

*Islamic Reform and Modernity in South Asia*¹

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¹ This article draws on attempts to consider aspects of Islamic reform and modernity over the past twenty years. See: 'Secularization, Weber, and Islam' first published in Wolfgang Schluchter ed., *Max Webers Sicht des Islams. Interpretation und Kritik* (Frankfurt, 1985), and republished in slightly amended form in Toby E. Huff & Wolfgang Schluchter eds., *Max Weber and Islam* (New Brunswick NJ, 1999), pp. 231-46; 'Religious Change and the Self in Muslim South Asia since 1800', *South Asia*, XX, 1, 1997, pp. 1-15; 'Islam and the Impact of Print in South Asia', in F. Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia* (Delhi, 2000), pp. 66-104; 'Other-Worldly and This-Worldly Islam and the Islamic Revival', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd series, 14, 1, April 2004, pp. 47-58.

From the beginning of the Islamic era Muslim societies have experienced periods of renewal (*tajdid*). Since the eighteenth century Muslim societies across the world have been subject to a prolonged and increasingly deeply felt process of renewal. This has been expressed in different ways in different contexts. Amongst political elites with immediate concerns to answer the challenges of the West, it has meant attempts to reshape Islamic knowledge and institutions in the light of Western models, a process described as Islamic modernism. Amongst `ulama and sufis, whose social base might lie in urban, commercial or tribal communities, it has meant `the reorganisation of communities... [or] the reform of individual behavior in terms of fundamental religious principles, a development known as reformism.² These processes have been expressed in movements as different as the Iranian constitutional revolution, the jihads of West Africa, and the great drives to spread reformed Islamic knowledge in India and Indonesia. In the second half of the twentieth century the process of renewal mutated to develop a new strand, which claimed that revelation had the right to control all human experience and that state power must be sought to achieve this end. This is known to many as Islamic fundamentalism, but is usually better understood as Islamism. For the majority of Muslims today, Islamic renewal in some shape or other has helped to mould the inner and outer realities of their lives.

This great movement of religious change in the Muslim world coincided with a Western engagement with that world of growing intensity. It should be clear, of course, that the movement of reform precedes the Western presence, its roots lying deep in the Islamic past, and being represented classically in the eighteenth century by the teaching of Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab in Arabia and Shah Wali Allah in India. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the nineteenth century

²Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 2002), p. 457.

Western imperial powers surged across the Muslim world so that by 1920 only Central Arabia, the Yemen, Anatolia, Afghanistan and Iran were free from formal Western control. The process of decolonisation which spanned the period from the mid-twentieth century to the 1990s made little difference. The end of formal political control, more often than not, left elites in Muslim societies with strong external allegiances which, for a period, were made to serve the Cold War rivalries of the Great Powers, and throughout played their part in submitting their societies, to a greater or less extent, to the influence of global economic forces. Thus, over two hundred years, the old ways of getting and spending of nomadic and agrarian societies were supplanted by those of industrialising ones, often driven by global capitalism. The old social hierarchies, which brought order to many a locality gave way to new classes. The old knowledge, hallowed from the Islamic past, was challenged by new knowledge from what often seemed to be a Godless West. Powerful material symbols of these changes were the new Western-style cities, with broad boulevards, apartment blocks and shopping streets, with banks and cinemas and perhaps an Opera House, which grew up alongside the old Islamic cities, often walled cities with a Sultan's palace, a Friday Mosque, a Grand Bazaar, sinuous lanes and gated quarters.

It was in this context of change, of the increasingly rapid erosion of old ways and cherished values, that the process of renewal took place. If the drive came from the inner compulsion of Muslims to make their faith live to the best possible effect, it was shaped in constant interaction with the changing material world in which it existed. Moreover, while Islamic reform often defined itself, in part at least, through its opposition to Western cultural and political hegemony, at the same time it made use, where appropriate, of Western knowledge and technology to drive forward its purposes and came to be fashioned in part by its interaction with it..

There were, associated with the workings of Islamic reform in these circumstances, changes which, taking into account the Western experience and noting the trajectories of Western social science, might be associated with modernity - admittedly always a relative concept. They were: the ending of the total authority of the past as Muslims sought new ways of making revelation and tradition relevant to the present; the new emphasis on human will as Muslims realised that in a world without political power it is only through their will that they could create an Islamic society on earth; the transformation of the self, achieved through willed activity, leading to self-reflectiveness, self-affirmation and growing individualism; the rationalisation of Islam from scripturalism through to its formation into an ideology; and finally a process of secularisation involving a disenchantment of the world which arguably has been followed by a `re-enchantment=.

These changes will be considered primarily in the context of the working of Islamic reform in South Asia. The focus will be on those in the tradition of Shah Wali Allah; some mention will be made of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his modernist strand, but the main concern will be with the Deoband School, the Ahl-i Hadith, the Ahl-i Qur=an and the Tablighi Jama`at. Attention will be paid to the evolution of reform into the Islamism of Mawlana Mawdudi=s Jama`at-i Islami. Moreover, the insights of that extraordinarily perceptive poet-philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, who was admired by Muslims as different as Mawdudi, Sayyid Abul`Ali Hasan Nadwi and Ayat Allah Khumayni, will be kept firmly in view. This is by no means a comprehensive list of those figures engaged in reform more generally; significant individuals such as Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, Inayat Allah Mashriqi, Shibli Nu`mani and the remarkable Abul Kalam Azad are left out. Particular attention is paid to those in the Wali Allah tradition, however, because they embrace a religious change, aspects of a `protestant reformation=perhaps, which arguably helped to drive a broader set of changes in the

Muslim world that we might associate with modernity. This position is adopted on the grounds that there is value in taking a Weberian perspective, while at the same time being prepared to recognise its limitations..

Let us identify the key aspects of reform in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India. First, it is crucial to remember the colonial context. British rule brutally removed much of the financial and institutional support for Islamic society. This helped to create a general anxiety about how a Muslim society might be sustained without power. Specifically, it meant that `ulama, who had once received land grants and jobs in government, now turned to society at large to sustain them in their role. They would survive only if they provided services society wanted.

