http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/parts_animals.1.i.html

Parts of Animals

By Aristotle

Written 350 B.C.E

Translated by William Ogle


   
Table of Contents

Book I
   http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/parts_animals.2.ii.html

 Part 1

Every systematic science, the humblest and the noblest alike, seems to  admit of two distinct kinds of proficiency; one of which may be properly  called scientific knowledge of the subject, while the other is a kind of  educational acquaintance with it. For an educated man should be able to  form a fair off-hand judgement as to the goodness or badness of the method  used by a professor in his exposition. To be educated is in fact to be  able to do this; and even the man of universal education we deem to be  such in virtue of his having this ability. It will, however, of course,  be understood that we only ascribe universal education to one who in his  own individual person is thus critical in all or nearly all branches of  knowledge, and not to one who has a like ability merely in some special  subject. For it is possible for a man to have this competence in some one  branch of knowledge without having it in all.

It is plain then that, as in other sciences, so in that which inquires  into nature, there must be certain canons, by reference to which a hearer shall be able to criticize the method of a professed exposition, quite  independently of the question whether the statements made be true or false.  Ought we, for instance (to give an illustration of what I mean), to begin  by discussing each separate species-man, lion, ox, and the like-taking  each kind in hand inde. pendently of the rest, or ought we rather to deal  first with the attributes which they have in common in virtue of some common  element of their nature, and proceed from this as a basis for the consideration  of them separately? For genera that are quite distinct yet oftentimes present  many identical phenomena, sleep, for instance, respiration, growth, decay,  death, and other similar affections and conditions, which may be passed  over for the present, as we are not yet prepared to treat of them with  clearness and precision. Now it is plain that if we deal with each species  independently of the rest, we shall frequently be obliged to repeat the  same statements over and over again; for horse and dog and man present,  each and all, every one of the phenomena just enumerated. A discussion  therefore of the attributes of each such species separately would necessarily  involve frequent repetitions as to characters, themselves identical but  recurring in animals specifically distinct. (Very possibly also there may  be other characters which, though they present specific differences, yet  come under one and the same category. For instance, flying, swimming, walking,  creeping, are plainly specifically distinct, but yet are all forms of animal progression.) We must, then, have some clear understanding as to the manner  in which our investigation is to be conducted; whether, I mean, we are  first to deal with the common or generic characters, and afterwards to  take into consideration special peculiarities; or whether we are to start  straight off with the ultimate species. For as yet no definite rule has  been laid down in this matter. So also there is a like uncertainty as to another point now to be mentioned. Ought the writer who deals with the  works of nature to follow the plan adopted by the mathematicians in their  astronomical demonstrations, and after considering the phenomena presented  by animals, and their several parts, proceed subsequently to treat of the  causes and the reason why; or ought he to follow some other method? And  when these questions are answered, there yet remains another. The causes  concerned in the generation of the works of nature are, as we see, more  than one. There is the final cause and there is the motor cause. Now we  must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second. Plainly,  however, that cause is the first which we call the final one. For this  is the Reason, and the Reason forms the starting-point, alike in the works  of art and in works of nature. For consider how the physician or how the  builder sets about his work. He starts by forming for himself a definite  picture, in the one case perceptible to mind, in the other to sense, of  his end-the physician of health, the builder of a house-and this he holds  forward as the reason and explanation of each subsequent step that he takes,  and of his acting in this or that way as the case may be. Now in the works  of nature the good end and the final cause is still more dominant than  in works of art such as these, nor is necessity a factor with the same  significance in them all; though almost all writers, while they try to  refer their origin to this cause, do so without distinguishing the various  senses in which the term necessity is used. For there is absolute necessity,  manifested in eternal phenomena; and there is hypothetical necessity, manifested  in everything that is generated by nature as in everything that is produced  by art, be it a house or what it may. For if a house or other such final object is to be realized, it is necessary that such and such material shall  exist; and it is necessary that first this then that shall be produced,  and first this and then that set in motion, and so on in continuous succession,  until the end and final result is reached, for the sake of which each prior  thing is produced and exists. As with these productions of art, so also  is it with the productions of nature. The mode of necessity, however, and  the mode of ratiocination are different in natural science from what they  are in the theoretical sciences; of which we have spoken elsewhere. For  in the latter the starting-point is that which is; in the former that which  is to be. For it is that which is yet to be-health, let us say, or a man-that,  owing to its being of such and such characters, necessitates the pre-existence  or previous production of this and that antecedent; and not this or that  antecedent which, because it exists or has been generated, makes it necessary  that health or a man is in, or shall come into, existence. Nor is it possible  to track back the series of necessary antecedents to a starting-point,  of which you can say that, existing itself from eternity, it has determined  their existence as its consequent. These however again, are matters that  have been dealt with in another treatise. There too it was stated in what  cases absolute and hypothetical necessity exist; in what cases also the  proposition expressing hypothetical necessity is simply convertible, and  what cause it is that determines this convertibility.

