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Isms and the Structure of Social Attitudes

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Social attitude measurement has been limited by inadequate structural models. In this study, broad, basic dimensions were sought, with the assumption that crucial variables are represented as terms ending in *-ism* (isms). 266 isms were extracted from a dictionary, and items were built from their definitions. In a sample of 500 college students, the most replicable item structure had 3 factors; one of these 3 factors split into 2 factors in the 4-factor structure. A replication study confirmed that Conservatism and Authoritarianism are subcomponents of the largest factor. The other factors, though highly meaningful, seem more sparsely represented in previous research. No factor was highly related to personality traits other than Openness to Experience. The factors can serve as content-validity benchmarks for developing improved measurement models in this consequential, discrete domain of individual differences.

> But human affairs are not entirely governed by mechanical laws, nor men's characters wholly and irrevocably formed by their situation in life; ideas are not always mere signs and effects of social circumstances, they are themselves a power in history.
>
> —John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Politics and Society*

On April 19, 1995, an explosion devastated the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people. The man convicted of carrying out the tragic bombing was apparently driven by a certain configuration of what psychologists call "social attitudes and beliefs." The episode is unfortunately not unique. Events that dominate the news—those connected with the "Unabomber," the Branch Davidians, Jonestown, the Solar Temple and Heaven's Gate cults, terrorist acts, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Holocaust—provide ongoing testimony to the power of social attitudes and beliefs. Does psychology have a role in understanding such events, and thus preventing them?

Ideas are a power in history because they are powerful in individual human behavior. Social attitudes and beliefs inform intentional acts not only of aggression and violence but also of defense against aggression and violence, and they influence a much broader array of forms of social interaction and attempts at self-regulation. In short, they are substantial predictors of behavior (Kraus, 1995). Moreover, at least some forms of social attitudes and beliefs are partly heritable (Eaves, Eysenck, & Martin, 1989; N. G. Martin et al., 1986; Waller, Kojetin, Bouchard, Lykken, & Tellegen, 1990), indicating some effect of biological substrates. Clearly they are important psychological variables whose relation to temperament and personality is poorly understood.

Psychology tends to focus on explanatory questions that involve the identification of crucial independent variables: By what mechanisms do social attitudes and beliefs influence behavior? To what other mechanisms are they connected? What makes them of life-or-death importance to individuals? Answering such questions competently, however, requires a competent handling of the dependent variables involved. This draws on more basic research questions: What are the basic dimensions of individual differences in social attitudes and beliefs? How can they be suitably measured?

This article focuses on these basic questions. After defining the domain of social attitudes and beliefs, I apply a novel methodological approach to uncovering major aspects of the structure of their interindividual variation. I detail the discovery of three broad, robust, orthogonal factors in the domain and show that only one of these factors is well represented among previous attitudinal measures and constructs. These factors are shown to be virtually independent of broad factors of personality variation. On the basis of these results, I suggest some necessary features of an adequate measurement model for social attitudes and beliefs. These features are likely to be crucial to investigations of those portentous mechanisms by which attitudes and beliefs originate and influence behavior.

The Domain of Social Attitudes and Beliefs

From its first uses in American psychology (e.g., George, 1917), the ambiguity of the term *attitude* has been acknowledged. Allport (1935) noted that "attitudes are measured more successfully than they are defined" (p. 828). There has been no consensual definition of the attitude concept (Jaspars, 1978), although some recurrent themes are discernable in various definitions that have been offered. Researchers have defined attitudes by noting that they have diverse manifestations (opinions, values, beliefs, etc.; Cooper & McGaugh, 1966; Eysenck, 1971; Thurstone, 1928), involve evaluations (e.g., like or dislike) of "objects" broadly understood (Katz, 1960; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948; Thurstone, 1946), and imply differing conceptions of what is desirable (Lorr, Suziedelis, & Tonesk, 1973). According to Kerlinger (1972), social attitudes can be thought of as sets of beliefs "whose referents have shared general societal relevance to many people in religious, economic, political, educational, ethnic, and other social areas" (p. 614).

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Inclusion of beliefs within the domain of social attitudes (Cooper & McGaugh, 1966; Rokeach, 1973) is virtually inevitable, because beliefs (whether religious, economic, political, or related to locus of control) are strongly intertwined with an individual's opinions, positions, and evaluations. For example, evaluation of an object typically involves beliefs about the object. Thus, social attitudes constitute in part the lines along which one finds individual differences in ideology within a society.

Perhaps the system of beliefs and social attitudes held by an individual constitute personality (Homer & Kahle, 1988). That is, Conservatism or Authoritarianism could be thought of as a personality dimension (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Nias, 1972) or as something disclosing "deeper aspects of character structure" (Allport, 1958, p. 250). Indeed, the system that social attitudes and beliefs form within a person can be considered an attribute of the person in its own right, a "social psychological trait" (Matthews & Deary, 1998, p. 164). Both draw on affective response tendencies, but personality is more concerned with consistencies in patterns of behavior, whereas social attitudes and beliefs are more concerned with consistencies in patterns of cognition (that might, of course, influence affect and motivate behavior). Whether the two domains have partial or complete overlap is addressed empirically later in this article.

What Is the Structure of Individual Differences in Social Attitudes and Beliefs?

An adequate descriptive model is prerequisite to an adequate explanatory model. As in any field of scientific inquiry, a systematic classification would enable researchers to study specified classes of attitudes and beliefs, instead of having to study each attitude and belief (or each measure of attitudes and beliefs) individually, and would facilitate "communication and accumulation of empirical findings" (John, 1989, p. 261) about both the attitudes and beliefs and the classes. In other words, a structural model would offer parsimony and would help bring coherence to the research literature.

Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted multivariate framework for organizing differences in individuals' social attitudes and beliefs. With regard to structure, much of the previous work can be summarized under three themes: (a) a correlated cluster of heavily used constructs, which might be construed as jointly indicating a large general factor in the domain; (b) a failure to replicate further factors beyond this general one; and (c) independent development of several very useful constructs that appear to be more specific and virtually uncorrelated with the general factor and with each other. Taking into account these three themes, it is possible to develop a working hypothesis as to the structure of social attitudes and beliefs.

A Cluster of Correlated Constructs

The history of the study of social attitudes has been dominated by three constructs—Conservatism, Authoritarianism, and Dogmatism—that turn out to be substantially intercorrelated. A fourth major construct—Religiousness—is part of the same group by virtue of sharing similar patterns of correlation with its members. Here I lump together constructs that other researchers might prefer to split; understanding the lump as a whole will help one understand the ways in which the constructs can be split.

Conservatism was hypothesized to be a general social attitudes factor by Vetter (1930) and Likert (1932), although it was previously used as an interpretive construct by Lundberg (1926). Thurstone (1934) conducted a factor analysis of a heterogeneous set of social attitude items and labeled the first factor Conservatism versus Radicalism, noting that this factor also appeared to be confounded with Religiousness. Simultaneously, Kulp and Davidson (1934) isolated Conservatism as a first factor in another heterogeneous set of items. Since then, factor analyses of such item pools have consistently identified a Conservatism or a Religiousness factor (Brown, 1981; Comrey & Newmeyer, 1965; Eysenck, 1944, 1954, 1971; Ferguson, 1939, 1940, 1942, 1973; Gorsuch & McFarland, 1972; Johnson, 1942; Lorr et al., 1973; Sanai, 1952; G. D. Wilson, 1970). Other studies have noted the high correlations of independently developed measures of Conservatism and Religiousness (Gorsuch, 1984; Walkey, Katz, & Green, 1990)—Religiousness typically denoting "a conservative form of religion" that "relates to social or sexual control" (Brown, 1981, p. 9). The most popular measure of Conservatism at present, Wilson's Conservatism (C) Scale (G. D. Wilson, 1970; G. D. Wilson & Patterson, 1968), shows the expected high correlation with Religiousness. Ostendorf's (1996) study of adjectival attitude descriptors found Religiousness and Conservatism factors that had strong tendencies to merge into a single factor.

The construct of Authoritarianism is rooted not in studies of heterogeneous attitude items but rather in analyses of an item pool emphasizing anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism items (Adorno et al., 1950). Initial measurement instruments for the construct spurred psychometric controversy, because of the lack of, and the difficulty of creating, adequate reverse-keyed items for measuring the construct. Altemeyer (1981, 1996) progressively refined elements of the former Authoritarianism scales into a new Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale, which lacked these psychometric problems. Although Altemeyer emphasized the ways in which RWA is a political attitude, its correlations with other measures suggest it is even more directly related to attitudes about conventions, traditions, and religion. The old Authoritarianism scales were highly correlated with measures of Religiousness (Gregory, 1957; Martin & Nichols, 1962; O'Neil & Levinson, 1954), and so too is RWA (Altemeyer, 1996; Leak & Randall, 1995). A large array of studies also document high correlations between Authoritarianism and Conservatism (Altemeyer, 1996; Billings, Guastello, & Rieke, 1993; Kline & Cooper, 1984a; Rubenstein, 1996; Stone, 1980; Stone & Smith, 1993; Tarr & Lorr, 1991).

Rokeach (1956) developed the Dogmatism (D) Scale in order to "measure general authoritarianism regardless of ideological content" (Kerlinger & Rokeach, 1966, p. 391). That is, Dogmatism should represent that part of Authoritarianism uncorrelated with Conservatism. However, numerous studies found Dogmatism to be substantially correlated with Conservatism (Altemeyer, 1996; Costin, 1971) as well as Authoritarianism (Bagley, 1970; Stone, 1980). In retrospect, it seems that Rokeach did not succeed in creating a construct independent of a general social attitudes factor.

Overall, a wide array of social attitudes studies indicates a first general factor that corresponds to some combination of Conservatism, Religiousness, and Authoritarianism. Clearly, the American

population has substantial variation in its attitudes about those sources of absolute authority embodied in tradition and religion. For some they are a sacred source of guidance, for others they are of little interest, and for yet others they are viewed as a profound threat. The same seems to be true of many other populations, as indicated by the cross-cultural robustness of at least some aspects of this correlated group of constructs (Altemeyer, 1996; McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992; Rubinstein, 1996; Walkey et al., 1990; G. D. Wilson & Iwawaki, 1980; G. D. Wilson & Lee, 1974) and the recurring polarity between modernist heterodoxy versus fundamentalist orthodoxy found in many nations (e.g., Egypt, Israel, Iran).

Failure to Replicate Additional Factors

Are there factors beyond this general one? In comparing studies of heterogeneous pools of attitude items, how are researchers to compare additional factors? One option would be to examine items loading highly on all the various factors, without trusting the veracity of the factor labels provided by those who conducted the studies. Unfortunately, most of the differences in these factors probably reflect divergences in item-pool content from one study to another, and it would be difficult to draw firm conclusions. So here I rely on the published factor labels to convey the diversity of content in these factors. The additional factors have been labeled as Humanitarianism (Ferguson, 1939, 1940); Nationalism (Ferguson, 1942); Humanism, Hedonism/Self-Interest, and Work Ethic (Lorr et al., 1973); Tough-Minded versus Tender-Minded (Eysenck, 1944, 1954); Realistic/Rational versus Emotional/Sentimental (Johnson, 1942); and Personal versus Political (Sanai, 1952). There is little agreement between these studies, and some factors seem better classed as personality trait dimensions.