The theme of emphasising *tawhid* (the unity of God) and condemning *shirk* (actions which compromised the unity of God) ran through all the movements of the time. There was a running attack on all sufi customs which, following Ibn `Arabi, suggested that God might be immanent rather than purely transcendent, which was expressed most frequently and forcibly in attacks on any practices which suggested that sufi saints might be able to intercede for man with God. At their most extreme these attacks aimed to wipe out sufism altogether.³ By the same token, there were assaults on indigenous customs which had come to be incorporated into Islamic practice, for instance, following the Hindu custom of not marrying widows.

A major concern of all reformers was to review the knowledge handed down from the past

³ It should be noted, however, that some sufis adjusted their practices not just to take account of reform but also to embrace its transformative processes. Nile Green, 'The Politics of Meditation in Colonial South Asia' in this volume, pp. 00-00 is a good example of the former. The classic study of reform led by a sufi and his Naqshbandi followers is: Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: the Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (New York, 1989).

to see what should be used to enable them to operate effectively in the present. At one level, that of the Deoband School, it meant no more than a shift in emphasis in the madrasa curriculum from theology and philosophy, and the triumphs of medieval Persian scholarship, to the Qur=an and Hadith and those subjects which made these central messages of Islam socially useful. `Ulama in this tradition firmly followed the precedent of medieval scholarship in these fields, ie. observed *taqlid*. At another more exacting level, `ulama circumvented medieval scholarship and the schools of law to exercise *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), on the Qur=an and Hadith, if they were Ahl-i Hadith, or on just the Qur=an, if they were Ahl-i Qur=an. As the stream of reform flowed into ever more challenging contexts from an Islamic point of view, the demand for *ijtihad* became even stronger. It was used, after the mode of the Ahl-i Hadith, by both Islamic modernists and Mawdudi=s Islamists.

A major concern of all movements was to spread knowledge of their reforming message as widely as possible. All to a greater or lesser extent founded madrasas or other educational institutions. The Deoband madrasa, founded in 1867, and supported by public subscription alone was the model. By 1967 it claimed to have founded over 8,000 madrasas in its image. From these institutions came the teachers and scholars who provided the knowledge and the guidance to enable Muslim society not just to survive but also to entrench itself further. One important development at Deoband was the establishment of a *Dar al-Ifta* ready to receive questions and to issue *fatawa* all over India. A key development in supporting this self-sustaining community of Muslims was the introduction of print and the translation of the Qur=an and large numbers of important texts into the regional languages of India. The reforming `ulama were amongst the very first to use the printing press; rightly they saw it as the means to fashion and to consolidate their constituency outside the

bounds of colonial rule.⁴ Reform, moreover, reached beyond the world of the literate. From the 1920s, it was carried forward by the Tabligh-i Jama`at, or preaching society, in which the devout set aside a period each year to work in teams which transmitted the reforming message orally to small town and village communities.⁵ The Tabligh-i Jama`at is said now to be the most widely followed society in the Muslim world. Thus, the reformers created a broad constituency for reform in Indo-Muslim society at large, and amongst the literate a growing body of Muslims who, without the constraints of a madrasa education, reflect upon the sources of their faith and interpret them for themselves.

⁴ Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1920* (Princeton, 1982), pp. 46-260.

⁵ Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., *Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama`at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal* (London, 2000); Yoginder Singh Sikand, *The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama`at (1920-2000): A Cross-Country Comparative Study* (Hyderabad, 2002).

The impact of the growing availability of knowledge of how to be a Muslim was only enhanced by the way in which the reforming movement made it clear that there was no intercession for man with God. Muslims were personally responsible for the way in which they put His guidance to them into practice on earth. Thus, the leading Deobandi reformer, Ashraf`Ali Thanwi, in his guide for women (but also men) in the tradition, *Bihishti Zewar* (The Jewels of Paradise), which is said to be the most widely published Muslim publication on the subcontinent after the Qur`an, paints a horrific picture of the Day of Judgement and the fate that will befall those who have not striven hard enough to follow God`s guidance. To help believers avoid this fate, he instructs them in regular self-examination, morning and evening, to ensure purity of intentions and to avoid wrongdoing.⁶ Thus, those in the Deobandi way, which was at the heart of India`s reforming movement, were made powerfully conscious that they must act to sustain Islamic society on earth, if they were to be saved.

⁶ This is done in book seven titled: `On Comportment and Character, Reward and Punishment. Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Perfecting Women: Maulana Ashraf `Ali Thanawi`s Bihishti Zewar: A Partial Translation with Commentary* (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 177-239.

Emphasis on personal responsibility before God, and on the need to act on earth to achieve salvation, ran through the many manifestations of reform in India.⁷ It was a central issue for Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), who hailed from the reforming tradition but, in his development of the principles of Islamic modernism, travelled far beyond it: 'I regard it as my duty to do all I can, right or wrong, he said of his striving to realise his faith on earth, 'to defend my religion and to show the people the true, shining countenance of Islam. This is what my conscience dictates and unless I do its bidding, I am a sinner before God.'⁸ This sense of personal responsibility was, if anything, even more enhanced in Muhammad Ilyas (d. 1944), the founder of the Tablighi Jama'at. He was oppressed by fear of Judgement and by whether he was doing enough to meet God's high standards. 'I find no comparison between my anxiety, my effort and my voice, he wrote, and the responsibility of Tabligh God has placed upon my shoulders. If he shows mercy, He is forgiving, merciful, and if He does justice, there is no escape for me from the consequences of my guilt.'⁹ Barbara Metcalf has cast doubt on the levels of anxiety amongst Islamic reformers.¹⁰ But anxiety does seem to be abundantly

⁷ Haniffa emphasises the indissoluble connection between piety and social action. Farzana Haniffa, 'Believing Women: Piety and Power amongst Muslim Women in Contemporary Sri Lanka', in this volume pp. 0-00.