Another matter which must not be passed over without consideration  is, whether the proper subject of our exposition is that with which the ancient writers concerned themselves, namely, what is the process of formation  of each animal; or whether it is not rather, what are the characters of  a given creature when formed. For there is no small difference between  these two views. The best course appears to be that we should follow the  method already mentioned, and begin with the phenomena presented by each  group of animals, and, when this is done, proceed afterwards to state the  causes of those phenomena, and to deal with their evolution. For elsewhere,  as for instance in house building, this is the true sequence. The plan  of the house, or the house, has this and that form; and because it has  this and that form, therefore is its construction carried out in this or  that manner. For the process of evolution is for the sake of the thing  Anally evolved, and not this for the sake of the process. Empedocles, then,  was in error when he said that many of the characters presented by animals  were merely the results of incidental occurrences during their development;  for instance, that the backbone was divided as it is into vertebrae, because  it happened to be broken owing to the contorted position of the foetus  in the womb. In so saying he overlooked the fact that propagation implies  a creative seed endowed with certain formative properties. Secondly, he  neglected another fact, namely, that the parent animal pre-exists, not  only in idea, but actually in time. For man is generated from man; and  thus it is the possession of certain characters by the parent that determines  the development of like characters in the child. The same statement holds  good also for the operations of art, and even for those which are apparently  spontaneous. For the same result as is produced by art may occur spontaneously.  Spontaneity, for instance, may bring about the restoration of health. The  products of art, however, require the pre-existence of an efficient cause  homogeneous with themselves, such as the statuary's art, which must necessarily  precede the statue; for this cannot possibly be produced spontaneously.  Art indeed consists in the conception of the result to be produced before  its realization in the material. As with spontaneity, so with chance; for  this also produces the same result as art, and by the same  process.

The fittest mode, then, of treatment is to say, a man has such  and such parts, because the conception of a man includes their presence,  and because they are necessary conditions of his existence, or, if we cannot  quite say this, which would be best of all, then the next thing to it, namely, that it is either quite impossible for him to exist without them,  or, at any rate, that it is better for him that they should be there; and their existence involves the existence of other antecedents. Thus we should  say, because man is an animal with such and such characters, therefore  is the process of his development necessarily such as it is; and therefore  is it accomplished in such and such an order, this part being formed first,  that next, and so on in succession; and after a like fashion should we  explain the evolution of all other works of nature.

Now that with which the ancient writers, who first philosophized  about Nature, busied themselves, was the material principle and the material cause. They inquired what this is, and what its character; how the universe  is generated out of it, and by what motor influence, whether, for instance,  by antagonism or friendship, whether by intelligence or spontaneous action,  the substratum of matter being assumed to have certain inseparable properties;  fire, for instance, to have a hot nature, earth a cold one; the former  to be light, the latter heavy. For even the genesis of the universe is  thus explained by them. After a like fashion do they deal also with the  development of plants and of animals. They say, for instance, that the  water contained in the body causes by its currents the formation of the  stomach and the other receptacles of food or of excretion; and that the  breath by its passage breaks open the outlets of the nostrils; air and  water being the materials of which bodies are made; for all represent nature  as composed of such or similar substances.

