Excerpt from Plato's Meno on the doubling of the square
(trans. B. Jowett)
Men. What was it ? and who were they ?
Soc. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how
they might be able to give a reason of their profession : there,
have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like
Pindar, and many others who were inspired. And they say — mark, now,
and see whether their words are true — they say that the soul of man is
immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at
another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is,
that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness.
“For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom
she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath
into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become noble
kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes
in after ages.”
The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many
times, rand having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or
in the world below, has knowledge of them all ; and it is no
wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever
knew about virtue, and about everything ; for as all nature is
akin, and the soul has learned all things ; there is no difficulty
in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection —
all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint ; for all
enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought
not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of
enquiry : for it will make us idle ; and is sweet only to the
sluggard ; but the other saying will make us active and
inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the
nature of virtue.
Men. Yes, Socrates ; but what do you mean by saying that we do not
learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of
recollection ? Can you teach me how this is ?
Soc. I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you ask
whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching,
but only recollection ; and thus you imagine that you will involve
me in a contradiction.
Men. Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only
asked the question from habit ; but if you can prove to me that
what you say is true, I wish that you would.
Soc. It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the
utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous
attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.
Men. Certainly. Come hither, Boy.
Soc. He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not ?
Men. Yes, indeed ; he was born in the house.
Soc. Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether
he learns of me or only remembers.
Men. I will.
Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a
square ?
Boy. I do.
Soc. And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal ?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the
square are also equal ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. A square may be of any size ?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side
be of two feet, how much will the whole be ? Let me explain :
if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in other direction
of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two
feet ?
Boy. There are.
Soc. Then the square is of twice two feet ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And how many are twice two feet ? count and tell me.
Boy. Four, Socrates.
Soc. And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and
having like this the lines equal ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And of how many feet will that be ?
Boy. Of eight feet.
Soc. And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the
side of that double square : this is two feet — what will that
be ?
Boy. Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
Soc. Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but
only asking him questions ; and now he fancies that he knows how
long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square
feet ; does he not ?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And does he really know ?
Men. Certainly not.
Soc. He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is
double.
Men. True.
Soc. Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To the
Boy.) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a
double line ? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of
a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this — that is to say
of eight feet ; and I want to know whether you still say that a
double square comes from double line ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line
here ?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Let us describe such a figure : Would you not say that this
is the figure of eight feet ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of
which is equal to the figure of four feet ?
Boy. True.
Soc. And is not that four times four ?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And four times is not double ?
Boy. No, indeed.
Soc. But how much ?
Boy. Four times as much.
Soc. Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but
four times as much.
Boy. True.
Soc. Four times four are sixteen — are they not ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one
of sixteen feet ; — do you see ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And the space of four feet is made from this half line ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Good ; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of
this, and half the size of the other ?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this
one, and less than that one ?
Boy. Yes ; I think so.
Soc. Very good ; I like to hear you say what you think. And now
tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more
than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet ?
Boy. It ought.
Soc. Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.
Boy. Three feet.
Soc. Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line
of three. Here are two and there is one ; and on the other side,
here are two also and there is one : and that makes the figure of
which you speak ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the
whole space will be three times three feet ?
Boy. That is evident.
Soc. And how much are three times three feet ?
Boy. Nine.
Soc. And how much is the double of four ?
Boy. Eight.
Soc. Then the figure of eight is not made out of a of three ?
Boy. No.
Soc. But from what line ? — tell me exactly ; and if you
would rather not reckon, try and show me the line.
Boy. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.
Soc. Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of
recollection ? He did not know at first, and he does not know now,
what is the side of a figure of eight feet : but then he thought
that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no
difficulty ; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor
fancies that he knows.
Men. True.
Soc. Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance ?
Men. I think that he is.
Soc. If we have made him doubt, and given him the “torpedo’s shock,”
have we done him any harm ?
Men. I think not.
Soc. We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to
the discovery of the truth ; and now he will wish to remedy his
ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world
again and again that the double space should have a double side.
Men. True.
Soc. But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or
learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of
it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not
know, and had desired to know ?
Men. I think not, Socrates.
Soc. Then he was the better for the torpedo’s touch ?
Men. I think so.
Soc. Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not
teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me : and do you
watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him,
instead of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of
four feet which I have drawn ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And now I add another square equal to the former one ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And a third, which is equal to either of them ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner ?
Boy. Very good.
Soc. Here, then, there are four equal spaces ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And how many times larger is this space than this other ?
Boy. Four times.
Soc. But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.
Boy. True.
Soc. And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect
each of these spaces ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And are there not here four equal lines which contain this
space ?
Boy. There are.
Soc. Look and see how much this space is.
Boy. I do not understand.
Soc. Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And how many spaces are there in this section ?
Boy. Four.
Soc. And how many in this ?
Boy. Two.
Soc. And four is how many times two ?
Boy. Twice.
Soc. And this space is of how many feet ?
Boy. Of eight feet.
Soc. And from what line do you get this figure ?
Boy. From this.
Soc. That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the
figure of four feet ?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if
this is the proper name, then you, Meno’s slave, are prepared to affirm
that the double space is the square of the diagonal ?
Boy. Certainly, Socrates.
Soc. What do you say of him, Meno ? Were not all these answers
given out of his own head ?
Men. Yes, they were all his own.
Soc. And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know ?
Men. True.
Soc. But still he had in him those notions of his — had he not ?
Men. Yes.
Soc. Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that
which he does not know ?
Men. He has.
Soc. And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as
in a dream ; but if he were frequently asked the same questions,
in different forms, he would know as well as any one at last ?