⁸ Speech of Sayyid Ahmad Khan quote in Altaf Husain Hali, *Hayat-i-Javid*, K.H. Qadiri & David J. Matthews trans., (Delhi, 1979), p. 172.

⁹ S. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Life and Mission of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas*, Mohammad Asif Kidwai trans., (Lucknow, 1979), p. 108; Huq emphasises the seriousness with which a contemporary women's Islamic student organisation in Bangladesh takes the Day of Judgement. Maimuna Huq, 'Reading the Qur'an in Bangladesh: The Politics of Belief Among Islamist Women', in this volume pp. 00-00..

¹⁰ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Weber and Islamic Reform* in Huff & Schluchter eds., *Weber*, pp. 217-29.

present amongst its leaders, at least.¹¹ It is reflected, moreover, into life in general. In his autobiography, the nephew of Ilyas, Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi, shows himself to be constantly aware of time, concerned about punctuality, worried about wasting resources (on marriages for instance), punctilious in all money matters and delights in the story of a colleague who kept a note of the minutes taken up by visitors when he was teaching in the madrasa so that he could repay an appropriate amount from his salary at the end of the month. His is witness to a life lived anxiously in the sight of God.¹²

¹¹ Robinson, 'Religious Change', pp. 108-10; Metcalf, *Deoband*, p. 269.

¹² Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi, *Aap Beeti: Autobiography*, 2 vols (Delhi, 1993).

The sense of personal responsibility and the centrality of action on earth to the Muslim life was expressed most completely by that sensitive and remarkable thinker, Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938). For Iqbal, man was chosen by God, but equally free to choose whether he followed God's guidance or not. Man realised himself in the creative work of shaping and re-shaping the world. The reality of the individual was expressed most explicitly in action. 'The final act', he declares in the closing sentences of his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 'is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego and sharpens his will into creative assurance that the world is not just something to be seen and known through concepts, but to be made and remade by continuous action.'¹³ Man was the prime mover in God's creation. As the prime mover, man was God's representative on earth, his vice-regent, the *Khilafat Allah*. Thus, Iqbal draws the Qur'anic reference to Adam as his vice-regent, or successor, on earth, which had been much discussed by medieval commentators on the Qur'an, and not least among them, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 'Arabi, into the modern politico-Islamic discourse of South Asia. In doing so, he both emphasises the enormous responsibility of each individual human being in the trust he/she has received from God and encapsulates that relationship in the concept of the caliphate of each

¹³ M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1954), p. 154.

individual human being.¹⁴ The idea was further taken by Mawlana Mawdudi who added his considerable weight to its acceptance.¹⁵ Indeed, the idea is present in much of the movement of reform in the Shia as well as the Sunni world.¹⁶

¹⁴ For a discussion of this see Robinson, 'Other-Worldly and This-Worldly Islam', p. 54 and note 22.

¹⁵ S.A.A. Maudoodi, *Fundamentals of Islam* (Delhi, 1979), p. xviii, and for a disquisition on the role of man as God's trustee on earth see pp. 29-30.

¹⁶ Robinson, 'Other-Worldly and This-Worldly Islam', pp. 54-56.

Taken together these key aspects of reform come close to that mix of aspects of `protestantism= which Eisenstadt argued some years ago gave it transformative potential. They were: its `strong combination of Athis-worldliness@ and transcendentalism=, its `strong emphasis on individual activism and responsibility=, and `the direct relationship of the individual to the sacred and the sacred tradition=, which in South Asia becomes stronger the closer reform moves into the modes of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Islamists.¹⁷

Let us turn to those new facets of Muslim life and thought which seem to spring, in part at least, from the religious changes of reform and represent aspects of what we might associate with modernity.

The assault on the authority of the past

¹⁷ S.N. Eisenstadt `The Protestant Ethic Thesis in an Analytical and Comparative Framework= in S.N. Eisenstadt ed., *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A comparative view* (New York, 1974 check), p. 10

There is the assault on the authority of the past. While never forgetting that Islam expresses itself in different ways in different contexts, we may assert that a pervasive feature of Muslim societies has been what Bill Graham has termed the *isnad* paradigm.¹⁸ At the heart of this, of course, is the system for the transmission of Hadith in which the authority of a tradition lies in the *isnad* or chain of individual transmitters from the Prophet, or his companions, down to the most recent receiver. The defining elements of the paradigm are that authority is derived from linkage to the origins of the tradition through an unbroken chain of personal transmission. Central is the belief that truth does not reside in documents, however authentic, ancient, or well-preserved, but in authentic human beings and their personal connections with one another. Authoritative transmission of knowledge through time was by people both learned and righteous, the person-to-person transmission of the golden chain of sincere Muslims. This was a model which expanded to embrace sufis, the Shia, and the descendants of the Prophet in general. It was also a model which applied to all forms of learning. So when a pupil had finally demonstrated his mastery, say, of Suyuti's *Jalalayn* he would be given an *ijaza* or permission to teach which would have all the names of those who had transmitted the book going back to Suyuti himself.¹⁹ Should he wish, he could consult the *tazkirahs*, or collective biographies, and see how many like him had received the central messages of Islamic knowledge from their teachers and transmitted it to their pupils. It was thus that authoritative knowledge was passed to the present.

Reform assaulted this authority from the past in two main ways. First, there was the jettisoning by the reformers of much of the medieval scholarship of the Islamic world. If the

¹⁸ William A. Graham, 'Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, XVIII, 3, Winter 1993, pp. 495-522.

Deobandis cut out much of the great persianate traditions of scholarship in *ma`qulat*, the rational sciences, the Ahl-i Hadith, the Ahl-i Qur=an, the modernists and the Islamists cut out the great traditions of Islamic scholarship altogether. In their concern to make contact with the Qur=an and Hadith afresh, in making them relevant to the modern world, they cast aside a thousand years of intellectual effort in fashioning a Muslim society, and the authority that came with direct connection to that effort.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 511-22.