But if men and animals and their several parts are natural phenomena,  then the natural philosopher must take into consideration not merely the ultimate substances of which they are made, but also flesh, bone, blood,  and all other homogeneous parts; not only these, but also the heterogeneous  parts, such as face, hand, foot; and must examine how each of these comes  to be what it is, and in virtue of what force. For to say what are the  ultimate substances out of which an animal is formed, to state, for instance,  that it is made of fire or earth, is no more sufficient than would be a  similar account in the case of a couch or the like. For we should not be  content with saying that the couch was made of bronze or wood or whatever  it might be, but should try to describe its design or mode of composition  in preference to the material; or, if we did deal with the material, it  would at any rate be with the concretion of material and form. For a couch  is such and such a form embodied in this or that matter, or such and such  a matter with this or that form; so that its shape and structure must be  included in our description. For the formal nature is of greater importance  than the material nature.

Does, then, configuration and colour constitute the essence of  the various animals and of their several parts? For if so, what Democritus  says will be strictly correct. For such appears to have been his notion.  At any rate he says that it is evident to every one what form it is that  makes the man, seeing that he is recognizable by his shape and colour.  And yet a dead body has exactly the same configuration as a living one;  but for all that is not a man. So also no hand of bronze or wood or constituted  in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name.  For like a physician in a painting, or like a flute in a sculpture, in  spite of its name it will be unable to do the office which that name implies.  Precisely in the same way no part of a dead body, such I mean as its eye  or its hand, is really an eye or a hand. To say, then, that shape and colour  constitute the animal is an inadequate statement, and is much the same  as if a woodcarver were to insist that the hand he had cut out was really  a hand. Yet the physiologists, when they give an account of the development  and causes of the animal form, speak very much like such a craftsman. What,  however, I would ask, are the forces by which the hand or the body was  fashioned into its shape? The woodcarver will perhaps say, by the axe or  the auger; the physiologist, by air and by earth. Of these two answers  the artificer's is the better, but it is nevertheless insufficient. For  it is not enough for him to say that by the stroke of his tool this part  was formed into a concavity, that into a flat surface; but he must state  the reasons why he struck his blow in such a way as to effect this, and  what his final object was; namely, that the piece of wood should develop  eventually into this or that shape. It is plain, then, that the teaching  of the old physiologists is inadequate, and that the true method is to  state what the definitive characters are that distinguish the animal as  a whole; to explain what it is both in substance and in form, and to deal  after the same fashion with its several organs; in fact, to proceed in  exactly the same way as we should do, were we giving a complete description  of a couch.

If now this something that constitutes the form of the living being  be the soul, or part of the soul, or something that without the soul cannot exist; as would seem to be the case, seeing at any rate that when the soul  departs, what is left is no longer a living animal, and that none of the parts remain what they were before, excepting in mere configuration, like  the animals that in the fable are turned into stone; if, I say, this be so, then it will come within the province of the natural philosopher to  inform himself concerning the soul, and to treat of it, either in its entirety,  or, at any rate, of that part of it which constitutes the essential character  of an animal; and it will be his duty to say what this soul or this part  of a soul is; and to discuss the attributes that attach to this essential  character, especially as nature is spoken of in two senses, and the nature  of a thing is either its matter or its essence; nature as essence including  both the motor cause and the final cause. Now it is in the latter of these  two senses that either the whole soul or some part of it constitutes the  nature of an animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that  enables matter to constitute the animal nature, much more than it is the  presence of matter which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature  is bound on every ground to treat of the soul rather than of the matter.  For though the wood of which they are made constitutes the couch and the  tripod, it only does so because it is capable of receiving such and such  a form.

