein, among others, has documented, Lima was a highly hierarchical, stratified society. The relationships between patrons and servants, parents and children, teachers and students, husbands and wives, and employers and employees all included diverse degrees of despotism and coercion. An appropriate symbol of this set of social arrangements would be, according to this perception, the tradition of *come y calla* (eat and shut up), which essentially underscores submission and obedience as necessary, appropriate, and even virtuous attitudes: subordinates were not supposed to reply or comment on any superior's order. The extensive use of corporal punishment was a central aspect of this culture: students were whipped at school, and domestic servants were physically punished by their patrons; in army barracks and police jails, the lash was widely used; in the domestic sphere, abuse of children and women was common.<sup>21</sup>

Two aspects of this situation need to be highlighted. First, the authoritarian tradition permeated all spheres of society, not just the relationship between elites and lower classes. It was reproduced, as the historian Alberto Flores Galindo emphasized, by the victims themselves in a seemingly endless chain of abusive and despotic behavior. Second, and contrary to what Stein suggests, the pervasiveness of this authoritarian tradition does not mean it went unchallenged. Stein takes at face value what contemporary prescriptive manuals and commentators said. "Obedience," he says, "was the main norm of society." But the fact that it was the norm does not mean it was always complied with. Stein goes even further when he argues that "a servile behavior was the preferred tactic in the

confrontation with persons deemed as powerful,” since the urban masses “assimilated a system of values that rewarded passive adaptation and personal dependence.” “Deference and submission,” according to Stein, would have been the most visible characteristics of lower-class social and political behavior.<sup>22</sup>

I would argue, on the contrary, that precisely because the norms of hierarchies and obedience were broken and challenged, an authoritarian response on the part of the superior was needed. In other words, for a parent or teacher to punish a child, the child usually had to commit a violation of the codes of appropriate behavior, and the same holds for servants, wives, workers, and other subalterns. If one accepts Stein’s argument, then the numerous daily expressions of resistance and unruliness, from workers’ strikes to servants’ acts of defiance, are unexplainable. A seemingly appropriate example is that of criminals: they violated the codes, so they were punished. How they were punished reflects the prevalence of certain notions of appropriate punishment. Where Stein sees conformity, I see contention and struggle. What defines an authoritarian culture is not the fact that it is not contested but rather that defiance of power is met with despotism and violence.



Modern prisons have been the focus of intense study over the last few decades. Interpretations about their place in the development and operation of their respective societies have varied widely. Prisons have been seen, by various authors, as key instruments in the development of capitalism and the formation of an industrial proletariat,<sup>23</sup> as institutions revealing of the intrinsic and insolvable contradictions of liberalism,<sup>24</sup> as manifestations of radical changes in cultural sensibilities,<sup>25</sup> as sites for the production of colonial knowledge and power,<sup>26</sup> as loci of racial oppression and marginalization,<sup>27</sup> and probably most famously, as both symbols and bastions of surveillance and normalization, which are deemed central features of modern societies. According to Michel Foucault, the most prominent advocate of this view, “the carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest support, in modern society, of the normalizing power.”<sup>28</sup>

But prisons have also been seen as sites of resistance where alternative social and political projects are imagined and fostered.<sup>29</sup> The profoundly

pessimistic Foucauldian rendering of total panoptical control—which left little or no room for subaltern agency and resistance—is challenged in studies that emphasize both prisoners’ agency and the limits of state despotism. While, understandably, scholars tend to focus on political prisoners as carriers of resistance against oppression, studies that deal with so-called common criminals also demonstrate that even the most despotic prison regimes cannot completely subdue prisoners’ resilience and determination.

The development of a network of institutions of confinement in modern societies represents, among other things, an expression of the growing intervention of the state in the regulation of the lives of ordinary citizens and its increasingly restrictive privilege in the use of legitimate coercion and violence. The emergence and operation of such institutions as the police, prisons, penitentiaries, and reformatories are intimately linked to the development of what the British historian V. A. C. Gatrell called “the policeman state.”<sup>30</sup> The role of prisons within the overall structure of the modern state, however, is contingent upon both the nature of that state (liberal, autocratic, oligarchic, military) and the concrete manner in which specific mechanisms and actors operate. The correspondence between the ideal models of state institutions and their actual operation is complicated by the very process through which they come into being. As a result, these institutions are less dependent on the grand designs of state ideologists than on the actions and omissions of those state officials in whose hands the task of implementing them is laid. The operation of Lima’s prisons demonstrates that a gulf sometimes separates the declared goals of state institutions from their practical implementation.

State institutions such as prisons cannot be dissociated from the broader scenario in which they function. Historians must be attentive to the influences exerted by prevailing cultural and mental settings. As David Garland has argued, prisons are also “cultural artifacts” that both reflect and contribute to the shaping of wider patterns of mentalities, values, and social practices.<sup>31</sup> Thinking of prisons as mirrors of society is not just a rhetorical trick, for they reflect deeply ingrained social values, beliefs, and practices, including, prominently, the ways in which authority and power is exercised in a given society. In the words of the historian Dario Melossi “punishment is deeply embedded in the national/cultural specificity of the environment which produces it.”<sup>32</sup> Regardless of the

specific needs that punishment may fulfill—deterrence, regeneration, control over the labor market, and so forth—or the legal and doctrinal basis upon which ideologists elaborate their designs—natural law, humanitarianism, science—the ultimate form punishment takes will always depend, at its core, on the influence of socially constructed sensibilities.<sup>33</sup> In other words, what is considered appropriate, just, horrendous, or well deserved is defined not just by the law or by the needs of the state but, more critically, by the dominant (though still contested) cultural values of the broader society.