Second, there was reform=s vigorous support for the adoption of print. From the very beginning print was the weapon of reform. Amongst the first printed works in Urdu were two tracts of the 1820s, the *Sirat al-Mustaqim* and the *Taqwiyat al-Iman* of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (d. 1831), who led a jihad on the Northwest Frontier. During the nineteenth century religious titles formed the largest category of Urdu books. The town of Deoband was renowned for the numbers of its bookshops. Certainly, reformers insisted that readers should only consult religious books in the company of an `alim, a learned man, so that the possibility of proper understanding and authoritative transmission could be maintained. But, in practice anyone could now read the sources and, as they came to be translated into Indian languages, read the great textbooks of the past and decide, without the benefit of a great sheaf of *ijazas*, what they meant for Islam in the present.²⁰

It is difficult for us, so profoundly moulded by our `modern= experience, to grasp the psychological impact, indeed the pain, of jettisoning so much of the past, the especial connectedness this gave to the work of fashioning the community through time, and the authority that came with it. This, moreover, was just one amongst a series of challenges to Muslim civilisational authority at the time, to be seen alongside that of Western science to theology, Western biomedicine to Unani Tibb, that of Western literary forms to Muslim ones, that of Western manufactured goods to the output of Muslim craftsmen, and that of Western powers to remnants of Muslim might. Arguably, all was brought to a head in the outpouring of emotion which accompanied the ending of the Turkish Khilafat between 1919 and 1923, the breaking symbolically of the continuous chain of leadership of the Muslim community back to the Prophet, an event which resonated at a deep psychological level. All was summed up by the poet, Akbar Ilahabadi:

²⁰ Robinson, `Islam and the Impact of Print=, pp. 80-1.

In the outcome the revolution was not quite so complete as Akbar suggests. The old style of authority rooted in connectedness to the past has remained in the `ulama of the Deobandi tradition, as in those of the followers of Ahmad Rida Khan Barelwi (d. 1921). But the breaking of the continuous link with the past has enabled new forms of religious authority to emerge, an authority which could be made and remade in each generation, and make use of the new resources of the times - a very modern kind of authority. Arguably, Mawlana Mawdudi was representative of this new form. He had been educated outside the madrasa system and vigorously attacked the `ulama for their attachment to old forms of authority. Indeed, his only claim to authority derived from Islamic tradition was his assertion that he was a *mujaddid*, a renewer of the faith, in the mould of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), or Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624). Otherwise, Mawdudi's authority was derived from the following: his character - a man of principle, self-reliant, dedicated and courageous, quite unmoved when condemned to death by the Pakistani authorities in 1953; his style - his aristocratic manners and his beautiful Urdu, deploying reason rather than rhetoric; and his life in which he defined himself in opposition to traditional authority - 'I recognize no king or ruler above me', he declared, 'nor do I bow before any government; nor do I view any law as binding on me ... nor do I accept any tradition or custom.'²² Thus, the reformers, the Deobandis apart, drove a coach and horses through the old authority resting on a connectedness to a `sacred' past and created new forms, future-oriented forms, which could be regularly remoulded with the materials then available.

²² Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi & the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York,

The new emphasis on human will

The second outcome of reformism was the new emphasis on human will. In the absence of Muslim power it was the will of each individual Muslim which was to fashion an Islamic society. Knowledge of the central messages of the faith was made accessible and widely spread, and it was the individual human conscience, working with this knowledge, which now had sole responsibility to ensure rightly-guided behaviour. Thus reformed Islam was a willed faith, a `protestant= faith, a faith of conscience and conviction.

1996), p. 138; for a general discussion of Mawdudi's authority, pp. 126-38.

In the reformed world the will of women was emphasised no less than that of men. Indeed, under colonial rule, the responsibility for fashioning a Muslim society fell particularly heavily on women. As non-Muslims dominated public space, women moved from their earlier position of being threats to the proper conduct of Muslim society to being the mistresses of private Islamic space, key transmitters of Islamic values and symbols of Muslim identity. It was for this reason that Ashraf `Ali Thanwi wrote *Bihishti Zewar* for women so that with the learning of a `mawlwi=, as he put it, they could play their parts in asserting *tawhid* and in fashioning an Islamic society.²³ It was for this reason, too, that Mawdudi insisted that women should acquire the same level of Islamic knowledge as men, and examine their consciences in the same way. This said, their task was to be the rulers of domestic space, sealed off from all those elements of *kufir* which polluted public space. `The harim=, he declared, `is the strongest fortress of Islamic civilization, which was built for the reasons that, if it [that civilization] ever suffered a reverse it [that civilization] may then take refuge in it.²⁴

²³ Metcalf, *Perfecting Women*, pp. 1-38.

²⁴ Cited in Faisal Fatehali Devji, `Gender and the Politics of Space: The Movement of Women=s Reform, 1857-1900,=, in Z. Hasan ed., *Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and the State* (New Delhi, 1994), pp. 35-6.

The new emphasis on human will heightened ideas of human instrumentality in the world. Indeed, it runs through all the manifestations of reform, often laced with a sense of urgency. The very life of Sayyid Ahmad Khan is testament to his belief that he, as an individual, must take action for the good of the community and of Islam.²⁵ Reformers from Ashraf`Ali Thanwi to Mawdudi emphasised that if a man knew what he should do, he must do it. Knowing meant doing. They were depicted as terrified by the thought that they might not be doing enough to be saved. Thus, Hasan Ahmad Madani, Principal of Deoband in the mid-twentieth century, would weep at the thought of his shortcomings. And, of course, no one laid as much emphasis on the Muslim as a man of action as Iqbal. Man as the prime mover in God's creation would by his repeated effort bring the world closer and closer to being a Qur=anic society. Thus, the reforming vision empowered Muslims on earth.²⁶ Thus, too, that most sensitive observer, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, in his *Islam in Modern History* (1957) referred to the extraordinary energy which had coursed through the Muslim world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, talking of`dynamism, the appreciation of activity for its own

²⁵ Hali, *Hayat-i-Javed*; C.F.I Graham, *the Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, K.C.S.I* , new and rev.ed., (London, 1909)

²⁶ Robinson, `Religious Change=, p. 9.

sake, and at a level of feeling a stirring of intense, even violent, emotionalism...²⁷

²⁷ W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957), p. 89. In harmony with Smith's insight, Haniffa emphasises how the women's piety movement in Sri Lanka has made its Muslims into 'a highly energized force of some magnitude within Sri Lanka's polity.' Haniffa, 'Believing Women', p. 00.