What has been said suggests the question, whether it is the whole  soul or only some part of it, the consideration of which comes within the province of natural science. Now if it be of the whole soul that this should  treat, then there is no place for any other philosophy beside it. For as  it belongs in all cases to one and the same science to deal with correlated  subjects-one and the same science, for instance, deals with sensation and  with the objects of sense-and as therefore the intelligent soul and the  objects of intellect, being correlated, must belong to one and the same  science, it follows that natural science will have to include the whole  universe in its province. But perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor all  its parts collectively, that constitutes the source of motion; but there  may be one part, identical with that in plants, which is the source of  growth, another, namely the sensory part, which is the source of change  of quality, while still another, and this not the intellectual part, is  the source of locomotion. I say not the intellectual part; for other animals  than man have the power of locomotion, but in none but him is there intellect.  Thus then it is plain that it is not of the whole soul that we have to  treat. For it is not the whole soul that constitutes the animal nature,  but only some part or parts of it. Moreover, it is impossible that any  abstraction can form a subject of natural science, seeing that everything  that Nature makes is means to an end. For just as human creations are the  products of art, so living objects are manifest in the products of an analogous  cause or principle, not external but internal, derived like the hot and  the cold from the environing universe. And that the heaven, if it had an  origin, was evolved and is maintained by such a cause, there is therefore  even more reason to believe, than that mortal animals so originated. For  order and definiteness are much more plainly manifest in the celestial  bodies than in our own frame; while change and chance are characteristic  of the perishable things of earth. Yet there are some who, while they allow  that every animal exists and was generated by nature, nevertheless hold  that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity;  the heaven, in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder  is discernible! Again, whenever there is plainly some final end, to which  a motion tends should nothing stand in the way, we always say that such  final end is the aim or purpose of the motion; and from this it is evident  that there must be a something or other really existing, corresponding  to what we call by the name of Nature. For a given germ does not give rise  to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each germ  springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny. And  thus it is the germ that is the ruling influence and fabricator of the  offspring. For these it is by nature, the offspring being at any rate that  which in nature will spring from it. At the same time the offspring is  anterior to the germ; for germ and perfected progeny are related as the developmental process and the result. Anterior, however, to both germ and  product is the organism from which the germ was derived. For every germ  implies two organisms, the parent and the progeny. For germ or seed is  both the seed of the organism from which it came, of the horse, for instance,  from which it was derived, and the seed of the organism that will eventually  arise from it, of the mule, for example, which is developed from the seed  of the horse. The same seed then is the seed both of the horse and of the  mule, though in different ways as here set forth. Moreover, the seed is  potentially that which will spring from it, and the relation of potentiality  to actuality we know.

There are then two causes, namely, necessity and the final end.  For many things are produced, simply as the results of necessity. It may, however, be asked, of what mode of necessity are we speaking when we say  this. For it can be of neither of those two modes which are set forth in  the philosophical treatises. There is, however, the third mode, in such  things at any rate as are generated. For instance, we say that food is  necessary; because an animal cannot possibly do without it. This third  mode is what may be called hypothetical necessity. Here is another example  of it. If a piece of wood is to be split with an axe, the axe must of necessity  be hard; and, if hard, must of necessity be made of bronze or iron. Now  exactly in the same way the body, which like the axe is an instrument-for  both the body as a whole and its several parts individually have definite  operations for which they are made-just in the same way, I say, the body,  if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such a character,  and made of such and such materials.

It is plain then that there are two modes of causation, and that  both of these must, so far as possible, be taken into account in explaining  the works of nature, or that at any rate an attempt must be made to include  them both; and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about  nature. For primary cause constitutes the nature of an animal much more  than does its matter. There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles  hits upon this, and following the guidance of fact, finds himself constrained  to speak of the ratio (olugos) as constituting the essence and real nature  of things. Such, for instance, is the case when he explains what is a bone.  For he does not merely describe its material, and say it is this one element,  or those two or three elements, or a compound of all the elements, but  states the ratio (olugos) of their combination. As with a bone, so manifestly  is it with the flesh and all other similar parts.

