Williams, B. (1993). Recognizing responsibility. In B. Williams,
Shame and necessity (pp. 50-74). Berkeley: University of
California Press.
A search engine for background information on Greek mythology.
[book cover]We tend to suppose that the ancient Greeks had
primitive ideas of the self, of responsibility, freedom, and shame,
and that now humanity has advanced from these to a more refined moral
consciousness. Bernard Williams's original and radical book questions
this picture of Western history. While we are in many ways different
from the Greeks, Williams claims that the differences are not to be
traced to a shift in these basic conceptions of ethical life. We are
more like the ancients than we are prepared to acknowledge, and only
when this is understood can we properly grasp our most important
differences from them, such as our rejection of slavery. The author is
a philosopher, but much of his book is directed to writers such as
Homer and the tragedians, whom he discusses as poets and not just as
materials for philosophy. At the center of his study is the question
of how we can understand Greek tragedy at all, when its world is so
far from ours. Williams explains how it is that when the ancients
speak, they do not merely tell us about themselves, but about
ourselves. Shame and Necessity gives a new account of our relations to
the Greeks, and helps us to see what ethical ideas we need in order to
live in the modern world.
The classic analysis of the folk psychology of
intentionality, free will, and responsibility; probably wrong but an
inevitable starting point.
1. Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J., & Baldwin, D. A. (in press). The
Significance of Intentionality. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, and
D. A. Baldwin, Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social
cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An overview article on research on intentionality. Focus
on the last section, in which we try to clarify the relation of
intentionality and responsibility, while distinguishing several
meanings of responsibility.
3. Shaver, K. G, & Drown, D. (1986). On causality,
responsibility, and self-blame: A theoretical note. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 697-702.
Reviews examples from the literature on "self-blame"
for illness and criminal victimization that illustrate insufficient
attention to construct validity in the measurement of causality,
responsibility, and blameworthiness. Distinctions among these terms
have been drawn in detail in a theory of the attribution of blame by
the 1st author (1985). It is argued that what has been called
behavioral self-blame is really a self-attribution of causality. In
the same way, what has been called characterological self-blame is
rather a self-attribution of responsibility, the form of which should
constitute a self-esteem threatening excuse.
4. Weiner, B. (1995). The anatomy of
responsibility. In B. Weiner, Judgments of responsibility: A
foundation for a theory of social conduct (pp. 1-24). New York:
Guilford.
5. Wallace, R. J. (1994). Excerpts from Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6. Bratman, M. E. (1997). Responsibility and planning. The Journal of Ethics, 1, 27-43.
Further Reading:
Pomerantz, A. (1978). Attributions of responsibility:
Blamings. Sociology, 12, 15-121.
Uses conversational analysis to distinguish between
two types of blamings: (1) those that are directed at behaviors an
agent performed (reprimands, criticisms); and (2) those that are
directed at unhappy incidents for which a causal origin is desired
(responsibility for negative outcome).
Semin, G. R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1983). Attribution of responsibility. In G. R. Semin and A. S. R. Mastead, The accountability of conduct: A social psychological analysis (ch. 4., pp. 123-155). London: Academic Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). The grounds of responsibility. In P. M. S. Hacker & J. Raz (Eds.), Law, morality, and society: Essays in honour of H. L. A. Hart (pp. 175-188). Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
1. Graham, S., Weiner, B., Giuliano, T., & Williams, E. (1993). An attributional analysis of reactions to Magic Johnson. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23, 996-1010.
2. Fincham, F. D, Beach, S. R, & Nelson, G. (1987). Attribution
processes in distressed and nondistressed couples: III. Causal and
responsibility attributions for spouse behavior. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 11, 71-86.