Women, too, have felt empowered although almost invariably it has been at the cost of enduring the tensions generated between their desire and capacity to act, on the one hand, and the demands of patriarchy and the symbolic requirements of community on the other. Historically, these tensions have been most acute amongst women from well-off families, but as time has gone on they should, in all likelihood, have become more widely spread. In his recent book, Yoginder Sikand has surveyed some of the women's madrasas which have grown up in India since independence. They range from madrasas in the Deobandi tradition through those of the Jama'ati Islami to those of the Mujahids, an Ahl-i Hadith-style group in Kerala. The outcomes were different in different reforming traditions and environments. Deobandi women's madrasas in north and central India, while insisting on strict purdah and patriarchal control, do enable women to become both teachers in girls madrasas in India and abroad and to set up their own madrasas.²⁸ In the case of the less conservative Jama'at-i Islami madrasas, girls study traditional and modern subjects, including English. The aim is that they should become religious authorities in their own right as well as teachers, founders of madrasas, or even practitioners of Unani medicine.²⁹ In the Mujahid madrasas of Kerala the empowerment of women has gone much further. The senior Mujahid leader, `Abd al-Qadir, made it clear that women could be the teachers of men. In fact Mujahid women work outside the home alongside men, including being elected to local councils, the main restriction being that they should not be left alone with a man. `Islam=, declared Zohra Bi, a leading figure in Mujahid education, `is wrongly thought of as a religion of women's oppression. Through our work in the college we want to show that Islam actually empowers Muslim women to work for the community at

²⁸ Yoginder Sikand, *Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India* (New Delhi, 2005), p.218-21.

large.³⁰

Transformation of the Self

A third outcome of reformism was a crucial transformation of the self

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-22.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

which, under the guidance of Charles Taylor and others, we have come to associate with modernity. This transformation involves in part an inward turn, the growth of self-consciousness and reflectiveness which Taylor argues is an important part of the constitution of the modern self³¹ and in part the affirmation of ordinary life which Taylor asserts 'although not uncontested and frequently appearing in secularized form, has become one of the most powerful ideas in modern civilization.'³²

We have noted that self-examination was a key aspect of Islamic reform; a willed Islam had to be a self-conscious one. This stimulated an inward turn and the growth of a reflective habit. Muslims had to ask themselves regularly if they had done all in their power to submit to God and to carry out His will in the world. In book seven of *Bihishti Zewar* Ashraf 'Ali Thanwi has a charming way of illustrating the process of regular self-examination to ensure purity of intention and avoidance of wrongdoing. He suggests to the believer that she sets aside a little time in the morning and the evening to speak to her lower self, her *nafs*, as follows:

O Self, you must recognize that in this world you are like a trader. Your stock-in-trade is your life. Its profit is to acquire well-being for ever, that is, salvation in the afterlife. This is indeed a profit! If you waste your life and do not gain your salvation, you suffer losses that reach to your stock-in-trade. That stock-in-trade is so precious that each hour - indeed, each breath - is

³¹ Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 111.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

valuable beyond limit.

O Self, recognize God's kindness that death has not yet come.

O Self, do not fall into the deception that Almighty God will surely forgive you.³³

³³ Metcalf, *Perfecting Women*, p. 234; Haniffa, 'Believing Women' and Huq 'Reading the Qur'an' in this volume are both excellent studies of projects designed to construct a new Islamic selfhood amongst women..

This theme of self-consciousness and self-examination is to be found in many religious thinkers of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whether we look at Muhammad Ilyas and Mawdudi or Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal. In Reformation Europe the process was accompanied by the emergence of the spiritual diary.³⁴ Something similar, though not directly comparable, exists from the India of Islamic reform. There is, for instance, Mawlana Mahomed Ali's semi-spiritual *My Life a Fragment*, which was written while he was interned during World War One,³⁵ or Dr Syed Mahmud's record of his spiritual reflections while in jail after the non-cooperation movement.

³⁶There is also a great deal of correspondence with sufis, which often contains processes of self-examination. With such evidence for the reflective habit, alongside the widespread exhortation to examine the self, it is arguable that the development of Islamic reform helped to open up an interior landscape. Whereas in the past the reflective believer, the mystic, might have meditated on the signs of God, the new type of reflective believer reflected on the self and the shortcomings of the self. Now the inner landscape became a crucial site where the battle of the pious for the good took place. Doubtless, there had been Muslims in the past, in particular times and in particular contexts, for whom this had been so. Who can forget the anguished reflections of that great eleventh-century scholar, al-Ghazali, in his autobiography, *The Deliverance from Error*?³⁷ Nevertheless, the importance of Islamic reform was that self-consciousness and self-examination were encouraged to

³⁴ See, for instance, Tom Webster, 'Writing to Redundancy: Approaches to Spiritual Journals and Early Modern Spirituality', *The Historical Journal*, 31, 1, 1996, pp. 35-6.

³⁶ Mohamed Ali, Afzal Iqbal ed., *My Life: A Fragment: An Autobiographical Sketch* (Lahore, 1942). Syed Mahmud's spiritual reflections may be found in the Farangi Mahall Papers, Karachi.

³⁷ W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali* (Oxford, 1994).

become widespread. Moreover, once the window on the inner landscape had been thrown open by reform, it could stay open for purely secular purposes.³⁸

³⁸ Robinson, 'Religious change', pp. 24-5.