The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method  of treatment was, that they were not in possession of the notion of essence,  nor of any definition of substance. The first who came near it was Democritus,  and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science,  but was merely brought to it, spite of himself, by constraint of facts.  In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. But at  this period men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers  diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which  benefit mankind.

Of the method itself the following is an example. In dealing with  respiration we must show that it takes place for such or such a final object; and we must also show that this and that part of the process is necessitated  by this and that other stage of it. By necessity we shall sometimes mean  hypothetical necessity, the necessity, that is, that the requisite antecedants  shall be there, if the final end is to be reached; and sometimes absolute  necessity, such necessity as that which connects substances and their inherent  properties and characters. For the alternate discharge and re-entrance  of heat and the inflow of air are necessary if we are to live. Here we  have at once a necessity in the former of the two senses. But the alternation  of heat and refrigeration produces of necessity an alternate admission  and discharge of the outer air, and this is a necessity of the second  kind.

In the foregoing we have an example of the method which we must  adopt, and also an example of the kind of phenomena, the causes of which  we have to investigate.

Part 2

 Some writers propose to reach the definitions of the ultimate forms  of animal life by bipartite division. But this method is often difficult,  and often impracticable.

Sometimes the final differentia of the subdivision is sufficient  by itself, and the antecedent differentiae are mere surplusage. Thus in  the series Footed, Two-footed, Cleft-footed, the last term is all-expressive  by itself, and to append the higher terms is only an idle iteration. Again  it is not permissible to break up a natural group, Birds for instance,  by putting its members under different bifurcations, as is done in the  published dichotomies, where some birds are ranked with animals of the  water, and others placed in a different class. The group Birds and the  group Fishes happen to be named, while other natural groups have no popular  names; for instance, the groups that we may call Sanguineous and Bloodless  are not known popularly by any designations. If such natural groups are  not to be broken up, the method of Dichotomy cannot be employed, for it  necessarily involves such breaking up and dislocation. The group of the  Many-footed, for instance, would, under this method, have to be dismembered,  and some of its kinds distributed among land animals, others among water  animals.

Part 3

 Again, privative terms inevitably form one branch of dichotomous  division, as we see in the proposed dichotomies. But privative terms in their character of privatives admit of no subdivision. For there can be  no specific forms of a negation, of Featherless for instance or of Footless,  as there are of Feathered and of Footed. Yet a generic differentia must  be subdivisible; for otherwise what is there that makes it generic rather  than specific? There are to be found generic, that is specifically subdivisible,  differentiae; Feathered for instance and Footed. For feathers are divisible  into Barbed and Unbarbed, and feet into Manycleft, and Twocleft, like those  of animals with bifid hoofs, and Uncleft or Undivided, like those of animals  with solid hoofs. Now even with differentiae capable of this specific subdivision  it is difficult enough so to make the classification, as that each animal  shall be comprehended in some one subdivision and in not more than one;  but far more difficult, nay impossible, is it to do this, if we start with  a dichotomy into two contradictories. (Suppose for instance we start with  the two contradictories, Feathered and Unfeathered; we shall find that  the ant, the glow-worm, and some other animals fall under both divisions.) For each differentia must be presented by some species. There must be some  species, therefore, under the privative heading. Now specifically distinct  animals cannot present in their essence a common undifferentiated element,  but any apparently common element must really be differentiated. (Bird  and Man for instance are both Two-footed, but their two-footedness is diverse  and differentiated. So any two sanguineous groups must have some difference  in their blood, if their blood is part of their essence.) From this it  follows that a privative term, being insusceptible of differentiation,  cannot be a generic differentia; for, if it were, there would be a common  undifferentiated element in two different groups.

