Another issue for discussion is: When and how does this conceptual framework develop in children?

According to Wellman et al., domain-specific conceptual systems develop by 5 years of age. Children differentially and appropriately use biological, physical, and psychological explanations for different types of behavior.

According to Kalish, children are able to distinguish between physical and psychological constraints on behavior, understanding that psychological constraints can be overcome by intentions, while physical constraints cannot.

In sum, these different lines of research have focused on different reasoning systems: Malle makes a distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior explanations, whereas Wellman et al. distinguish between biological, physical, and psychological explanations.

Questions:

1. In what ways do these different reasoning systems relate?

2. Are the different reasoning systems defined by Malle and Wellman et al. actually the same? Or do they capture different explanatory systems?

3. If they are different systems, what is their a) developmental sequence and b) temporal sequence in behavior explanation?

4. Are these different systems mutually exclusive?

5. What defines a reasoning system?

General Discussion:

Q1 How do we distinguish reasons from causes when there is a mismatch between the intention and the outcome?

A1 In these cases, the reason that led to the original intention becomes the cause for the unintended outcome.

When a normally unintentional behavior (e.g., coughing) is explained by a reason (e.g., she doesn't want to go to school today), the behavior is then judged as intentional.

Q2 Can we define reasons and causes independently from intentions/intentionality?

A2 Not really.

Causes and reasons could be the same mental states, but they function in different ways. Children may understand the difference between causes and reasons, but may not understand that both can be mental states.

Intellectual offering: Maybe children start out with a distinction between internal and external causes of behavior. This may explain why children struggle with biological explanations--these are internal, but not intentional, causes of behavior.

As researchers, it's important to realize that the reasoning systems we are looking for may influence the coding schemes we devise.

After the break......

We understand that people's beliefs and desires lead to intentions, but how do we figure out the content of these beliefs and desires?

According to Goldman, people don't use "laws" to understand behavior (theory theory), but instead use introspection and simulation to make 1st and 3rd person behavior attributions, respectively.

Maybe simulation is useful in determining the content of others' mental states, whereas the theory theory may provide a framework for knowing when to attribute mental states and how mental states differ.

Q3 Why can't simulation theory (ST) and theory theory (TT) get along?

A3 Maybe they explain different things. TT has its strength in explaining conceptual change in development, whereas ST concerns itself with on-line use.

Interesting side note: Perhaps theory of mind should be considered as analogous to syntax in language as opposed to scientific theory.

Where ST and TT disagree: ST says that you have privileged access to your own beliefs and desires. They "feel different". ST argues that your own experience is extremely important in understanding the mental states of others. TT, on the other hand, argues that you can't understand your subjective experience without a conceptual framework.

Maybe there are different kinds of simulation: 1st person point of reference --> what would I do? vs. 3rd person point of reference --> what would she do? (knowing what I know about her?). The use of these different types of simulation may depend on who you are trying to simulate (e.g., friend vs. stranger).

Young children are typically poor simulators because they tend to respond egocentrically. As they get older, they become better at simulating other people's experiences (though we never become perfect simulators).

There may be certain experiences that are easier or harder to simulate (e.g., taste, emotions).

Perspective taking is a form of simulation, but simulation doesn't require perspective taking, because it can occur on a more automatic level (e.g., responding to someone who is in pain). In these more automatic cases, are we simulating or is it just a generalizing response?