With the inward turn, there also came the affirmation of the things of the self, the ordinary things of daily life. We can see this process at work in the new trends which emerge in the biographies of the Prophet, whose number increase greatly in the twentieth century. Increasingly, Muhammad is depicted not as the 'Perfect Man' of the sufi tradition, but as the perfect person. Less attention, as Cantwell Smith has pointed out, is given to his intelligence, political sagacity and capacity to harness the new social forces in his society and much more to his qualities as a good middle-class family man: his sense of duty and his loving nature, and his qualities as a good citizen, his consideration for others and in particular those who are less fortunate.³⁹ The transition is also mirrored in changes which take place in biographical writing generally; the concern is less with what the individual might have contributed to Islamic civilisation and more on his life in his time and his human qualities. Even in the writings of the 'ulama it is possible to see them responding to the humanistic preferences of their times and depicting much more rounded lives to support their didactic purpose. Another dimension of this process was the growing discussion of family and domestic issues, and particularly women, in public space. This discourse was begun by men such as Nazir Ahmad, Hali and Mumtaz 'Ali in the late-nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century it was increasingly taken up by women, and not least by the tens of women who aired their views in those remarkable journals, *Ismat* and *Tehzib un-Niswan*. All matters were discussed in public, from education, diet and dress to love marriages, divorce and sources of women's inferiority. The writing is often assertive in style, demanding that women be given respect. Alongside these developments, there came the rise of the short story and the novel, which indicated the new value being given to

³⁹ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (London, 1946), pp. 64-7. See also Amit Dey, 'The Image of the Prophet in Bengali Muslim Piety, 1850-1947' (PhD thesis, University of London, 1999).

understanding human character and the many ways of being human. The themes, often shocking in their day, which were taken up by leading practitioners such as Manto and Ismat Chughtai - family life, relationships, feelings, sex - indicate the new areas in which Muslims were finding meaning. Of course, not all of these striking changes can, by any means, be laid at the door of Islamic reform; the influence of the West and developments in wider Indian society all had their part to play.

Nevertheless, such was the importance of these profoundly human matters that religious thinkers could not afford to ignore them.⁴⁰ 'The Islamic pattern of life', declared the religious philosopher Syed Vahiduddin, 'finds expression in religious and moral acts, in prayer, in love, in forgiveness, in seemingly mundane activities such as sex and domestic life, which should be radiated by the glow of the world beyond'⁴¹.

Rationalisation

Rationalisation of religious belief and practice was a further outcome of Islamic reform. In using the term, however, it is not given the full weight of the Weberian concept in which areas of modern life, from politics to religion to economics, become increasingly marked by the impact of

⁴⁰ Robinson, 'Religious change', pp. 10-11.

⁴¹ Christian W. Troll, ed., *Islam in India: Studies and Commentaries, 3: The Islamic Experience in Contemporary Thought* (New Delhi, 1986), p. 153.

science, technology and bureaucracy, though there is much of value in the rationalising trajectory.

By emphasising the development of a scriptural faith focussed on the Qur=an and Hadith, by attacking local custom around which many superstitions revolved, and by attacking all idea of intercession at sufi shrines, indeed at times by attacking sufism itself, Islamic reform rationalised belief and practice. Print was ever the handmaid as it made available the Qur=an in forms that believers could read, and as it produced guides which specifically stated what practices should be followed and what customs abandoned.⁴² Reforming `ulama used their organisations developed through the Deoband madrasa and its political wing, the Jamiyat al-`Ulama-i Hind, to put pressure on the colonial state to remove all elements of custom from the personal law. Thus between 1918 and 1920 reforming `ulama successfully pressed the state to remove Hindu custom which persisted in law governing Muslims in the Punjab, Memons in Western India and Mapillas in Kerala. Then from the 1920s the Jamiyat waged a campaign to impose *shari`a* law over custom in the personal law throughout India, a rationalising campaign crowned with success in the Shariat Application Act of 1937. Through this work of rationalisation, which began to reorientate Muslims from local cults towards widely shared practices and symbols, Islamic reform helped to prepare Muslims for the world of the modern political party and the modern state.

⁴² Book six of Thanawi=s *Bihishti Zewar*, for instance, specifically discusses the whole issue of custom, Metcalf, *Perfecting Women*, pp. 89-161.

Side by side with this there went the reification of Islam. The reforming impulse, in which submitting to God became an act of will rather than an unquestioning following of the folkways of the faith, drove the development, although some responsibility must be attributed to the impact of the colonial state. Men and women consciously embraced a particular set of beliefs and practice that they identified with `true=Islam, and abandoned others which could not be so identified.⁴³ But this reification process stemmed in part, too, from two additional influences: the distancing impact of print which enabled Muslims to stand apart from their faith, analyse and conceptualise it, and their growing consciousness, which was especially strong in India, that they were living alongside other faiths, at times real competitors, which were also reified, or being so. For the first time, in the late-nineteenth century, Muslims begin to use the term `Islam= not just to describe their relationship to God, but to describe an ideal religious pattern, or a mundane religious system, or even just Islamic civilisation. Thus, it appears in the title of the poet Hali=s masterwork, *Musaddas, Madd-o jazr-i Islam*, of 1879 or Amir Ali=s *Spirit of Islam* of 1891. It does not appear in the title of Ashraf`Ali Thanwi=s *Bishishti Zewar*, although the contents of the book are very much the forerunners of the host of how-to-be-a-proper-believer books which have followed, for instance, Mawdudi=s *Towards Understanding Islam* of 1940, Muhammad Hamidullah=s *Introduction to Islam* of 1959 or Manzoor Nomani=s *What Islam is* of 1964.⁴⁴ In the latter part of the twentieth century, along with mass education, this reification of Islam in Muslim consciousness has become widespread.⁴⁵

The final stage in the reification of Islam, but arguably also in its rationalisation, was its

⁴³ `At every turn=, Haniffa records, `I was told by members of Al-Muslimaat that they were Muslims by choice as well as by birth.= Haniffa, `Believing Women=, p. 00.