There are several possible reasons for the failure to replicate additional factors in this domain: (a) The item pools may have varied critically from one study to another, (b) the samples also may have varied in a way that affected results, (c) all or most of these studies may have used samples too small to generate sufficiently stable parameter estimates, (d) all or most of the item pools may have been unrepresentative of the domain of social attitudes and beliefs (cf. Christie, 1956), partly because computational limitations limited the number of variables, or (e) there may in fact be no additional factors. The best conclusion is probably no conclusion: The studies are ambiguous with respect to additional factors, although there appear to be some. Studies with larger and more representative item pools might bring more clarity. Ray's (1982) conclusion that there is nothing independent of Radicalism versus Conservatism, except in the domain of personality, was probably premature.

Machiavellianism and Social Dominance Orientation

I turn now to two social attitude constructs that were developed rationally rather than on the basis of exploratory factor analyses of heterogeneous item pools. Each construct has proved useful from a predictive standpoint and thus ought to be accounted for in studies of the structure of social attitudes and beliefs.

Machiavellianism Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) items were constructed on the basis of the study of the writings of Renaissance political theorist Machiavelli. High Machiavellianism is indicated by flattery, dishonesty, and rejection of the belief that people are moral, believing instead that people are vicious and untrustworthy. There is an uneasy blend of Machiavellian tactics and Machiavellian views in this scale (Fehr, Samson, & Paulhus, 1992; Kline & Cooper, 1984b), and its multidimensionality has been the basis for much criticism (e.g., Hunter, Gerbing, & Boster, 1982). Nonetheless, recent work suggests some coherence in the scale's external correlates (D. S. Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996). Some researchers (Christie & Geis, 1970; Stone, 1974; Stone & Russ, 1976) have proposed that Machiavellianism is related to tough-mindedness (Eysenck, 1944, 1954). It is clear that the construct is virtually uncorrelated with Conservatism, Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, and Religiousness (Christie & Geis, 1970; Stone & Russ, 1976), and its content is therefore a viable candidate for inclusion in additional factors in the domain (cf. Stone, Ommundsen, & Williams, 1985).

Social-Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1996) is described as "a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical" (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). The Machiavellian-type items in early measures of SDO (Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994) have been eliminated: The scale has been made progressively more specific, and thus homogeneous and reliable, and presumably more independent of Machiavellianism (though Altemeyer, 1998, reported a substantial correlation between the two constructs). SDO appears to be overall quite independent of Conservatism, Authoritarianism, and Religiousness (Altemeyer, 1998; Sidanius et al., 1994), although correlations might be substantial within certain demographic groups (Sidanius et al., 1994, 1996). SDO also is a viable candidate for inclusion in additional factors in the domain.

There are other rationally developed constructs involving social attitudes and beliefs. Those involving epistemological orientation (Perry, 1981; Wilkinson & Schwartz, 1991), belief in a just world (Lipkus, 1991; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), and mysticism (Hood, 1975) are a few examples. The relation of these less prominent constructs to the apparent general factor likewise appears not to be close.

In summary, intercorrelations among measures of Conservatism, Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, and Religiousness suggest a general factor in the domain of social attitudes and beliefs. Factor analytic studies have not arrived at further factors, but useful rationally developed measures may represent aspects of such factors.

Applying the Lexical Approach to Social Attitudes and Beliefs

The situation in the domain of social attitudes and beliefs contrasts sharply with that in the personality domain. Studies of personality distinctions as represented in the natural language (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996) have contributed to a multifactorial representation of the domain that has attained some degree of consensus—the Big Five (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1992; John, 1989). Moreover, questionnaire measures of the five factors (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992) have been improved with the use of results of lexical studies as content-validity benchmarks (McCrae & Costa, 1985; Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999). In the social-attitudes

domain, however, consensus on all but a single broad factor seems as yet impossible.

Frequently, scientific progress in one discipline is accelerated by the use of an approach that has proved valuable in another discipline. Researchers might consider, then, applying the "lexical approach" to the domain of social attitudes. Aspects of this approach are alluded to by many authors (Austin, 1957; Cattell, 1943; Norman, 1963); the fundamental principle is that noteworthy (socially significant, widely occurring, sufficiently distinct) features of interindividual variation tend to become encoded in the natural language as single terms. Moreover, the "degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute" (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996, p. 26). Because representation in language is one guide to the importance of an attribute, and because structures derived from phrases and sentences are likely to be related to those based on single words, the lexical approach provides a strong rationale for the selection of variables.

Might the lexical approach, which proved useful in the personality trait domain, be borrowed for the study of social attitudes and beliefs? Individual differences in social attitudes and beliefs are socially meaningful phenomena, so it is likely that people would develop a distinct vocabulary for describing them. If so, lexical studies might help build a more differentiated, comprehensive, and consensual model for the domain. But where would one find the relevant vocabulary in a dictionary?

Saucier and Goldberg (1996) argued for the primacy of *adjectives* as descriptors of personality: Adjectives indicate qualities that distinguish one thing from another. Social attitudes are primarily encoded in English-language adjectives in two distinct ways: (a) in terms, often ending in *-ist,* that simultaneously denote a type noun (e.g., *Communist, Fundamentalist*), and (b) in terms, often ending in *-ic,* that are strictly adjectival (e.g., *Individualistic, Democratic*). Another alternative is *referent nouns* (e.g., *Abortion, Hippies*), buzzwords that provoke an affective response, indeed provoking the attitude itself; Kerlinger (1972, 1978) and G. D. Wilson (1973) advocated the use of referents (catchphrases as well as single buzzwords) for attitude measurement. A third alternative would be *attribute nouns* for social attitudes and beliefs, which are most commonly represented in English (and some other European languages) by nouns ending in *-ism* (e.g., *Communism, Fundamentalism, Individualism*).

Ultimately, it would be useful to study social attitude representation in language using all of these alternatives. For the present study, my choice was based on the relative linguistic richness, practicality, demarcability, and flexibility of these forms. Referent nouns are potentially the most richly represented in the dictionary, but only because virtually any noun denoting a real or symbolic object (e.g., *Calculus, February, Prosthesis*) could be the object of an attitude. This alternative is less practical because the number of lexical variables is so potentially enormous. As for adjectives, one form (e.g., *Individualist*) is ambiguous with respect to noun or adjective status, and this uncertainty of interpretation is likely to affect self-descriptions; the other form of adjective (e.g., *Individualistic*) seems to be less frequently used in everyday discourse (though these terms have been studied in German by Ostendorf, 1996).

I concluded that the attribute-noun form (e.g., *Individualism*) is the best starting point. This form is linguistically rich and indeed highly productive: Currently, new words denoting ways of thought are regularly generated by pinning *-ism* to the end of a noun (isms; e.g., *Thatcherism, pentecostalism*). The form is flexible: Isms can be used as buzzword referents (e.g., "How do you feel about Thatcherism?") and convert easily into understandable adjectives of either form (e.g., *Thatcherist, Thatcheristic*). With respect to encoding social attitudes and beliefs into the English lexicon, these considerations suggest some centrality for nouns ending in *-ism.* Moreover, this is the more practical alternative: The set of social-attitude-and-belief terms in a dictionary ending in *-ism* is a finite domain. Most of the constructs already used in the domain (e.g., *Conservatism, Authoritarianism*) are themselves denoted by isms. The isms in the natural language have not previously been studied systematically. It seemed that a reasonably comprehensive study of these descriptors might yield important information about the structure of interindividual variation in social attitudes and beliefs.

Study 1

Method

Extracting isms from a dictionary. An unabridged dictionary contains terms no longer in common use, but an overly brief dictionary might leave out many familiar terms. For this study I chose a fairly large dictionary of the English language—the third edition of *The American Heritage Dictionary* (1992). With different starting points, a graduate student research assistant and I independently examined each one of the 2,080 pages of entries in this dictionary. We listed all entries ending in *-ism* for which a definition was provided, and included the few entries consisting of two words (e.g., *Dialectical Materialism*). When our lists were combined, there were 721 terms (from *Abolitionism* to *Zoroastrianism*).

Not all words ending in *-ism* refer to social attitudes and beliefs (consider *Albinism, Alcoholism, Aneurism, Astigmatism, Botulism, Metabolism, Plagiarism, Truism,* and *Ventriloquism*). To remove irrelevant terms, three judges (myself and two graduate student assistants) examined each definition for each of the 721 terms against the following criterion: "Does it refer directly to a belief, opinion, principle, view, or conviction that might be held by one individual human being?" Each judge rated each definition—the 721 terms had a total of 1,208 definitions—on a 4-point (0 to 3) scale of likely relevance to the domain ranging from *no relevance* (0) to *obvious relevance* (3). The average interjudge correlation for these ratings was .76, generating coefficient alpha reliability of .90 (these coefficients were .70 and .88 when ratings were rescaled into dichotomous responses contrasting the upper 2 points with the lower 2 points). If two of three judges assigned a 0 or 1 to a term, it was excluded. By this criterion, 834 of the 1,208 definitions were excluded, leaving 374 definitions (including 278 judged as relevant by all three judges).

These 374 definitions drew on 292 actual ism terms (40% of the original 721). In the next stage I converted the 374 definitions into a questionnaire. One could simply present respondents with the ism terms and ask to what degree they subscribe to each ism. There are, however, three problems with this approach: (a) Many terms (e.g., *Environmentalism, Spiritualism*) have very different meanings according to which definition is intended, and this ambiguity would confuse respondents; (b) there might be large differences in knowledge of the isms vocabulary, which could distort results; and (c) because isms are more frequently used to describe the beliefs of *other* people, self-report respondents might be loath to pin a certain ism label on themselves, although if provided with a definition of the ism they would strongly agree with its content. Many of us might feel we don't personally subscribe to any isms, although other people, of course, do. For these reasons, I borrowed a technique from lexical work on personality (Goldberg & Kilkowski, 1985; Tellegen & Waller, 1987): For each ism definition, I presented respondents with a questionnaire statement that was based closely on the definition, not mentioning the ism at all.

This was a dictionary-based questionnaire. To reduce the role of subjectivity in the conversion of ism definitions into questionnaire items and to make the procedure more repeatable, I used a set of item-conversion rules in a designated hierarchical order.[1] The items relating to 26 isms were eliminated at this stage because of (a) complete redundancy with other items, (b) overly specialized content about which very few respondents would be knowledgeable, or (c) the impossibility of creating a suitable item due to a lack of information in the definition.[2] Some definitions were split into two or more items (to be reassembled before any analyses into a single variable corresponding to that definition) to cut down on confusing "double-barreled" items. The final questionnaire consisted of 389 items, which were based on 335 definitions (see Appendix A) derived from 266 discrete ism terms. Eleven further items of interest were added to create a total of 400 items.[3] Appendix B contains examples of the items. The 400 items were placed in a randomized order and were divided into two 200-item forms, whose order of presentation was counterbalanced across respondents.[4] Participants responded to each item using a 5-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (5).