Examined causal and responsibility attributions for
spouse behavior in 40 couples seeking therapy and in 40 age- and
socioeconomic status (SES)-matched nondistressed community couples. Ss
rated the causes of positive and negative partner behaviors, made
attributions of responsibility for the behaviors, indicated their
affective impact, and specified what they would do in response to each
behavior. Distressed spouses saw the causes of negative partner
behavior as more global and considered the behavior to be more
negative in intent, selfishly motivated, and blameworthy than did
nondistressed spouses. The inverse pattern of results was obtained for
positive spouse behavior. Only responsibility attributions predicted
the affective impact and intended responses to the behavior.
4. Alicke, M. D., Davis, T. L. (1990). Capacity responsibility in social
evaluation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16,
465-474.
Examined whether social evaluations were
based on the degree of constraint that existed in the immediate
situation, as well as on responsibility for the process by which
control was inhibited. Capacity-development responsibility refers to
responsibility for the development of an incapacitating characteristic
such as depression, alcoholism, or neurosis; capacity-activation
responsibility refers to responsibility for the activation of an
incapacity in situations where the incapacity may produce negative
outcomes. 78 college students were presented with a series of
vignettes that varied capacity-development and capacity-activation
responsibility, as well as the severity of the outcome that
occurred. Each factor significantly influenced Ss' judgments of blame
and punishment.
Weiner, B. (1993). On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived responsibility and social motivation. American Psychologist, 48, 957-965.
Fincham, F. D, & Emery, R. E. (1988). Limited mental capacities
and perceived control in attribution of responsibility. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 193-207.
Hamilton, V. L. (1978). Who is responsible? Towards a social
psychology of responsibility attribution. Social Psychology,
41, 316-328.
Fincham, F. D., & Bradbury, T. N. (1987). Cognitive processes and
conflict in close relationships: An attribution-efficacy
model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,. 53,
1106-1118.
Adam Smith, A. (1976/xxxx). The theory of moral sentiments.
(Edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie). Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1976.
Russell, P. (1995). Freedom and moral sentiment. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Sabini, J., & Silver, M. (1998). On the captivity of the will: Sympathy, caring, and a moral sense of the human. In J. Sabini and M. Silver, Emotion, character, and responsibility (ch. 3, pp. 31-52). New York: Oxford University Press.
Further Reading:
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1993). Introduction. In J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, Pespectives on moral responsibility (pp. 1-41). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Tedeschi, J. T., & Felson, R. B. (1994). Perceived injustice and
the expression of grievances. In J. T., Tedeschi and
R. B. Felson, Violence, aggression, and coercive actions
(ch. 8, pp. 213-248). Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Russell, P. (1995). Freedom and moral sentiment. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1985). Morality and the retributive emotions. In
J.L. Mackie, Persons and values (Selected papers,
vol. 2, pp. 206-219). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Quigley, B. M, & Tedeschi, J. T. (1996). Mediating effects of
blame attributions on feelings of anger. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1280-1288.
Delin, C. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (1994). Praise: More than just social reinforcement. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 24, 219-241.
Rozin, P.,
Lowery, L., Imada, S, & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad
hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger,
disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy,
divinity). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,
574-586.
Examined the impact of a child's psychological
disturbance on adults' judgments of causation, blame, and punishment
for action outcomes portrayed across F. Heider's (1958) levels, using
197 undergraduates. The effect of these levels on perceived control
and the utility of perceived control in predicting judgments were also
investigated. It was found that (a) the psychological status of the
child affected responses for a subset of Heider's levels but did not
alter the pattern of responses across levels and (b) responses were
not affected by the existence of a psychological disorder but appeared
to reflect inferences regarding the capacities influenced by the
disorder. Perceived control increased across Heider's levels and was
more useful than previously investigated subjective probabilities in
accounting for variance in perceived cause, blame, and
punishment. Suggestions regarding the assessment of capacities
necessary for being held accountable for one's actions are
outlined.
In both studies, support was obtained for the proposal
that the relation between conflict dimensions (e.g., blame) and causal
dimensions is mediated by judgments of responsibility.