⁴⁴ Robinson, `Islam and the Impact of Print=, p. 91.

⁴⁵ Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, (Princeton, 1996), pp. 37-45.

conceptualisation as a system. This was the particular achievement of Mawdudi, growing out of his concern to establish an Islamic vision of life to set against that of the West, and which was to be protected against the West. He describes Islam as a *nizam*, a system, which was comprehensive, complete and covered all aspects of human existence. These aspects, moreover, were integrated as the human body was integrated into one homogeneous whole. God in another image was the great engineer in his workshop; he had created the world and in the *shari`a* had given man a complete set of principles on which to conduct himself in that place. `It is his explicit Will=, Mawdudi states:

that the universe - this grand workshop with its multifarious activities - should go on functioning smoothly and graciously so that man - the prize of creation - should make the best and most productive use of all his powers and resources, of everything that has been harnessed for him in the earth and in the high heavens... The *Shari-ah* is meant to guide the steps of man in this respect.⁴⁶

This vision of Islam as a system, which may also be seen as an ideology, meant that the *shari`a* must be united to power on earth. Mawdudi described the pursuit of power, by which he meant capturing the machinery of the modern state, as a jihad obligatory on all his followers. In fact, he was not particularly effective in politics. But he did set a standard against which the conduct of the first thirty years of government in Pakistan might be set, and a model which from February 1979 General Zia ul-Haq tried to introduce into that country.

Secularisation

Finally, let us turn to the relationship between Islamic reform and secularisation. This is, of course, a much-disputed concept, For the founding fathers of sociology, as science and technology increasingly controlled and explained the social and physical world, and as the modern state grew to

⁴⁶ Sayyid Abul A`la Maududi, *Towards Understanding Islam*, Khurshid Ahmad trans. and ed., 9th ed., (Delhi, 1979), pp. 138-39.

provide security within it, religion was due to become more and more marginalised. On the other hand, strong critics of the concept have emerged amongst sociologists, arguing that religion remains an important force in modern societies, though often expressed in new forms.⁴⁷ The impact of Islamic reform supports the latter view.

⁴⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, 4th ed., (Cambridge, 2001), p. 545.

At one level we can see Weber's secularisation at work. We see his process of disenchantment of the world, or using his term *entzauberung*, the driving of magic out of things: the attack on all ideas of intercession for man with God, the rationalisation of belief and practice, and the emphasis on action on earth to achieve salvation. We can also see a further process associated with disenchantment, which is a fragmentation of human understandings of the world, though this outcome owes as much to the impact of the West as to Islamic reform. We can see it, for instance, in the way in which the Muslim modernists make Western science the measure of Islamic belief, and that in which Muslim socialists, Progressive Writers and their ilk, come to think in terms of a Godless world.⁴⁸ This said, while noting how Islamic reform would seem to have driven matters down a Weberian secularising path, we should also note that, as in the West, this has not resulted in a complete eradication of magic. Deobandi `ulama at the heart of the reforming process prepared amulets for followers to use in case of illness.⁴⁹

One criticism of a focus on disenchantment in Weberian thought is that it is a trajectory derived from the European Christian experience. Arguably the process of secularisation should be considered in Islamic terms, indeed, as Weber might have done, in terms of the unique developmental history of Islam, that is in terms of its development as a rationalisation of worldviews. In this light it has been suggested that, as Islam has always had a considerable interest in this world, being more concerned with how men behave than in what they believe, the developmental criterion must rest with Muslim behaviour. The *shari`a*, ideally the distilled essence of the Qur'an and the Life

⁴⁸ Robinson, 'Secularization, Weber, and Islam', pp. 236-37.

⁴⁹ Kandhlawi, *Aap Beeti*, 2, pp. 314-16; Marsden makes a similar point about reform-minded Muslims in Chitral. Magnus Marsden, *Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan's North-West Frontier* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 241.

of the Prophet, which offers guidance for every aspect of human life, represents the criterion. So Muslim society is Islamic to the extent that it follows the *shari`a* and Muslim states are Islamic to the extent that they support the *shari`a*. Here we have a possible criterion of secularisation in Muslim societies and states.

If we apply this criterion to India, on the one hand we can reasonably argue that Islamic reform led to scriptural knowledge becoming more widespread and more widely followed than before. On the other hand, the pressure brought by Islamic reformers on the state led to the *shari`a*, at least in its personal law aspects, being more completely imposed by the state than before. Of course, if this trajectory is taken through into the history of Pakistan, it is possible to see a continuing expansion of the realm of the *shari`a* and an Islamisation of the state. Alongside this theme stands the ideal created by Mawdudi and his Islamist followers of an ideological system in which the *shari`a* is asserted over all of human life and backed by all the authority of the modern state. We conclude by noting a paradox. If we take the Weberian trajectory of disenchantment, we can see Islamic reform driving magic out of the Indo-Muslim world, to some degree at least. But, if we take the developmental approach, arguably the pressure of reform on society and on the state, in British India and Pakistan at least, has led to greater levels of *shari`a* application/Islamisation than ever before.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Robinson, 'Secularization, Weber, and Islam', pp. 239-41.

Before concluding we need to note the broader context in which religious reform amongst South Asian Muslims was taking place. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were across the Muslim world moves towards this-worldly faith, or forms of Islamic 'protestantism', expressed in varying ways.⁵¹ Similar processes were also taking place at the same time amongst other South Asians; the faith of Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists were all acquiring this-worldly 'protestant' forms, which were in time to develop fundamentalist dimensions.⁵²

So where does this leave the relationship between Islamic reform and modernity? Much as the vision and brio of Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is to be admired, and although the impact of Islamic reform is full of Weberian echoes, there is no evidence for the emergence of some quasi-Calvinistic group, whose this-worldly moral energy and ascetic self-discipline have stimulated a continued capitalist development, not even among the Ahl-i Hadith.⁵³ This is said, moreover, in spite of the success of Islamic reform among the Muslim merchant classes. Arguably Weber's friend, the religious historian Ernst Troeltsch, gives us helpful direction when he argues that Protestantism had a unique role in fashioning the modern religious spirit: this 'religion of personal conviction and conscience', he declared, 'is the form of religion which is homogeneous with and adopted to modern individualistic civilisation, without, however, possessing in detail any very close connexions with the creations of the latter.'⁵⁴ Ernest Gellner, in considering

⁵¹ Robinson, 'Other-Worldly and This-Worldly Islam' pp. 54-58.