Participants. Participants were recruited from the student body of a "commuter campus" state university in southern California. Completion of the surveys required on average about 75 min. Participants, who were drawn mostly from lower-division classes peopled predominantly with nonmajors, received course credit in psychology classes. The 500 participants included 127 men and 369 women (4 participants declined to indicate gender). They were heterogeneous with respect to age: approximately 40% were under 20 years old, 42% were in their 20s, 11% in their 30s, 4% in their 40s, and 2% in their 50s or 60s. No information on ethnicity was elicited for this survey, but at this ethnically diverse campus about 20% of the students are Hispanic, and close to 10% are African American.

Analyses. The 389 items were collapsed into the 335 ism-definition variables (Appendix A). This set of variables was randomly divided in half, and identical analyses were conducted on each half (167 and 168 variables × 500 participants). With the aim of isolating factors robust across the (random) variable selections, I conducted principal-components analyses with varimax rotation—oblique rotations resulted in virtually identical results.[5] I examined all solutions from 1 (unrotated components only) and 2 (rotated) to 10 factors (rotated), and correlated factor scores from the split halves of the total sample. Next, the set of variables was divided randomly in half again, and the same procedures were followed with this new pair of subsamples. As an index of degree of factor replication at each number of factors, I used the average correlation between matched factors for each number-of-factors solution. This index was used to determine the optimal (most replicable) solutions. Finally, to aid initial interpretation of the factors, I correlated each of the 11 supplementary items with the factors in the optimal solution(s). On the basis of previous studies, I expected the largest factor to contain content related to Conservatism, Authoritarianism, and Religiousness.

Results

Examination of the highest and lowest response means served both to identify some demographic characteristics of the sample (e.g., few participants subscribed to Judaism or Islam) and to characterize the collectively shared values of the culture from which the sample was derived (e.g., endorsing environmentalism and equality for women; opposing bigotry, slavery, polytheism, and satanism). In contrast to the case with personality variables, however, the first unrotated component in the present data was not strongly associated with endorsement frequency or desirability.

When all 335 definition variables were analyzed together, the first 10 eigenvalues were 23.1, 19.4, 14.5, 7.9, 5.1, 4.4, 4.0, 3.8, 3.4, and 3.4. This scree pattern suggests three large factors along with a fourth of moderate size.



Figure 1. Replication indices for 1- to 10-factor solutions.

Figure 1 provides indices of replication across halves of the variable set. The three-factor solution was the most robust in these replication tests. The four-factor solution was not as robust, but more robust than any subsequent solutions. I more closely examined the three- and four-factor solutions in the total data set (all 335 variables).

Table 1 provides the correlations between the factor scores for the three- and four-factor solutions. The first two factors were essentially identical in either solution, and these two factors had only small correlations with additional factors. The third factor in the three-factor solution had a correlation of .86 with the third factor in the four-factor solution and a correlation of .48 with the

[1] The rules were: (a) delete a few nonessential words (e.g., "the belief that") and retain the remaining sentence as an item, (b) convert an "as" or a "to be" into an "is" (e.g., "imperialism as [is] the final form of capitalism"), (c) where appropriate, create an "ought to" statement, (d) change a noun into its verb form (e.g., "belief [believe] in and worship of all gods"), (e) where appropriate, create a "there is/are" statement. In the small number of cases where I could not apply any of these rules to profit and could not find a same-sense definition in another dictionary to which any of the rules could be applied, I simply generated a best-sense paraphrase.

[2] The 26 terms were *Anarchosyndicalism, Auteurism, Celticism, Charism, Equilateralism, Hellenism, Imagism, Germanism, Hindooism* (sic; *Hinduism* was retained), *Hitlerism, Literalism, Lysenkoism, Marxism–Leninism, Mazdaism, National Socialism, Naturism, Neo-Darwinism, Neo-Lamarckism, Neo-Scholasticism, Pacificism, Postmillenarianism, Structuralism, Sufism, Tibetan Buddhism, Universalism,* and *Zoophilism.*

[3] The added items were designed to index Christianity, Islam, favoring Plutocracy, Meritocracy, Gun Control, Ancestor Worship, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, Separatism/Segregationism, Technicism, and Antiabortionism.

[4] Copies of the questionnaire are available from Gerard Saucier.

[5] It has been demonstrated that if sample size is large and the variable to factor ratio is high (as in the present study) principal-components solutions are nearly identical to principal-factors solutions (Snook & Gorsuch, 1989; Velicer & Jackson, 1990; Widaman, 1993) but have the advantage of yielding exact factor scores. I found correlations from .998 to .999 between matched factors in principal-components and principal-factors solutions. The correlations from .990 to 1.000 between matched factors derived from varimax and oblique (either oblimin or promax) rotational methods, along with the ease of creating relatively uncorrelated scales, indicate that the isms factors are fundamentally orthogonal.

Table 1
Correlations Between Factor Scores for Three- and Four-Factor Solutions

	Three-factor solution		
Four-factor solution	Factor 1 (α)	Factor 2 (β)	Factor 3 ($\gamma\delta$)
Factor 1 (α)	**.99**	−.03	−.08
Factor 2 (β)	.01	**.98**	−.15
Factor 3 (γ)	.04	.06	**.86**
Factor 4 (δ)	.10	.19	**.49**

Note. N = 500. Correlations of at least .20 magnitude are printed in boldface type.

fourth factor in that solution, indicating a hierarchical relation: The third factor (of three) was a higher-order combination of two smaller factors.

I adopted a labeling system for the factors that took this pattern into account. The first factor was called *alphaisms*, as it refers to a collection of isms loading on a first, or alpha, factor. The second factor was called *betaisms*, referring to a collection of isms on a second, or beta, factor. The third and fourth factors (from the four-factor solution) were called, respectively, *gammaisms* and *deltaisms* after the third and fourth letters of the Greek alphabet, and their higher-order composite in the three-factor solution was called *gammadeltaisms*. The use of Greek letters was intended to avert the kind of mislabeling that sometimes occurs when one attempts to encompass a broad factor within a single-attribute noun (Agreeableness in the Big Five model is an example). The use of the plural form in the label is a reminder of the content heterogeneity of the broad factors.

Table 2 presents variables with high loadings on each of these factors. Alphaisms and betaisms are represented entirely by loadings from the three-factor solution, because loadings in the four-factor solution were nearly the same.[6]

One psychometric feature discernable in Table 2 deserves mention. Whereas the alphaisms constitute a fairly bipolar factor, with some isms loading highly at both poles, this is less true for the remaining factors.[7] This indicates that the isms lexicon consists largely of nouns referring to interest in, or valuing of, certain positions, rather than sheer opposition to certain positions. In other words, each factor consists primarily of a constellation of positively covarying isms; the negative factor pole consists of ways of rejecting elements in that constellation. The development of suitable reverse-keyed items for that negative factor pole would then be a crucial step in developing adequate scales for these latter factors.[8]

The correlations of supplementary items with the factors provide further information. Correlated with the alphaisms were avowals of Christianity (.68) and opposition to abortion (.49). Correlated with the betaisms were endorsements of plutocracy (.43), technicism (belief that technology will solve all problems; .39), and separatism or segregationism (.37). Favorability toward the Democratic versus the Republican party was not strongly related to the factors; the largest correlation was with deltaisms (.32, Democratic leaners scoring higher); there were smaller correlations with alphaisms (r = −.14) and gammaisms (−.17), in both cases those leaning toward Republican scored higher on the factor. Although the broader $\gamma\delta$ factor was neutral with respect to party, the bifurcation between γ and δ seemed to best reflect this political polarity.

On the basis of the results from Study 1 alone, one might conjecture that the alphaisms involve a polarity between religious sources of authority (e.g., the church, the holy book, the inerrant tradition) and either secular sources of authority (e.g., evolutionary theory) or an attitude of denial or skepticism about the religious sources. The betaisms seem to involve admitting to having subjective motives for personal behavior that may be carnal, egoistic, materialistic, reflect in-group favoritism, and be "politically incorrect." The gammadeltaisms seem to involve allegiance to a set of civic principles characteristic of modern Western democracies, a complex synthesis of classical liberalism, humanism, individualism, existentialism, romanticism, and utilitarianism. Whereas the gammaisms put greater stress on the collective nationalistic, patriotic, and constitutionalist themes in this synthesis, the deltaisms discriminantly stress a kind of spiritual individualism that represents a unique synthesis including some Eastern religious ideas and has a New Age or New England–transcendentalist flavor.

One fascinating (but incidental) hypothesis with respect to the three factors is that they are historically layered, that is, sedimented in the stream of Western language and culture at different

[6] The unrotated first and second factors represented a nearly 45° rotation from the first and second rotated factors. Authoritarianism is correlated highly with the first and moderately with the second rotated factor—however, it would be correlated even more highly with the first unrotated factor. The third and fourth unrotated factors are very similar to the third and fourth factors in the four-factor rotated solution.

[7] One might propose that the third factor could be a difficulty factor, because items with high-response means tend to load on it. A pair of observations suggest there are no difficulty factors here: (a) Only 32 of the 335 lexical variables—just under 10%—have markedly skewed distributions (skew more extreme than ±1.00), comparable to the frequency of skewed distributions among personality adjectives (e.g., the 540 trait-descriptive adjectives used by Hofstee, De Raad, & Goldberg, 1992, for which the figure is about 7%), and (b) when these 32 variables were removed from the variable selection and factor analyses recalculated on the remaining variables, the factor scores for the three- and four-factor solutions had correlations from .99 to 1.00 with matched factors from the full set of 335 variables. In other words, the markedly skewed variables have no determining effect on the factor structure.

[8] Ipsatized data yielded factors with much the same content coverage—the four factors in the four-factor ipsatized-data solution had multiple correlations of .98, .88, .82, and .91, respectively, with the α, β, γ, and δ factors described above. The ipsatized solutions did, however, rotate some of the factors into variant positions. Although the α position matched that for the original data, the β, γ, and δ positions were systematically rotated 15° to 30° with respect to one another. I give primacy in this article to solutions from original data because of a problematic assumption in the use of ipsatized data: that individual differences in both mean and standard deviation reflect all or mostly response biases (acquiescence and extremeness responding). This assumption can be tenable when content in an item pool is well matched for keying direction. But in this data set, all four factors consist primarily of a constellation of positively covarying isms—without many reverse-keyed items. Therefore, individual differences in mean response might reflect differences in underlying attitudes—those who tend to agree with major elements of all four constellations will have high means, those who disagree with major elements of all four will have low means.