Examined principles of action identification theory for
their relevance to the allocation of responsibility for alleged
rape. 88 undergraduates learned of a rape incident in which the
motives of the alleged perpetrator and victim were ambiguous. Ss
identified the action of the target (the perpetrator or victim) in
either low level terms (e.g., the action's details) or relatively high
level terms (e.g., the action's effects or implications) and then were
exposed to 1 of 2 mutually inconsistent conclusions regarding the
respective responsibility of the perpetrator and victim for what
happened. As predicted, Ss in the low level conditions allocated
responsibility between the perpetrator and victim in a manner that was
consistent with the conclusion they were provided; Ss in the high
level conditions, however, did not show such judgmental emergence
Hard but very thorough. Explains Strawson’s position and various follow-up arguments.
Alicke, M. D. (1992). Culpable causation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 368-378.
"Culpable causation" refers to the influence of the
perceived blameworthiness of an action on judgments of its causal
impact on a harmful outcome. Four studies were conducted to show that
when multiple forces contribute to an unfortunate outcome, people
select the most blameworthy act as the prepotent causal factor. In
Study 1, an actor was cited more frequently as the primary cause of an
accident when his reason for speeding was to hide a vial of cocaine
than when it was to hide his parents' anniversary gift. In Study 2, of
the 4 acts that produced an unfortunate outcome, the most blameworthy
act was cited as the factor with the greatest causal impact. Study 3
found that greater causal influence was perceived throughout a causal
chain when the act that engaged the chain was positive rather than
negative. Finally, Study 4 found that both traditional causal factors
(i.e., necessity and sufficiency) and culpable factors influenced
perceived causation.
Sabini, J., & Silver, M. (1998). In defense of shame. In J. Sabini and M. Silver, Emotion, character, and responsibility (pp. 81-103). New York: Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. (1993). Mechanisms of shame and guilt. In B. Williams, Shame and necessity (pp. 219-223). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Baumeister, R. F, Stillwell, A. M, & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 243-267.
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli,
C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral
agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71,
364-374.
This research examined the role of mechanisms of moral
disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Regulatory
self-sanctions can be selectively disengaged from detrimental conduct
by converting harmful acts to moral ones through linkage to worthy
purposes, obscuring personal causal agency by diffusion and
displacement of responsibility, misrepresenting or disregarding the
injurious effects inflicted on others, and vilifying the recipients of
maltreatment by blaming and dehumanizing them. The study examined the
structure and impact of moral disengagement on detrimental conduct and
the psychological processes through which it exerts its effects. Path
analyses reveal that moral disengagement fosters detrimental conduct
by reducing prosocialness and anticipatory self-censure and by
promoting cognitive and affective reactions conducive to
aggression. The structure of the paths of influence is very similar
for interpersonal aggression and delinquent conduct. Although the
various mechanisms of moral disengagement operate in concert, moral
reconstruals of harmful conduct by linking it to worthy purposes and
vilification of victims seem to contribute most heavily to engagement
in detrimental activities
The authors asked whether evidence could be found for
adaptive or maladaptive aspects of guilt and shame in 5-12-year-old
children (44 boys, 42 girls). Children completed semiprojective and
scenario based measures thought to assess shame, guilt, or both. Their
parents (N = 83) completed the Child Behavior Checklist to assess
child symptoms. Shame and projective guilt were related to symptoms;
they also were associated with self-blame and attempts to minimize
painful feelings. Scenario-based guilt was related to fewer symptoms
in boys but to greater symptoms in girls. This measure of guilt
reflected concerns with adhering to standards, expressing empathy, and
taking appropriate responsibility. Discussion focuses on possible
origins of differential symptom-emotion links in boys and girls as
well as measurement implications.
Williams, B. (1993). Autonomy and shame. In B. Williams, Shame and necessity (pp. 75-104). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wallace, R. J. (1994). Further emotional vicissitudes. In R. J. Wallace, Responsibility and the moral sentiments (Appendix 1, pp. 237-250). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 3, 193-209.
Ferguson, T J., Stegge, H., & Damhuis, I. (1991). Children's
understanding of guilt and shame. Child Development, 62,
827-839.