⁵² Francis Robinson, 'Fundamentalism: Tolerance and India's Heritage', *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, XLV, 3, 2003, pp. 5-13.

⁵³ For a sceptical approach to Islamic 'protestantism' as a preparation for modernity, see Martin Reixinger, 'How favourable is Puritan Islam to Modernity? A Case Study on the Ahl-i Hadith (late 19th/early 20th centuries)', unpublished paper, 2004.

⁵⁴ Troeltsch put this argument to the ninth conference of German historians at Stuttgart in

some thirty years ago the impact of Islamic reform in North Africa came to a similar conclusion: 'the severe discipline of puritan Islam', he declared, far from being incompatible with modernisation might be 'compatible with, or positively favourable to modern social organisation.'⁵⁵

In the arguments already surveyed, there is plentiful evidence of the way in which Islamic reform both opened the way to modernity, and then worked with it. Islamic Reform destroyed much of the authority of the past, making possible a more creative engagement with the present. It emphasised human will, preparing the way for the modern understanding of undiluted human instrumentality in the world. It set off transformations of the self that we associate with modernity, the emergence of an internal landscape and the affirmation of the ordinary things of life. It helped set off a rationalisation and reification of Islam which, amongst other things, prepared Muslims to engage with a broad-based political identity and conceive of their faith as an entity, even a system. And

April 1906 when he gave the lecture which Weber had been supposed to give on the meaning of Protestantism for the rise of the modern world. Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress; The Significance of Protestantism for the Rise of the Modern World* (Philadelphia, 1986), p. 100.

⁵⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 170; twenty years later the argument is put much more forcibly by Lapidus, *History of Islamic Societies*, pp. 817-22..

finally it set going processes which offered both a disenchanted world and one in which paradoxically the transcendent was reasserted, indeed, the world itself was re-enchanted.

This, then, is the relationship between Islamic reform and modernity in South Asia, one of preparing the way and then engagement with the worldwide forces of modernity, shaping them to its particular purposes. This said, should not the Islamist insistence on reasserting the transcendent over all creation give us pause for thought? This is, after all, not the outcome of the modernising process which the founding fathers of sociology anticipated. Now, it is a commonplace of modern scholarship on Islamism, or any other form of religious fundamentalism, that it is a profoundly modern phenomenon, being fashioned by modernity, as it strives to shape it - protesting against the outcomes of Enlightenment rationalism, what Bruce Lawrence terms 'the heresies of the modern age'.⁵⁶ It seeks to assert the moral community, the transcendent, and moral absolutes, in order to confront the uncertainties, and relativisms of the time. It raises the question of whether modernity should necessarily be dominated by Enlightenment rationalism.

In an excellent recent work Roxanne Euben has juxtaposed the critique of the nature and limits of modern rationalism by a series of Western social theorists (Hannah Arendt, Charles Taylor, Alisdair MacIntyre, Richard Neuhaus, Robert Bellah and Daniel Bell) with that of Sayyid Qutb, who was with Mawdudi the most influential Islamist thinker of the twentieth century. She notes that, although coming from different angles of vision, all see in modernity 'a crisis due to rupture with tradition, the dual rejection of theology and teleology inaugurated by Enlightenment rationalism and

⁵⁶ Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age* (London, 1990).

the subsequent diminishment of meaning in authority, morality and community...⁵⁷ Turning to Qutb she finds similar anxieties, similar analysis. Where, of course, he differs from the Western theorists is in insisting on divine sovereignty as the answer to the crises of authority, morality and community.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory* (Princeton, 1999), p. 124.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-92, 154-67.

These arguments proposed in relation to Qutb could be applied no less to Mawdudi. Thus Islamism, which is the current end point of Islamic reform, is not only a profoundly modern phenomenon but also offers an answer to widely-shared modern anxieties. Research devoted to Islamism in West Asia has demonstrated its modernising impact.⁵⁹ Papers in this volume reveal similar possibilities for South Asia. Indeed, if we accept that the Islamist concern to build a moral community, to reassert the transcendent, and to re-enchant the world is one possible answer to the problems of modernity, it is arguable that Islamic reform not only helped to prepare the way for modernity but in its Islamist form has become a modernising force in its own right. As Haniffa states, 'the promise that feminism ... holds for transforming women's lives does not necessarily require a secular framework within which to flourish'.⁶⁰

This leads us to a final reflection. It is clear that there is no one modernity, as once Western modernisation theorists vainly believed, but many or multiple modernities. Different societies fashion their modernities as arguably do different individuals. The reforming traditions of Muslim South Asia from Shah Wali Allah to the Islamists of the present are powerful strands amongst Muslim modernities. But they form only one set of strands amongst Muslim modernities, just as those modernities are a larger set of strands amongst those fashioned by humankind in general.⁶¹

⁵⁹ See, for instance, B.O. Utvik, 'the Modernizing Force of Islamism', in J.L. Esposito and F. Burgat (eds), *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe* (London, 2003), pp. 43-68; B.O. Utvik, *The Pious Road to Development: Islamist Economics in Egypt* (London, 2006); Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam* (Oxford, 2000); F. Adelhah, *Being Modern in Iran* (London, 1998); Jenny B. White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics* (Seattle, 2002).

⁶⁰ Haniffa, 'Believing Women', p. 00; this point has also been made at length and to great effect by Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ., 2005).

⁶¹ S.N. Eisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities', *Daedalus*, 129, no. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 1-30;