Table 2
Variables With High Loadings on Lexical Isms Factors

Three-factor solution					
α		β		$\gamma\delta$	
Ecclesiasticism 2	.79	Materialism 1	.61	Liberalism 2a	.61
Pietism 3	.75	Sensualism 2	.56	Environmentalism 1	.55
Creationism	.75	Machiavellianism	.54	Individualism 1a	.54
Evangelicism 1	.69	Solipsism 2	.53	Liberalism 4a	.51
Religionism 1	.69	Fascism 1b	.53	Existentialism	.48
Salvationism	.68	Sensationalism 3	.53	Humanism 4	.46
Institutionalism 1	.68	Ethnocentrism 1	.52	Neoliberalism	.46
Textualism 1	.66	Rationalism 2	.52	Meliorism	.45
Monotheism	.64	Hobbism	.52	Romanticism 1	.45
Legalism 1	.62	Materialism 2	.50	Utilitarianism 2	.44
Apocalypticism	.62	Nihilism 1b	.47	Associationism	.43
Theism	.61	Aestheticism 2	.47	Intellectualism 2	.43
Fideism	.61	Hedonism 2	.46	Logical Atomism	.42
Messianism 1	.60	Animalism 2	.46	Transcendentalism 1	.40
Puritanism 2	.59	Egoism 1b	.45	Patriotism	.40
Traditionalism 1	.57	Hedonism 1	.44	Illuminism 1	.39
Inerrantism	.56	Solipsism 1	.44	Immanentism	.39
Postmillenialism	.56	Medievalism 2	.44	Relativism	.38
Premillenialism	.53	Immaterialism	.44	Hedonism 3	.38
Calvinism	.52	Dialectical Materialism	.43	Zen Buddhism	.38
Zoroastrianism	.52	Benthamism	.43	Humanism 1	.38
Theanthropism 2	.52	Positivism 1a	.43	Constitutionalism 2b	.37
Gnosticism	.51	Chauvinism 3	.42	Antinomianism 2	.36
Formalism 1	.47	Cynicism 3	.42	Moralism	.36
Secular Humanism 1	.63	Empiricism 1	.42	Intuitionism 2	.36
Atheism	−.58	Anarchism 1	.42	Americanism 3	.36
Humanitarianism 3	−.58	Jansenism	.41	Pacifism 1	.35
Evolutionism 2	−.57	Illusionism 1	.41	Reconstructionism	.35
Marcionism	−.55	Idealism 4	.41	Realism 3b	.35
Secularism 2	−.52	Racism	.41	Transcendentalism 2	.34
		Chauvinism 1	.40	Antisemitism 1	−.35

Four-factor solution			
γ		δ	
Liberalism 2a	.55	Hinduism	.54
Individualism 1a	.53	Bergsonism	.46
Americanism 3	.51	Transcendentalism 2	.44
Patriotism	.50	Illuminism 1	.42
Humanism 4	.48	Asceticism 2	.41
Constitutionalism 2b	.48	Animism 1	.41
Logical Atomism	.47	Spinozism	.40
Neoliberalism	.46	Immanentism	.39
Environmentalism 1	.44	Populism 1a	.39
Intellectualism 2	.44	Neoplatonism 1	.38
Liberalism 4a	.43	Taoism	.38
Hedonism 3	.41	Anthropomorphism	.37
Fundamentalism 2	.40	Zen Buddhism	.37
Utilitarianism 2	.40	Animism 2	.36
Associationism	.40	Totemism	.36
Benthamism	.40	Pacifism 2a	.35
Meliorism	.40	Pantheism 1	.35
Humanism 1	.39	Spiritism 1	.33
Historicism 2	.39	Spiritualism 1a	.33
Functionalism 2	.39	Quietism 1	.33
Systematism 2	.37	Indifferentism	.32
Existentialism	.37	Fetishism 1	.31
Restrictionism	.37	Agrarianism	.31
Credentialism	.36	Sacerdotalism	.31
Holism 1	.36	Jainism	.31
Moralism	.36	Animism 3	.31
Realism 3b	.34	Antinomianism 2	.31
Objectivism 1	.34		
Atlanticism	.33		
Uniformitarianism	.33		
Physicalism	.33		
Factualism	.32		

Note. $N = 500$. Variable labels refer to entry numbers in *The American Heritage Dictionary* (1992). Many of the variables listed are composites of two or more items. In cases in which the term had multiple definitions, the number (and letter) after the term indicates which definition was the basis for the item.

periods. A number of the isms are named after historical figures. Among these, those named after Zoroaster, Mani, Marcion, Pelagius, Arius, and Calvin (the oldest stratum of characters) are among the alphaisms, those named after Epicurus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Jansen, and Chauvin (a later stratum) are among the betaisms, and those named after Bergson, Darwin, Spencer, Spinoza, Weismann, and Hegel (on average, an even later stratum) are among the gammadeltaisms. Overall, it is easy to conjecture that the alphaisms involve a polarity in social attitudes and beliefs that goes back several thousand years to the beginning of world religions, whereas aspects of the betaisms were expounded later, and even later came the gammadeltaisms, which involve polarities more conditional on a modern sociopolitical landscape.

I had hypothesized that the first factor would combine elements of Conservatism, Religiousness, and related aspects of Authoritarianism, and indeed it did. I examine this convergence more fully in Study 2. Except for a possible association between Machiavellianism and the second factor, the additional factors do not appear to correspond precisely to previous constructs. These additional factors could conceivably, then, be important new variables in the domain of social attitudes and beliefs, overlooked until now by expert intuitions and commonly used scales.

Study 2

Study 1 established the existence of three replicable factors in statements derived from dictionary definitions of -ism terms in English. It also indicated two specific subcomponents of the third of these factors. Study 2 addressed further questions, which were relevant to better interpretation of the factors in light of the previous literature. Study 1 only imprecisely indicated how the factors might relate to the most prominent social-attitudes-and-beliefs constructs in the literature—Conservatism, Authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, SDO. In Study 2, I administered measures of these constructs alongside markers of the isms factors.

Another unresolved issue was the relation of isms to personality factors. Are the former in fact just covert projections of the latter, as Eysenck (1954, 1961) suggested with respect to his early Tough-Mindedness factor? Or do the isms factors mark out individual differences in a separate domain from personality factors? Only one broad personality trait has in the past been found consistently associated with measures of social attitudes. Several studies indicate that Conservatism is negatively correlated with Openness to Experience (Billings et al., 1993; Joe, Jones, & Ryder, 1977; Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997; Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, & Richter, 1993). Openness is a version of a Big Five factor found in questionnaire studies (Costa & McCrae, 1992), whereas the lexical version of the same factor has usually been called Intellect (e.g., Goldberg, 1992). Interestingly, Yik and Tang (1996) found that Openness was the personality dimension most related to values, whereas a measure of Intellect was the least related. This suggests that inclusion of social-attitudes content is the key discriminator between these two versions of the factor: Openness includes attitudes, Intellect does not. To gauge the relation of the isms factors to personality factors, I included a measure of the lexical Big Five and, for comparison purposes, an indicator of Openness as well.

Method

Measures of isms factors. To measure the isms factors, I developed alternative forms of a Survey of Dictionary-Based Isms (SDI). A long form, the SDI-A, consists of approximately 40 item clusters that were developed with a sequence including (a) within-factor-domain promax factor analyses, and (b) reduction of the resultant initial clusters to tighter clusters that were homogeneous both empirically (using reliability analyses) and rationally (with respect to overt content). These clusters readily generate either the three- or four-factor lexical solutions with high fidelity, and contrait (reverse-keyed) items are being built into the item clusters. Development of this instrument is described in a separate report (Saucier, 1999).[9]

Because this more comprehensive instrument was still under construction, I relied in Study 2 on briefer measures of the isms factors, whose psychometric characteristics are summarized in Table 3. In one version (SDI-B), developed entirely from the Study 1 data set, each scale consisted of a set of high-loading items on the respective factor. This version stands out for a combination of brevity and high fidelity to the lexical factors from Study 1; its items are presented in Appendix B. One limitation of the SDI-B is that only the alphaisms scale has a substantial proportion of contrait (reverse-keyed) items. In the other version (SDI-C), these scales were revised to include additional new contrait items (used for the first time in Study 2). Scale intercorrelations for SDI-B (in either sample) and SDI-C were typically below .10, and always below .20, in magnitude. For the SDI-B, reliability estimates were at the same level in the replication as in the derivation sample, indicating high generalizability of the covariances among the items in its scales.

As an additional indicator of each isms factor, I generated a composite that was based on regression weights for each factor, with those 123 items used in both the Study 1 and Study 2 data sets. In the former data set, composites that were based on weights with these 123 items had correlations ranging from .97 to .99 with factor scores for matched factors from the original lexical analyses. The Study 2 isms survey consisted of 35 items in addition to the 123, the majority of these additions being candidate contrait items.

Other measures. I used the 50-item C Scale (G. D. Wilson, 1973) minus 20 items for which previous studies indicated low general-factor saturation or that seemed unlikely to work well with either contemporary or American samples (e.g., coeducation, computer music, pajama parties, birching, royalty). The measure has a 3-point (*yes, ?, no*) response scale. Rather than creating a unit-weighted scale, Conservatism was indicated by the first unrotated factor that was based on the 30 items administered.

I used the 32-item, 1997 version of Altemeyer's (1998) RWA scale; the first two items are not scored. The measure has a 9-point response scale, and reliability coefficients for RWA scales have been generally in the .85 to .95 range; in the present sample the alpha coefficient was .93.

Machiavellianism was measured by the 20-item Mach-IV (Version 1), which has reported reliabilities around .80 (Christie & Geis, 1970). The measure has a 6-point response scale. I used Mach-IV rather than Mach-V because of the latter's questionable reliability (Fehr et al., 1992; Shea & Beatty, 1983), questionable method of controlling for social desirability, and poor fit with the theory of the construct (Fehr et al., 1992; Williams, Hazleton, & Renshaw, 1975). In the present sample, alpha reliability was .67. Mach-IV is known to be factorially heterogeneous, so I also considered three promax factors derived from the items in the present data, which

[9] The three factors derived from the SDI-A clusters in the Study 1 sample had correlations from .96 to .98 with factor scores for matched factors from the lexical three-factor solution in Study 1, and the four factors had correlations from .94 to .98 with those for matched factors from the lexical four-factor solution. Up-to-date information regarding the item content and psychometric characteristics of the SDI-A is available from Gerard Saucier.

Table 3
Psychometric Characteristics of Survey of Dictionary-Based Isms (SDI) Scales

Scale	Protrait/ contrait items	Derivation sample (N = 500) Correlation with criterion	Coefficient alpha	Mean r	Replication sample (N = 303) Correlation with criterion	Coefficient alpha	Mean r
			SDI-B				
α	6/6	.92	.84	.30	.93	.85	.32
β	15/0	.90	.80	.21	.90	.82	.23
$\gamma\delta$	19/1	.91	.80	.17	.91	.79	.16
γ	19/0	.90	.80	.18	.91	.79	.17
δ	18/1	.88	.75	.14	.90	.77	.15
			SDI-C				
α	6/6	.92	.84	.30	.93	.85	.32
β	11/8				.87	.83	.21
$\gamma\delta$	11/6				.86	.79	.18
γ	8/4				.83	.65	.14
δ	8/4				.81	.71	.17

Note. Contrait items are reverse-keyed items. "Criterion" refers to factor score for target factor from analyses in Table 2 (for derivation sample) or composite generated using regression weights for same factor from derivation sample (for replication sample). Mean r denotes the mean interitem correlation of the items composing the scale. Some SDI-C items were not administered to the derivation sample, so scale statistics cannot be calculated except for the SDI-C α scale: The α scale for the SDI-C is identical to that for the SDI-B.

could be labeled as Duplicity (disavowing the need for honesty), Machiavellian Tactics, and Cynicism Regarding Human Nature.

SDO was measured using the 16-item SDO6 (Pratto et al., 1994), with a 7-point response scale. It generated an alpha coefficient of .86.