Again, if the species are ultimate indivisible groups, that is,  are groups with indivisible differentiae, and if no differentia be common  to several groups, the number of differentiae must be equal to the number  of species. If a differentia though not divisible could yet be common to  several groups, then it is plain that in virtue of that common differentia  specifically distinct animals would fall into the same division. It is  necessary then, if the differentiae, under which are ranged all the ultimate  and indivisible groups, are specific characters, that none of them shall  be common; for otherwise, as already said, specifically distinct animals  will come into one and the same division. But this would violate one of the requisite conditions, which are as follows. No ultimate group must  be included in more than a single division; different groups must not be included in the same division; and every group must be found in some division.  It is plain then that we cannot get at the ultimate specific forms of the  animal, or any other, kingdom by bifurcate division. If we could, the number  of ultimate differentiae would equal the number of ultimate animal forms.  For assume an order of beings whose prime differentiae are White and Black.  Each of these branches will bifurcate, and their branches again, and so  on till we reach the ultimate differentiae, whose number will be four or  some other power of two, and will also be the number of the ultimate species  comprehended in the order.

(A species is constituted by the combination differentia and matter.  For no part of an animal is purely material or purely immaterial; nor can  a body, independently of its condition, constitute an animal or any of  its parts, as has repeatedly been observed.)

Further, the differentiae must be elements of the essence, and  not merely essential attributes. Thus if Figure is the term to be divided,  it must not be divided into figures whose angles are equal to two right  angles, and figures whose angles are together greater than two right angles. For it is only an attribute of a triangle and not part of its essence that  its angles are equal to two right angles.

Again, the bifurcations must be opposites, like White and Black,  Straight and Bent; and if we characterize one branch by either term, we  must characterize the other by its opposite, and not, for example, characterize  one branch by a colour, the other by a mode of progression, swimming for  instance.

Furthermore, living beings cannot be divided by the functions common  to body and soul, by Flying, for instance, and Walking, as we see them  divided in the dichotomies already referred to. For some groups, Ants for  instance, fall under both divisions, some ants flying while others do not.  Similarly as regards the division into Wild and Tame; for it also would  involve the disruption of a species into different groups. For in almost  all species in which some members are tame, there are other members that  are wild. Such, for example, is the case with Men, Horses, Oxen, Dogs in  India, Pigs, Goats, Sheep; groups which, if double, ought to have what  they have not, namely, different appellations; and which, if single, prove  that Wildness and Tameness do not amount to specific differences. And whatever  single element we take as a basis of division the same difficulty will  occur.

The method then that we must adopt is to attempt to recognize the  natural groups, following the indications afforded by the instincts of mankind, which led them for instance to form the class of Birds and the  class of Fishes, each of which groups combines a multitude of differentiae,  and is not defined by a single one as in dichotomy. The method of dichotomy  is either impossible (for it would put a single group under different divisions  or contrary groups under the same division), or it only furnishes a single  ultimate differentia for each species, which either alone or with its series  of antecedents has to constitute the ultimate species.

If, again, a new differential character be introduced at any stage  into the division, the necessary result is that the continuity of the division becomes merely a unity and continuity of agglomeration, like the unity  and continuity of a series of sentences coupled together by conjunctive particles. For instance, suppose we have the bifurcation Feathered and  Featherless, and then divide Feathered into Wild and Tame, or into White  and Black. Tame and White are not a differentiation of Feathered, but are  the commencement of an independent bifurcation, and are foreign to the  series at the end of which they are introduced.

As we said then, we must define at the outset by multiplicity of  differentiae. If we do so, privative terms will be available, which are unavailable to the dichotomist.