In Study 1, 24 Dutch children (aged 10 yrs 9 mo to 12 yrs
5 mo) answered questions about scenarios that should elicit feelings
of guilt and/or shame (moral transgressions and social blunders). In
Study 2, 26 Dutch children (aged 7 yrs 10 mo to 9 yrs 5 mo) completed
a sorting task to ascertain the features they associate with guilt and
shame. Feelings of guilt were aroused by moral norm violations. Guilt
feelings were also seen as involving an approach-avoidance conflict
with respect to the victim, self-criticism, remorse, desire to make
amends, and fear of punishment. Feelings of shame resulted from both
moral transgressions and social blunders. Younger Ss associated shame
with embarrassment, blushing, ridicule, and escape. Older Ss
additionally characterized shame as feeling stupid, being incapable of
doing things right, and not being able to look at others.
This is a complete book on the topic. Not meant as "light reading on
the side" but for those of you who are particularly interested in
these "self-conscious" moral sentiments.
(This chapter is not easily available, so there is no
master copy in the folder. If interested, you would have to order the
book via Interlibrary Loan and copy the chapter yourself.)
[the author] starts his discussion with the impact of
attributions of responsibility and blame on victims' stress
experiences / criticizes the undifferentiated use of the concept of
"blame" in the literature--"blame" being used both for attributions of
causality, or of responsibility, or of blameworthiness which
definitely have different meanings / voices doubts about the
assumption that self-blame as well as being blamed by others will add
to the stress imposed on victims / therefore, he developed a "blame
inoculation program" in order to enable victims to better avoid or
manage the stress resulting from self-blame or from being blamed by
others / this training program focuses on a clarification of the
concepts of causality, responsibility, and blame, and aims at the
insight that responsibility and blame worthiness should be applied
only to intentional actions which cannot be justified by adequate
reasons
Mendoza, R. J. (1996). Introduction to the topic of empathy.
Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University.
[only two pages;
stapled on top of the next paper:]
Mendoza, R. J. (1996). Excerpts from "Emotional" and "situational" inductions of empathy: Effects on interpersonal understanding and punitiveness. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Leith, K. P., & Baumeister, R. F. (1999). Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of interpersonal conflicts: Guilt-prone people are better at perspective taking. Journal of Personality, 66, 1-37.
Enright, R. D., Freedman, S., & Rique, J. (1998). The psychology of interpersonal forgiveness. In Enright, R. D., & North, J. (1998). Exploring forgiveness (pp. 46-62). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hoffman, M. L. (1994).The contribution of empathy to justice
and moral judgment. In B. Puka (Ed.), Reaching out: Caring,
altruism, and prosocial behavior. Moral development: A compendium
(Vol. 7., pp. 161-194). New York, NY: Garland.
Demonstrate the possible role of empathy in a
comprehensive moral theory / describe the scheme to pave the way for
[the author's] argument, ending with 5 empathy-based moral affects:
empathic distress, sympathetic distress, guilt, empathic anger, and
empathic injustice / discuss how these affects may contribute to
caring and justice principles, the role they may play in moral
judgment and decision making, and the problem of empathic bias and how
to reduce it / speculate about the stabilizing effect that moral
principles, as "hot cognitions," may have on empathy
Results of 2 experiments supported the proposal that
empathy-induced altruism can lead one to act in a way that violates
the moral principle of justice. In each experiment, participants were
asked to make an allocation decision that affected the welfare of
other individuals. Participants who were not induced to feel empathy
tended to act in accord with a principle of justice; participants who
were induced to feel empathy were significantly more likely to violate
this principle, allocating resources preferentially to the person for
whom empathy was felt. High-empathy participants who showed partiality
agreed with other participants in perceiving partiality to be less
fair and less moral (Experiment 1). Overall, results suggested that
empathy-induced altruism and the desire to uphold a moral principle of
justice are independent prosocial motives that sometimes cooperate but
sometimes conflict. Implications of this independence are
discussed.
Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, Regulation, and Moral
Development. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 665-697.
Here only the first part is directly relevant -- pp. 666-682.
Richardson, D. R, Green, L. R, & Lago, T. (1998). The relationship
between perspective-taking and nonaggressive responding in the face of
an attack. Journal of Personality, 66, 235-256.
Examined the extent to which perspective-taking enhances
nonaggressive responses in a situation where people typically make
aggressive responses. It also examined the relationship between
perspective-taking and response to interpersonal context. 130 Ss
participated in a reaction time (RT) task in which they could respond
either aggressively or nonaggressively in 2 different interpersonal
contexts (i.e., the target either increased or decreased provocation
during the interaction). As predicted, perspective-taking was related
to the inhibition of aggressive responding and the facilitation of
nonaggressive responding. In general, perspective-taking was
associated with less aggression, including relatively more positive
and fewer negative responses. This was especially the case in the
interpersonal context in which the target had increased provocation
across the trials of the task
Richardson, D., Hammock, G., Smith, S., & Gardner, W. (1994).
Empathy as a cognitive inhibitor of interpersonal aggression.
Aggressive Behavior, 20, 275-289.
Examined empathy, especially perspective taking, as a
potential inhibitor of interpersonal aggression in 189 university
students. Study 1 confirmed the hypothesis that empathy would be
associated with constructive and nonaggressive responses to
conflict. Study 2 examined the effects of perspective taking and
threat on aggressive responding. Ss' participation in a reaction time
(RT) task designed to measure aggression showed an inhibitory effect
of perspective taking on aggressive responding in moderately
threatening situations. Study 3 examined the effect of dispositional
perspective taking on verbal aggression in men and women. Threat was
manipulated in terms of the combination of provocation and S
gender. Perspective taking related to aggression inhibition under
conditions of moderate threat: high provocation for women, low
provocation for men. Findings support D. Zillmann's (see PA, Vol
76:7499) cognitive excitation model.
Empathic feelings arise when a person values another's
welfare and perceives the other to be in need. As a result, level of
empathic response can be used to infer how much one values the welfare
of a person in need. Four experiments were conducted to test these
ideas. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that a similarity manipulation led
to increased valuing of a similar person's welfare and, in turn, to
increased empathy when this person was in need. Experiments 3 and 4
revealed that direct manipulations of empathy (perspective-taking
instructions, or false physiological arousal feedback) led to
increased empathy and, in turn, to increased valuing of the welfare of
the person in need. Once induced, this valuing was a relatively stable
disposition; it remained even after empathy had declined.
Nietzsche, F. (1967/1886). Zur Genealogie der Moral [On the genealogy of morality] (Transl. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale). New York: Vintage Books.
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings: A theory of
normative judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Further Reading:
Nietzsche, F. (1998/XXXX). Jenseits von Gut und Böse [Beyond good and evil: Prelude to a philosophy of the future] (Translated and edited by Marion Faber). New York: Oxford University Press. (especially §260).
Krebs, D. L. (1998). The evolution of moral behaviors. In
C. Crawford, and D. L. Krebs (Eds.), Handbook of evolutionary
psychology: Ideas, issues, and applications (pp. 337-368). Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Illustrates how evolutionary theory can help explain
moral behaviors. There are 3 main models of morality in psychology:
psychoanalytic, social learning, and cognitive-developmental. The
author argues that each of these models neglects important aspects of
morality and emphasizes particular aspects at the expense of
others. He posits that evolutionary theory is equipped to integrate
psychological approaches to morality, resolve many of their
differences, and steer the study of morality in new, more productive
directions. Specific topics addressed include: evolution of respect
for authority; evolution of justice; evolution of care; evolution of
altruism; can moral behaviors evolve through group selection;
interaction among mechanisms of selection; evolution of cheating; and
the psychological models of morality revisited.
Wright, Robert. The Moral Animal: the New Science of Evolutionary Psychology. Random House, 1994.