The Big Five factors were indicated by the Mini-Markers (Saucier, 1994), a set of 40 adjectives including 8-item scales for each factor, based on Goldberg's (1992) longer set of adjective markers. Reliability coefficients for these scales are generally about .80. This instrument includes a scale for the Intellect factor, but not for the Openness version of the factor. To compare Openness to Intellect, I included nine items from the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, in press) that have high correlations with the NEO Personality Inventory—Revised Openness domain and summed their scores to create an Openness indicator.[10] These nine items were interspersed among the items relating to isms factors. Their heterogeneity is indicated by their modest alpha reliability (.53).

As an additional indicator of Religiousness, I included two adjectives (*religious* and *nonreligious*) that Saucier and Goldberg (1998) found to be a remarkably reliable two-item composite whose content lies beyond the Big Five. Response to all adjectives involved use of a 9-point response scale (as in Goldberg, 1992; Saucier, 1994).

The materials were arranged in a form beginning with the personality adjectives, followed first by the attitude measures and then by the isms-factor measures. A second form was created with the measures in exactly reversed order, and administration of the two forms was counterbalanced across respondents.

Participants. Participants were recruited from the student body of the same campus as in Study 1. Completion of the surveys required on average about 55 min. Participants received a modicum of course credit in psychology classes, with most of them being drawn from lower-division classes consisting predominantly of nonmajors. The 303 participants included 91 men and 212 women. They were again somewhat heterogeneous with respect to age: The mean age reported was 25.6 years, with a standard deviation of 8.9 years, and a similar distribution to that in Study 1. Minority ethnic identifications of participants included 27% citing Hispanic ancestry, 13% citing African American ancestry, 12% citing Asian or Pacific-Islander ancestry, and 3% citing Native American ancestry. I also gathered data on the educational attainment of the respondent's parents.

Analyses. Indicators of the isms factors—the SDI scales and the regression composite—were correlated in turn with (a) the four attitude measures (C, RWA, Mach-IV, and SDO), (b) the personality scales, and (c) demographic variables. My prediction was that alphaisms would be associated with C and RWA and the *religious–nonreligious* adjective pair, and that betaisms would be associated with Mach-IV and SDO. In the case of SDO, because correlations might theoretically be expected to differ within varying demographic groups (Sidanius et al., 1994, 1996), I repeated these analyses for subsets of the data defined by minority-group versus majority-group membership.

Results

Table 4 presents the correlations between the isms factors and the attitude scales. Conservatism and Authoritarianism correlated at .77 with one another. Moreover, their correlations with isms factors clearly indicate both are classifiable as alphaisms. They are distinguishable in three-factor isms space because C has a small negative correlation with betaisms and less of a negative correlation with gammadeltaisms. To better discern their convergent and divergent content, I generated a common factor from the two scales, and also examined the correlations of each scale, after the other scale had been partialed out, with each of the 158 survey items. Their common factor correlated highly with core alphaisms items (e.g., creationism, devotion to church and codes of morality, opposition to secularism). Conservatism sans RWA suggested a more religious outlook, whereas RWA sans Conservatism included

[10] The 10 items were "Believe in the importance of art," "Have a vivid imagination," "Tend to vote for liberal political candidates," "Enjoy wild flights of fantasy," "Am interested in many things" (protrait), "Do not like art," "Am not interested in abstract ideas," "Avoid philosophical discussions," "Tend to vote for conservative political candidates," and "Prefer to stick with things that I know."

Table 4
Correlations Between Isms Factor Scales and Measures of Social Attitudes

Scales	Religiousness	RWA	Conservatism	SDO	Mach-IV Total	Mach-IV F1	Mach-IV F2	Mach-IV F3
RWA	**.51**							
Conservatism	**.59**	**.77**						
SDO	−.04	.22	.09					
Mach-IV total	**−.28**	−.21	**−.31**	.21				
Alphaisms								
RC	**.69**	**.74**	**.76**	.05	**−.27**	**−.38**	.03	−.18
SDI-B	**.72**	**.68**	**.75**	−.02	**−.28**	**−.36**	−.04	−.16
SDI-C	**.72**	**.68**	**.75**	−.02	**−.28**	**−.36**	−.04	−.16
Betaisms								
RC	−.23	−.01	−.16	**.29**	**.40**	.16	**.53**	−.04
SDI-B	−.19	.11	−.04	**.31**	**.34**	.11	**.51**	−.07
SDI-C	−.17	.07	−.07	**.28**	**.37**	.14	**.50**	.00
Gammadeltaisms								
RC	−.14	**−.29**	−.21	−.21	−.11	.01	−.10	**−.32**
SDI-B	−.07	−.23	−.13	−.18	−.17	−.02	−.14	**−.36**
SDI-C	−.07	**−.25**	−.11	−.22	−.23	−.02	−.22	**−.37**
Gammaisms								
RC	−.10	−.13	−.16	−.08	−.13	−.05	−.06	**−.34**
SDI-B	−.05	−.06	−.04	−.15	−.16	−.07	−.07	**−.34**
SDI-C	−.07	−.14	−.07	−.17	−.22	−.05	−.21	**−.31**
Deltaisms								
RC	−.07	−.24	−.16	−.19	.06	.07	.07	−.13
SDI-B	−.04	−.21	−.12	−.18	−.02	.03	.03	−.22
SDI-C	.02	−.13	−.05	−.16	−.11	−.02	−.07	−.22

Note. $N = 303$. Religiousness refers to the combined score on the adjectives *Religious* versus *Nonreligious*. For Mach-IV, factor (F) scores for three promax factors are provided with the total score (F1 = Duplicity, F2 = Machiavellian Tactics, F3 = Cynicism Regarding Human Nature). RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social-Dominance Orientation; RC = regression composite; SDI = Survey of Dictionary-Based Isms (Version B or C). In a sample of this size, correlations of ≥.15 are $p < .01$, and of ≥.12 are $p < .05$. Correlations of at least .25 magnitude are printed in boldface type.

more overt endorsements of the political right, ethnocentrism, militarism, and political absolutism: In short, as would be expected, RWA is more clearly fascist (and less religious) than is Conservatism. The bipolar pair of Religiousness adjectives correlated at about .70 with alphaisms, .59 with Conservatism, and .51 with RWA. Thus, as in previous studies, Religiousness, Conservatism, and Authoritarianism form a strong mutually correlating cluster, all identified as alphaisms.

As predicted, Machiavellianism was correlated with betaisms, but this association was moderate in size (r = .34 to .40); the associations of the overall scale with gammaisms (r = −.13 to −.22) and alphaisms (r = −.27 to −.28) are also potentially meaningful. Its three subfactors were discriminantly associated with the three isms factors, Duplicity (negatively) with alphaisms, Machiavellian Tactics (positively) with betaisms, and Cynicism Regarding Human Nature (negatively) with gammadeltaisms.[11] Thus, although Mach-IV maps primarily onto the betaisms, its content suggests a profile in three-factor isms space (low α, high β, low γ and $\gamma\delta$); does this suggest how Machiavelli himself might have scored?

SDO had moderate correlations with betaisms (r = .29 to .31), its profile having some similarity with that of Mach-IV (high β, low $\gamma\delta$). The demographically homogeneous subsamples generally showed the same pattern. There was some variation in the correlation between SDO and Conservatism, which was .03 in the European non-Hispanic ancestry group, but .35 in the minority (Hispanic and African American) group. Compared with Machiavellianism (with which it was correlated overall .21), SDO had higher correlations with isms items denoting forms of ethnocentrism, in-group favoritism, patriotism, and political absolutism, and lacked the secularist, nihilistic content found among the Mach correlates. Although both Mach and SDO are classifiable as betaisms, they are highly divergent facets of this factor.

Table 5 presents the correlations between the isms factors and the Big Five indicators. The correlations are low. Among the lexical Big Five, Agreeableness and Intellect had the strongest

[11] The first (duplicity vs. honesty) factor was most highly correlated with items regarding honesty, lying, and giving the real reasons for what you want; interestingly, isms items about being perfectly faithful to a text were also correlated with this factor. The second (tactics) factor was most highly correlated with items relating to not disclosing the real reasons for one's actions, assuming a vicious streak in others, and cutting corners to get ahead; associated isms related to ethnocentrism, particularism, egoism, solipsism, sensualism, and anarchism. The third (cynicism) factor was most highly correlated with items suggesting that most people are good, kind, brave, clean, and moral and that it is possible to be good in all respects; a strongly associated isms item read, "I believe in the natural goodness of human beings." Tables of factor loadings and correlations for these factors are available from Gerard Saucier.

Table 5
Correlations Between Isms Factor Scales and Personality Measures

Scale	Big Five mini-marker scales					9-item Openness indicator
	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Emotional Stability	Intellect/ Imagination	
Alphaisms						
RC	.03	.17	.05	.02	−.17	**−.31**
SDI-B	.06	.20	.08	.07	−.17	**−.27**
SDI-C	.06	.20	.08	.07	−.17	**−.27**
Betaisms						
RC	−.12	−.19	−.07	−.15	−.16	−.21
SDI-B	−.12	−.19	−.02	−.16	−.16	**−.29**
SDI-C	−.13	−.18	−.03	−.12	−.20	**−.30**
Gammadeltaisms						
RC	.06	.19	.05	.03	.11	**.47**
SDI-B	.06	.19	.08	.00	.06	**.43**
SDI-C	.09	.22	.06	.06	.08	**.46**
Gammaisms						
RC	.04	.18	.15	.10	.08	**.28**
SDI-B	.07	.17	.16	.09	.05	**.28**
SDI-C	.05	.21	.10	.09	.11	**.36**
Deltaisms						
RC	.02	.06	−.15	−.15	.00	**.34**
SDI-B	.00	.11	−.09	−.10	−.02	**.32**
SDI-C	.02	.17	−.07	−.05	.05	**.29**

Note. N = 303. RC = regression composite; SDI = Survey of Dictionary-Based Isms (Version B or C). Coefficients of at least .25 magnitude are printed in boldface type.

projections in three-factor isms space.[12] By any isms measure, Agreeableness was slightly high α, low β, and high $\gamma\delta$, whereas Intellect was slightly low α and low β.[13] However, as in Yik and Tang (1996), these modest associations are dwarfed by those between the Openness indicator scale and isms. Like Intellect, Openness had the low α and low β profile, but with somewhat higher projections; unlike Intellect it had quite strong positive associations with the deltaisms (and more generally the gammadeltaisms). These latter isms may be powerful discriminators of the lexical Intellect and the questionnaire Openness constructs. Overall, the correlation coefficients of the Openness indicator with gammadeltaisms approached the magnitude of its reliability coefficient; with SDI-B gammadeltaisms, the attenuation-corrected correlation would be nearly 1.00. Future studies might address whether the same strong relations occur when a more conventional measure of Openness is administered separately from the isms items.[14]

The crossover of Openness into the isms domain suggests an area of overlap between some personality models and the domain of social attitudes and beliefs. The same is true of Machiavellianism, the only one of the attitude scales that had substantial correlations with the personality measures. The total Mach-IV score had a correlation of −.48 with Agreeableness, suggesting that it can be thought of partly as a subcomponent of (Dis)Agreeableness and partly as reflecting social attitudes and beliefs. We might speculate that those who score high on Machiavellianism represent a select group with respect to temperament, who are attracted to and take up a particular set of social attitudes and beliefs. It is also conceivable that attitudes and beliefs affect the personality trait.