The impossibility of reaching the definition of any of the ultimate  forms by dichotomy of the larger group, as some propose, is manifest also from the following considerations. It is impossible that a single differentia,  either by itself or with its antecedents, shall express the whole essence  of a species. (In saying a single differentia by itself I mean such an  isolated differentia as Cleft-footed; in saying a single differentia with  antecedent I mean, to give an instance, Manycleft-footed preceded by Cleft-footed.  The very continuity of a series of successive differentiae in a division  is intended to show that it is their combination that expresses the character  of the resulting unit, or ultimate group. But one is misled by the usages  of language into imagining that it is merely the final term of the series,  Manycleft-footed for instance, that constitutes the whole differentia,  and that the antecedent terms, Footed, Cleft-footed, are superfluous. Now  it is evident that such a series cannot consist of many terms. For if one  divides and subdivides, one soon reaches the final differential term, but  for all that will not have got to the ultimate division, that is, to the  species.) No single differentia, I repeat, either by itself or with its  antecedents, can possibly express the essence of a species. Suppose, for  example, Man to be the animal to be defined; the single differentia will  be Cleft-footed, either by itself or with its antecedents, Footed and Two-footed.  Now if man was nothing more than a Cleft-footed animal, this single differentia  would duly represent his essence. But seeing that this is not the case,  more differentiae than this one will necessarily be required to define  him; and these cannot come under one division; for each single branch of  a dichotomy ends in a single differentia, and cannot possibly include several differentiae belonging to one and the same animal.

It is impossible then to reach any of the ultimate animal forms  by dichotomous division.

Part 4

 It deserves inquiry why a single name denoting a higher group was  not invented by mankind, as an appellation to comprehend the two groups of Water animals and Winged animals. For even these have certain attributes  in common. However, the present nomenclature is just. Groups that only  differ in degree, and in the more or less of an identical element that  they possess, are aggregated under a single class; groups whose attributes  are not identical but analogous are separated. For instance, bird differs  from bird by gradation, or by excess and defect; some birds have long feathers,  others short ones, but all are feathered. Bird and Fish are more remote  and only agree in having analogous organs; for what in the bird is feather,  in the fish is scale. Such analogies can scarcely, however, serve universally  as indications for the formation of groups, for almost all animals present  analogies in their corresponding parts.

The individuals comprised within a species, such as Socrates and  Coriscus, are the real existences; but inasmuch as these individuals possess one common specific form, it will suffice to state the universal attributes  of the species, that is, the attributes common to all its individuals, once for all, as otherwise there will be endless reiteration, as has already  been pointed out.

But as regards the larger groups-such as Birds-which comprehend  many species, there may be a question. For on the one hand it may be urged  that as the ultimate species represent the real existences, it will be  well, if practicable, to examine these ultimate species separately, just as we examine the species Man separately; to examine, that is, not the  whole class Birds collectively, but the Ostrich, the Crane, and the other indivisible groups or species belonging to the class.

On the other hand, however, this course would involve repeated  mention of the same attribute, as the same attribute is common to many species, and so far would be somewhat irrational and tedious. Perhaps,  then, it will be best to treat generically the universal attributes of  the groups that have a common nature and contain closely allied subordinate  forms, whether they are groups recognized by a true instinct of mankind,  such as Birds and Fishes, or groups not popularly known by a common appellation,  but withal composed of closely allied subordinate groups; and only to deal  individually with the attributes of a single species, when such species,  man, for instance, and any other such, if such there be-stands apart from  others, and does not constitute with them a larger natural  group.

It is generally similarity in the shape of particular organs, or  of the whole body, that has determined the formation of the larger groups.  It is in virtue of such a similarity that Birds, Fishes, Cephalopoda, and  Testacea have been made to form each a separate class. For within the limits of each such class, the parts do not differ in that they have no nearer  resemblance than that of analogy-such as exists between the bone of man and the spine of fish-but differ merely in respect of such corporeal conditions  as largeness smallness, softness hardness, smoothness roughness, and other  similar oppositions, or, in one word, in respect of  degree.

We have now touched upon the canons for criticizing the method  of natural science, and have considered what is the most systematic and easy course of investigation; we have also dealt with division, and the  mode of conducting it so as best to attain the ends of science, and have shown why dichotomy is either impracticable or inefficacious for its professed  purposes.

Having laid this foundation, let us pass on to our next  topic.

