Intentionality<br>
Graduate Seminar - Fall 1997<br>
Baldwin, Malle, Moses<br>
University of Oregon<p>
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<center><h1>Oct 8 Intentionality and Philosophy</h1></center>
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<h2>Things we seem to agree on:</h2>
<ul>
<li>A philosophical analysis of the "pure" concept of intentionality
need not lead to the same results as an exploration of how ordinary
people (including children) use the concept.  Both approaches may be
fruitful, but it is important to keep in mind which approach one takes
at any point of the argument.<p>

<li>Not all behaviors are intentional (see Dretske).  The notion of
intentional behaviors can be contrasted with accidental as well as
with unintentional behaviors.  What exact criteria we have to
distinguish between these is as yet unclear. <p>

<li>An intentional action seems to require the agent to have a mental
state of an intention, which seems different from a desire.  The exact
differences are yet to be explored. <p>

<li>Several shades of intentions were discussed.  Intentions can be
plans (also called future or prior intentions); these are based on
often quite elaborate reasoning (deliberating). This deliberation
often consists of resolving conflicts among various desires (see
Searle) with the help of beliefs, and it may involve going against
one's more immediate desires, considering important long-range
goals. <p>

<li>Not all intentional actions seem to have elaborate prior plans.
Some intentional actions are spontaneous.  One possibility is that
such actions, too, have prior intentions-but a split second before the
action's performance begins.  Another possibility is that there is
another type of intention-intentions in action. These exist while the
action is being performed and represent (a la Searle) the agent's mind
state "I am intending to do what I am currently doing." <p>

<li>In general, at least one belief and one desires, but more
realistically, a network of many beliefs and desires provides the
reasons for intending to do something.  People then explain
intentional actions by citing one or more of those reasons. <p>
</ul>

<h2>Unresolved issues:</h2>
<ul>
<li>What are the criteria for ascribing intentionality?  Do people
(and should they) ascribe intentionality to children? Regardless of
age?  From a certain age on?  Is it the same concept of intentionality
that is ascribed to adults?  Or to animals?   Is it a weaker concept?
What requirements would be dropped? <p>

<li>What exactly is the difference between desires and intentions? <p>

<li>Is an intention a commitment to act in the future (see Moya)? <p>

<li>What is the relation between prior intentions and intentions in
action? <p>

<li>If spontaneous actions have split-second prior intentions or no
prior intentions, how can we reconcile this fact with the assumption
that the agent performed the action for reasons (beliefs, desires)?
Can there be unconscious reasons? Or can reasons combine to form an
immediate intention without active deliberation?<p>
</ul>