Table 6 provides correlations with demographic variables. As in Study 1, increasing age was moderately associated with low β and high $\gamma\delta$; the association with low β was more pronounced among women ($r \sim -.40$) than among men ($r > -.20$).[15] Unlike some previous studies (Nias, 1973; Truett, 1993), it is surprising that age and alphaisms were uncorrelated. However, middle-aged college students are probably an unrepresentative sample of middle-aged Americans; moreover, among the Hispanic participants, age and alphaisms were negatively correlated ($r = -.34$), whereas among the non-Hispanic participants they were positively correlated ($r = .07$). As in Study 1, the isms factor scales were virtually uncorre-

[12] Saucier (1997) found two factors appearing in solutions beside the Big Five, when a very wide range of person descriptors is included. Both of these two factors had indicators included in the adjective list. One of them, Attractiveness, appeared quite independent of isms factors. The other, Negative Valence, had a correlation of almost .30 with betaisms and virtually no correlation at all with other isms factors. This association deserves further attention.

[13] Also included in the adjective-item pool were sufficient additional adjectives to provide markers for the Big Three personality factors (Saucier, 1998) and higher order factors of the Big Five (Digman, 1997). Correlations of these factors with isms factors were in general lower than those for the Big Five.

[14] However, it is unlikely that shared method variance accounts for the higher correlations of Openness with social attitudes. The Openness indicator had correlations of −.48 with RWA, −.34 with C, and −.29 with SDO, even though these measures were administered in another section of the survey with different response scales.

[15] In this sample, the distribution of ages was positively skewed. A log-10 transformation to reduce the skew had no meaningful effect on these correlations.

Table 6
Correlations Between Isms Factors and Demographic Variables

		Controlling for age							
			Education level			Reported ancestry			
Factor	Age	Sex (male)	Father	Mother	Family size	API	AA	H	ENH
Alphaisms									
RC	−.01	−.07	−.04	−.03	.14	−.04	.10	.03	−.10
SDI-B	−.01	−.08	−.03	−.03	.15	−.08	.10	.07	−.11
SDI-C	−.01	−.08	−.03	−.03	.15	−.08	.10	.07	−.11
Betaisms									
RC	**−.30**	.05	−.19	−.13	.08	**.29**	.12	.06	**−.33**
SDI-B	**−.32**	.01	−.20	−.15	.10	**.25**	.08	.06	**−.31**
SDI-C	**−.31**	.05	−.16	−.12	.10	.23	.12	.06	**−.30**
Gammadeltaisms									
RC	.21	.01	.07	.01	−.03	−.03	−.07	.00	.09
SDI-B	.22	−.03	.07	.05	−.02	.00	−.07	−.01	.06
SDI-C	.22	−.08	.08	.06	−.01	−.03	−.02	−.05	.09
Gammaisms									
RC	.17	.10	.13	.08	−.03	−.04	−.14	−.01	.14
SDI-B	.20	.07	.12	.07	−.02	−.04	−.15	.01	.12
SDI-C	.21	.05	.13	.11	−.01	−.05	−.15	−.03	.17
Deltaisms									
RC	.04	−.15	−.13	−.15	.04	.09	.15	.05	−.18
SDI-B	.10	−.12	−.10	−.15	.05	.06	.10	.04	−.13
SDI-C	.06	−.11	−.03	−.09	.06	.06	.16	−.05	−.10

Note. N = 300. Family size = number of siblings reported. API = Asian/Pacific Islander; AA = African American; H = Hispanic; ENH = European non-Hispanic; RC = regression composite; SDI = Survey of Dictionary-Based Isms (Version B or C). Correlations of at least .25 in magnitude are printed in boldface type.

lated with gender. The correlations were similarly low with parental education, one indicator of socioeconomic status.[16]

Associations between isms and ethnicity were very modest. The largest involved a surprising contrast between the European/non-Hispanic participants (tending toward low β) and the Asian/Pacific-Islander participants (tending toward high β).[17] Membership in African American and Hispanic groups was not correlated at over about .15 with any factor. Interestingly, gammaisms and deltaisms were moderately (positively) correlated with one another in the data subset defined by these minorities, whereas they were independent of each other in the European/non-Hispanic subgroup.

Interpreting the Factors

With the results of Study 1 and 2 and the content of the SDI-B indicated in Appendix B, there is sufficient information for venturing a fuller characterization of the isms factors. I emphasize the meaning of the constellation of isms at the positive pole of the factor, because most ism variables are located there.

The alphaisms concern reverence for traditional and religious sources of authority. Durkheim (1915) proposed that religion plays an important social role: It preserves the social structure by making it into something sacred. Rohrbaugh and Jessor's (1975) description of the religious person in terms of "general conventionality: a relative acceptance of social institutions as worth conserving as they are, a set of values that sustain conformity" (p. 151) has a similar theme. In alphaisms, precedent is valued; alphaisms advocate conserving cultural traditions. This conservation function can take diverse forms: immersion in conventional forms of religion (Religiousness), a dislike of radical political change and revolutions in lifestyle (Conservatism), or willingness to aggress on behalf of established, traditional sources of authority (Authoritarianism).

As shown by studies in the former Soviet Union (McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992), the cultural tradition to which authoritarians adhere can be capitalist or communist in its economic orientation. The association with religion may drop off if the tradition happens to be hostile to religion—though perhaps here a new "religion" has been installed, an atheistic religion of the state ideology. Altemeyer (1998) noted that religion and authoritarianism share an attraction to absolute sources of authority. Obviously, absolutes are more easily and consensually obtained from the past—upstream in the development of one's culture—than in the future or in some other culture. Both a proclivity toward absolutes and a defense of the traditional social structure are involved in the alphaisms; it is not clear which element is primary.

[16] Most of our participants (178) provided sufficient information about parental occupations for us to convert these into prestige codes. There were no significant associations between occupational prestige for either parent and the isms factors.

[17] A large part of this effect can be attributed to the correlation between Asian/Pacific-Islander identification and SDO (r = .23) and Machiavellianism (r = .20). Questions can be raised about whether by and large the Asian/Pacific-Islander participants in this sample (a) are representative of Asian/Pacific-Island cultures and (b) understood the degree to which positions expressed in betaisms tend to be socially disapproved among other Americans.

It is conceivable that much of the belief content in the alphaisms (e.g., monotheism, messianism, good-and-evil dualism) was originally novel and radical so that, in a different historical and cultural context, those whose psychological processes predispose them to conserve tradition would not have been especially attracted to it.

The positions associated with low α express forms of skepticism about absolutes and traditional accounts (e.g., Agnosticism, Evolutionism, Pluralism), without any agreement about what source of authority should replace the ones the alphaisms embody. Abroad, the polarities between religious tradition and secular limits on it are particularly evident in the Islamic world: In some nations (e.g., Iran, Afghanistan) the fundamentalists may prevail, whereas in others (e.g., Turkey, Egypt) it is secular modernists, but the conflict can be intense. In the modern state of Israel, the split between orthodox and secular viewpoints profoundly affects political alignments. Within the United States, a similar split strongly informs the debate over gay rights (Gallagher & Bull, 1996) and is reflected in what 1992/1996/2000 presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan called the "culture wars" between traditional values and contrasting political agendas.

Humphrey (1976) argued that there are benefits "both from preserving the overall structure of the group and at the same time from exploiting and outmaneuvering others within it" (p. 309). This formulation suggests one reason for the independence of alphaisms and betaisms: Traditionalists and religionists are sometimes altruists, sometimes not. Whereas alphaisms concern preservation of traditional social structure, betaisms concern one's individual attitude toward the immediate social environment: Shall I advocate unfettered personal exploitation of environmental opportunities (not only in a materialistic, hedonistic, or sexual sense, but also in terms of whether people like me should be favored over people unlike me)? Or shall I invoke considerations of morality or a higher good, which would limit such exploitation? In experimental paradigms, this polarity is likely to be reflected in that between exploiters and cooperators (D. S. Wilson et al., 1996) as well as hawks and doves (Maynard Smith, 1982).

The inclusion of chauvinistic, ethnocentric attitudes with egoism, sensualism, and materialism within the betaisms suggests an overall orientation favoring whatever is immediately beneficial to me and mine, disregarding wider concerns of fairness or morality. The potential evolutionary advantages and drawbacks of such an orientation have been brilliantly discussed elsewhere (e.g., Dawkins, 1989). The underlying psychological processes involved may predispose those high in betaisms to espouse unusual (e.g., nihilism, polytheism) and even mutually contradictory (e.g., both materialism and immaterialism) beliefs. It may be that such individuals have only relationships of convenience with belief systems: They endorse beliefs that seem likely to help justify their current behavior patterns—patterns that make sense from a fitness-maximization standpoint but do not garner much societal approval. The present studies suggest that adoption of this approach is independent of one's level of traditionalism and conventional religion. Perhaps, among individuals who are religious, those high on the betaisms stand out for extrinsic religiousness (Allport & Ross, 1967); Donahue (1985) described the extrinsic orientation as "self-serving" (p. 400).

As with the alphaisms, it is easy to imagine the betaisms finding expression in a wide range of cultures. This is more difficult for the gammadeltaisms, and either (γ or δ) component of them. The defining isms for $\gamma\delta$ involve the norms of Western democracies: Humanist, freedom oriented, individualist, and liberal (in the older, classic senses of the term), with a utilitarian readiness to embrace environmental safeguards and considerations of social justice. These isms are anchored in the ideas of Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, Jefferson, and their humanist forebears (e.g., Erasmus). Correlates in Study 2 suggest that those high in Agreeableness and especially Openness are prone to embrace them more enthusiastically and that those high in RWA, SDO, or Machiavellianism are more prone to reject them. However, these relations involve somewhat different subcomponents of $\gamma\delta$. Those high in Openness and low in SDO or RWA seem more prone to embrace spiritually individualistic deltaisms, whereas those high in Agreeableness and low in Machiavellianism seem more prone to embrace the collective ideals of the gammaisms.

Gammaisms and deltaisms may be two separable strands in normative thinking in Western democracies. The gammaisms seem to be the older strand. More consensual and political in reference, they involve support for the common institutions (government, constitution) of the nation, guarantees of individual freedom, an emphasis on the exercise of reason, and a rather optimistic view of human nature. Empirically, such an attitude seems to be related to a sense of patriotism and devotion to the nation.

The deltaisms involve something less political and more personal: a reverence for intuition, enlightenment, and personal spiritual (not necessarily religious) experience. Consonant with implications of some religious ideas from India, a "spiritual democracy" is extended beyond the human species—there is divinity in nature. The deltaisms might be thought of as a kind of spin-off of Western democratic political ideals into a more subjective domain. The roots of these ideas can be traced to diverse mystical schools, Spinoza, Bergson, Emerson, and Thoreau, with wider expression in American culture beginning in the 1960s. Some of the deltaisms might be characterized as superstitions of the fashionable sort that have been increasing among Americans (Vyse, 1997). It is noteworthy that the deltaisms were the most effective in distinguishing those with Democratic-party from those with Republican-party leanings. And note that, with respect to the isms factors, an emphasis on spirituality is ambiguous and likely to be substantially associated with both α and δ; such an emphasis can be differentiated into a more traditional (high α) form and a more individualist, subjectivist, and mystical (high δ) form, similar to distinctions developed early in this century by Sabatier (1905). Unfortunately, psychology has tended to ignore variables of either sort, probably a perilous course if one is to fully understand human behavior (Campbell, 1975; Miller, 1998).