The impact of these cultural values upon the operation of prisons is critically mediated by the construction of images and representations of the criminal population. These “distorting mirrors” include, but are not limited to, legal, popular, and scientific representations of the criminal population that also shaped the ways in which prisoners are treated inside the prison.<sup>34</sup> Perceptions about crime as a social issue, for example—whether viewed as a major threat or a minor problem, a social malaise or the result of specific deficiencies among certain groups—and the criminal as an individual—whether seen as a victim or a monster, a degenerate being or a sick person—also inform the specific forms that punishment adopts at any given time.<sup>35</sup>

The operation of institutions of confinement, finally, is crucially mediated by the responses they generate among the very recipients of the variety of interventions that prison regimes entailed, namely, their inmates. Prisons, like other socio-institutional settings such as the plantation and the factory, constitute arenas in which power and domination are wielded but in which contestation and struggle also take place. Despite the formally extreme differential of power existing between a prison authority and a convict, there is always room for the convict to manipulate, circumvent, and redefine the rules of engagement. The success of these strategies is always limited and very frequently fragile and ephemeral, but nonetheless they offer ample demonstration that prisoners do not totally succumb to the oppressive logic behind their imprisonment. A study of the prison that ignores prisoners’ agency and the realities of daily life inside the prison is incomplete. In the words of the historian Michelle Perrot, “It is precisely the real, the daily life of this group—the prisoners—that we must try to capture at its most hidden level, the level that lies behind and beyond the serene statements and the conventions of the discourse of the penitentiary.”<sup>36</sup>



The case of Lima's prisons reveals the profound schism existing between the promises of the Peruvian republic—democracy, rule of law, and citizenship rights for all Peruvians—and the realities of despotic and exclusionary political and social systems. Despite recent and quite valuable analyses of the development of civil society and political participation that tend to highlight the spread of democratic impulses and practices among the Peruvian population, authoritarian traditions and exclusionary practices tend to emerge in the literature as decisive features of Peruvian society.<sup>37</sup> In numerous ways prisons have both reflected and reproduced the inequalities of the Peruvian social and political structures: in the visibly discriminatory patterns of policing and incarceration, in the excessive punishment inflicted against vulnerable populations, in the absolute disdain for human life and dignity, and in the denial of access to fair trials and adequate legal counsel. Even though prisoners, as this book emphasizes, were not always passive or acquiescent victims, the overall picture is one in which they suffered from the state's and society's indifference and malice, if not open brutality. That these conditions continue to inform the operation of Peruvian penal institutions to date is revealing of the pervasiveness of the exclusionary and anti-democratic traditions born with the Peruvian republic almost two hundred years ago.



This book is largely, although not solely, based on a rich and for the most part unused collection of documents from various institutions of confinement and other administrative units connected to the Peruvian prison network. They were gathered by the Dirección General de Prisiones (DGP) and housed at the Ministry of Justice. When this ministry was closed in the 1970s, the papers from the DGP were sent to the National Archives, where they remain. Despite the richness of this documentation, lacunas and gaps are numerous. Certain aspects of the experience of incarceration are less represented than others in the documents. For example, I found little documentation for political prisoners before 1920, and the documents are very silent on prison employees, about which I would have liked to say much more. More important, documents on female prisoners and their institutions of confinement are quite scarce, which prevents me from including, as I wanted, an account of female imprisonment in Lima.<sup>38</sup>

Part 1, "Apprehending the Criminal," reviews the ways in which crime

and criminals were represented by a variety of social commentators as well as the role of the police in the construction of a criminal class. Chapter 1 looks at the invention of the “criminal question” and the intersection between views about crime and discourses about race, urban life, and lower-class morals. Chapter 2 traces the early development of scientific theories of crime, stressing the continuities it had with previous, prescientific discourses. Chapter 3 analyzes the ways in which the most visible and intrusive arm of the state, the police, contributed to the construction of the “criminal classes” by displaying a highly arbitrary and class-biased pattern of abuse against certain segments of the lower classes. Part 2, “Prisons and Prison Communities,” describes penal institutions and their inhabitants. Chapter 4 reviews the evolution of institutions of confinement such as the Lima penitentiary, the Guadalupe jail, and El Frontón Penal Island, while chapter 5 looks in detail at the male inmate population, highlighting their diversity as well as the ways in which they bridged the prison and the outside world. Part 3, the last section, entitled “The World They Made Together,” examines in greater detail the ways in which daily interactions, negotiations, and forms of contestation shaped the world of the prison. Chapter 6 reconstructs what I call the customary order of the prison, pointing at the complexities of the prison experience and the multiple forms of interaction—ranging from partnership and complicity to abuse and neglect—between prison officials and inmates and among inmates themselves. Chapter 7 considers the formation of prison subcultures and their impact on daily life inside the prison, and chapter 8 the various ways in which inmates defied both the customary order and the overall prison regime imposed upon them. The conclusion puts the findings of these chapters in the social, political, and cultural context of Lima society and offers an interpretation of the connections between punishment, modernization, and authoritarian traditions in Peruvian society.