Part 5

 Of things constituted by nature some are ungenerated, imperishable,  and eternal, while others are subject to generation and decay. The former are excellent beyond compare and divine, but less accessible to knowledge.  The evidence that might throw light on them, and on the problems which  we long to solve respecting them, is furnished but scantily by sensation;  whereas respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant information,  living as we do in their midst, and ample data may be collected concerning  all their various kinds, if only we are willing to take sufficient pains.  Both departments, however, have their special charm. The scanty conceptions  to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence,  more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live; just  as a half glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than a leisurely  view of other things, whatever their number and dimensions. On the other  hand, in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial things  has the advantage. Moreover, their greater nearness and affinity to us balances somewhat the loftier interest of the heavenly things that are  the objects of the higher philosophy. Having already treated of the celestial  world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we proceed to treat of animals,  without omitting, to the best of our ability, any member of the kingdom,  however ignoble. For if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet even  these, by disclosing to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that  designed them, give immense pleasure to all who can trace links of causation,  and are inclined to philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange if mimic representations  of them were attractive, because they disclose the mimetic skill of the  painter or sculptor, and the original realities themselves were not more  interesting, to all at any rate who have eyes to discern the reasons that  determined their formation. We therefore must not recoil with childish  aversion from the examination of the humbler animals. Every realm of nature  is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who came to visit  him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated  to go in, reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even  in that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture on the study  of every kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal  to us something natural and something beautiful. Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in Nature's works  in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations and combinations  is a form of the beautiful.

If any person thinks the examination of the rest of the animal  kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man.  For no one can look at the primordia of the human frame-blood, flesh, bones,  vessels, and the like-without much repugnance. Moreover, when any one of  the parts or structures, be it which it may, is under discussion, it must  not be supposed that it is its material composition to which attention  is being directed or which is the object of the discussion, but the relation  of such part to the total form. Similarly, the true object of architecture  is not bricks, mortar, or timber, but the house; and so the principal object  of natural philosophy is not the material elements, but their composition,  and the totality of the form, independently of which they have no  existence.

The course of exposition must be first to state the attributes  common to whole groups of animals, and then to attempt to give their explanation. Many groups, as already noticed, present common attributes, that is to  say, in some cases absolutely identical affections, and absolutely identical  organs,-feet, feathers, scales, and the like-while in other groups the  affections and organs are only so far identical as that they are analogous.  For instance, some groups have lungs, others have no lung, but an organ  analogous to a lung in its place; some have blood, others have no blood,  but a fluid analogous to blood, and with the same office. To treat of the  common attributes in connexion with each individual group would involve,  as already suggested, useless iteration. For many groups have common attributes.  So much for this topic.

As every instrument and every bodily member subserves some partial  end, that is to say, some special action, so the whole body must be destined  to minister to some Plenary sphere of action. Thus the saw is made for  sawing, for sawing is a function, and not sawing for the saw. Similarly,  the body too must somehow or other be made for the soul, and each part  of it for some subordinate function, to which it is  adapted.

We have, then, first to describe the common functions, common,  that is, to the whole animal kingdom, or to certain large groups, or to  the members of a species. In other words, we have to describe the attributes  common to all animals, or to assemblages, like the class of Birds, of closely  allied groups differentiated by gradation, or to groups like Man not differentiated  into subordinate groups. In the first case the common attributes may be  called analogous, in the second generic, in the third  specific.

When a function is ancillary to another, a like relation manifestly  obtains between the organs which discharge these functions; and similarly,  if one function is prior to and the end of another, their respective organs  will stand to each other in the same relation. Thirdly, the existence of these parts involves that of other things as their necessary  consequents.

Instances of what I mean by functions and affections are Reproduction,  Growth, Copulation, Waking, Sleep, Locomotion, and other similar vital  actions. Instances of what I mean by parts are Nose, Eye, Face, and other  so-called members or limbs, and also the more elementary parts of which  these are made. So much for the method to be pursued. Let us now try to  set forth the causes of all vital phenomena, whether universal or particular,  and in so doing let us follow that order of exposition which conforms,  as we have indicated, to the order of nature.