Is there a deeper, more cross-culturally universal psychological element in the gammadeltaisms? In a sense, the $\gamma\delta$ constellation involves a "civil theology" (Gebhardt, 1993, p. 209; cf. Sandoz, 1972) quite distinct from, but not opposed to, the older religious tradition.[18] In America, there is some tradition of reverence for ideals like liberty, equality, and constitutional government, and the apostles of these ideals (whose shrines are mostly in the nation's

[18] The genealogy of the notion of civil religion is traced by Bellah and Hammond (1980). Rousseau (1762/1943) used the phrase "la religion civile" (p. 413) as the title of the penultimate chapter of his famous work on the social contract.

capital). Such reverence is independent of reverence for the Bible, the messiah, and the prophets of Israel (which would have a different set of shrines). Each theology generates its own conceptions of virtue, whether a moral/religious virtue or a civic virtue. These conceptions are not necessarily in conflict, but neither are they necessarily in agreement.

In the original three-factor lexical structure, Moralism is the most complex blend—it has the highest minimum correlation (.29) with all three of the factors.[19] This finding may be interpretively important. Whereas alphaisms and gammaisms represent, respectively, religious and civic conceptions of ethics and morality, betaisms involve a polarity between an egoistic conception of morality (morality that is based on self-interest) and a nonegoistic conception—that there is a higher good beyond what is good for me and mine.[20] The fact that these three factors are independent indicates that respondents endorse a variety of combinations of these conceptions, with but a small minority endorsing none of them. Thus, there is heterogeneity with respect to conceptions of the good (morality, ethics, virtue), but only a few major alternatives seem to be at work. It might be that these differing conceptions of morality and virtue stem from the sources of authority and value associated differentially with each of the four factors: orthodox tradition (α), sheer self-interest (β), civic ideals (γ), and personal spiritual/mystical experience (δ).

General Discussion

Consequences and Implications

The present study suggests that there are at least three broad, orthogonal factors in the domain of social attitudes and beliefs. However, the number and nature of these factors may be a function of the particular samples. The size of the present samples suggests some generalizability, but the findings need replication in nonstudent samples. I have proposed that, given their content and relation to extant psychological research, it is likely that the first two factors have a high degree of cross-cultural generality. But the third factor is more likely to be culture dependent. Studies in other cultures and languages would be illuminating. Also of interest would be studies using select samples, such as scientists and philosophers. Some items may show a different pattern of associations in such samples: For example, some items loading on betaisms in the present samples (e.g., naturalism, epiphenomenalism) may reflect fairly mainstream views in these disciplines and not be associated with hedonism, nihilism, and the like in the way they are among laypersons.

The relatively low correlation of these factors with personality factors suggests that they form a domain separate from personality. Nonetheless, this domain is highly relevant to personality. Although empirically independent of variation in most personality traits, the isms factors implicate personality in several ways: (a) They reflect beliefs, values, and expectancies, which function dynamically in processes of self-regulation; (b) it is easy to form individual-differences constructs—like Machiavellianism and Openness—that reflect both personality and attitudes; and (c) the isms factors embody themes found in classic personality theories. With respect to (c), it is obvious that humanistic and phenomenological personality theories involve themes classifiable here as gammadeltaisms. Less obvious is the provocative relation of isms factors to the well-known conceptions of Freud: Whereas the alphaisms seem to reflect external projections of the superego (the church, the moral code, the tradition), the betaisms seem to project the id (out-group aggression as well as pleasure seeking) into forms of belief. In other words, what Freud saw transpiring within the psyche may also (and perhaps more clearly) be observed in the social world: Some forms of belief are on behalf of the id and the primary process, whereas others are on behalf of superego controls.

There may be factors beyond those detailed in this article. The factor-replication criterion used in Study 1 is sensitive to sample size: Had the sample been 5,000 instead of 500, solutions with more factors would probably have appeared more robust. One indicator of possible additional factors is SDO: Its multiple correlation with the isms factors is meaningful but moderate (under .40), suggesting that some of its content falls outside the space defined by α, β, γ, and δ. Although two political-value dimensions posited by Rokeach (equality-valuing and freedom-valuing; 1973) might fit well into the present isms space (e.g., related to β and $\gamma\delta$), some dimensions of value in Schwartz's (1992) work may fall outside isms space. Important aspects of social attitudes and beliefs may fall outside of the isms factors because (a) they have fewer -isms descriptors associated with them, (b) a larger sample size is needed to find their factors reliably, (c) they are not encoded in -isms terms at all, because they are either encoded in some other natural-language form or are derived solely from expert intuitions. In this regard, it would be useful to conduct lexical studies using other word forms. It would also be useful to conduct studies investigating the relation of many other attitude constructs to the isms factors. A number of currently important attitudes are undoubtedly not included in the present variable selection of isms.

If there are other factors whose importance can be demonstrated, they should be added to the current set. In the meantime, however, the current factors can be used as content-validity benchmarks for any comprehensive model of social attitudes and beliefs. The first of these three factors is well-represented in previous research, but the second and third factor content seems only partially reflected in prominent social attitude measures. It would seem unwise to leave out of any such model broad, many-faceted constructs like these, which are so amply represented in the natural language and can be found reliably in survey responses. With such benchmarks available, this research domain may have a more adequate descriptive model. The isms factors offer a classification system for social attitudes and beliefs, which can bring better communication and coherence to the field and provide a framework within which to communicate and relate findings.

As one example of the ways in which this model can prove useful, consider the literature on conviction, attitude accessibility, and attitude centrality (reviewed by Sherman & Fazio, 1983). Most of the studies and conclusions in this literature are based on studies using a certain range of attitudes as dependent variables. But what

[19] Moralism had a correlation of .06 with deltaisms but of at least .27 with the other three factors in the four-factor lexical structure.

[20] Ethics and morality can certainly be distinguished, but here I capitalize on the two terms' common focus on conceptions of the good.

if the patterns found depend on which type of attitude is considered, and illuminating new patterns can be found if new attitude content is assessed? The content found in the present factors provides one framework for assessing what prior studies in these areas do and do not tell us. Is the attitude content in some isms factors more resistant to change than that from other factors? Is extreme standing on an isms factor related to accessibility of attitudes in that domain?

As a further example, consider again the Oklahoma City bombing tragedy. Are current models adequate to shed light on the ideological motivation at work in this act of domestic terrorism? Right-wing authoritarianism can be invoked, but the ideology of the convicted individual seems to have been distinctly more anarchist, antigovernment, anticonstitutionalist, and amoral than is typical for RWA. Taking into account interindividual variation in commitment to gammadeltaisms—a civil theology of Western democracies—would seem to offer considerable incremental validity.

Three limitations of the present studies must be acknowledged. The first concerns stability. I have assumed that the interindividual variation reflected in the isms factors is *stable* variation. Although I have demonstrated their correlation with scales for which stability is established, it would be useful to check their stability in future work. The stability of the factor structure has not been established cross-culturally or even across relevant populations within the United States, and studies using other lexical forms (e.g., adjectives, referent nouns) should provide a useful supplement to the present studies.

Second, I have not investigated response-bias interpretations of the present factors; although development of fully balanced scales is still in progress, developing reverse-keyed items for these factors is not overly difficult, and removal of acquiescence variance (by ipsatizing) had little effect on the four-dimensional space defined by the factors. There does seem to be, however, an element of social desirability in responses to to betaisms (mostly nonnormative beliefs) and gammadeltaisms (mostly normative beliefs). There could even be some amount of impression management or self-deception (Paulhus, 1986) reflected in responses. As in the field of personality, socially desirable responses may be a sign of positive adjustment. It would be useful to examine the role of response biases in further research.

A third limitation is that the dictionary-based approach used here goes beyond a folk psychology approach to attitudes. Most of the isms terms probably began as expert concepts (e.g., positivism, romanticism, scholasticism), but at some point became familiar enough to find their way into a standard lexicon. The same incorporation of expert concepts into ordinary language occurs with personality traits (e.g., extraverted, neurotic, narcissistic), but probably with less speed and frequency. Therefore, my results may be less generalizable to free-description variable selections than is true of lexical studies of personality (e.g., Saucier, 1997), where a higher proportion of terms studied are also frequently used by laypersons. That is, if I had selected variables by free-description (e.g., "What isms can you name?"), I might have arrived at a pared-down version of the present lexical model. The domain of isms terms is only a partial sample of content in popular attitudes, so studies of isms should be supplemented by studies using other types of variable selections.

Conclusion

If we are to make psychological sense of ideologies and of the causal underpinnings of social attitudes and beliefs and their important effects on behavior then we must work from an adequate descriptive model. One can patch together such a descriptive model from the sprawling research literature on attitudes and beliefs, but the present study goes beyond a patchwork model. I identified not only hypothetical constructs (factors) superordinate to those embodied in the previously most commonly used measures, but also components of variation not previously accounted for, important attitude content that has been studied too little. A more parsimonious and comprehensive descriptive model facilitates communication and integration of empirical findings. The present model is not the last word on the structure of this domain, but it sets out some necessary elements of a structure of broad factors in social attitudes and beliefs.

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Appendix A

The 335 Isms Variables Analyzed in Study 1

Abolitionism
Absolutism-1a
Absurdism-1
Aestheticism-1
Aestheticism-2
Aestheticism-3
Agnosticism-1
Agnosticism-2
Agrarianism
Altruism
Americanism-3
Anarchism-1
Anarchism-3
Animalism-2
Animalism-3
Animism-1
Animism-2
Animism-3
Anthropomorphism
Anthropopathism
Antinomianism-1
Antinomianism-2
Antisemitism-1
Apocalypticism
Arianism
Asceticism-2
Associationism
Atheism
Atlanticism
Atomism-1
Atomism-2
Automatism-2
Benthamism
Bergsonism
Berkelianism
Bimetallism-2
Biregionalism
Buddhism-1
Calvinism
Catastrophism-1
Centrism
Chauvinism-1
Chauvinism-2
Chauvinism-3
Classicism-2
Classism
Clericalism
Commercialism-2
Communalism-1
Communalism-2
Communism-1
Communism-2b
Conceptualism-1
Conservatism-1
Conservatism-2
Constitutionalism-2b
Consumerism-2
Creationism
Credentialism
Cynicism-3
Darwinism
Deism
Denominationalism-2
Denominationalism-3
Determinism-3
Diabolism-1
Dialectical Materialism
Docetism
Dualism-2
Dualism-3
Dualism-4a
Dualism-4b
Dynamism-1
Ecclesiasticism-2
Egoism-1a
Egoism-1b
Elitism-1
Emotionalism-1
Empiricism-1
Environmentalism-1
Environmentalism-2
Epicureanism-1
Epiphenomenalism
Ethnocentrism-1
Eudemonism
Euhemerism
Evangelicism-1
Evolutionism-2
Existentialism
Factualism
Fascism-1b
Fatalism-1
Fatalism-2
Federalism-1b
Federalism-2
Feminism-1
Fetishism-1
Fideism
Formalism-1
Fourierism
Functionalism-1
Functionalism-2
Fundamentalism-1b
Fundamentalism-2
Futurism-1
Gallicanism
Gnosticism
Gradualism
Hedonism-1
Hedonism-2
Hedonism-3
Hegelianism
Henotheism
Hereditarianism
Heterosexism
Hinduism
Historical Materialism
Historicism-1
Historicism-2
Hobbism
Holism-1
Humanism-1
Humanism-4
Humanitarianism-2
Humanitarianism-3
Hylozoism
Idealism-4
Illuminism-1
Illusionism-1
Immamentism
Immaterialism
Indeterminism-2
Indifferentism
Individualism-1a
Individualism-2
Individualism-3
Inerrantism
Institutionalism-1
Instrumentalism
Intellectualism-2
Intuitionism-1
Intuitionism-2
Intuitionism-3
Irrationalism-2
Jainism
Jansenism
Jingoism
Judaism-2
Lamarckism
Leftism-2
Legalism-1
Liberalism-2a

(*Appendix continues*)

Appendix A (*continued*)

Liberalism-3
Liberalism-4a
Localism-2
Logical Positivism
Logical Atomism
Machiavellianism
Manicheism-2
Marcionism
Marxism
Materialism-1
Materialism-2
Mechanism-8
Medievalism-2
Meliorism
Mentalism-2
Messianism-1
Messianism-2
Messianism-3
Militarism-1
Modernism-1b
Monarchism-2
Monetarism-1
Monism-1
Monism-2
Monogenism
Monotheism
Moralism
Mysticism-2
Nationalism-1
Nationalism-2
Nativism-1
Nativism-3
Naturalism-3
Naturalism-4
Nazism
Necessitarianism
Neoconservatism
Neoliberalism
Neomalthusianism
Neoplatonism-1
Neutralism-2
Nihilism-1a
Nihilism-1b
Nihilism-2
Nihilism-4
Nominalism
Nudism
Objectivism-1
Occultism-2
Officialism
Operationalism
Optimism-2a
Optimism-2b
Organicism-1
Organicism-2
Organicism-3
Originalism
Pacifism-1
Pacifism-2a
Pantheism-1
Pantheism-2a
Parallelism-4
Particularism-1
Particularism-3
Patriotism
Pelagianism
Perfectionism-2
Personalism-2
Pessimism-2
Pessimism-3
Phenomenalism
Physicalism
Pietism-1
Pietism-3
Platonism
Pluralism-4a
Pluralism-4b
Polytheism
Populism-1a
Positivism-1a
Positivism-1d
Postmillenialism
Pragmatism
Premillenialism
Primitivism-3a
Primitivism-3b
Probabilism-1
Pronatalism
Protectionism
Protestantism-1
Purism-1
Puritanism-2
Pythagoreanism
Quietism-1
Racism
Rastafarianism
Rationalism-2
Realism-1
Realism-3a
Realism-3b
Reconstructionism
Reductionism
Reform Judaism
Regionalism-1b
Regionalism-2
Relativism
Religionism
Restrictionism
Revisionism-1
Revivalism-2
Rightism-2
Ritualism-2
Romanticism-1
Royalism
Sacerdotalism
Sacramentalism-1
Sacramentalism-2
Salvationism
Satanism-1
Scholasticism-2
Scientific Empiricism
Scientism
Sectionalism
Secular Humanism-1
Secularism-2
Semitism-3
Sensationalism-2
Sensationalism-3
Sensualism-2
Sentimentalism-1
Sexism-2
Shamanism-1
Skepticism-2
Skepticism-3
Social Darwinism
Socialist Realism
Solipsism-1
Solipsism-2
Speciesism
Spencerism
Spinozism
Spiritism-1
Spiritualism-1a
Spiritualism-2
Statism
Stoicism-1
Stoicism-2
Subjectivism-2a
Subjectivism-2b
Subjectivism-3
Supernaturalism-2
Syndicalism
Synergism-2
Systematism-2
Taoism
Textualism-1
Theanthropism-1
Theanthropism-2
Theism
Totemism
Traditionalism-1
Traditionalism-2
Traducianism
Transcendentalism-1
Transcendentalism-2
Tribalism-2
Tritheism
Triumphalism-1
Ultramontanism
Uniformitarianism
Unionism-3
Unitarian Universalism
Utilitarianism-1
Utilitarianism-2
Vampirism-1
Vitalism
Vocationalism
Voluntarism-2
Weismannism
Welfarism
Zen Buddhism
Zoomorphism-1
Zoroastrianism

Note. Entries refer to discrete dictionary definitions in *The American Heritage Dictionary* (1992). In cases in which the term had multiple definitions, the number after the term indicates which definition was the basis for the item.

Appendix B

Items for Survey of Dictionary-Based Isms, Version B (SDI-B)

Ecclesiasticism-2: I am devoted to the principles and interests of the church. (α)
Institutionalism-1y: I adhere to an organized religion. (α)
Legalism-1y: I adhere strictly and literally to a code of religion and morality. (α)
Calvinism: God is all-powerful, and those whom God chooses will be saved by God's grace alone. (α)
Manicheism-2x: The world is divided between good and evil principles. (α)
Traditionalism-1: I adhere to tradition, especially in cultural and religious practice. (α)
Liberalism-4az: I put little emphasis on religious dogma. ($\alpha-$)
Evolutionism-2: I believe in biological evolution. ($\alpha-$)
Secularism-2: Religious considerations should be excluded from civil affairs and public education. ($\alpha-$)
Secular humanism-1: I favor human rather than religious values. ($\alpha-$)
Atheism: There is no God or gods. ($\alpha-$)
Romanticism-1z: I rebel against established social rules and conventions. ($\alpha-$)
Solipsism-2: The self is the only reality. (β)
Solipsism-1: The self is the only thing that can be known and verified. (β)

Appendix B (*continued*)

Sensationalism-3: What is good can be judged only by the gratification of the senses. (β)
Materialism-2: Physical well-being and worldly possessions are the greatest good and highest value in life. (β)
Sensualism-2: The pleasures of the senses are the highest good. (β)
Hedonism-2: Only what is pleasant, or has pleasant consequences, is essentially good. (β)
Rationalism-2x: The only valid basis for action and belief is reason—not the acceptance of empirical methods, authority, or spiritual revelation. (β)
Determinism-3: Every event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of preceding events that are independent of the human will. (β)
Machiavellianism-y: Craft and deceit are justified in pursuing and maintaining power in the political world. (β)
Materialism-1y: Everything—including thought, feeling, mind, and will—can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena. (β)
Naturalism-3: All phenomena can be explained in terms of natural causes and laws, without attributing moral, spiritual, or supernatural significance to them. (β)
Fascism-1bz: The government ought to suppress and censor the opposition. (β)
Chauvinism-1: I am militant in my devotion to and glorification of my country. (β)
Ethnocentrism-1: I believe in the superiority of my own ethnic group. (β)
Polytheism: I believe in and worship more than one god. (β)
Existentialism-y: The individual is a self-determining agent responsible for how authentic and genuine his or her choices are. (γδ)
Relativism: Conceptions of truth and moral values are not absolute, but are relative to the persons and groups holding them. (γδ)
Transcendentalism-1: One must go beyond whatever is sensed or experienced to find out the basic principles of all knowledge. (γδ)
Romanticism-1x: I appreciate nature and celebrate nature. (γδ)
Liberalism-2av: I believe in the natural goodness of human beings. (γδ)
Jansenism-z: Human nature is not capable of good. (γδ−)
Liberalism-4ax: I favor free intellectual inquiry. (γδ, γ)
Humanism-4: I emphasize reason, scientific inquiry, and human fulfillment in the natural world. (γδ, γ)
Humanism-1: Human interests, values, and dignity ought to prevail in our thoughts and actions. (γδ, γ)
Constitutionalism-2b: I am in favor of a constitutional form of government. (γδ, γ)
Meliorism: Society has an innate tendency toward improvement that can be furthered through conscious human effort. (γδ, γ)
Environmentalism-1: I favor protecting the environment from destruction and pollution. (γδ, γ)
Patriotism: I love and am devoted to my country. (γδ, γ)
Utilitarianism-2: All action should be directed toward achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. (γδ, γ)
Logical positivism-x: Observable data is necessary to find out whether factual statements are true. (γδ, γ)
Credentialism: In hiring and promotion, one ought to rely on credentials, especially academic degrees. (γδ, γ)
Transcendentalism-2: There is an ideal spiritual reality that goes beyond sense experience and science and is knowable through intuition. (γδ, δ)
Immanentism: A god, mind, or spirit exists within the world and within the individual. (γδ, δ)
Zen Buddhism: Enlightenment can be gained through meditation, self-contemplation, and intuition. (γδ, δ)
Jainism-y: I emphasize the liberation of the soul through self-discipline and nonviolence toward all living creatures. (γδ, δ)
Intellectualism-2: I am devoted to the exercise of the intellect. (γ)
Logical atomism: Knowledge consists in awareness of individual facts and in an understanding of the logical relations among these facts. (γ)
Neoliberalism: We ought to emphasize economic growth but also be concerned with social justice. (γ)
Americanism-3: I prefer, and I am devoted to, the United States and its institutions. (γ)
Functionalism-2: I stress purpose, practicality, and usefulness. (γ)
Nationalism-1: I am devoted to one particular nation. (γ)
Hedonism-3: Behavior is motivated by the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. (γ)
Benthamism-y: The greatest happiness for the greatest number of people: this should be our ultimate goal. (γ)
Fundamentalism-2: I adhere firmly to fundamental and basic principles. (γ)
Neo-Platonism-1: An individual soul can be mystically united with the single source from which all existence comes. (δ)
Animism-2: There are spiritual beings separate, or separable, from bodies. (δ)
Asceticism-2: The self-disciplined life releases the soul from bondage to the body, and permits union with what is divine and sacred. (δ)
Illuminism-1: I believe in a special personal enlightenment. (δ)
Hinduism-x: I believe in a supreme being of many forms and natures. (δ)
Spinozism: All reality consists of one substance (God or nature); mind and bodies are the perceived qualities and attributes of this substance. (δ)
Bergsonism-y: All living forms arise from a persisting natural force, a vital living spirit or glow. (δ)
Animism-1: Natural objects and even nature itself have conscious life. (δ)
Anthropomorphism: Many nonhuman things have human motivation and human characteristics. (δ)
Hinduism-w: I believe in reincarnation—rebirth of the soul in another body. (δ)
Spiritualism-1a: The dead communicate with the living through mediums. (δ)
Populism-1a: I support the rights and power of the people in their struggle against the privileged elite. (δ)
Taoism: I favor a life of complete simplicity, naturalness, and noninterference with the course of natural events. (δ)
Antinomianism-2: Moral laws are not fixed, absolute, or universal, but relative. (δ)
Classism: I prefer people of a certain social or economic class. (δ−)

Note. Dictionary entries are given in italics before item wording; letters v through z signify parts of a definition from a single entry. Greek letters in parentheses after full item wording indicate that item is used to score indicated Survey of Dictionary-Based Items—B scale, with minus (−) indicating reverse-keyed items. Items for Survey of Dictionary-Based Items—C (and successor sets of more counterbalanced scales) are available from the author.

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